Chapter 23

The Liberal regime, having few roots in the soil and those rotten, could not but be ephemeral, unless the external force that had planted continued to uphold it: in which case M. Venizelos might have lived to weep over the triumph of his cause and the ruin of his country. This contingency, however, was eliminated in advance by the clashing ambitions of the Allies--the real guarantee of Greek independence. Foreign interference, made possible by the War, had to cease with it. And that was not all. M. Ribot, on 16 July, 1917, had declared in the French Senate that the changes brought about in Greece would have to be ratified by a Greek National Assembly. M. Venizelos also had, as we saw, stated on his advent that the 1915 Chamber was but a temporary solution: that in due time a Constituent Assembly would be elected to settle matters--a statement which he repeated shortly afterwards in Parliament: "The representatives of the Nation," he said, "watch with perfect calmness the internal evolution of the political life of the country and wait for the removal of the obstacles which do not permit the immediate convocation of the National Assembly that will lay definitely the basis of the State."

After nearly three years of "internal evolution," the time for the redemption of these pledges seemed to the people overdue. In vain did M. Venizelos endeavour to put off the day of trial by arguing that it was advisable to avoid the agitation inseparable from an election whilst Greece was still at war with Turkey, and by promising that the elections would follow close upon the signature of peace. It was natural that he should adopt this course: he could not but hope that the fruits of his foreign policy--fruits never even dreamt of a few years before--would reconcile the people to his domestic administration. It was equally natural that the people should be impatient: {218} Turkey may not sign peace for ages, they protested; meanwhile are we to go on living under martial law? They demanded the dissolution of the illegal and, at best, long superannuated Chamber, and fresh elections. The call for freedom grew louder, more insistent, more imperious and dangerous, until M. Venizelos took a first tentative step towards a return to normality.

On 6 May, 1920--the day of the publication of the Turkish Peace terms granted by the Allies at San Remo--a Royal Decree was issued at Athens abolishing martial law. As at a signal, the Press turned its search-lights on the inroads made into the Constitution. Abuses and excesses hitherto held back by the Censorship gained publicity. Political groups started organizing themselves for the electoral contest, with every grievance of the past as an incitement to action in the future. Most disturbing manifestation of all--though one that might have been foretold--streets and taverns resounded again with the song in which King Constantine was referred to as "The Son of the Eagle" leading his army to glory. Evidently the efforts to root up loyalism had not succeeded: far from it.

While M. Venizelos grew less by his elevation, King Constantine was raised by his humiliation to a condition, if not actually divine, half-way towards divinity. In many a house his portrait stood among the holy icons, with a light burning before it, and the peasants worshipped it much as their pagan ancestors would have done. It was but the culmination of a process long at work--a process in which the historical element was strangely mingled with the mythical.[1] Since the Balkan Wars, King Constantine had been identified in the peasant mind with the last Byzantine _Basileus_--his namesake, Constantine Palaeologus, slain by the Turks in 1453; who, according to a widely believed legend, lay in an enchanted sleep waiting for the hour when he should wake, break with his sword the chains of slavery, and replant the cross {219} on the dome of Saint Sophia. This singular fancy--whether a case of resurrection or of reincarnation, is not clear--was strengthened by the fact that his fall occurred on the very anniversary (29 May/11 June) of the day on which that unfortunate Emperor fell in the ramparts of Constantinople. The coincidence completed the association between the monarch who sacrificed his life to save his people from subjection and the monarch who, after leading his army in two victorious campaigns and doubling the extent of his country, did not hesitate to sacrifice his crown to save his people from disaster. Henceforth, even in minds not prone to superstition, the two events were linked by the same date, the mourning for the one rekindled the memory of the other, and King Constantine acquired a new and imperishable title to the gratitude of the nation. If all the efforts made in the past to blast his glory or to belittle his services had only heightened his popularity, all the efforts made since to blot out his image could only engrave it still deeper on the hearts of the people. His very exile was interpreted, symbolically, as the enchanted sleep whence he would arise to fulfil the ancient prophecies.

Mysticism apart, during the sad period preceding his departure, the affection of the masses for their sovereign, intensified by compassion, had assumed the quality of veneration. Now that he was gone, they brooded over the wrongs which had driven him, a lawful and popular king, into exile: wrongs which suffered for their sakes enhanced his claims on their loyalty. They remembered wistfully the splendour of his victories, his manly courage, his saintly patience, and perhaps most of all his unfailing kindness to the humble and the weak. This was the quality which drew men most strongly to Constantine, and the absence of which repelled them most from M. Venizelos.[2] The experience of the last three years had helped to emphasize the contrast: when the Eagle's Son was up above, there were few vultures in the land; now there were vultures only. So the name of Constantine became a synonym for orderly government, loyalty to his person was identified with the principle of liberty, and the people who had never regarded Alexander as anything more than {220} a regent, who cried after the departing monarch from the shore at Oropus: "You shall come back to us soon," hailed the return to normality as presaging the return of the legitimate sovereign as well as of a legal Constitution.

