Part 2
There is a _Double Perception_ in Nature, the Rational Perception, and the Sensitive: The Rational Perception is more subtil and penetrating than the Sensitive; also, it is more generally perceptive than the Sensitive; also, it is a more agil Perception than the Sensitive: All which is occasioned not onely through the _purity_ of the Rational parts, but through the _liberty_ of the Rational parts; whereas the Sensitive being incumbred with the Inanimate parts, is obstructed and retarded. Yet all Perceptions, both Sensitive and Rational, are in parts; but, by reason the Rational is freer, (being not a painful Labourer) can more easily make an united Perception, than the Sensitive; which is the reason the Rational parts can make a Whole Perception of a Whole Object: Whereas the Sensitive makes but Perceptions in part, of one and the same Object.
CHAP. XI. Whether the Triumphant Parts can be perceived distinctly from each other.
Some may make this Question,_ Whether the Three sorts of Parts, the Rational, Sensitive, and Inanimate, may be singly perceived?_ I answer, Not unless there were single Parts in Nature; but, though they cannot be singly perceived, yet they singly perceive; because, every Part hath its own motion, and so its own perception. And though those Parts, that have not self-motion, have not perception; yet, being joined, as one Body, to the Sensitive, they may by the Sensitive Motion, have some different sorts of Self-knowledg, caused by the different actions of the Sensitive parts; but that is not _Perception_. But, as I said, the _Triumphant Parts_ cannot be perceived distinctly asunder, though their Actions may be different: for, the joining, or intermixing of Parts, hinders not the several Actions; as for example, A Man is composed of several Parts, or, (as the Learned term them) _Corporeal Motions_; yet, not any of those different Parts, or Corporeal Motions, are a hindrance to each other: The same between the _Sensitive_ and _Rational Parts_.
CHAP. XII. Whether Nature can know her self, or have an Absolute Power of her self, or have an exact Figure.
I was of an opinion, That Nature, because Infinite, could not know her Self; because Infinite hath no limit. Also, That Nature could not have an Absolute Power over her own Parts, because she had Infinite Parts; and, that the Infiniteness did hinder the Absoluteness: But since I have consider'd, That the Infinite Parts must of necessity be Self-knowing; and that those Infinite Self-knowing Parts are united in one Infinite Body, by which Nature must have both an United Knowledg, and an United Power. Also, I questioned, Whether Nature could have an Exact Figure, (but, mistake me not; for I do not mean the Figure of Matter, but a composed Figure of Parts) because Nature was composed of Infinite Variety of Figurative Parts: But considering, that those Infinite Varieties of Infinite Figurative Parts, were united into one Body; I did conclude, That she must needs have an Exact Figure, though she be Infinite: As for example, This World is composed of numerous and several Figurative parts, and yet the World hath an exact Form and Frame, the same which it would have if it were Infinite. But, as for Self-knowledg, and Power, certainly God hath given them to Nature, though her Power be limited: for, she cannot move beyond her Nature; nor hath she power to make her self any otherwise than what she is, since she cannot create, or annihilate any part, or particle: nor can she make any of her Parts, Immaterial; or any Immaterial, Corporeal: Nor can she give to one part, the Nature (_viz_. the Knowledg, Life, Motion, or Perception) of another part; which is the reason one Creature cannot have the properties, or faculties of another; they may have the like, but not the same.
CHAP. XIII. Nature cannot judg her self.
Although Nature knows her self, and hath a free power of her self; (I mean, a natural Knowledg and Power) yet, Nature cannot be an upright, and just Judg of her self, and so not of any of her Parts; because every particular part is a part of her self. Besides, as she is Self-moving, she is Self-changeing, and so she is alterable: Wherefore, nothing can be a perfect, and a just Judg, but something that is Individable, and Unalterable, which is the Infinite GOD, who is Unmoving, Immutable, and so Unalterable; who is the Judg of the Infinite Corporeal Actions of his Servant Nature. And this is the reason that all Nature's Parts appeal to God, as being the only Judg.
CHAP. XIV. Nature Poyses, or Balances her Actions.
