Part 30

The aforesaid shallow pantheism is an equally obvious inference from this shallow identity. All that those who employ this invention of their own to accuse philosophy gather from the study of God’s _relation_ to the world is that the one, but only the one factor of this category of relation—and that the factor of indeterminateness—is identity. Thereupon they stick fast in this half-perception, and assert—falsely as a fact—that philosophy teaches the identity of God and the world. And as in their judgment either of the two,—the world as much as God—has the same solid substantiality as the other, they infer that in the philosophic Idea God is _composed_ of God and the world. Such then is the idea they form of pantheism, and which they ascribe to philosophy. Unaccustomed in their own thinking and apprehending of thoughts to go beyond such categories, they import them into philosophy, where they are utterly unknown; they thus infect it with the disease against which they subsequently raise an outcry. If any difficulty emerge in comprehending God’s relation to the world, they at once and very easily escape it by admitting that this relation contains for them an inexplicable contradiction; and that hence, they must stop at the vague conception of such relation, perhaps under the more familiar names of, e.g. omnipresence, providence, &c. Faith in their use of the term means no more than a refusal to define the conception, or to enter on a closer discussion of the problem. That men and classes of untrained intellect are satisfied with such indefiniteness, is what one expects; but when a trained intellect and an interest for reflective study is satisfied, in matters admitted to be of superior, if not even of supreme interest, with indefinite ideas, it is hard to decide whether the thinker is really in earnest with the subject. But if those who cling to this crude “rationalism” were in earnest, e.g. with God’s omnipresence, so far as to realise their faith thereon in a definite mental idea, in what difficulties would they be involved by their belief in the true reality of the things of sense! They would hardly like, as Epicurus does, to let God dwell in the interspaces of things, i.e. in the pores of the physicists,—said pores being the negative, something supposed to exist _beside_ the material reality. This very “Beside” would give their pantheism its spatiality,—their everything, conceived as the mutual exclusion of parts in space. But in ascribing to God, in his relation to the world, an action on and in the space thus filled on the world and in it, they would endlessly split up the divine actuality into infinite materiality. They would really thus have the misconception they call pantheism or all-one-doctrine, only as the necessary sequel of their misconceptions of God and the world. But to put that sort of thing, this stale gossip of oneness or identity, on the shoulders of philosophy, shows such recklessness about justice and truth that it can only be explained through the difficulty of getting into the head thoughts and notions, i.e. not abstract unity, but the many-shaped modes specified. If statements as to facts are put forward, and the facts in question are thoughts and notions, it is indispensable to get hold of their meaning. But even the fulfilment of this requirement has been rendered superfluous, now that it has long been a foregone conclusion that philosophy is pantheism, a system of identity, an All-one doctrine, and that the person therefore who might be unaware of this fact is treated either as merely unaware of a matter of common notoriety, or as prevaricating for a purpose. On account of this chorus of assertions, then, I have believed myself obliged to speak at more length and exoterically on the outward and inward untruth of this alleged fact: for exoteric discussion is the only method available in dealing with the external apprehension of notions as mere facts,—by which notions are perverted into their opposite. The esoteric study of God and identity, as of cognitions and notions, is philosophy itself.

§ 574. This notion of philosophy is the self-thinking Idea, the truth aware of itself (§ 236),—the logical system, but with the signification that it is universality approved and certified in concrete content as in its actuality. In this way the science has gone back to its beginning: its result is the logical system but as a spiritual principle: out of the presupposing judgment, in which the notion was only implicit and the beginning an immediate,—and thus out of the _appearance_ which it had there—it has risen into its pure principle and thus also into its proper medium.

§ 575. It is this appearing which originally gives the motive of the further development. The first appearance is formed by the syllogism, which is based on the Logical system as starting-point, with Nature for the middle term which couples the Mind with it. The Logical principle turns to Nature and Nature to Mind. Nature, standing between the Mind and its essence, sunders itself, not indeed to extremes of finite abstraction, nor itself to something away from them and independent,—which, as other than they, only serves as a link between them: for the syllogism is _in the Idea_ and Nature is essentially defined as a transition-point and negative factor, and as implicitly the Idea. Still the mediation of the notion has the external form of _transition_, and the science of Nature presents itself as the course of necessity, so that it is only in the one extreme that the liberty of the notion is explicit as a self-amalgamation.