This, however, was the very last thing the powers that were contemplated even as a remote potentiality. For them the monarch in exile was dead; and the sooner his memory was buried the better. Accordingly, a police circular, issued on 26 May, prohibited conversations favourable to the ex-king, pictures of the ex-king, songs in honour of the ex-king, cheers for the ex-king. And, these regulations having been found insufficient to curb royalist fervour, five days later M. Venizelos demanded and obtained from Parliament the re-establishment of martial law, on the ground that "talk about the return of the ex-king was calculated to excite public feeling; and then the Opposition might have cause to blame the Government for not respecting the freedom of elections." The question of the ex-king, he argued, was utterly irrelevant to the forthcoming contest: the people would not be called upon to elect a Constituent, but merely a Revisionist Assembly: "Who has said there is to be a Constituent Assembly?" he asked.

The answer, of course, was easy: he himself had said so, on his installation in 1917. But lapses of memory are permissible to statesmen who mean business. M. Venizelos wanted a National Assembly which would have powers to ratify the dethronement of the King, the suspension of the irremovability of judges, and all other revolutionary illegalities, besides perhaps altering fundamental articles of the Constitution--such as the right of the Crown to appoint and dismiss Ministers and to dissolve Parliaments--powers which essentially belong to a Constituent Assembly. But he wanted it to be merely Revisionist. The paradox made havoc of his logic; but it no way affected his purpose; which was that, while as Constituent in its nature the Assembly should effect any alterations in the government of the country that he desired, as Revisionist in name it would not be competent to discuss the restoration of the King, and, if it proved recalcitrant, would be subject to dissolution by the {221} executive. Consistency and M. Venizelos had been divorced long ago, and the decree was now to be made absolute.

While these eccentricities prevailed at home, abroad the gamester-spirit of the Cretan scored its crowning triumph. By the Treaty of Sèvres (10 Aug., 1920), which embodied the territorial arrangements already made at San Remo, Greece obtained practically the whole of Thrace outside the enclave of Constantinople, and a mandate over Smyrna and its hinterland. No doubt, this enormous extension of the kingdom, though still largely problematical, appealed to that compound of idealism and greed (mostly greed) which constitutes Hellenic, as it does all other, Imperialism. But it did not fully compensate for the suppression of popular liberties within its frontiers. Except among the followers of M. Venizelos the national aggrandisement evoked but little enthusiasm: "What is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" wrote one of the Opposition leaders, voicing a widespread sentiment--a sentiment which, only two days after the publication of the Treaty (12 Aug.), found sinister expression. As he was about to leave Paris, M. Venizelos was shot at and slightly wounded by two Greek ex-officers. The assailants, on being arrested, declared that their object had been "to free Greece from its oppressor and to ensure freedom for their fellow-citizens." [3]

The Paris outrage had a sequel at Athens, as significant and more tragic. The followers of M. Venizelos, like those of King Constantine, included a set of fanatics who preached that the salvation of the country demanded the extirpation of their adversaries. To these zealots the moment seemed propitious for putting their doctrine into practice. "Hellenes!" cried one of their journals, "our great Chief, our great patriot, the man who has made Greece great and prosperous, the man who has made us proud to be called Greeks, has been murdered by the instruments of the ex-King. Hellenes, rise up all of you, and drive the murderers out of the fatherland." The Hellenes in general remained unmoved. But some gangs of hooligans did rise up (13 Aug.) and, under the eyes of the police and the _gendarmerie_, wrecked a number of Royalist newspaper {222} offices, clubs, cafés, and sacked the houses of four prominent anti-Venizelist statesmen. The authorities, on their side, had a dozen leaders of Opposition groups thrown into prison and, pending their conviction, M. Repoulis, a Minister who in the absence of M. Venizelos acted as his Deputy, declared that the attempt on the Premier formed part of a plot long-planned for the overthrow of the regime: it had failed, but the heads of the culprits would fall without fail. In fact, one of the Opposition leaders--Ion Dragoumis, son of the ex-Premier of that name--was assassinated by the Cretan guards who had arrested him. The others, after being kept in solitary confinement for twenty-four days, had to be released for want of any incriminating evidence.

M. Venizelos in Paris, when he heard of the riots, was reported as being beside himself with righteous indignation; and he sent a strongly-worded telegram to the Government, expressing the fear that part of the responsibility for the disorders rested upon its organs, and assuring it that he should exact full account from everyone concerned.[4] But when he returned home he publicly embraced M. Repoulis, who explained in the Chamber to the entire satisfaction of his Chief that the Government had been overawed and very nearly overthrown by the extremists in its own ranks (8 Sept.).

Everything that could be done--short of a massacre--to disorganize and to intimidate the Opposition having been done, martial law was suspended (7 Sept.), and the question of Elections began to engage M. Venizelos's attention seriously. It was a trial which involved his political life or death, and therefore required the utmost care and vigilance: one ill-considered step, one omission on his part might send him to his doom.

He began with the enfranchisement of Thrace (9 Sept.). This province, still under military occupation and martial law, was to vote: further, a political frontier was erected between it and the rest of Greece, which only those possessing a special pass could cross, whilst a rigorous censorship kept all anti-Venizelist newspapers out of it; and, lastly, it was enacted, for the benefit of an electorate alien in its majority and unable to read or write Greek, that the {223} Thracian votes, contrary to the general rule, should be polled by ballot paper, instead of by a ball.

Another Bill enabled the army on active service, for the first time in the history of Greece, to participate in elections, the assumption being that among the soldiers Venizelist feeling predominated, or that, at all events, they would be controlled by their officers.

