part I deny solemnly and formally,—is this, that civilisation and

corruption march abreast. If it were so, a fatal equilibrium would be established between ‹the means of liberty› and ‹the sources of slavery›; and immobility would be the fate of the human race.

There cannot, moreover, enter into the human heart a thought more melancholy, more discouraging, more desolating, a thought more fitted to urge us to despair, to irreligion, to impiety, to blasphemy, than this, that every human being, whether he wills it or not, whether he doubts it or not, proceeds on the road of civilisation—and civilisation is corruption!

Then, if all civilisation be corruption, wherein consist its advantages? It is impossible to pretend that civilisation is unattended with moral, intellectual, and material advantages, for then it would cease to be civilisation. As Châteaubriand employs the term, civilisation signifies material progress, an increase of population, of wealth, of prosperity, the development of intelligence, the advancement of the sciences; and all these steps of progress imply, according to him, a corresponding retrogression of the moral sense.

This were enough to tempt men to a wholesale suicide; for I repeat that material and intellectual progress is not of our preparation and ordination. God himself has decreed it, in giving us expansible desires and improvable faculties. We are urged on to it without wishing it, without knowing it,—Châteaubriand, and his equals, if he has any, more than any one else. And this progress is to sink us deeper and deeper into immorality and slavery, by means of corruption! . . . . . . [p512]

I thought at first that Châteaubriand had let slip an unguarded phrase, as poets frequently do, without examining it too narrowly. With that class of writers, sound sometimes runs away with sense. Provided the antithesis is symmetrical, what matters it that the thought be false or objectionable? Provided the metaphor produces its intended effect, that it has an air of inspiration and depth, that it secures the applause of the public, and enables the author to pass for an oracle, of what importance are exactitude and truth?

I had thought, then, that Châteaubriand, giving way to a momentary excess of misanthropy, had allowed himself to formulate a conventionalism, a vulgarism dragged from the kennel. “Civilisation and corruption march abreast,” is a phrase that has been repeated since the days of Heraclitus, but it is not more true on that account.

At a distance of several years, however, the same great writer has reproduced the same thought, and in a more didactic form; which shows that it expressed his deliberate opinion. It is proper to combat it, not because it comes from Châteaubriand, but because it has got abroad, and so generally prevails.

“The material condition is ameliorated,” he says, “intellectual progress advances, and nations, in place of profiting, decay. Here is the explanation of the decay of society and the growth of the individual. Had the moral sense been developed in proportion to the development of intelligence, there would have been a counter weight, and the human race would have grown greater without danger. But it is just the contrary which happens. The perception of good and evil is obscured in proportion as intelligence is enlightened; conscience becomes narrowed in proportion as ideas are enlarged.”—‹Mémoires d’Outre-Tombe›, vol. xi. [p513]

XXV.

RELATIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH MORALS, WITH POLITICS, WITH LEGISLATION.[116]

WITH RELIGION.

A phenomenon is always found placed between two other phenomena, one of which is its ‹efficient›, and the other its ‹final› cause; [p514] and science has not done with that phenomenon as long as either of these relations remains undeveloped.

The human mind generally begins, I think, with the discovery of final causes, because they are more immediately interesting to us. No species of knowledge, besides, leads us with more force towards religious ideas, or is more fitted to make us feel in all the fibres of our heart a lively sense of gratitude for the inexhaustible goodness of God.

Habit, it is true, has so familiarized us with a great number of these ‹providential intentions›, that we enjoy them without thought. We see, and we hear, without thinking of the ingenious mechanism of the eye and of the ear. The sun, the dew, the rain, lavish upon us their useful effects, or their gentle sensations, without awakening our surprise or our gratitude. This is solely owing to the continued action upon us of these admirable phenomena. For let a final cause, although comparatively insignificant, come to be disclosed to us for the first time, let the botanist explain to us why this plant affects such or such a form, or why that other is clothed in such or such a colour, we immediately feel in our heart the unspeakable enchantment with which new proofs of the power, the goodness, and the wisdom of God never fail to penetrate us.

The region of final intentions, then, is for man’s imagination as an atmosphere impregnated with religious ideas.

But after we have perceived, or had a glimpse of the phenomenon in this aspect, we have still to study it in another relation, that is to say, to seek for its efficient cause. [p515]

It is strange, but it sometimes happens, that after having obtained the full knowledge of that cause, we find that it carries with it so necessarily the effect which we had admired at first, that we refuse to recognise in it longer the character of a final cause; and we say: “I was very simple to believe that God had provided such an arrangement with such a design; I see now that the cause which I have discovered being given (and it is inevitable), this arrangement must follow necessarily, apart from any pretended providential intention.”

It is thus that defective and superficial science, with its scalpel and its analyses, comes sometimes to destroy in our souls the religious sentiment to which the simple aspect of nature had given rise.

This is the case frequently with the anatomist and the astronomer. What a strange thing it is, exclaims the ignorant man, that when an extraneous substance penetrates into a tissue, where its presence does great injury, an inflammation and a suppuration take place, which tend to expel it! No, says the anatomist, there is nothing intentional in that expulsion. It is a ‹necessary› effect of the suppuration; and the suppuration itself is a ‹necessary› effect of the presence of an extraneous substance in our tissues. If you wish it, I shall explain to you the mechanism, and you will acknowledge yourself that the effect follows the cause, but that the cause has not been arranged intentionally to produce that effect, since it is itself the necessary effect of an anterior cause.