§ 576. In the second syllogism this appearance is so far superseded, that that syllogism is the standpoint of the Mind itself, which—as the mediating agent in the process—presupposes Nature and couples it with the Logical principle. It is the syllogism where Mind reflects on itself in the Idea: philosophy appears as a subjective cognition, of which liberty is the aim, and which is itself the way to produce it.

§ 577. The third syllogism is the Idea of philosophy, which has self-knowing reason, the absolutely-universal, for its middle term: a middle, which divides itself into Mind and Nature, making the former its presupposition, as process of the Idea’s subjective activity, and the latter its universal extreme, as process of the objectively and implicitly existing Idea. The self-judging of the Idea into its two appearances (§§ 575, 576) characterises both as its (the self-knowing reason’s) manifestations: and in it there is a unification of the two aspects:—it is the nature of the fact, the notion, which causes the movement and development, yet this same movement is equally the action of cognition. The eternal Idea, in full fruition of its essence, eternally sets itself to work, engenders and enjoys itself as absolute Mind.

Ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τοῦ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. Αὑτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. Τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς. Ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων. Ὥστ᾽ ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον τούτου ὂ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. Εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν; εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. Ἔχει δὲ ὡδί. Καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει; ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή, ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια; ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. Φαμὲν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ; τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός. (ARIST. _Met._ XI. 7.)

INDEX.

Absolute (the), xlviii, 7.

Abstraction, 74.

Accent, 81, 87.

Ages of man, 17.

Alphabets, 81.

Altruism, 57.

Animal magnetism, clxi, 5, 29 seqq.

Anthropology, xxv, lxxxviii, 12 seqq.

Appetite, 53.

_Aristotle_, liii, cxxxiii, 4, 63, 163.

Art, xxxix seqq., 169 seqq.

Asceticism, cxv, cxliii, clxxxvii, 159.

Association of ideas, 73.

Atheism, 183.

Athens, cxxx.

Attention, clxxiii, 69.

Automatism (psychological), clxv.

_Bacon_ (Fr.), xxi, lii, lix, clx.

_Bain_ (A.), cxxi.

Beauty, 169.

Bhagavat-Gita, 186 seqq.

Biography, 151.

Body and Soul (relations of), lxxxii, cxvi, clvi, 13.

_Boëthius_, l.

_Böhme_ (J.), 95.

_Braid_ (J.), clxiv.

Bravery, cxcix.

Budget, 144.

Capitalism, cci seqq.

Cardinal virtues, cxxxii.

Categories, lx.

Catholicism, 157.

Children, lxxxvii, cii.

Chinese language, 81 seqq.

Choice, 98.

Christianity, xliv, cxli, clxxix, 7, 101, 157.

Clairvoyance, clviii, clxi, 33.

Cognition, 64.

Commercial morality, cci.

_Comte_ (C.), xcix.

_Condillac_, lxxviii, 61.

Conscience, xxx, cxxii, clxxxvii, 117, 156, 161.

Consciousness, xxv, xcix, 47 seqq.

Constitution of the State, 132.

Contract, 108.

Corporation, 130.

Crime, cxciii, 109.

Criticism, xvi, cxxxviii, 149.

Custom, clxxxix, 104.

_Dante_, cxxxiv.

Deduction (Kantian and Fichtean), cx seqq.

Democracy, 141.

Development, 60.

Disease (mental), 27, 37.

Duty, cxiv, cxix, cxxi seqq., cxxxi, cxxxix, 97, 104, 116.

Economics, 122.

Education, xcii, cxxxvii, 11.

Ego (the), lxiv seqq., 47 seqq.

Egoism, 55.

Eleaticism, 190.

England, 143.

Epicureanism, cxli, 195.

Epistemology, ciii.

Equality (political and social), cxc, 133.

Equity, xxxi.

Estates, 123.

Ethics, xv, xix, xxx seqq., xcv, cxiii seqq., cxc seqq., 113 seqq.

Experience, 51.

Experimental psychology, lxxxi seqq., c.

Expression (mental), 23, 45.

Faculties of Mind, lxxiii seqq., xcvii, cxxvi, 58, 65.

Faith, cvii.

Faith-cure, clxi, 35.

Fame, 153.

Family, xxxii, cxcii, 121.