As exceptional importance has always attached to the district and city of Athens--"which," M. Venizelos said, "symbolizes the very soul of the country," [5]--it was incumbent upon him to pay special attention to this area. The difficulty was that the actual population was notoriously unsympathetic. M. Venizelos hastened to overcome this difficulty by three strokes of the pen: 18,000 refugees from all parts who lived on the Ministry of Public Relief were enrolled as Athenian citizens; to these were added some 6,000 Cretan gendarmes and policemen; and, to make up the deficiency, 15,000 natives of Smyrna, supposed to have earned Greek citizenship by volunteering in the war, had their names inscribed on the electoral lists of Attica.

There followed promises and warnings. On the one hand, the people were promised fresh labour legislation, the conversion of the great landed estates into small holdings, and public works on a large scale. On the other hand, they were warned that an adverse vote from them would have disastrous consequences for the country: Greece had been aggrandized by the Allies for the sake of M. Venizelos; if she discarded him, she would forfeit their goodwill and her territorial acquisitions. But M. Venizelos and his partisans did not trust altogether to the practical sense and the Imperialist sensibilities of the people.

For months past the extremists among his followers openly threatened that, if by any mishap Venizelos did not win the day after all, they would make a _coup d'état_ and strike terror into the hearts of their adversaries. This threat, which primarily presented itself as an extravagance of irresponsible fanaticism, was on 7 September officially espoused by M. Venizelos, who declared in Parliament that, should perchance his adversaries obtain a majority in the new Assembly, and should that Assembly decide {224} to convoke a Constituent Assembly, and should this Constituent Assembly invite King Constantine back, the "Reaction" would find itself confronted with the hostility of a large political party which had become the mortal enemy of the ex-king; and he went on to foreshadow a fresh schism in the army: that is, civil war. Encouraged by so solemn a sanction, Venizelist candidates--notably at Tyrnavo in Thessaly and Dervenion in Argolis--told their constituents without any circumlocution that, in the event of a defeat at the polls, the Government would not surrender its power, but would maintain it through the Army of National Defence, which was pledged to a new Revolution: the Parliamentary system would cease to function even in name, and many a malignant would swing.

These appeals to the sovereign people, published in the Royalist and not contradicted by the Venizelist Press, will doubtless seem startling for a Government whose mission was to establish democratic liberties. But they were justified by necessity. M. Venizelos and his partisans could not afford to be very fastidious: their political existence was at stake: they must make every effort, and summon every resource at their command. Anyone who was in Athens at that time and saw the Cretan guards, often with the Premier's photograph pinned on their breasts, assault such citizens as displayed the olive-twig (emblem of the Opposition), or saw the gendarmes, who patrolled the streets with fixed bayonets, protect the excesses of Venizelist bravoes, would appreciate how far the Government was prepared to stoop in order to survive.

In the midst of these electoral activities, King Alexander died--of blood poisoning caused by the bite of a pet monkey. Alive he had neither exercised nor been wanted to exercise any influence over the destinies of his country: he had simply played the part required by the cast in which a whimsical fortune had placed him. His death proved of more importance, inasmuch as it forced the question of the throne upon M. Venizelos irresistibly: the vacancy had to be filled. Anxious to perpetuate the comedy, M. Venizelos sought a successor in a still younger and less-experienced scion of the dynasty: Prince Paul, a lad in his teens, who refused the offer on the ground that, until his father and his eldest brother renounced their rights, {225} he could not lawfully ascend the throne. After threatening to change the dynasty rather than admit any discussion on the restoration of King Constantine, M. Venizelos, by one of those swift turns characteristic of him, suddenly made that restoration the main issue of the Elections. He challenged the Opposition to this test of the real wishes of the Greek people. The Greek people, he said, should be given the chance of deciding whether it will have Constantine back; and if it so decided, he himself would go.

The Opposition, which consisted of no fewer than sixteen different groups united only by a common desire to get rid of the Cretan Dictator, would fain decline the challenge. Some of the leaders were ardent Royalists; others were very lukewarm ones; and others still could hardly be described as Royalists at all. Generally speaking, the politicians out of office had found in the cause of Constantine a national badge for a party feud. Moreover, they realized that the question of Constantine possessed an international as well as a national aspect, and they did not wish to compromise the future of Greece and their own; which would have been nothing else than stepping into the very pit M. Venizelos had dug for them. But neither could they repudiate Constantine without losing popular support: to the Greek people the main issue of the fight was indeed what M. Venizelos made it.

At length the day of trial arrived: a Sunday (14 Nov.)--a day of leisure in a land of universal suffrage. From an early hour people of all classes thronged the polling-stations quietly. They had clamoured for a chance of expressing their sentiments; yet now that the chance had come, they took it with an extraordinary composure. Even to the most expert eye the electors' demeanour gave no indication of their sentiments: the olive-twig had very curiously withered out of sight. Nor did the behaviour of the voters in the last three years afford any clue to the use they would make of their present opportunity. Greeks are past masters of simulation and dissimulation. Openly some might have pretended friendship to the Venizelist regime from hopes of favour, others again dissembled hostility through fear; but the voting was secret.

Both Government and Opposition shared the suspense, {226} though the Government anticipated an overwhelming majority;[6] which was natural enough, since all the advantage seemed on its side.