How I admire, says the ignorant man, the foresight of God, who has willed that the rain should not descend on the soil in a sheet, but should fall in drops, as if it came from the gardener’s watering-pot! Were it not so, vegetation would be impossible. You throw away your admiration, answers the learned naturalist; the cloud is not a sheet of water; if it were, it could not be supported by the atmosphere. It is a collection of microscopic vesicles, or minute bladders like soap-bubbles. When their density increases, or when they burst by compression, these thousands of millions of infinitesimal drops fall, growing larger in their descent by the vapour of the water which they precipitate, etc. If vegetation is benefited in consequence, it is by accident; but we must not think that the Creator amuses himself in sending us down water through the sieve of a monster watering-pot.

Ignorance, we must confess, very often imparts a certain plausibility to science, when the connexion of causes and effects is regarded in this way, by attributing a phenomenon to a final intention which does not exist, and which is dissipated before the light of superior knowledge. [p516]

Thus, in former days, before men had any knowledge of electricity, they were frightened by the noise of thunder, being able to recognise in that astounding voice, bellowing amid the storm, nothing less than a manifestation of Divine wrath. This is an association of ideas which, like many others, has disappeared before the progress of physical science. Man is so constituted, that when a phenomenon affects him, he searches for the cause of it; and if he finds out that cause, he gives it a name. Then he sets himself to find out the cause of that cause, and so he goes on until he can mount no higher, when he stops, and exclaims, “‹It is God; it is the will of God›.” This is his ‹ultima ratio›. He is arrested, however, only for the moment. Science advances, and soon this second, third, or fourth cause, which had remained unperceived, is revealed to his eyes. Then science says, This effect is not due, as we believed, to the immediate will of God, but to that natural cause which I have just discovered. And man, after having taken possession of this discovery, after having gained this step in the region of science, finds himself, so to speak, one step farther removed from the region of Faith, and again asks, What is the cause of that cause? And not finding it, he persists in the ever-recurring explanation, “It is the will of God.” And so he proceeds onwards for indefinite ages, through a countless succession of scientific revelations and exercises of faith.

This procedure on the part of mankind must appear to superficial minds to be destructive of every religious idea; for is the result of it not this, that as science advances, God recedes? Do we not see clearly that the domain of final intentions is narrowed in proportion as the domain of natural causes is enlarged?

Unhappy are they who give to this fine problem so narrow a solution. No, it is not true that as science advances, the idea of God recedes. On the contrary, what is true is that, as our intelligence increases, this idea is enlarged, and broadened, and elevated. When we discover a natural cause for what we had imagined an immediate, spontaneous, supernatural act of the Divine will, are we to conclude that that will is absent or indifferent? No, indeed; all that it proves is, that that will acts by processes different from those which it had pleased us to imagine. All that it proves is, that the phenomenon which we regarded as an accident in creation occupies its place in the universal frame; and that everything, even the most special effects, have been foreseen from all eternity by the divine prescience. What! is the idea which we form of the power of God lessened when we come to see that each of the countless results which we discover, or which escape our [p517] investigations, not only has its natural cause, but is bound up in an infinite circle of causes; so that there is not a detail of movement, of force, of form, of life, which is not the product of the great whole, or which can be explained apart from that whole.

But why this dissertation, which is foreign, as it would seem, to the main object of our inquiries? The phenomena of the social economy have likewise their efficient cause, and their providential intention. In this department, as in natural science, as in anatomy, or in astronomy, men have frequently denied the final cause precisely because the efficient cause assumes the character of an absolute necessity.

The social world abounds in harmonies, of which we can form no adequate or complete conception until the mind has remounted to causes, in order to seek their explanation, and descended to effects, to discover the destination of the phenomena. . . . .

NOTES.

TRANSLATOR’S PREFACE

[1] Notice, etc., p. 30, ‹note› [TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE: This refers to NOTE 11 Below].

NOTICE OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT.

[2] ‹Notice sur la vie, etc.›—‹Œuvres Complètes›, t. i. pp. 10, 11.

[3] ‹Correspondance›—‹Œuvres Complètes›, t. i. p. 27. ‹Revue des Deux Mondes›, t. xvii. p. 139.

[4] ‹Œuvres Complètes›, tome i. p. 244.

[5] Tome xvii. p. 148.

[6] ‹Revue des Deux Mondes›, t. xvii. p. 146.

[7] ‹Correspondance›—‹Œuvres Complètes›, t. i. p. 99.

[8] ‹Notice sur la vie›, etc.—‹Œuvres Complètes›, t. i. p. 18.

[9] This admirable work, the best and most complete treatise on money which exists in any language, well deserves a place in English literature.

[10] “God made the country; and it is perhaps in surveying plains, and meads, and mountains, remote from man, that the mind is most elevated to pure and high contemplations. But cities, temples, and the memorials of past ages, bridges, aqueducts, statues, pictures, and all the elegancies and comforts of the town, are equally the work of God, through the propensities of His creatures, and, we must presume, for the fulfilment of His design.”—‹Sir Charles Bell on the Hand›, ch. 3.

[11] The following list of chapters, intended to complete the ‹Harmonies Économiques›, found among the author’s papers, is exceedingly interesting. Of those marked * no notes or traces were found.

«Normal Phenomena.»

1. Producer—Consumer. 2. The Two Aphorisms. 3. Theory of Rent. 4. *Money. 5. *Credit. 6. Wages. 7. Saving. 8. Population. 9. Private and Public Services. 10. *Taxation.

«Corollaries.»