_Fechner_ (G. T.), cli.

Feeling, 22, 68, 92.

_Fichte_ (J. G.), cvi, cix seqq., clxiv, clxix, 49.

Finance, 144.

Finitude, 8.

Fraud, 110.

Freedom, cxxv seqq., clxxv, 6, 99, 113, 133 seqq.

_Fries_, clxxix.

Genius (the), clvii, 28.

German language, 78, 88: politics, clxxvii; empire, clxxxi.

God, xxxiv, xli, cxxii, 20, 154, 176.

_Goethe_, cliv, clxix.

Goodness, 115.

Government, 137; forms of, 141.

Greek ethics, cxxix seqq., cxciv; religion, 164.

Habit, clviii, 39.

Happiness, 99.

_Herbart_, lxii seqq., lxxxv, cxxvii.

Hieroglyphics, 80.

History, xxxiv, xlvii, xci, 147 seqq.

_Hobbes_, lxxvi, clxxxii.

Holiness, 159.

Honour, 124.

_Humboldt_ (W. v.), 79.

_Hume_, lxxi, cxx.

Hypnotism, clxiv seqq., 31 seqq.

Idea (Platonic), 163.

Idealism, civ; political, clxxxvi.

Ideality, clxviii, 25.

Ideas, lxix seqq., ci seqq.

Imagination, 72.

Immaterialism, clii, 12, 45.

Impulse, 95.

Individualist ethics, cxx seqq.

Individuality in the State, 139.

Industrialism, cc, 123.

Insanity, 37.

Intention, 114.

International Law, 147.

Intuition, 67.

Irony, 179.

_Jelaleddin-Rumi_, 189.

Judgment, 89.

Judicial system, 127.

_Jung-Stilling_, clxii.

Juries, 128.

_Kant_ (I.), xv, lxiv, lxxi, xcvi, cvii, cxxviii, clxxxviii, 20, 48, 51, 63, 154.

_Kieser_, clxiii.

Knowledge, cv, cxxxv, cxli, 64.

Krishna, 186 seqq.

Labour, 123.

Language, clxxiv, 79 seqq.

_Laplace_, clxiv.

Law, xxix, xcvi, cxc, 104, 125.

Legality, xxx, clxxxix.

Legislation, 125.

_Leibniz_, lxxii, lxxvii, cxlvi, 14, 80, 82.

Liberty, see Freedom.

Life, 13.

Logic, xiv, xvii, lxi, xcv, 196.

Lutheranism, 157.

_Macchiavelli_, clxxx.

Magic, clxi, 29.

Manifestation, 7.

Manners, 104.

Marriage, 121, 159.

Master and slave, 56.

Mathematics in psychology, lxviii.

Medium, 34.

Memory, clxxiv, 70, 84.

_Mesmer_, clxi.

Metaphysic, lviii seqq.

_Mill_ (James), lxxix.

Mind (= Spirit), xlix seqq., 58, 196.

Mnemonics, 85.

Monarchy, 139.

Monasticism, 159.

Monotheism, 188.

Morality, xxx, xxxviii, cxxi, clxxxviii seqq., cxcviii, 113 seqq.

_Münsterberg_ (H.), lxxxiii.

_Napoleon_, 19.

Nationality, 142, 150, 154, cxcv.

Natural Philosophy, xv, xvii, xxii.

Natural rights, 112.

Nature, cxx, cxxiv, 12, 133, 196.

Nemesis, 174.

_Nietzsche_ (F.), cxxviii.

Nobility, cxcvii.

Observation, lxxxix.

Orders (social), cxcvii seqq., 124.

Ought, clxxv, 94, 116.

Pain, 6, 94.

Pantheism, 184, 194.

Parliament, 142.

Passion, 95.

Peasantry, cci.

_Peel_ (Sir R.), 127.

Perception, 67.

Perfection, cxxvii, cxxix.

Person, 107, 119.

Personality, lxiv, clxvii.

Philosophy, xiv, cxvii, cxxxviii, 159 seqq., 179 seqq.

Phrenology, 35.

Physiology, lxxxi, c.

_Pinel_, 39.

_Plato_, xcviii, cxxxi, cxxxv, 33, 97, 102, 162.

Pleasure, cxxxvi, 94.

_Plotinus_, cxliv.

Police, 130.

_Porphyry_, xx.

