Part 13

I answer: Were it never so pure, it would be in the List or Circle of Body: and certainly, the purest Substance, must have the Properties of Body, as, to be divisible, and capable to be united and compounded; and being divisible and compoundable, it would have the same Properties that grosser Parts have: but, if there be any difference, certainly the purest Substance would be more apt to divide and unite, or compound, than the grosser sort. But, as to those sorts of Substance, which some Learned Men have imagined; in my opinion, they are but the same sort of Substance that the Vulgar call, _Thoughts_, and I name, the _Rational Parts_; which, questionless, are as truly Body, as the grossest Parts in Nature: but, most Human Creatures are so troubled with the Thoughts of Dissolving, and Dis-uniting, that they turn Fancies and Imaginations, into Spirits, or Spiritual Substances; as if all the other Parts of their Bodies, should become Rational Parts; that is, that all their Parts should turn into such Parts as Thoughts, which I name, the _Rational Parts_. But that Opinion is impossible: for, Nature cannot alter the nature of any Part; nor can any Part alter its own Nature; neither can the Rational Parts be divided from the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts, by reason those Three sorts constitute but one Body, as being Parts of one Body. But, put the case that the Rational Parts might divide and subsist without the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts; yet, as I said, they must of necessity have the Properties and Nature of a Body, which is, to be divisible, and capable to be united, and so to be Parts: for, it is impossible for a Body, were it the most pure, to be indivisible.

CHAP. II. Of an IMMATERIAL.

I Cannot conceive how an Immaterial can be in Nature: for, first, An Immaterial cannot, in my opinion, be naturally created; nor can I conceive how an Immaterial can produce particular Immaterial Souls, Spirits, or the like. Wherefore, an Immaterial, in my opinion, must be some uncreated Being; which can be no other than GOD alone. Wherefore, Created Spirits, and Spiritual Souls, are some other thing than an Immaterial: for surely, if there were any other Immaterial Beings, besides the Omnipotent God, those would be so near the Divine Essence of God, as to be petty gods; and numerous petty gods, would, almost, make the Power of an Infinite God. But, God is Omnipotent, and only God.

CHAP. III. Whether an Immaterial be Perceivable.

Whatsoever is Corporeal, is Perceivable; that is, may be perceived in some manner or other, by reason it hath a Corporeal Being: but, what Being an Immaterial hath, no Corporeal can perceive. Wherefore, no Part in Nature can perceive an Immaterial, because it is impossible to have a perception of that, which is not to be perceived, as not being an Object fit and proper for Corporeal Perception. In truth, an Immaterial is no Object, because no Body.

But some may say, that, _A Corporeal may have a Conception, although not a Perception, of an Immaterial_.

I answer, That, surely, there is an innate Notion of God, in all the Parts of Nature; but not a perfect knowledg: for if there was, there would not be so many several Opinions, and Religions, amongst one Kind, or rather, sort of Creatures, as Mankind, as there are; insomuch, that there are but few of one and the same Opinion, or Religion: but yet, that Innate Notion of God, being in all the Parts of Nature, God is infinitely and eternally worshipped and adored, although after several manners and ways; yet, all manners and ways, are joyned in one Worship, because the Parts of Nature are joyned into one Body.

CHAP. IV. Of the Differences between God, and Nature.

God is an Eternal Creator; Nature, his Eternal Creature. GOD, an Eternal Master: Nature, GOD's Eternal Servant. GOD is an Infinite and Eternal Immaterial Being: Nature, an Infinite Corporeal Being. GOD is Immovable, and Immutable: Nature, Moving, and Mutable. GOD is Eternal, Indivisible, and of an Incompoundable Being: Nature, Eternally Divisible and Compoundable. GOD, Eternally Perfect: Nature, Eternally Imperfect. GOD, Eternally Inalterable: Nature Eternally Alterable. GOD, without Error: Nature, full of Irregularities. GOD knows exactly, or perfectly, Nature: Nature doth not perfectly know GOD. GOD is Infinitely and Eternally worshipped: Nature is the Eternal and Infinite Worshipper.

CHAP. V. All the Parts of Nature worship God.