11. Machinery. 12. Free Trade. 13. Intermediaries. 14. Raw Materials—Manufactured Products. 15. Luxury.

«Disturbing Phenomena.»

16. Spoliation. 17. War. 18. *Slavery. 19. *Theocracy. 20. *Monopoly. 21. Governmental Undertakings. 22. False Fraternity or Communism.

«General Views.»

23. Responsibility—Solidarity. 24. Personal Interest or Social Motive Force. 25. Perfectibility. 26. *Public Opinion. 27. *Relations of Political Economy. with Morals, *with Politics, *with Legislation, with Religion.

TO THE YOUTH OF FRANCE

[12] The First Edition of the ‹Harmonies Économiques› appeared in 1850.—«Translator.»

[13] The author employs the term ‹prolétaire›, for which we have no equivalent word, to distinguish the man who lives by wages from the man who lives upon realized property—“les hommes qui n’ont que leurs bras, les salariés.”—‹See post›, Chap. X.—«Translator.»

[14] I shall explain this law by figures: Suppose three periods during which capital increases, labour remaining the same. Let the total production at these three periods be as 80—100—120. It will be thus divided:

Capitalist’s Labourer’s Total. share. share. First Period, 45 35 80 Second Period, 50 50 100 Third Period, 55 65 120

Of course these proportions are merely given for the sake of illustration.

I. NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL ORGANIZATION

[15] This Chapter was first published in the ‹Journal des Économistes›, January 1848.—«Editor.»

[16] Allusion to a socialist work of the day—‹La Reforme industrielle, ou la Phalanstère, par Ch. Fourier›.—«Translator.»

[17] ‹Métayage› is a mode of letting farms in the south of Europe, where the landlord furnishes a proportion of the means of cultivation, and shares the produce with the cultivator, or ‹métayer›.—«Translator.»

[18] “It is averred that the régime of free competition demanded by an ignorant Political Economy, and intended to do away with monopolies, tends only to the general organization of monster monopolies in all departments.”—‹Principes du Socialisme, par M. Considérant›, p. 15.

II. WANTS, EFFORTS, SATISFACTIONS

[19] This and the following chapter were inserted in the ‹Journal des Économistes›, September and December 1848.—«Editor.»

[20] Icarie, Phalanstère, etc.,—allusion to Socialist works of the day.—«Translator.»

[21] “Our industrial régime, founded on competition without guarantee and without organization, is then only a social hell, a vast realization of all the torments and all the punishments of the ancient Tænarus. There is one difference, however—namely, the victims.”—(‹Vide Considérant.›)

III. WANTS OF MAN

[22] A mathematical law of frequent occurrence, but very little understood in Political Economy.

[23] One of the indirect objects of this work is to combat modern sentimental schools, who, in spite of facts, refuse to admit that suffering to any extent enters into the designs of Providence. As these schools are said to proceed from Rousseau, I must here cite to them a passage from their master: “The evil which we see is not absolute evil; and far from being directly antagonistic to the good, it concurs with it in the universal harmony.”

[24] The term ‹consumption› employed by English Economists, the French Economists translate by ‹consommation›.—«Translator.»

IV. EXCHANGE

[25] V. J. B. Say.

[26] Moreover, this slave, by reason of his superiority, ends in the long-run by depreciating and emancipating all others. This is a ‹harmony› which I leave to the sagacity of the reader to follow to its consequences.

[27] See ‹Sophismes Économiques› (English edition), 2d series, p. 127, ‹et seq.›

[28] What follows is from a note found among the author’s papers. Had he lived, he would have incorporated the substance of it in the body of his dissertation on Exchange. All that we feel authorized to do is to place it at the end of the present chapter.—«Editor.»

[29] See, for the refutation of this error, chapter xi., ‹post.›—Also chapters ii. and iii. of ‹Sophismes Économiques›, English Edition.

V. OF VALUE

[30] I have ventured to state elsewhere some of the reasons which induce me to doubt the entire soundness of Bastiat’s conclusions on the subject of Rent and the Value of Land.—See note to chapter ix. ‹post›.—«Translator.»

[31] French Economists of the school of Quesnay.—«Translator.»

[32] Adds! The subject had then intrinsic value, anterior to the bestowal of labour upon it. That could only come from nature. The action of nature is not then ‹gratuitous›, according to this showing; but in that case, who can have the audacity to exact payment for this portion of ‹superhuman› value?

[33] The French Economists translate our word ‹consumption› by consommation.—«Translator.»

[34] It is because, in a state of freedom, efforts compete with each other that they obtain this remuneration nearly in proportion to their intensity. But, I repeat, this proportionality is not inherent in the notion of value.

It is a proof that where this competition does not exist the proportionality ceases. In that case we discover no relation between divers kinds of labour and their remuneration.

The absence of competition may result from the nature of things or from human perversity.

If it arises from the nature of things, we shall see a very small amount of labour give rise to great ‹value›, and no one have reason to complain. Such is the case of the man who finds a diamond. Such is the case of Rubini, of Malibran, of Taglioni, of a fashionable tailor, of the proprietor of the Clos-Vougeot, etc., etc. Circumstances have put them in possession of rare means of rendering service; they have no rivals, and exact a high price. ‹The service being, from its very nature, of excessive rarity›, shows that it is not essential to the well-being and progress of mankind. It is an object of luxury, of vanity, which wealthy people are enabled to procure. Is it not natural that a man, before indulging in such satisfactions, should wait until he finds himself in a situation to provide for wants which are more imperious and more reasonable?