Although Nature be Infinite, yet all her Actions seem to be _poysed_, or _balanced_, by Opposition; as for example, As Nature hath dividing, so composing actions: Also, as Nature hath regular, so irregular actions; as Nature hath dilating, so contracting actions: In short, we may perceive amongst the Creatures, or Parts of this World, slow, swift, thick, thin, heavy, leight, rare, dense, little, big, low, high, broad, narrow, light, dark, hot, cold, productions, dissolutions, peace, warr, mirth, sadness, and that we name _Life_, and _Death_; and infinite the like; as also, infinite varieties in every several kind and sort of actions: but, the infinite varieties are made by the Self-moving parts of Nature, which are the Corporeal Figurative Motions of Nature.
CHAP. XV. Whether there be Degrees of Corporeal Strength.
As I have declared, there are (in my Opinion) Two sorts of Self-moving Parts; the one Sensitive, the other Rational. The Rational parts of my Mind, moving in the manner of Conception, or Inspection, did occasion some Disputes, or Arguments, amongst those parts of my Mind. The Arguments were these: _Whether there were degrees of Strength, as there was of Purity, between their own sort, as, the Rational and the Sensitive?_ The Major part of the Argument was,_ That Self-motion could be but Self-motion: for, not any part of Nature could move beyond its power of Self-motion_. But the Minor part argued, _That the Self-motion of the Rational, might be_ _stronger than the Self-motion of the Sensitive._ But the Major part was of the opinion, _That there could be no degrees of the Power of Nature, or the Nature of Nature: for Matter, which was Nature, could be but Self-moving, or not Self-moving; or partly Self-moving, or not Self-moving._ But the Minor argued, _That it was not against the nature of Matter to have degrees of Corporeal Strength, as well as degrees of Purity: for, though there could not be degrees of Purity amongst the Parts of the same sort, as amongst the Parts of the Rational, or amongst the Parts of the Sensitive; yet, if there were degrees of the Rational and Sensitive Parts, there might be degrees of Strength._ The Major part said, _That if there were degrees of Strength, it would make a Confusion, by reason there would be no Agreement; for, the Strongest would be Tyrants to the Weakest, in so much as they would never suffer those Parts to act methodically or regularly._ But the Minor part said, _that they had observed, That there was degrees of Strength amongst the Sensitive Parts._ The Major part argued,_ That they had not degrees of Strength by Nature; but, that the greater Number of Parts were stronger than a less Number of Parts. Also, there were some sorts of Actions, that had advantage of other sorts. Also, some sorts of Compositions are stronger than other; not through the degrees of innate Strength, nor through the number of Parts; but, through the manner and form of their Compositions, or Productions._ Thus my Thoughts argued; but, after many Debates and Disputes, at last my Rational Parts agreed, That, If there were degrees of Strength, it could not be between the Parts of the same degree, or sort; but, between the Rational and Sensitive; and if so, the Sensitive was Stronger, being _less pure_; and the Rational was more Agil, being _more pure_.
CHAP. XVI. Of Effects, and Cause.
To treat of Infinite Effects, produced from an an Infinite Cause, is an endless Work, and impossible to be performed, or effected; only this may be said, That the Effects, though Infinite, are so united to the material Cause, as that not any single effect can be, nor no Effect can be annihilated; by reason all Effects are in the power of the Cause. But this is to be noted, That some Effects producing other Effects, are, in some sort or manner, a Cause.
CHAP. XVII. Of INFLUENCE.
An _Influence_ is this; When as the Corporeal Figurative Motions, in different kinds, and sorts of Creatures, or in one and the same sorts, or kinds, move sympathetically: And though there be antipathetical Motions, as well as sympathetical; yet, all the Infinite parts of Matter, are agreeable in their nature, as being all Material, and Self-moving; and by reason there is no _Vacuum_, there must of necessity be an Influence amongst all the Parts of Nature.
CHAP. XVIII. Of FORTUNE and CHANCE.
_Fortune_, is only various Corporeal Motions of several Creatures, design'd to one Creature, or more Creatures; either to _that_ Creature, or _those_ Creatures Advantage, or Disadvantage: If Advantage, Man names it _Good Fortune_; if Disadvantage, Man names it _Ill Fortune_. As for _Chance_, it is the visible Effects of some hidden Cause; and _Fortune_, a sufficient Cause to produce such Effects: for, the conjunction of sufficient Causes, doth produce such or such Effects; which Effects could not be produced, if any of those Causes were wanting: So that, _Chances_ are but the Effects of Fortune.