Positivity of laws, 125.

Powers (political), ccii, 138.

Practice, 92.

Property, xxix, cxcii, 107.

Protestantism, 166.

Prussia, clxxviii, clxxxiv.

Psychiatry, 33.

Psychology, xxii, xxiv, lii seqq., lxiii, lxxxvi, xcv, cxvii, 4, 58, 63.

Psycho-physics, clvi, 23.

Punishment, cxciii, cciii, 111.

Purpose, 97, 114.

Races, 16.

Rationalism, clxv, 183.

Reason, cxv, cxliii, clxxii, 58.

Recollection, 70.

_Reinhold_, 49.

Religion, xxxvii seqq., cxcvi, 155 seqq., 167 seqq.

Representation, cxi, 70; political, clxxxiii, 142.

Responsibility, 114.

Revelation, 7, 175.

Right, xxix, 104 (see Law).

_Ritter_, clxi, clxiii.

Romances, 151: romantic art, 172.

Savages, lxxxvii, cii.

_Schelling_, clxi.

_Schindler_, clxiii.

_Schopenhauer_, cvi, cxvi, cli, clxiv, clxix, clxxxvii.

Science, xviii.

_Scott_ (Sir W.), 151.

Self-consciousness, clxxi, 53 seqq.

Sensibility and sensation, 20, 50.

Sex, 18.

Siderism, clxiii, 15.

Signs (in language), 76.

Skill (acquired), 42.

Slavery, 56, 101.

Sleep, 18.

Society, xxxii, 56.

Sociology, xxiii.

Somnambulism, 30.

Soul, liv, lxix, lxxv, 26.

_Spencer_ (H.), xxi seqq., cxi, cxxiii, cxliv.

_Spinoza_, lxxvi, ci, cxix, cl, 14, 49, 188.

Spiritualism, clxii.

State, xxxii seqq., clxxvi, clxxxiii, 131 seqq.

Stoicism, cxix, cxxiv, cxi, cxliii.

Suggestion, clxv seqq., 33.

Superstition, 158.

Syllogism, 90.

Symbol, 77, 171.

Sympathy, clv.

Telepathy, clxi, 34.

Tellurism, clxiii, 15.

Theology, 155.

Thinking, clxxiv, 89.

_Tholuck_, 191.

Trinity, 177 seqq.

Truth, cv, 182.

Unconscious (the), cxlvi.

Understanding, 52, 89.

Universalising, cxxviii.

Utilitarianism, cxxxvi.

Value, 109.

Virtues, cxxxi, cxcviii, 120.

War, cxcix, 146.

Wartburg, clxxix.

Welfare, 114.

Wickedness, 9, 94, 117.

Will, xxviii, cxxv, clxxv, 62, 90.

_Wolff_, lxxiii.

Words, clxxiv, 79.

_Wordsworth_, li, clxviii.

Written language, 81 seqq.

Wrong, 109.

Würtemberg, clxxxv.

FOOTNOTES

1 Plato, _Rep._ 527.

2 The prospectus of the _System of Synthetic Philosophy_ is dated 1860. Darwin’s _Origin of Species_ is 1859. But such ideas, both in Mr. Spencer and others, are earlier than Darwin’s book.

3 Hegel’s _Verhältniss_, the supreme category of what is called actuality: where object is necessitated by outside object.

4 Cf. Herbart, _Werke_ (ed. Kehrbach), iv. 372. This consciousness proper is what Leibniz called _« __Apperception,__ »__ la connaissance réflexive de l’état intérieur (Nouveaux Essais)_.

5 Herbart, _Werke_, vi. 55 (ed. Kehrbach).

6 p. 59 (§ 440).

7 p. 63 (§ 440).

8 These remarks refer to four out of the five Herbartian ethical ideas. See also Leibniz, who (in 1693, _De Notionibus juris et justitiae_) had given the following definitions: “Caritas est benevolentia universalis. Justitia est caritas sapientis. Sapientia est scientia felicitatis.” The jus naturae has three grades: the lowest, jus strictum; the second, aequitas (or caritas, in the narrower sense); and the highest, pietas, which is honeste, i.e. pie vivere.

9 To which the Greek πόλις, the Latin civitas or respublica, were only approximations. Hegel _is not writing a history_. If he were, it would be necessary for him to point out how far the individual instance, e.g. Rome, or Prussia, corresponded to its Idea.