If competition is absent in consequence of some human intervention, the same effects are produced, but with this enormous difference, that they have been produced where they ought not. In that case we see a comparatively small amount of labour give rise to great value; but how? By forcibly interdicting that competition the effect of which is to proportion remuneration to services. Then, just as Rubini might say to a ‹dilettante›. “You must pay me handsomely, or I don’t sing this evening,”—presuming on being able to render a service which no one else can render,—in the same way a butcher, a baker, a landlord, a banker, may say, “I must have an extravagant price, or you shall have none of my corn, my bread, my meat, my gold; and I have adopted precautions, I shall employ force, to prevent you being able to provide yourself elsewhere, and to make sure that no one shall render you services analogous to mine.”

People who assimilate artificial to what they call natural monopolies, because they have this in common, that they enhance the value of labour, such people, I say, are both blind and superficial.

Artificial monopoly is nothing else than spoliation. It produces evils which, apart from it, did not exist. It inflicts privations on a considerable portion of society, frequently as regards commodities of primary necessity. Moreover, it gives rise to irritation, hatreds, reprisals,—all the fruits of injustice.

Natural advantages do no harm to mankind. At most we can say that they merely exhibit pre-existent evils, imputable to no one. It may be regretted, perhaps, that tokay is not as cheap and as abundant as ‹vin ordinaire›. But that is not a social evil; it is one imposed on us by nature.

Between natural and artificial monopolies, then, there is this essential difference:

The one is the effect of scarcity, pre-existent and inevitable.

The other is the effect of a scarcity which is factitious and unnatural.

In the first case, it is not the absence of competition which creates the scarcity; it is the scarcity which explains the absence of competition. Society would be puerile were it to complain and torment itself because there is in the world only one Jenny Lind, one Clos-Vougeot, one Regent.

In the second case it is very different. It is not on account of a providential scarcity that competition becomes impossible, but because force has repressed and put down competition that there is created among men a scarcity which ought not to have existed.—(‹Note extracted from MSS. left by the Author.›)

[35] ‹Vide post›, chap. xv.

‹Accumulation› is a circumstance of no account in Political Economy.

Let the satisfaction be immediate or delayed, let it be adjourned or follow instantly on the effort,—in what respect does this change the nature of things?

I choose to make a sacrifice to enjoy the pleasure of hearing a fine voice. I go to the theatre, and pay for my entertainment—the satisfaction is immediate. I devote my money to the purchase of a basket of strawberries, and I can delay my satisfaction till to-morrow—that is all.

It may be said that the strawberries constitute wealth, because I can exchange them. True. Whilst the effort has been made and the satisfaction is delayed, wealth subsists. It is satisfaction which destroys wealth. When the strawberries been eaten the satisfaction will be on a level with that which I derived from hearing Alboni.

Service received—service rendered—this is political economy.—(‹Note from MSS. left by the Author.›)

[36] What follows was intended by the author to form part of this chapter.

[37] These are the words by which Roman lawyers designated what they termed ‹innominate› contracts, as distinguished from contracts with known names, as ‹purchase› and ‹sale›, ‹letting›, ‹hiring›, ‹borrowing›, ‹lending›, etc.—«Translator.»

[38] ‹Traité d’Économie Politique›, p. 1.

VI. WEALTH

[39] ‹Nouvel essai sur la Richesse des Nations›, p. 438.

[40] ‹Ib.›, p. 263.

[41] ‹Ib.›, p. 456.

[42] ‹Ib.›, p. 456.

[43] ‹Nouvel essai sur la Richesse des Nations›, p. 161.

[44] ‹Ib.›, p. 168.

[45] ‹Ib.›, p. 168

[46] ‹Ib.›, p. 63.

[47] The Earl of Lauderdale, from adopting the false principle which the author here exposes, fell into the same error, maintaining that “‹an increase of riches›, when arising from alterations in the quantity of commodities, is always a proof of the immediate ‹diminution of wealth›,” and that a diminution of riches is evidence of an immediate increase of wealth; and that “in proportion as the ‹riches› of individuals are increased by an augmentation of the ‹value› of any commodity, the wealth of the nation is generally diminished; and in proportion as the mass of individual ‹riches› is diminished by the diminution of the ‹value› of the commodity, the national opulence is generally increased.” This melancholy paradox Lord Lauderdale maintained stoutly in a set treatise. See ‹Inquiry into the Nature and Origin of Public Wealth by the Earl of Lauderdale›. Edition 1804, p. 50. Mr Ricardo has given an exposition of the “Distinctive Properties of Value and Riches” in his work on the ‹Principles of Political Economy›. Third Edition, p. 320.—«Translator.»

[48] “Do you take the side of Competition, you are wrong—do you argue against Competition, you are still wrong; which means that you are always right.”—P. J. Proudhon, ‹Contradictions Économiques›, p. 182.

[49] Always this perpetual and lamentable confusion between Value and Utility? I can show you many utilities which are not appropriated, but I defy you to show me in the whole world a single ‹value› which has not a proprietor.

[50] What follows is the commencement of a supplementary note found among the papers of the author.—«Translator.»

VII. CAPITAL

[51] See my brochure entitled ‹Capital et Rente›.

[52] Allusion to Socialist works—‹La Réforme industrielle, ou le Phalanstère, Recueil periodique, rédigé par Ch. Fourier›, 1832.—‹Visite au Phalanstère, par M. Briancourt›, 1848.—‹Voyage en Icarie, par Cabet›, 1848, etc.—«Translator.»