Presently the votes were counted--and "it was officially announced that the Government had been mistaken in its anticipations." The magnitude of the mistake appeared on the publication of the figures: 250 seats to 118: the Royalists had swept the polls, to the astonishment of all parties, including their own.[7] The very men who had fought at the bidding of M. Venizelos had pronounced themselves against him: having fulfilled their duty as soldiers, they vindicated their right to live as free citizens. His own constituency had rejected him. And would the rout stop there? Among the millions who had submitted to his rule with sullen irritation there were many whose hearts swelled with rage, in whom old wounds rankled and festered: might not these men now have recourse to other weapons than the vote in order to get even with the bully?

For a moment M. Venizelos felt stupefied: the edifice that had seemed so solid was collapsing about him, and he was in danger of being buried under the ruins. Then he wisely stole out of the country he had done his best to aggrandize and to disintegrate.[8]

The result of the elections was virtually an invitation to King Constantine to return and resume his crown. But the King, not content with an indirect verdict, wanted an explicit plebiscite _ad hoc_, clear of all other issues. The Allies, after a conference in London, telegraphed (2 Dec.) {227} to M. Rallis, the new Greek Premier, that they "had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece, but they felt bound to declare publicly that the restoration of the throne to a king whose disloyal attitude and conduct towards the Allies during the War caused them great embarrassment and loss could only be regarded by them as a ratification by Greece of his hostile acts." [9] This message--yet another fruit of Franco-British compromise--was followed up (6 Dec.) by a second Note, enumerating the consequences, political and financial, of the Powers' displeasure. But it produced little effect: out of the 1,013,724 electors who took part in the plebiscite (7 Dec.), only 10,383 voted against the King.[10] M. Rallis, in acquainting him with the result, stated that he considered it tantamount to a formal request from the country to the Sovereign to come into his own again, and invited him to respond to the clearly expressed wish of the nation. Which King Constantine did, nothing loth.

Few of those who witnessed the event will ever forget it. On the eve of the King's return (18 Dec.) Athens could scarcely contain her emotion. All day long her beflagged streets rang with the cry: "_Erchetai! Erchetai!_" ("He is coming! He is coming!")--hardly anybody failed to utter it, and nobody dared to say "_Then erchetai_" ("He is not coming"), even if referring to an unpunctual friend. At night the song in which Constantine was alluded to as "The Son of the Eagle" echoed from one end of the illuminated city to the other. But this was only a preparation for next morning's welcome.

Owing to stress of weather the cruiser carrying the King and Queen of the Hellenes was compelled to put in at Corinth, where the exiles landed. From that point to the capital their journey was a triumphal progress. The train moved slowly between lines of peasants who, their hands linked, accompanied it, shouting: "We have wanted him! We have brought him back!" [3] When {228} the King stepped out at the station, officers fought a way to the carriage with blue and silver dressed postillions which waited for him and the Queen. He had to keep tossing from one hand to the other his baton, as men and women pressed upon him for a handshake. The carriage struggled forward, men and women clinging to its steps and running with it, trying to kiss the hands and feet of the royal pair, and baulked of this, kissing even the horses and the carriage itself. All the way dense masses of people pressed round the carriage, shouting: "He has come!" or singing the chorus, "Again our King will draw the sword." An eye-witness had a vision of a soldier who, amid cries of "We will die for you, Godfather!" clambered into the carriage head first and fell to kissing the knees of the King and Queen, while around people fainted and stretchers pressed through the crowd.[12]

And so the fight for the soul of Greece ended in a victory for Constantine.

The character of this prince has been painted in the most opposite colours, as must always be the case when a man becomes the object of fervent worship and bitter enmity. But the bare record of what he did and endured reveals him sufficiently. His qualities speak through his actions, so that he who runs may read. His most conspicuous defect was a want of suppleness--a certain rigidity of spirit which, when he succeeded, was called firmness, and when he failed, obstinacy. Yet the charge so often brought against him, that he allowed himself to be misled by evil counsellors, shows that this persistence in his own opinion did not spring from egoism nor was incompatible with deference to the opinions of others. It arose from a deep sense of responsibility: he stubbornly refused to deviate from his course when he believed that his duty to his country forbade deviation, and he readily laid down his crown when duty to his country dictated renunciation. For the rest, a man who never posed to his contemporaries may confidently leave his character to the judgment of posterity.

As for M. Venizelos, history will probably say of him {229} what it has said of Themistocles: Though he sincerely aimed at the aggrandizement of his country, and proved on some most critical occasions of great value to it, yet on the whole his intelligence was higher than his morality--a man of many talents and few principles, ready to employ the most tortuous and unscrupulous means, sometimes indeed for ends in themselves patriotic, but often merely for aggrandizing himself. By nature he was more fitted to rule in a despotic than to lead in a constitutional State. Had he been born an emperor, his fertile genius might, unless betrayed by his restless ambition, have rendered his reign prosperous and his memory precious. As it is, in his career, with all its brilliance, posterity will find not so much a pattern to imitate as an example to deter.

[1] There is always so much of mystery surrounding the peasant mind, that its workings must often be accepted rather than understood. But those who wish to understand somewhat the psychological process which led in antiquity to the deification of kings during their life-time could not do better than study the cult of Constantine among the modern Greek peasantry.

[2] See Vice-Admiral Mark Kerr, in the _Morning Post_, 13 Dec., 1920.