CHAP. XIX. Of TIME and ETERNITY.
_Time_ is not a Thing by it self; nor is _Time_ Immaterial: for, _Time_ is only the variations of Corporeal Motions; but Eternity depends not on Motion, but of a Being without Beginning, or Ending.
The Second Part.
CHAP. I. Of CREATURES.
All Creatures are Composed-Figures, by the consent of Associating Parts; by which Association, they joyn into such, or such a figured Creature: And though every Corporeal Motion, or Self-moving Part, hath its own motion; yet, by their Association, they all agree in proper actions, as actions proper to their Compositions: and, if every particular Part, hath not a perception of all the Parts of their Association; yet, every Part knows its own Work.
CHAP. II. Of Knowledg and Perception of different kinds and sorts of Creatures.
There is not any Creature in Nature, that is not composed of Self-moving Parts, (_viz._ both of Rational and Sensitive) as also of the Inanimate Parts, which are Self-knowing: so that all Creatures, being composed of these sorts of Parts, must have a Sensitive, and Rational Knowledg and Perception, as Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, Elements, or what else there is in Nature: But several kinds, and several sorts in these kinds of Creatures, being composed after different manners, and ways, must needs have different Lives, Knowledges, and Perceptions: and not only every several kind, and sort, have such differences; but, every particular Creature, through the variations of their Self-moving Parts, have varieties of Lives, Knowledges, Perceptions, Conceptions, and the like; and not only so, but every particular part of one and the same Creature, have varieties of Knowledges, and Perceptions, because they have varieties of Actions. But, (as I have declared) there is not any different kind of Creature, that can have the like Life, Knowledg, and Perception; not only because they have different Productions, and different Forms; but, different Natures, as being of different kinds.
CHAP. III. Of Perception of Parts, and United Perception.
All the Self-moving Parts are perceptive; and, all Perception is in Parts, and is dividable, and compoundable, as being Material; also, Alterable, as being Self-moving: Wherefore, no Creature that is composed, or consists of many several sorts of Corporeal Figurative Motions, but must have many sorts of Perception; which is the reason that one Creature, as Man, cannot perceive another Man any otherwise but in Parts: for, the Rational, and Sensitive; nay, all the Parts of one and the same Creature, perceive their Adjoining Parts, as they perceive Foreign Parts; only, by their close conjunction and near relation, they unite in one and the same actions. I do not say, they always agree: for, when they move irregularly, they disagree: And some of those United Parts, will move after one manner, and some after another; but, when they move regularly, then they move to one and the same Design, or one and the same United Action. So, although a Creature is composed of several sorts of Corporeal Motions; yet, these several sorts, being properly united in one Creature, move all agreeably to the Property and Nature of the whole Creature; that is, the particular Parts move according to the property of the whole Creature; because the particular Parts, by conjunction, make the Whole: So that, the several Parts make one Whole; by which, a Whole Creature hath both a general Knowledg, and a Knowledg of Parts; whereas, the Perceptions of Foreign Objects, are but in the Parts: and this is the reason why one Creature perceives not the Whole of another Creature, but only some Parts. Yet this is to be noted, That not any Part hath another Part's Nature, or Motion, nor therefore, their Knowledg, or Perception; but, by agreement, and unity of Parts, there is composed Perceptions.
CHAP. IV. Whether the Rational and Sensitive Parts have a Perception of each other.
Some may ask the Question, _Whether the Rational and Sensitive, have Perception of each other?_ I answer: In my Opinion, they have. For, though the Rational and Sensitive Parts, be of two sorts; yet, both sorts have Self-motion; so that they are but as one, as, that they are both Corporeal Motions; and, had not the Sensitive Parts incumbrances, they would be, in a degree, as agil, and as free as the Rational. But, though each sort hath perception of each other, and some may have the like; yet they have not the same: for, not any Part can have another's Perception, or Knowledg; but, by reason the Rational and Sensitive, are both Corporeal Motions, there is a strong sympathy between those sorts, in one Conjunction, or Creature. Indeed, the Rational Parts are the Designing Parts; and the Sensitive, the Labouring Parts; and the Inanimate are as the Material Parts: not but all the three sorts are Material Parts; but the Inanimate, being not Self-moving, are the Burdensome Parts.