[53] ‹Ante›, p. 82, ‹et. seq.›

VIII. PROPERTY—COMMUNITY

[54] Public warehouses where goods were deposited, and negotiable receipts issued in exchange for them.—«Translator.»

IX. LANDED PROPERTY

[55] ‹Wealth of Nations› (Buchanan’s 2d edit.), vol. ii. p. 53.

[56] ‹Ib.›, vol. ii. p. 54.

[57] ‹Ib.›, vol. ii. p. 55, note.

[58] ‹Ricardo’s Political Works› (M’Culloch’s edit.), pp. 34, 35.

[59] The words in ‹italics› and ‹capitals› are thus printed in the original text.

[60] ‹Alterner un champ›, is to rear alternate crops of corn and hay in a field.—«Translator.»

[61] On the subject of Rent, and the constituent elements of the Value of Land, Bastiat would seem to have adopted, though perhaps unconsciously, the theory of Mr Carey, in his able and original work on ‹The Principles of Political Economy› (Philadelphia, 1837-38). Practically, no doubt, Mr Carey’s view of the subject to a great extent holds true. If we take into account all the labour and capital laid out in permanent ameliorations upon a field or a farm, from its first clearance to the present moment, it may be true that there is scarcely any land now under cultivation which is worth what it cost; and that the Rent yielded by such land, consequently, resolves itself into the remuneration of anterior labour. But the sweeping assertion of Bastiat, that “land which has not been subjected, directly or indirectly, to human action is everywhere destitute of value,” is certainly not correct as a “matter of fact;” for from the spot where I am now writing, I can see thousands of acres which have never since the creation had a spade, or a plough, or a human hand applied to them, which nevertheless do yield a Rent—a small rent, a shilling, a penny an acre, it may be—but a return which can by no process of analysis be resolved into the remuneration of anterior labour or capital. With regard to such land, the question of rent or no rent would seem to depend on the current and usual rate of profits.

Land in its natural state, and without cultivation, is capable of producing grass for the food of cattle, and other products capable of rendering service to man. Suppose, for example, that the agriculture of a country has reached the least productive corn-land, which yields a return of £120 for each £100 of capital employed in its cultivation, and that much of the remaining land is incapable of cultivation,—a tract of moorland, or rough pasture, for instance, like some parts of the Highlands of Scotland. Whether such land will or will not yield a rent must depend on whether the return, in sheep, cattle, copsewood, or other produce, after replacing the capital employed, exceeds or falls short of 20 per cent.

Suppose that a person possessed of a capital equal to £100, instead of applying that capital to the cultivation of the least productive corn-land, with a return equal to £120, employs his £100 in purchasing, tending, and bringing to market 100 sheep,—if the annual produce and increase of his flock, over and above his necessary outgoings, amounts only to 10 per cent. on his capital, of course he will find the rearing of sheep unprofitable, and give up the trade. He can in that case pay no rent, for his return is not equal to even the ordinary profits. But if the increase of his flock, over and above his outgoings, amounts to 30 per cent. on the capital employed, then the land to which we refer will yield a rent equal to 10 per cent. on that capital. Whether this shall be the rent of 10, of 50, or 100, or 1000 acres of land, depends entirely on how much land is required to feed 100 sheep; the greater the extent of land, the less will be the rent of each acre; it may be a pound, or a shilling, or a penny an acre; still every acre, and every part of every acre, will yield a ‹rent›. Nor does the question of rent or no rent depend on the amount of the capital employed; for if a capital of £100 employed on 10,000 acres of land yields a clear return of £130 when profits are at 20 per cent., the surplus £10 clearly constitutes rent. Rent depends on the ratio of the product to the capital employed, and if that product, or its value, exceed the capital, or its value, by more than the ordinary rate of profits, a rent, greater or less in amount, according to the value of the capital and the extent of surface over which that capital is spread, will be yielded by every inch of land capable of giving nourishment to a blade of grass.

On a searching analysis of rent, then, we always find a ‹residuum› which cannot be resolved into the remuneration of anterior labour or capital; and as the value of land in its natural and uncultivated state depends on the amount of this residuum, or rent, if that value is to be brought within the limits of Bastiat’s theory, we must apply to it the same principle which he applied (Chap. V., pp. 139-141 ‹ante›) to the case of a diamond found by accident, and resolve it, not into service rendered by undergoing labour, or ‹making an effort›, for another, but into service rendered by ‹saving› another from undergoing the labour or making the effort for himself. Bastiat seems to have felt this as he approached the conclusion of the present chapter. (See ‹post›, p. 282.)

In this part of his work, Bastiat, in his desire to refute the fallacies of the Socialists and Communists on the subject of property, seems to have gone beyond the proper domain of Political Economy; for in strictness it is not the business of that science to vindicate the institution of property, or to explain its origin. It is enough for the Economist that property ‹exists›, and all that he is concerned to do is to explain the laws which regulate the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth.—«Translator.»

[62] Ricardo.

X. COMPETITION

[63] ‹Ante›, p. 48 ‹et seq.›

[64] Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.—«Translator.»

[65] See Voltaire’s tragedy, ‹Le Fanatisme›.—«Translator.»

XI. PRODUCER—CONSUMER

[66] ‹Economic Sophisms›, chap. 1.

[67] Allusion to Socialist works. See p. 205, ‹ante›.

[68] See the author’s discourse ‹Sur l’Impôt des Boissons›, in the second edition of the pamphlet entitled ‹Incompatibilités Parlementaires›.—«Editor.»