All Creatures (as I have said) have an Innate Notion of GOD; and as they have a Notion of God, so they have a Notion to worship GOD: but, by reason Nature is composed of Parts; so is the Infinite Worship to God: and, as several Parts are dividing and uniting after several kinds, sorts, manners and ways; so is their Worship to GOD: but, the several manners and ways of Worship, make not the Worship to GOD less: for certainly, all Creatures Worship and Adore GOD; as we may perceive by the Holy Scripture, where it says, _Let the Heavens, Earth, and all that therein is, praise God._ But 'tis probable, that some of the Parts being Creatures of Nature, may have a fuller Notion of GOD than others; which may cause some Creatures to be more Pious and Devout, than others: but, the Irregularity of Nature, is the cause of Sin.

CHAP. VI. Whether GOD's Decrees are limited.

In my opinion, though God is Inalterable, yet no ways bounded or limited: for, though GOD's Decrees are fixt, yet, they are not bound: but, as GOD hath an Infinite Knowledg, He hath also an Infinite Fore-knowledg; and so, fore-knows Nature's Actions, and what He will please to decree Nature to do: so that, GOD knows what Nature can act, and what she will act; as also, what He will decree: and this is the cause, that some of the Creature's or Parts of Nature, especially Man, do believe _Predestination_. But surely, GOD hath an Omnipotent Divine Power, which is no ways limited: for GOD, being above the nature of Nature, cannot have the Actions of Nature, because GOD cannot make Himself no GOD; neither can He make Himself more than what he is, He being the All-powerful, Omnipotent, Infinite, and Everlasting Being.

CHAP. VII. Of GOD's Decrees concerning the particular Parts of Nature.

Though Nature's Parts have Free-will, of Self-motion; yet, they have not Free-will to oppose _GOD's Decrees_: for, if some Parts cannot oppose other Parts, being over-power'd, it is probable, that the Parts of Nature cannot oppose the All-powerful Decrees of _GOD_. But, if it please the All-powerful _GOD_ to permit the Parts of Nature to act as they please, according to their own natural Will; and, upon condition, if they act so, they shall have such Rewards as Nature may be capable to receive; or such Punishments as Nature is capable of; then the Omnipotent _GOD_ doth not predestinate those Rewards, or Punishments, any otherwise than the Parts of Nature do cause by their own Actions. Thus all Corporeal Actions, belong to Corporeal Parts; but, the Rewards and Punishments, to _GOD_ alone: but, what those Punishments and Blessings are, no particular Creature is capable to know: for, though a particular Creature knows there is a _GOD_; yet, not what _GOD_ is: so, although particular Creatures know there are Rewards and Punishments; yet, not what those Rewards and Punishments are. But mistake me not; for I mean the general Rewards and Punishments to all Creatures: but 'tis probable, that _GOD_ might decree Nature, and her Parts, to make other sorts of Worlds, besides this World; of which Worlds, this may be as ignorant, as a particular Human Creature is of _GOD_. And therefore, it is not probable (since we cannot possibly know all the Parts of Nature, of which we are parts) that we should know the Decrees of _GOD_, or the manners and ways of Worship, amongst all kinds and sorts of Creatures.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Ten Commandments.

In my opinion, the Notions Man hath of _GOD's Commands_ concerning their Behaviour and Actions to Himself, and their Fellow-Creatures, is the very same that Moses writ, and presented to all those of whom he was Head and Governour. But, mistake me not, I mean only the _Ten Commandments_; which Commandments are a sufficient Rule for all Human Creatures: and certainly, _GOD_ had decreed, that Moses should be a wise Man, and should publish these wise Commands. But, the Interpretation of the Law must be such, as not to make it no such Law: but, by reason Nature is as much Irregular, as Regular, Human Notions are also Irregular, as much as Regular; which causes great variety of Religions: and their Actions being also Irregular, is the cause that the practise of Human Creatures is Irregular; and that occasions Irregular Devotions, and is the cause of SIN.

CHAP. IX. Of Several RELIGIONS.

Concerning _the several Religions_, and several Opinions in Religions, which are like several Kinds and Sorts; the Question is,

_Whether all Mankind could be perswaded to be of one Religion, or Opinion?_

The opinion of the Minor part of my Thoughts, was, That all men might be perswaded.