CHAP. V. Of Thoughts, and the whole Mind of a Creature.
AS for Thoughts, though they are several Corporeal Motions, or Self-moving Parts; yet, being united, by Conjunction in one Creature, into one whole Mind, cannot be perceived by some Parts of another Creature, nor by the same sort of Creature, as by another Man. But some may ask, _Whether the whole Mind of one Creature, as the whole Mind of one Man, may not perceive the whole Mind of another Man_? I answer, That if the Mind was not joyn'd and mix'd with the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts, and had not interior, as well as exterior Parts, the whole Mind of one Man, might perceive the whole Mind of another Man; but, that being not possible, one whole Mind cannot perceive another whole Mind: By which Observation we may perceive, there are no _Platonick Lovers_ in Nature. But some may ask, Whether the Sensitive Parts can perceive the Rational, in one and the same Creature? I answer, They do; for if they did not, it were impossible for the Sensitive Parts to execute the Rational Designs; so that, what the Mind designs, the Sensitive Body doth put in execution, as far as they have Power: But if, through Irregularities, the Body be sick, and weak, or hath some Infirmities, they cannot execute the Designs of the Mind.
CHAP. VI. Whether the Mind of one Creature, can perceive the Mind of another Creature.
Some may ask the reason, _Why one Creature, as Man, cannot perceive the Thoughts of another Man, as well as he perceives his exterior Sensitive Parts?_ I answer, That the Rational Parts of one Man, perceive as much of the Rational Parts of another Man, as the Sensitive Parts of that Man doth of the Sensitive Parts of the other Man; that is, as much as is presented to his Perception: for, all Creatures, and every part and particle, have those three sorts of Matter; and therefore, every part of a Creature is perceiving, and perceived. But, by reason all Creatures are composed of Parts, (_viz._ both of the Rational and Sensitive) all Perceptions are in parts, as well the Rational, as the Sensitive Perception: yet, neither the Rational, nor the Sensitive, can perceive all the Interior Parts or Corporeal Motions, unless they were presented to their perception: Neither can one Part know the Knowledg and Perception of another Part: but, what Parts of one Creature are subject to the perception of another Creature, those are perceived.
CHAP. VII. Of Perception, and Conception.
Although the Exterior Parts of one Creature, can but perceive the Exterior Parts of another Creature; yet, the Rational can make Conceptions of the Interior Parts, but not Perception: for, neither the Sense, nor Reason, can perceive what is not present, but by rote, as after the manner of Conceptions, or Remembrances, as I shall in my following Chapters declare: So that, the Exterior Rational Parts, that are with the Exterior Sensitive Parts of an Object, are as much perceived, the one, as the other: but, those Exterior Parts of an Object, not moving in particular Parties, as in the whole Creature, is the cause that some Parts of one Creature, cannot perceive the whole Composition or Frame of another Creature: that is, some of the Rational Parts of one Creature, cannot perceive the whole Mind of another Creature. The like of the Sensitive Parts.
CHAP. VIII. Of Human Suppositions.
Although Nature hath an Infinite Knowledg and Perception; yet, being a Body, and therefore divisible and compoundable; and having, also, Self-motion, to divide and compound her Infinite Parts, after infinite several manners; is the reason that her finite Parts, or particular Creatures, cannot have a general or infinite Knowledg, being limited, by being finite, to finite Perceptions, or perceptive Knowledg; which is the cause of _Suppositions_, or Imaginations, concerning Forrein Objects: As for example, A Man can but perceive the Exterior Parts of another Man, or any other Creature, that is subject to Human Perception; yet, his Rational Parts may suppose, or presuppose, what another Man thinks, or what he will act: and for other Creatures, a Man may suppose or imagine what the innate nature of such a Vegetable, or Mineral, or Element is; and may imagine or suppose the Moon to be another World, and that all the fixed Starrs are Sunns; which Suppositions, Man names _Conjectures_.
CHAP. IX. Of Information between several Creatures.