[3] The _Daily Mail_, Aug. 13, 1920.

[4] _Eleutheros Typos_, 5/18 Aug., 1920.

[5] The _New Europe_, 29 March, 1917, p. 327.

[6] "Even if the Opposition sweeps the Peloponnese and gains a majority in Acarnania and Corfu, it is still doubtful whether it will have 120 seats in the new Chamber, which will contain 369 Deputies; and the Venizelists anticipate that their opponents will emerge from the struggle with less than 100 Deputies."--_The Times_, 15 Nov., 1920.

[7] The _Daily Mail_; The _Evening News_, 16 Nov, 1920; Reuter, Athens, 15 Nov.: "Not a single Venizelist was returned for Macedonia and Old Greece, except in Epirus and Aegean Islands."

[8] We learn that his followers "urged upon him the advisability of a _coup d'état_. It would have been the easiest thing in the world to carry out, and with so much at stake for Greece and for democratic principles generally, it seemed justifiable."--"M. Venizelos at Nice," in _The Times_, 29 Nov., 1920. But, "fears are entertained, it is said, that the regular Army--which is strongly anti-Venizelist--may get out of hand."--The _Daily Mail_, 17 Nov.

[9] The terms of the Note were communicated to the House of Commons by Mr. Bonar Law the same night.

[10] Reuter, Athens, 9 Dec., 1920.

[11] Another version of this refrain, which might be seen in crude lettering over a café at Phaleron, is: "So we willed it, and we brought him back" (_Etsi to ethelame, kai ton epherame_)--a distinct expression of the feeling that the people, by bringing back its sovereign in the face of foreign opposition, asserted its own sovereignty.

[12] See _The Times_, 20 Dec.; The _Daily Mail_, 21 Dec., 1920.

{230}

AFTERWORD

In default of a Providence whose intervention in human affairs is no longer recognized, there still is a Nemesis of history whose operations can scarcely be denied. International morality, strange as the juxtaposition of the two words may seem, exists no less than the law of gravity; and a statesman who offends against the one must expect much the same catastrophe as an engineer who ignores the other. But it is not often that this law of retribution asserts itself so swiftly as it has done in the drama for which Greece supplied the stage to French statesmen during the last few years; for it is not often that a Government in the pursuit of practical interests overlooks so completely moral principles, flouts so openly national sentiments, and, while priding itself on realism, shuts its eyes so consistently to realities.

The logic of French action is as above reproach, as its motives are beyond dispute.

Nine decades ago the Duc de Broglie clearly explained that the aim of France in assisting to liberate Greece from the Turkish yoke was to have in the Eastern Mediterranean an instrument of her own ambition: "a State disposed to turn her eyes constantly towards that Power who has made her free--to watch for us over the ports of the Levant, to guard with us the mouth of the Black Sea and the keys of the Bosphorus [Transcriber's note: Bosporus?]";--it followed that the greater the client, the better for the patron's purpose. After undergoing many fluctuations and modifications, this idea was revived at the time of the Balkan wars, when France, together with Germany, supported the Greek claim to Cavalla, and it was fostered to an unhealthy growth during the European War. Hence the identification of France with M. Venizelos, who stood for a policy of expansion at all hazards, and her hostility to King Constantine who, preferring safety to hazardous ventures, stood for Greece's right to shape her course without dictation from Paris any more than from Berlin.

{231}

By the methods which she employed, France succeeded in gaining Greece and losing the Greeks. Nothing else could have been expected: friends are sometimes to be won by good offices; sometimes by the promise of good offices; and sometimes by good words. They are seldom won by injuries, and by insults never. It is curious that so elementary a lesson in human nature should have been unknown to the able men who guided the policy and diplomacy of France during the War, who raised her military prestige and re-established her position in the first rank of the European Powers. Yet it is a fact--a fact which can be easily verified by a reference to their utterances: they are upon record. Brute force, and brute force, and again brute force: such is the burden that runs through them all; and it embodies a doctrine: the Greeks are Orientals and must be wooed with terror: on the notion, enunciated by an English humorist as a paradox, and adopted by French statesmen as an axiom, that terror sown in the Oriental heart will yield a harvest of esteem--even of affection. With this mad dogma nailed to her mast, France set out upon her voyage for the conquest of the Hellenic heart. It was the first of her mistakes--and it was accompanied by another.

Even if Greece were willing to play the part of a French satellite, she could not do so; for her geographical situation exposes her to the influence of more than one Power. Italy, who has her own ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean, opposed during the War a policy the object of which was Greek expansion over territories coveted by herself and a readjustment of the balance of forces in favour of France; and it was partly in order not to alienate Italy during the War that French statesmen wanted Greece to come in without any specified conditions, leaving the matter of territorial compensations for the time of settlement. Russia showed herself not less suspicious of French diplomacy for similar reasons. But it was with England chiefly that France had to reckon. In the past the rivalry between France and England in the Eastern Mediterranean, though often overshadowed by their common antagonism, first to Russia and subsequently to Germany, was a perennial cause of discord which kept Greece oscillating between the two Powers.