10 Shakespeare’s phrase, as in _Othello_, iii. 2; _Lover’s Complaint_, v. 24.

_ 11 Iliad_, xii. 243.

12 See Hegel’s _Logic_, pp. 257 seq.

13 See p. 153 (§ 550).

14 Cf. _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, chaps. xviii, xxvi.

15 As stated in p. 167 (_Encycl._ § 554). Cf. _Phenom. d. Geistes_, cap. vii, which includes the Religion of Art, and the same point of view is explicit in the first edition of the _Encyclopaedia_.

_ 16 Philosophie der Religion_ (_Werke_, xi. 5).

17 Hegel, _Phenomenologie des Geistes_ (_Werke_, ii. 545). The meeting-ground of the Greek spirit, as it passed through Rome, with Christianity.

18 Ib., p. 584.

_ 19 Phenomenologie des Geistes_ (_Werke_, ii. 572). Thus Hegelian idealism claims to be the philosophical counterpart of the central dogma of Christianity.

20 From the old Provençal _Lay of Boëthius_.

21 It is the doctrine of the _intellectus agens_, or _in actu_; the _actus purus_ of the Schoolmen.

_ 22 Einleitung in die Philosophie_, §§ 1, 2.

_ 23 Psychologie als Wissenschaft_, Vorrede.

_ 24 Einleitung in die Philosophie_, §§ 11, 12.

_ 25 Einleitung in die Philosophie_, § 18: cf. _Werke_, ed. Kehrbach, v. 108.

26 Cf. Plato’s remarks on the problem in the word Self-control. _Republ._ 430-1.

_ 27 Lehrbuch der Psychologie_, §§ 202, 203.

_ 28 Allgemeine Metaphysik_, Vorrede.

_ 29 Hauptpunkte der Metaphysik_ (1806), § 13.

_ 30 Werke_, ed. Kehrbach (_Ueber die Möglichkeit_, &c), v. 96.

_ 31 Ibid._, p. 100.

32 One might almost fancy Herbart was translating into a general philosophic thesis the words in which Goethe has described how he overcame a real trouble by transmuting it into an ideal shape, e.g. _Wahrheit und Dichtung_, cap. xii.

33 Herbart’s language is almost identical with Hegel’s: _Encycl._ § 389 (p. 12). Cf. Spencer, _Psychology_, i. 192. “Feelings are in all cases the materials out of which the superior tracts of consciousness and intellect are evolved.”

_ 34 Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, ch. xvii.

_ 35 Psychologia Empirica_, § 29.

36 As is also the case with Herbart’s metaphysical reality of the Soul.

_ 37 Human Nature_, vii. 2. “Pleasure, Love, and appetite, which is also called desire, are divers names for divers considerations of the same thing....” Deliberation is (ch. xii. 1) the “alternate succession of appetite and fears.”

_ 38 Eth._ ii. 48 Schol.

_ 39 Eth._ ii. 43 Schol.: cf. 49 Schol.

40 This wide scope of thinking (_cogitatio_, _penser_) is at least as old as the Cartesian school: and should be kept in view, as against a tendency to narrow its range to the mere intellect.

41 e.g. _Analysis of the Human Mind_, ch. xxiv. “Attention is but another name for the interesting character of the idea;” ch. xix. “Desire and the idea of a pleasurable sensation are convertible terms.”

42 As Mr. Spencer says (_Psychology_, i. 141), “Objective psychology can have no existence as such without borrowing its data from subjective psychology.”

43 The same failure to note that experiment is valuable only where general points of view are defined, is a common fault in biology.

44 Münsterberg, _Aufgaben und Methoden der Psychologie_, p. 144.

_ 45 Lehrbuch der Psychologie_, § 54 (2nd ed.), or § 11 (1st ed.).

46 See p. 11 (§ 387).

47 Cf. Nietzsche, _Also sprach Zarathustra_, i. 43. “There is more reason in thy body than in thy best wisdom.”

48 This language is very characteristic of the physicists who dabble in psychology and imagine they are treading in the steps of Kant, if not even verifying what they call his guesswork: cf. Ziehen, _Physiol. Psychologie_, 2nd ed. p. 212. “In every case there is given us only the psychical series of sensations and their memory-images, and it is only a universal hypothesis if we assume beside this psychical series a material series standing in causal relation to it.... The material series is not given equally originally with the psychical.”