XII. THE TWO APHORISMS

[69] When the van-guard of the Icarian expedition left Havre, I questioned some of these visionaries with a view to discover their real thoughts. ‹Competence easily obtained›, such was their hope and their motive. One of them said to me, “I am going, and my brother follows with the second expedition. He has eight children, and you see what a great thing it will be for him to have no longer to educate and maintain them.” “I see it at once,” I replied, “but that heavy charge must fall on some other body.” To rid oneself of a burden and transfer it to the shoulders of another, such was the sense in which these unfortunate people understood the apophthegm of Fraternity—‹all for each›.

[70] See the pamphlet ‹Spoliation et Loi›, p. 22 ‹et seq.›—«Editor.»

XIII. RENT

[71] Two or three short fragments are all that the author has left us on this important subject. The reason is, that he proposed, as he has told us, to set forth the views of Mr Carey of Philadelphia, in opposition to the theory of Ricardo.—«Editor.»

[72] Celebrated vineyard of Burgundy.—«Translator.»

[73] Of these intended developments none, unfortunately, exist; but we may be permitted to notice, briefly, the two principal consequences of the state of matters supposed by the author.

1. Two fields, the one cultivated, A, the other uncultivated, B, being supposed of identical quality, the amount of labour formerly devoted to the clearance of A is assumed as the necessary measure of the amount of labour required for the clearance of B. We may even say that, on account of our now superior knowledge of agriculture, of our implements, of our improved means of communication, etc., a ‹less› amount of labour would now be necessary to bring B into cultivation than was formerly required in the case of A. If land had value in itself, A would be worth all that it cost to bring it into culture, ‹plus something additional for its natural productive powers›; that is to say, much more than the sum now required to bring B into the same state. Now it is just the reverse. The field A is worth less since we buy it rather than bring B into cultivation. In purchasing A, then, we pay nothing for the natural productive powers, since the price does not even compensate the original cost of bringing it into cultivation.

2. If the field A produces 1000 measures of corn, the field B when cultivated must be supposed to produce the same quantity. The reason why A was formerly cultivated was, that formerly 1000 measures of corn amply remunerated all the labour required both for its original clearance and its annual cultivation. The reason why B is not cultivated is, that now 1000 measures of corn would not remunerate the same amount of labour, or even a less amount, as we have just before remarked.

And what does this show? Evidently that the value of human labour has risen in relation to corn; that a day’s labour is worth more wages estimated in corn. In other words, corn is obtained with less effort, and is exchanged for a less amount of labour; and the theory of ‹the progressive dearness of the means of subsistence is erroneous›.—«Editor.»

MONEY

[74] See the author’s brochure, ‹Maudit Argent›.—«Editor.»

CREDIT

[75] See the author’s brochure, ‹Gratuité du Credit›.—«Editor.»

XIV. WAGES

[76] See ‹ante›, chapters i. and ii.

[77] ‹Ante›, p. 172.

[78] See ‹post›, chapter xx., on ‹Responsibility›.

[79] Extract from ‹La Presse›, 22d June 1850.

[80] ‹Caisse de Retraite›,—a friendly accumulation society which has for object to provide for the labourer in his old age.—See an account of these ‹Caisses de Retraite› in ‹Dictionnaire de l’Économie Politique›, t. i. p. 255.—«Translator.»

[81] ‹Emeutes› of June 1848.

[82] The chapter, “‹Des Machines›,” is one of those included in the author’s list of intended additions, which he did not live to write. (See ‹Notice of Life and Writings, etc.›, p. 30, ‹ante›.)—«Translator.»

[83] For an explanation of these terms, borrowed from the Civil Law, see ‹ante›, p. 172.—«Translator.»

[84] See ‹ante›, chapter iv.

[85] The manuscript brought from Rome stops here. What is subjoined was found among the papers left by the author in Paris. It indicates how he intended to terminate and sum up this chapter.—«Editor.»

XV. SAVING

[86] Sir James Steuart of Coltness, whose ‹Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy› was published in 1767, nine years before the appearance of Adam Smith’s great work, takes the very same view of the principle of population which Malthus, thirty years afterwards, more formally enunciated. “The generative faculty,” says Sir James Steuart, “resembles a spring loaded with a weight, which always exerts itself in proportion to the diminution of resistance. When food has remained some time without augmentation or diminution, generation will carry numbers as high as possible; if, then, food come to be diminished, the spring is overpowered, the force of it becomes less than nothing, inhabitants will diminish, at least in proportion to the overcharge. If, on the other hand, food be increased, the spring will begin to exert itself in proportion as the resistance diminishes, people will begin to be better fed, they will multiply, and, in proportion as they increase in numbers, the food will become scarce again.”—«Translator.»

[87] “Threescore and ten ‹souls›.”—‹Gen.› xlvi. 27. “Seventy ‹souls›.”—‹Exodus› i. 5. “Threescore and ten ‹persons›.”—‹Deut.› x. 22.—«Translator.»

[88] 601,730 “from twenty years old and upwards.”—‹Numbers› xxvi. 2 and 51.—«Translator.»

[89] What follows was written in 1846.—«Editor.»

[90] It is fair to mention that J. B. Say represents the ‹means of existence› as a variable quantity.

[91] “There are few states in which there is not a constant effort in the population to increase beyond the means of subsistence. This constant effort as ‹constantly tends› to subject the lower classes of society to distress, ‹and to prevent any great permanent melioration of their condition›. . . . The constant effort towards population . . . increases the number of people ‹before› the means of subsistence are increased,” etc.—«Malthus» ‹on Population›, vol. i. pp. 17, 18, 6th edition.