{232}

During the War England, of necessity, lent France her acquiescence and even assistance in a work which she would rather not have seen done. But, once done, she endeavoured to secure such profit as was to be derived therefrom. The Greeks in Asia Minor--it was thought--could serve to check the Turks from troubling us in Mesopotamia and other parts of the Near and Middle East. Hence the Treaty of Sèvres, which provided for the aggrandizement of Greece at the expense of the Ottoman Empire in Asia as well as in Europe, to the seeming satisfaction of both French and British interests. But the adjustment--even if it had been forced upon Turkey--could, by the nature of things, be only temporary. Owing to her geographical situation, Greece must inevitably move within the orbit of the Power who dominates the sea.

Psychology accelerated a movement imposed by geography. While France based her action upon an English humorist's paradox, England based hers upon a French thinker's maxim: _Lorsqu'on veut redoubler de force, il faut redoubles de grâce_. Although her diplomatic, military, and naval representatives did participate in every measure of coercion and intimidation as a matter of policy, they (if we except the Secret Service gentry) never forgot the dictates of decency: they never, figuratively, kicked the person whom they deemed it necessary to knock down. The ordinary British soldiers, too, for all the relaxation of moral rules natural in war, maintained throughout the campaign a standard of behaviour which contrasted so favourably with their comrades' that it earned them among the inhabitants of Macedonia the honourable nickname of "the maids." It was particularly noted during the fire which devastated Salonica that, while others took advantage of the turmoil to loot, the British soldier devoted himself wholly to rescuing. Some of these things were perhaps resented by our allies as weak, and some were ridiculed as naïve; but they must be judged by their effect. At the end of the War one nation was respected by the Greeks as much as the other was hated and despised. British prestige rose exactly in proportion as French prestige sank. And the object which France elected to seek, and sought in vain, by {233} means of violence and terror, England attained by a conduct which, if not more lawful, was much more graceful.

Still, French statesmen counted on M. Venizelos--"_l'homme politique qui incarne l'idée de la solidarité des intérêts français et grecs_"--to keep his country on their side. And as in the first instance they had made the alliance conditional on his being placed in control, so now they made the benefits accruing from it to Greece dependent on his remaining in control. That M. Venizelos could not always remain in control does not seem to have occurred to them. Nor that he might not always be content to be a mere puppet in their hands. Murmurs at his pro-British leanings were indeed heard occasionally. But on the whole the Cretan possessed in an adequate measure the faculty of adapting himself to rival points of view, of making each Power feel that her interests were supreme in his regard, and of using the ambitions of both to promote his own. As long as he remained in control, France, with whatever reservations, felt sure of her share of influence.

The collapse of M. Venizelos and the demand of the Greek people for King Constantine's return, came to French statesmen as a painful surprise. That they had for several years been laboriously building on illusions could not be disguised, and being made to look absurd before those of their own compatriots who had all along advocated a policy based on the preservation and exploitation of Turkey, rendered the situation doubly awkward. Unable to rise above personal pique, they would fain veto the return of a prince whom they hated and whom they had wronged beyond hope of conciliation. England, however, free from petty animosities, and sensible that, under whatever ruler, Greece would be with her, refused to sanction lawlessness in the midst of peace; and her view that, if the Greeks wanted Constantine, it was their business and not ours, prevailed. But, on the other hand, by way of compromise, France obtained that he should return to an empty treasury, with foreign credits cut off, and the loans made by the Allies to the Venizelist Government, to facilitate the waging of a common war against Turkey, revoked.

It was an impossible position which King Constantine was called upon to face: a position none of his own making, {234} yet one from which there was no retreat. The Greek people's imperialism had been roused. The leaders who once criticized M. Venizelos's Asiatic policy as a dangerous dream, opposed to economic, strategic, and ethnic realities, might still hold those views and mutter in secret that Smyrna would prove the grave of Greece; but they no longer dared express them, out of deference to public opinion. To the masses M. Venizelos's wild game of chance seemed vindicated by its results, and while they rejected the man they clung to his work.

The Greek Government had no choice but to carry on the conflict under enormous disadvantages. As France anticipated, with foreign credits cut off and a progressive fall in the exchange, the expense of maintaining a large army on a war footing proved too heavy for the National Exchequer. And that was not the worst. France, who since the Armistice had betrayed a keen jealousy of England's place in a part of the world in which she claims special rights, presently concluded a separate agreement with Turkey--an example in which she was followed by Italy--and gave the Turks her moral and material support in their struggle with the Greeks; while England, though refusing to reverse her policy in favour of their enemies, contented herself with giving the Greeks only a platonic encouragement, which they were unwise enough to take for more than it was worth.

Everyone knows the melancholy sequel: our unhappy "allies," left to their own exhausted resources, were driven from the Asiatic territories which in common prudence they should never have entered; and the overseas Empire which M. Venizelos had conjured up vanished in smoke.

The rout in Asia Minor had its repercussion in Greece. For nearly two years the people, though war-worn and on the edge of bankruptcy, bore the financial as they had borne the famine blockade, trusting that England would at any moment come forth to counter the vindictiveness of France, and sturdily resisted all the efforts of the Venizelist party to shake the stability of the Royalist regime: Constantine again appeared in their eyes as a victim of the Cretan's intrigues. But the loss of Ionia and the danger of the loss of Thrace; the horror and {235} despair arising from the sack of Smyrna, whence shiploads of broken refugees fled to the Greek ports; all this, reinforced by an idea that the maintenance of the King on the throne prevented the effective expression of British friendship and his fall would remove French hostility, created conditions before which questions of personalities for once faded into insignificance, and put into the hands of M. Venizelos's partisans an irresistible lever.