And, the opinion of the Major part of my Thoughts, was, That Nature, being divisible and compoundable, and having Free-will, as well as Self-motion; and being Irregular, as well as Regular; as also, Variable, taking delight in variety; it was impossible for all Mankind to be of one _Religion_, or _Opinion_.

The opinion of the Minor part of my Thoughts, 246,$ was, That the Grace of GOD could perswade all Men to one Opinion.

The Major part of my Thoughts was of opinion, That GOD might decree or command Nature: but, to alter Nature's nature, could not be done, unless GOD, by his Decree, would annihilate this Nature, and create another Nature, and such a Nature as was not like this Nature: for, it is the nature of this Material Nature, to be Alterable; as also, to be Irregular, as well as Regular; and, being Regular, and Irregular, was a fit and proper Subject for GOD's Justice, and Mercies; Punishments, and Rewards.

CHAP. X. Of Rules and Prescriptions.

As Saint Paul said, _We could not know Sin, but by the Law_; so, we could not know what Punishment we could or should suffer, but by the Law; not only Moral, but Divine Law.

But, some may ask, _What is Law?_

I answer: Law is, Limited Prescriptions and Rules.

But, some may ask, _Whether all Creatures in Nature, have Prescriptions and Rules?_

I answer: That, for any thing Man can know to the contrary, all Creatures may have some Natural Rules: but, every Creature may chuse whether they will follow those Rules; I mean, such Rules as they are capable to follow or practise: for, several kinds and sorts of Creatures, cannot possibly follow one and the same Prescription and Rule. Wherefore, Divine Prescriptions and Rules, must be, according to the sorts and kinds of Creatures; and yet, all Creatures may have a Notion, and so an Adoration of God, by reason all the Parts in Nature, have Notions of God. But, concerning particular Worships, those must be Prescriptions and Rules; or else, they are according to every particular Creature's conception or choice.

CHAP. XI. Sins and Punishments, are Material.

As all Sins are Material, so are Punishments: for, Material Creatures, cannot have Immaterial Sins; nor can Material Creatures be capable of Immaterial Punishments; which may be proved out of the Sacred Scripture: for, all the Punishments that are declared to be in Hell, are Material Tortures: nay, Hell it self is described to be Material; and not only Hell, but Heaven, is described to be Material. But, whether Angels, and Devils, are Material, that is not declared: for, though they are named Spirits, yet we know not whether those Spirits be Immaterial. But, considering that Hell and Heaven is described to be

Material, it is probable, Spirits are also Material: nay, our blessed Saviour Christ, who is in Heaven, with God the Father, hath a Material Body; and in that Body will come attended by all the Hosts of Heaven, to judg the quick and the dead; which quick and dead, are the Material Parts of Nature: which could not be actually judged and punished, but by a Material Body, as Christ hath. But, pray mistake me not; I say, They could not be actually judged and punished; that is, not according to Nature, as Material Actions: for, I do not mean here, Divine and Immaterial Decrees. But Christ, being partly Divine, and partly Natural; may be both a Divine and Natural Judg.

CHAP. XII. Of Human Conscience.

The Human Notions of GOD, Man calls _Conscience_: but, by reason that Nature is full of Varieties, as having Self-moving Parts; Human Creatures have different Notions, and so different Consciences, which cause different Opinions and Devotions: but, Nature being as much compoundable as dividable, it causes unity of some, as also, divisions of other Opinions, which is the cause of several Religions: which Religions, are several Communities and Divisions. But, as for Conscience, and holy Notions, they being Natural, cannot be altered by force, without a Free-will: so that the several Societies, or Communicants, commit an Error, if not a Sin, to endeavour to compel their Brethren to any particular Opinion: and, to prove it is an Error, or Sin, the more earnest the _Compellers_ are, the more do the _Compelled_ resist; which hath been the cause of many Martyrs. But surely, all Christians should follow the Example of Christ, who was like a meek Lamb, not a raging Lyon: neither did Christ command his Apostles to Persecute; but, to suffer Persecution patiently. Wherefore, _Liberty of Conscience_ may be allowed, conditionally, it be no ways a prejudice to the Peaceable Government of the State or Kingdom.

The Second Part.

CHAP. I. Whether it is possible there could be Worlds consisting only of the Rational Parts, and others only of the Sensitive Parts.