[92] See chap. xi. ‹ante›.

[93] “Although we might describe ‹fermage›, in a general way, as the letting or leasing of land, in whatever form it is done, we must distinguish two forms of letting, equally common in various parts of Europe, and very different in their effects. In the one form, the land is let for a fixed rent, payable in money annually. In the other, it is let under the condition of the produce being divided between the proprietor and the cultivator. It is to the first of these two modes of leasing land that we give more particularly the name of ‹fermage›. The other is generally designated in France as ‹métayage›.” (‹Dictionnaire de l’Économie Politique›, tome i. p. 759.)—«Translator.»

XVII. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SERVICES

[94] “The moment this value is handed over by the taxpayer, it is lost to him; the moment it is consumed by the Government, it is lost to everybody, and does not return to society.”—«J. B. Say», ‹Traité d’Économie Politique›, liv. iii. chap 9.

Unquestionably; but society gains in return the service which is rendered to it—security, for example. Moreover, Say returns to the correct doctrine almost immediately afterwards, when he says,—“To levy a tax is to do a wrong to society—a wrong which is compensated by no advantage, ‹when no service is rendered to society in exchange›.”—‹Ibid.›

[95] “Public contributions, even when they are consented to by the nation, are a violation of property, seeing they can be levied only on values which have been produced by the land, capital, and industry of individuals. Thus, ‹whenever they exceed the amount indispensable for the preservation of society›, we must regard them as spoliation.”—«J. B. Say.» ‹Traité d’Économie Politique›, liv. iii. chap. 9.

Here, again, the subsequent qualification corrects the too absolute judgment previously pronounced. The doctrine that ‹services are exchanged for services›, simplifies much both the problem and its solution.

[96] Civil law terms. See ‹ante›, p. 172.

[97] The effects of such a transformation are strikingly exemplified in an instance given by M. d’Hautpoul, the Minister of War:—“Each soldier,” he says, “receives 16 centimes a day for his maintenance. The Government takes these 16 centimes, and undertakes to support him. The consequence is that all have the same rations, and of the same kind, whether it suit them or not. One has too much bread, and throws it away. Another has not enough of butcher’s meat, and so on. We have, therefore, made an experiment. We leave to the soldiers the free disposal of these 16 centimes, and we are happy to find that this has been attended with a great improvement in their condition. Each now consults his own tastes and likings, and studies the market prices of what they want to purchase. Generally they have, of their own accord, substituted a portion of butcher’s meat for bread. In some instances they buy more bread, in others more meat, in others more vegetables, in others more fish. Their health is improved; they are better pleased; and the State is relieved from a great responsibility.”

The reader will understand that it is not as bearing on military affairs that I cite this experiment. I refer to it as calculated to illustrate a radical difference between public and private service, between official regulations and liberty. Would it be better for the State to take from us our means of support, and undertake to feed us, or to leave us both our means of support and the care of feeding ourselves? The same question may be asked with reference to all our wants.

[98] See the author’s pamphlet, entitled ‹Baccalauréat et Socialisme›.—«Editor.»

[99] The author, in a previous work, had sought the solution of the same question. The subject of his inquiry was the legitimate province of law. All the developments in the pamphlet, entitled ‹La Loi›, are applicable to the subject he is now discussing. We refer the reader to that ‹brochure›.—«Editor.»

[100] Here ends the MS. We refer the reader to the author’s pamphlet entitled ‹Spoliation et Loi›, in the second part of which he has exposed the sophisms which were given utterance to at this meeting of the ‹Conseil général›.

On the subjects of the six chapters intended to follow this, under the titles of Taxation, Machinery, Free Trade, Intermediaries, Raw Materials, and Luxury, we refer the reader, ‹1st›, to the ‹Discours sur l’Impôt des Boissons›, inserted in the second edition of the pamphlet, ‹Incompatibilités Parlementaires›; ‹2dly›, to the pamphlet entitled ‹Ce qu’on voit et Ce qu’on ne voit pas›; ‹3dly›, to the ‹Sophismes Économiques›.

XVIII. DISTURBING CAUSES

[101] The author was unable to continue this examination of errors—which are for those who are misled by them a nearly immediate cause of suffering—nor to describe another class of errors, which make their appearance in the shape of violence and fraud, and the first effects of which bear heavily on others. His notes contain nothing on the subject of ‹disturbing causes› but the preceding fragment and that which follows. We would also refer the reader to the first chapter of the second series of ‹Sophisms›, entitled ‹Spoliation›.—«Editor.»

XIX. WAR

[102] See concluding part of chapter xi. ‹ante›.

[103] We forget this, when we propose the question, Is slave labour dearer or cheaper than free labour?

[104] See the author’s brochure, ‹Baccalauréat et Socialisme›.—«Editor.»

XX. RESPONSIBILITY

[105] . . . . . because I believe that it is under the direction of a superior impulse, because, Providence being unable to act in the social order except through the intervention of men’s interests and men’s wills, it is impossible that the natural resulting force of these interests, the common tendency of these wills, should be towards ultimate evil; for then we must conclude that it is not only man, or the human race, which proceeds onward towards error; but that God himself, being powerless or malevolent, urges on to evil His abortive creation. We believe, then, in liberty, because we believe in universal harmony, because we believe in God. Proclaiming in the name of faith, and formulating in the name of science, the Divine laws of the moral movement, living and pliant as these laws are, we spurn the narrow, sinister, unbending, and unalterable institutions which the blind leaders of the ignorant would substitute for this admirable mechanism. It would be absurd in the atheist to say, ‹laissez faire le hasard!›—seek not to control chance, or blind destiny. But, as believers, we have a right to say, seek not to control the order and justice of God—seek not to control the free action of the sovereign and infallible mover of all, or of that machinery of transmission which we call the human initiative. Liberty thus understood is no longer the anarchical deification of individualism. What we adore is above and beyond man who struggles; it is God who leads him.