No question but there is _Information_ between all Creatures: but, several sorts of Creatures, having several sorts of Informations, it is impossible for any particular sort to know, or have perceptions of the Infinite, or Numberless Informations, between the Infinite and Numberless Parts, or Creatures of Nature: Nay, there are so many several Informations amongst one sort (as of Mankind) that it is impossible for one Man to perceive them all; no, nor can one Man generally perceive the particular Informations that are between the particular Parts of his Sensitive Body; or between the particular Informations of his Rational Body; or between the particular Rational and Sensitive Parts: much less can Man perceive, or know the several Informations of other Creatures.
CHAP. X. The Reason of several kinds and sorts of Creatures.
Some may ask, _Why there are such sorts of Creatures, as we perceive there are, and not other sorts?_ I answer, That, 'tis probable, we do not perceive all the several kinds and sorts of Creatures in Nature: In truth, it is impossible (if Nature be Infinite) for a Finite to perceive the Infinite varieties of Nature._ Also they may ask, Why the Planets are of a Spherical Shape, and Human Creatures are of an Upright shape, and Beasts of a Bending and stooping shape? Also, Why Birds are made to flye, and not Beasts? And for what Cause, or Design, have Animals such and such sorts of shapes and properties? And Vegetables such and such sorts of shapes and properties? And so of Minerals and Elements?_ I answer; That several sorts, kinds, and differences of Particulars, causes Order, by reason it causes Distinctions: for, if all Creatures were alike, it would cause a Confusion.
CHAP. XI. Of the several Properties of several Kinds and sorts of Creatures.
As I have said, There are several kinds, and several sorts, and several particular Creatures of several kinds and sorts; whereof there are some Creatures of a mixt kind, and some of a mixt sort, and some of a mixture of some particulars. Also, there are some kind of Creatures, and sorts of Creatures; as also Particulars of a Dense Nature, others of a Rate Nature; some of a Leight Nature, some of a Heavy Nature; some of a Bright Nature, some of a Dark Nature; some of an Ascending Nature, some of a Descending Nature; some of a Hard Nature, some of a Soft Nature; some of a Loose Nature, and some of a Fixt Nature; some of an Agil Nature, and some of a Slow Nature; some of a Consistent Nature, and some of a Dissolving Nature: All which is according to the Frame and Form of their Society, or Composition.
The Third Part.
CHAP. I. Of Productions in general.
The Self-moving Parts, or Corporeal Motions, are the Producers of all Composed Figures, such as we name _Creatures_: for, though all Matter hath Figure, by being Matter; for it were non-sense to say, _Figureless Matter_; since the most pure Parts of Matter, have Figure, as well as the grossest; the rarest, as well as the densed: But, such Composed Figures which we name _Creatures_, are produced by particular Associations of Self-moving Parts, into particular kinds, and sorts; and particular Creatures in every kind, or sort. The particular kinds, that are subject to Human Perceptions, are those we name Animals, Vegetables, Minerals, and Elements; of which kinds, there are numerous sorts; and of every sort, infinite particulars: And though there be Infinite Varieties in Nature, made by the Corporeal Motions, or Self-moving Parts, which might cause a Confusion: Yet, considering Nature is intire in her self, as being only Material, and as being but one United Body; also, poysing all her Actions by Opposites; 'tis impossible to be any ways in Extreams, or to have a Confusion.
CHAP. II. Of Productions in general.
The Sensitive Self-moving Parts, or Corporeal Motions, are the Labouring Parts of all Productions, or Fabricks of all Creatures; but yet, those Corporeal Motions, are parts of the Creature they produce: for, Production is only a Society of particular Parts, that joyn into particular Figures, or Creatures: but, as Parts produce Figures, by Association; so they dissolve those Figures by Division: for, Matter is a perpetual Motion, that is always dividing and composing; so that not any Creature can be eternally one and the same: for, if there were no Dissolvings, and Alterings, there would be no varieties of Particulars; for, though the kinds and sorts may last, yet not the Particulars. But, mistake me not, I do not say those Figures are lost,
or annihilated in Nature; but only, their Society is dissolved, or divided in Nature. But this is to be noted, That some Creatures are sooner produced and perfected, than others; and again, some Creatures are sooner decayed, or dissolved.
CHAP. III. Of Productions in general.