On 26 September an army of 15,000 insurgent soldiers landed near Athens and demanded the abdication of the King. The loyal troops were ready to meet force by force. But the King, in order to avert a fratricidal struggle which would have dealt Greece the finishing stroke, forbade opposition and immediately abdicated, "happy," as he said, "that another opportunity has been given me to sacrifice myself once more for Greece." In fact, once more Constantine was made the scape-goat for disasters for which he was in no way responsible--disasters from which he would undoubtedly have saved his country, had he been allowed to pursue his own sober course.

M. Venizelos would not go back to Athens until the excitement subsided, lest people should think, he said, that he had had any part in the revolution: but undertook the defence of the national interests in the Entente capitals. His mission was to obtain such support as would enable him to save Greece something out of the ruin which his insane imperialism had brought upon her, so that he might be in a position to point out to his countrymen that he alone, after the disastrous failure of Constantine, had been able to secure their partial rehabilitation. That accomplished, he might then hope to become a perpetual Prime Minister or President.

France made it quite clear that no changes in Greece could alter her policy: however satisfied she might be at the second disappearance of the antipathetic monarch, it should not be supposed that, even were a Republic to be set up, presided over by the Great Cretan, her attitude on territorial questions would be transformed: Thrace, after Ionia, must revert to Turkey. French statesmen longed for the complete demolition of their own handiwork. M. Poincaré, in 1922, was proud to do what the Duc de Broglie ninety years before scoffed at as an {236} unthinkable folly: "_Abandonner la Grèce aujourd'hui, détruire de nos propres mains l'ouvrage que nos propres mains ont presque achevé!_"

England's expressed attitude was not characterized by a like precision. It is true that after the Greek debacle she dispatched ships and troops to prevent the Straits from falling into the hands of the Turks; but in the matter of Thrace she had already yielded to France: and how the restoration of Turkish rule in Europe can be reconciled with the freedom of the Straits remains to be seen.

What the future may have in store for Greece and Turkey is a matter of comparatively small account. What is of great and permanent importance is the divergence between the paths of France and England revealed by the preceding analysis of events.

From this analysis have been carefully excluded such superficial dissensions as always arise between allies after a war, and were especially to be expected after a war in which every national susceptibility was quickened to a morbid degree: they belong to a different category from the profound antagonisms under consideration. These--whatever the philosopher may think of a struggle for domination--present a problem which British statesmen must face frankly. It is not a new problem; but it now appears under a new form and in a more acute phase than it has ever possessed in the past--thanks to the success of the "knock-out blow" policy which governed the latter stages of the War.

With the German power replaced by the French, the Russian for the moment in abeyance, French and Italian influences competing in Turkey, French and British aims clashing in the Arab regions wrested from Turkey--while indignation at Occidental interference surges in the minds of all the peoples of the Orient--the Eastern Mediterranean offers a situation which tempts one to ask whether the authors of that policy have not succeeded too well? Whether in pursuing the success of the day--to which their personal reputations were attached--they did not lose sight of the morrow? Whether they have not scattered the seed without sufficiently heeding the crop? However that may be, unless this situation was clearly foreseen by its creators and provided for--a hypothesis {237} which, with the utmost goodwill towards them, does not appear very probable--they have an anxious task--a task that, under these conditions, demands from British statesmanship more thinking about the Near Eastern question and the Greek factor in it than was necessary before 1914.

As a first aid to an appreciation of the problem by the public--which the present crisis found utterly unprepared--it would have been well if the fundamental differences between the respective attitudes of France and England towards each other and towards the peoples concerned had been candidly acknowledged, and all pretence of Franco-British co-operation in the Near East abandoned. Lasting co-operation cannot be where there is neither community of interests nor consonance of ideas: where the loss of one party is welcomed as gain by the other, and the wisdom of the one in the eyes of the other is folly. Pious talk of a common Allied mission in the Near East has only served to obscure issues and to render confusion in the public mind worse confounded. It was idle to make a mystery of the support given by France to the Turks and of her insistence on the revision of the Sèvres Treaty--preliminary steps to her demand for the evacuation of Chanak and the consequent elimination of British sea-power. The object of these tactics was evident to every serious student of history: France pursues now the plan laid down by Louis XIV, continued by Napoleon, fitfully carried on throughout the nineteenth century, and facilitated by her installation in Syria--the equivalent of the German _Drang nach Osten_: a plan incompatible with the safety of the British Empire in the East. This is the truth of the matter, and nothing has been gained by hiding it.

The people who fought a ruinous war without quite knowing the ends aimed at, had a right to know at least the results obtained; and after France's separate agreement with Turkey, the denial to them of any part of that knowledge could not be justified on any principle of honour or plea of expediency.