The Parts of my Mind did argue amongst themselves, _Whether there might not be several kinds and sorts of Worlds in Infinite Nature?_

And they all agreed, That probably there might be several kinds and sorts of Worlds.

But afterwards, the Opinion of the Major parts of my Mind, was, That it is not possible: for, though the Rational parts of Nature move free, without Burdens of the Inanimate Parts; yet, being Parts of the same Body, (viz. of the Body of Nature) they could not be divided from the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts; nor the Sensitive and Inanimate Parts, from the Rational.

The Opinion of the Minor Parts of my Mind, was, That a Composed World, of either degree, was not a division from the Infinite Body of Nature, though they might divide so much, as to compose a World meerly of their own Degree.

The Major's Opinion was, That it was impossible; because the three Degrees, Rational, Sensitive, and Inanimate, were naturally joyned as one Body, or Part.

The Minor's Opinion was, That a World might be naturally composed only of Rational Parts, as a Human Mind is only composed of Rational Parts; or, as the Rational Parts of a Human Creature, could compose themselves into several Forms, _viz._ into several sorts and kinds of Worlds, without the assistance of the Sensitive or the Inanimate Parts: for, they fancy Worlds which are composed in Human Minds, without the assistance of the Sensitive.

The Major Part agreed, That the Rational Corporeal Actions, were free; and all their Architectors were of their own Degree: but yet, they were so joyned in every Part and Particle, to the Sensitive and Inanimate, as they could not separate from these two Degrees: for, though they could divide and unite from, and to Particulars, as either of their own Degrees, or the other Degrees; yet, the Three Degrees being but as one united Body, they could not so divide, as not to be joyned to the other Degrees: for, it was impossible for a Body to divide it self from it self.

After this Argument, there followed another; _That, if it were possible there could be a World composed only of the Rational Parts, without the other two Degrees; Whether that World would be a Happy World?_

The Major Part's Opinion was, That, were it possible there could be such unnatural Divisions, those divide Parts would be very unhappy: for, the Rational Parts would be much unsatisfied without the Sensitive; and the Sensitive very dull without the Rational: also, the Sensitive Architectors would be very Irregular, wanting their Designing Parts, which are the Rational Parts.

Upon which Argument, all the Parts of my Mind agreed in this Opinion, That the Sensitive was so Sociable to the Rational, and the Rational so Assisting to the Sensitive, and the Inanimate Parts so necessary to the Sensitive Architectors, that they would not divide from each other, if they could.

CHAP. II. Of Irregular and Regular Worlds.

Some Parts of my Mind were of opinion, _That there might be a World composed only of Irregularities; and another, only of Regularities: and some, that were partly composed of the one, and the other._

The Minor Part's Opinion was, That all Worlds were composed partly of the one, and partly of the other; because all Nature's Actions were poysed with Opposites, or Contraries: wherefore, there could not be a World only of Irregularities, and another of Regularities.

The Major Part's Opinion, was, That Nature's Actions were as much poysed by the contrary Actions of Two Worlds, as by the contrary Actions of the Parts of One World, or one Creature: As for example, The Peace and Trouble, Health and Sickness, Pain and Ease, and the like, of one Human Creature; and so of the contrary Natures of several kinds and sorts of Creatures of one and the same World.

After which Discourse, they generally agreed, There might be Regular and Irregular Worlds; the one sort to be such happy Worlds, as that they might be named Blessed Worlds; the other so miserable Worlds, as might be named Cursed Worlds.

CHAP. III. Whether there be Egress and Regress between the Parts of several Worlds.

There arose a Third Argument, _viz. Whether it was possible for some of the Creatures of several Worlds, to remove, so as to remove out of one World, into another?_

The Major Part's Opinion was, That it was possible for some Creatures: for, if some particular Creatures could move all over the World, of which they were a part, they might divide from the Parts of the World they were of, and joyn with the Parts of another World.

The Minor Part's Opinion was, That they might travel all over the World they were part of, but not to joyn with the Parts of another World, to which they belong not.

The Major's Opinion was, That every Part and Particle, belonged to the Infinite Body of Nature, and therefore not any Part could account it self not of the Infinite Body; and being so, then every Part of Nature may joyn, and divide from and to particular Parts, as they please, if there were not Obstructions and Hindrances, and some Parts did not obstruct other Parts: Wherefore, if there were not Obstructions, there might be Egress and Regress amongst the particular Parts of several Worlds.