We acknowledge, indeed, that man may err; yes, by the whole interval which separates a truth realized and established from one which is merely guessed at or suspected. But since man’s nature is to seek, his destiny is to find. Truth, be it observed, has harmonious relations, necessary affinities, not only with the constitution of the understanding and the instincts of the heart, but also with the whole physical and moral conditions of our existence; so that even when we fail to grasp it as ‹absolute truth›, even when it fails to recommend itself to our innate sympathies as ‹just›, or to our ideal aspirations as ‹beautiful›, it, nevertheless, at length contrives to find acceptance in its practical and unobjectionable aspect as ‹useful›.

Liberty, we know, may lead to evil. But evil has itself its mission. Assuredly God has not thrown it across our path as a stumbling-block. He has placed it, as it were, on each side of that path as a warning,—as a means of keeping us in the right road, or bringing us back to it.

Man’s will and inclinations, like inert molecules, have their law of gravitation. But, whilst things inanimate obey blindly their pre-existent and inevitable tendencies, in the case of beings indued with free will, the force of attraction and repulsion does not precede action; it springs from the voluntary determination which it seems to be waiting for, it is developed by the very act itself, and it reacts for or against the agent, by a progressive exertion of co-operation or resistance, which we term recompense or chastisement, pleasure or pain. If the direction of the will coincides with that of the general laws, if the act is ‹good›, happiness is the result. If it takes an opposite direction, if it is ‹bad›, something opposes or repels it; error gives rise to suffering, which is its remedy and its end. Thus, Evil is constantly opposed by Evil, and Good as constantly gives rise to Good. And we venture to say that, when seen from a higher point of view, the errors of free will are limited to certain oscillations, of a determinate extent, around a superior and necessary orbit; all persistent resistance, which would force this limit, tending only to destroy itself, without at all succeeding in disturbing the order of the sphere in which it moves.

This reactive force of co-operation or repulsion, which, by means of recompense and suffering, governs the orbit, at once voluntary and necessary, of the human race, this ‹law of gravitation of free beings› (of which Evil is only a necessary part) is distinguished by the terms Responsibility and Solidarity; the one brings back upon the individual; the other reflects and sends back on the social body the good or bad consequences of the act; the one applies to man as a solitary and self-governing individual; the other envelops him in an inevitable community of good and evil as a partial element, a dependent member, of a collective and imperishable being—man. ‹Responsibility› is the sanction of individual liberty, the foundation of the ‹rights› of man. ‹Solidarity› is the evidence of his social subordination, and his principle of duty. . . .

[‹A leaf of Bastiat’s MS. being awanting, I hope to be pardoned for thus endeavouring to continue the idea of this religious introduction.›]—R. F.

[106] Religion (‹religare›, to bind), that which connects the present life with the future, the living with the dead, time with eternity, the finite with the infinite, man with God.

[107] May we not say that Divine Justice, which is so incomprehensible when we consider the lot of individuals, becomes striking when we reflect on the destinies of nations? Each man’s life is a drama which is begun on one theatre and completed on another. But the same thing cannot be said of the life of nations. That instructive tragedy begins and ends upon earth. This is the reason why history becomes a holy lesson; it is the justice of Providence.—«De Custine’s» ‹La Russie›.

[108] Allusion to Socialist Utopias of the day.—«Translator.»

[109] “As to the doctrine of necessity, no one believes it. If a man should give me arguments that I do not see, though I could not answer them, should I believe that I do not see? . . . . All theory is against the freedom of the will; all experience for it. . . . . I ‹know› that I am free, and there’s an end on’t.” (‹Dr Johnson.›)—«Translator.»

[110] “Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life: Thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee. . . . In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, until thou return unto the ground; for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return.”—‹Gen.› iii. 17, 18, 19.

[111] The interesting developments which the author intended to present here by way of illustrations, and of which he indicated beforehand the character, he unfortunately did not live to write. The reader may supply the want by referring to chapter xvi. of this work, and likewise to chapters vii. and xi. of Bastiat’s pamphlet, ‹Ce qu’on voit et Ce qu’on ne voit pas›.—«Note of the Editor.»

[112] “For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves; which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another.”—‹Romans› ii. 14, 15. See also ‹Bishop Butler’s 3d Sermon, on Human Nature›: “Nothing,” says he, “can be more evident than that, ‹exclusive of revelation›, man cannot be considered as a creature left by his Maker to act at random, and live at large up to the extent of his natural power, as passion, humour, wilfulness, happen to carry him; which is the condition brute creatures are in. But that, ‹from his make, constitution, or nature, he is in the strictest and most proper sense a law to himself›. He hath the rule of right within. What is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it.”—«Butler’s» ‹Works›, vol. ii. p. 65.—«Translator.»

[113] The conclusion of this chapter is little more than a series of notes thrown together, without transitions or developments.—«Editor.»

XXI. SOLIDARITY

[114] This sketch terminates here abruptly; the ‹economic› view of the law of solidarity is not indicated. We may refer the reader to