49 It is the same radical feature of consciousness which is thus noted by Mr. Spencer, _Psychology_, i. 475. “Perception and sensation are ever tending to exclude each other but never succeed.” “Cognition and feeling are antithetical and inseparable.” “Consciousness continues only in virtue of this conflict.” Cf. Plato’s resolution in the _Philebus_ of the contest between intelligence and feeling (pleasure).

50 It is the quasi-Aristotelian ἀπαγωγή, defined as the step from one proposition to another, the knowledge of which will set the first proposition in a full light.

_ 51 Grundlage des Naturrechts_, § 5.

_ 52 System der Sittenlehre_, § 8, iv.

53 Even though religion (according to Kant) conceive them as divine commands.

54 Cf. Hegel’s _Werke_, vii. 2, p. 236 (Lecture-note on § 410). “We must treat as utterly empty the fancy of those who suppose that properly man should have no organic body,” &c.; and see p. 159 of the present work.

_ 55 Criticism of Pure Reason_, Architectonic.

56 Spencer, _Psychology_, i. 291: “Mind can be understood only by observing how mind is evolved.”

57 Cf. Spencer, _Principles of Ethics_, i. 339: “The ethical sentiment proper is, in the great mass of cases, scarcely discernible.”

_ 58 Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, p. 143.

59 Windelband (W.), _Präludien_ (1884), p. 288.

60 Cf. Plato, _Republic_, p. 486.

_ 61 Human Nature: Morals_, Part III.

_ 62 Emotion and Will_, ch. xv. § 23.

63 It is characteristic of the Kantian doctrine to absolutise the conception of Duty and make it express the essence of the whole ethical idea.

64 Which are still, as the Socialist Fourier says, states of social incoherence, specially favourable to falsehood.

_ 65 Rechtsphilosophie_, § 4.

66 Cf. Schelling, ii. 12: “There are no _born_ sons of freedom.”

67 Simmel (G.), _Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft_, i. 184.

_ 68 Jenseits von Gut und Böse_, p. 225.

69 Aristot. _Polit._ i. 6.

70 Plato, _Phaedo_.

71 Carus, _Psyche_, p. 1.

72 See Arist., _Anal. Post._ ii. 19 (ed. Berl. 100, a. 10).

73 Cf. _The Logic of Hegel_, notes &c., p. 421.

74 “Omnia individua corpora quamvis diversis gradibus animata sunt.” _Eth._ ii. 13. schol.

_ 75 Nanna_ (1848): _Zendavesta_ (1851): _Ueber die Seelenfrage_ (1861).

76 Described by S. as the rise from mere physical _cause_ to physiological _stimulus_ (Reiz), to psychical _motive_.

77 Infra, p. 12.

78 Aristot., _De Anima_, i. c. 4, 5.

_ 79 Wilhelm Meister’s Wanderjahre_, i. 10.

_ 80 Wilhelm Meister’s Wanderjahre_, iv. 18.

81 Works like Preyer’s _Seele des Kindes_ illustrate this aspect of mental evolution; its acquirement of definite and correlated functions.

82 Cf. the end of Caleb Balderstone (in _The Bride of Lammermoor_): “With a fidelity sometimes displayed by the canine race, but seldom by human beings, he pined and died.”

83 See Windischmann’s letters in _Briefe von und an Hegel_.

84 Cf. _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_, chaps. xii-xiv.

85 Kieser’s _Tellurismus_ is, according to Schopenhauer, “the fullest and most thorough text-book of Animal Magnetism.”

86 Cf. Fichte, _Nachgelassene Werke_, iii. 295 (_Tagebuch über den animalischen Magnetismus_, 1813), and Schopenhauer, _Der Wille in der Natur_.

87 Bernheim: _La suggestion domine toute l’histoire de l’humanité_.

88 An instance from an unexpected quarter, in Eckermann’s conversations with Goethe: “In my young days I have experienced cases enough, where on lonely walks there came over me a powerful yearning for a beloved girl, and I thought of her so long till she actually came to meet me.” (Conversation of Oct. 7, 1827.)

_ 89 Gleichsam in einer Vorwelt, einer diese Welt schaffenden Welt_ (_Nachgelassene Werke_, iii. 321).