The Minor's Opinion was, That if it could be according to the Major's Opinion, it would cause an Infinite Confusion in Infinite Nature: for, every Creature of every World, was composed according to the Nature and Compositions of the World they were of: wherefore, the Products of one kind or sort of Worlds, would not be sutable, agreeable, and Regular, to the productions of another kind.

The Major Part's Opinion was, That it was impossible, since Nature is one united Body, without _Vacuum_, but that the Parts of all Worlds must have Egress and Regress.

CHAP. IV. Whether the Parts of one and the same Society, could, after their Dissolution, meet and unite.

The Fifth Argument, was partly of the same Subject, _viz. Whether the particular Parts of a Creature, (such as a Human Creature is) could travel out of one World into another, after the dissolution of his Human Life?_

The Major Part's Opinion was, That they could.

The Minor's Opinion was, They could not; because the particular Parts so divided and joyned to and from other particular Parts and Societies, as it was impossible, if they would, so to agree, as to divide from those Parts and Societies they are joyned to, and from those they must joyn with, to meet in another World, and joyn as they would, in the same Society they were of, when the whole Society is dissolved. Neither can Parts divide and joyn, as they would: for, though Self-moving Parts have a Free-will to move; yet, being subject to Obstructions, they must move as they can: for, no particular Part hath an absolute Power. Wherefore, the Dispersed Parts of a Dissolved Society, cannot meet and joyn as they would. Besides, every Part is as much affected to one Sort, Kind, or Particular, they are Parts of, as to another. Besides, the Knowledg of every Part alters, according as their Actions alter: so that the Parts of one and the same Society, after division, have no more knowledg of that Society.

CHAP. V. Whether, if a Creature being Dissolved, and could Unite again, would be the same.

The Sixth Argument was, _That, put the case it were possible all the several Parts belonging to one and the same Society; as for example, To one Human Creature, after his Human Life was dissolved, and his Parts dispersed, and afterwards, all those Parts meeting and uniting; Whether that Human Creature would be the same?_

The Minor Part's Opinion was, That it could not be the same Society: for, every Creature was according to the nature of their Kind or Sort; and so according to the Form and Magnitude of one of their Kind or Sort.

The Major Part's Opinion was, That though the Nature of every particular Creature had such Forms, Shapes, and Properties, as was natural to that sort of Creatures they were of; yet, the Magnitude of particular Creatures of one and the same sort, might be very different.

The Minor Part's Opinion was, That if all the Parts of one Society, as for example, a Man, from the first time of his Production, to the time of his Dissolution, should, after division, come to meet and unite; that Man, or any other Creature, would be a Monstrous Creature, as having more Parts than was agreeable to the nature of his Kind.

The Major Part's Opinion was, That though the Society, viz. The MAN, would be a Society of greater Magnitude; yet, not any ways different from the Nature of his Kind.

CHAP. VI. Of the Resurrection of Human Kind.

The Seventh Argument, was, _Whether all the particular Parts of every Human Creature, at the time of the Resurrection, be, to meet and joyn, as being of one and the same Society?_

The Minor Part's Opinion was, They shall not: for, if all those Parts that had been of the same Body and Mind of one Man, from his first Production, to the last of his Dissolution; or, from his Birth, to the time of his Death, (supposing him to have liv'd long) should meet and joyn, as one Society, that is, as one Man; that Man, at the time of his Resurrection, would be a Gyant; and if so, then old Men would be Gyants; and young Children, Dwarfs.

The Major Part's Opinion was, That, if it was not so, then every particular Human Society would be imperfect at the time of their Resurrection: for, if they should only rise with some of their Parts, as (for example) when they were in the strength of their Age, then all those Parts that had been either before, or after that time, would be unjustly dealt with, especially if Man be the best Product in Nature. Besides, if a dead Child did rise a Man, as at his most perfect Age, it could not be said, He rises according to a Natural Man, having more Parts than by Nature he ever had; and an old Man, fewer Parts than naturally he hath had: so, what by Adding and Diminishing the Parts of particular Men, it would not cause only Injustice; but, not any particular Human Creature, would be the same he was.

CHAP. VII. Of the Dissolution of a World.