{239}

INDEX

Achilleion, 92 Albania, Suggested partition of, 19 Alexander, King, 197, 203, 205-7, 219, 224 Andrew, Prince, 123, 200 Asia Minor, Concessions to Greece in, 19, 22-26, 32, 34, 35, 37, 221, 232. ---- ----, Greeks driven from, 234 Athens, Naval demonstrations against, 82, 102, 110, 111 ----, Fighting at, 159-161 ----, Bombardment of, 160 ----, Occupation of, 204 ----, Conspiracy at, 216 ----, Riots at, 221, 222 ---- electorate, 223 Austria and Greece, 9 ---- and Servia, 7, 17, 22 Averoff, M., 183 ---- gaol, 209

Balkan League, 4, 19, 20, 24, 27 Benazet, M., Negotiation of, 146, 147, 150-152 Blockades, 82, 101, 164, 172-176, 184 Boulogne, Conference at, 140, 185 Bratiano, M., 22 Briand, M., 76, 86, 89, 100-103, 105, 116, 131, 132, 146 Broglie, Due de, 188, 230, 235 Bucharest Treaty, 7-9, 18 ----, Conference at, 18 Bulgaria and Greece, 7, 8, 21, 23, 67 ---- ---- Servia, 7, 17, 21, 62 ---- ---- Turkey, 21, 52 ---- ---- Central Powers, 27, 40 ---- ---- Entente, 21, 28, 38, 40, 43, 57, 60, 66, 144 Bülow, Prince von, 47

Callimassiotis, M., 92 Calogeropoulos, M., Premier, 124-132, 140, 192 Canea, 92, 128, 130, 132 Castellorizo, 85, 86 Castoria, Metropolitan of, 209 Cavalla allotted to Greece, 10, 230 ----, Proposed cession of, to Bulgaria. 20, 23-25, 39, 41-42 ---- surrendered to Germano-Bulgars, 118-21 Cephalonia, 86, 177 Cerigo, 177 Chanak, 237 Chios, 130 Church, Greek, 175, 176, 208, 209 Churchill, Mr. Winston, 13 Cochin, M. Denys, 81 Constantine, King: his popularity, 1, 2, 75, 131, 175, 198, 218-220 ----, ----; policy, 5, 8-12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 34, 35, 38, 55, 81, 114, 124, 144, 146, 150, 156, 181, 230 ----, ----: defeat in 1897, 1, 74 ----, ----, and M. Venizelos, 5, 14, 15, 53-57, 115, 133, 145, 181 ----, ----, and the Kaiser, 9, 10, 56, 69, 95, 96, 170 ----, ----, Agitation against, 70, 121, 127, 143, 145, 167, 181, 182 ----, ----: dethronement, 186, 191-199 ----, ----: restoration, 227, 228 ----, ----: character, 198, 199, 228 ----, ----: abdication, 235 Constantinople, Russia and, 31, 32 Constitution, Greek, 70-74, 191, 201, 205, 220 Corfu, 85, 86, 91, 177 Corinth, 186, 190, 192, 195, 227 Coundouriotis, Admiral, 103, 131, 133, 183, 209 {240}

Crete, 2, 86, 128, 130, 133-136, 208 Crewe, Lord, 41, 42 Crimean War, 103 Crown Councils, 29, 68, 170, 192 Cuninghame, Sir Thomas, 82 Cyprus, 66, 75

Danglis, General, 133 Dardanelles, 14, 15, 27-31, 34, 59, 72. _See also_ "Gallipoli" Dartige du Fournet, Admiral, 91, 92, 110, 112, 129, 130, 131, 139, 141, 143, 147, 148, 149, 152, 153-160, 163-164 Delcassé, M., 32, 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, 46, 76 Delyannis, M., 74 Demidoff, Prince, Russian Minister at Athens, 32, 35, 104, 112 Demir-Hissar, Bridge of, 85 Deville, M., quoted, 13, 28, 40, 51, 57 Dimitracopoulos, M., 123, 192 Dousmanis, General, 81, 112, 200 Dova-tépé, Fort, 99 Dragoumis, Ex-Premier, 192, 210 ----, Ion, 222 Drama, 109, 118, 121

Elections of June, 1915, 33, 50 ---- ---- December, 1915, 75 ---- demanded and eluded (June-September, 1916), 102, 106-108, 114, 115, 123 ---- of November, 1920, 222-226 Eleusis, 111, 174 Elliot, Sir Francis, British Minister at Athens, 35, 88, 104, 114, 117, 123, 125, 128, 142, 145, 149, 156, 165 England, Policy of, 13, 20, 22, 31, 42, 56, 77, 102, 104, 106, 128, 144, 185, 186, 232-234, 236 Esslin, M., 209 Evangelismos hospital, 210

Falkenhayn, General von, 95-97 Fleet, Greek, 131, 141, 148, 149 Florina, 85 France, Policy of, 13, 31, 46, 77, 87, 103, 129, 144, 153, 155, 183-185, 230, 231, 233-235, 237

Gallipoli, 14, 30, 31, 36, 43, 50, 63, 73. _See also_ "Dardanelles" Gauchet, Admiral, 164, 190 George, King of Greece, 71 ----, Prince, 35, 38-40, 134-137, 156, 211 Gerakini, 91 Germany and Greece, 11, 87, 89, 95-98, 121, 122 Goerlitz, Greek troops interned at, 121 Gounaris, M., Premier, 33-46, 200 Grey, Sir Edward, 22, 23, 25, 35, 56, 59, 60, 66, 101, 102 "Guarantee" of Greek constitution, 187-189 Guillemin, M., French Minister at Athens, 37, 56, 61, 82, 88, 102, 104, 106, 110, 117, 118, 129, 146, 152, 164

Hamilton, General, 59 Hatzopoulos, Colonel, 108, 118-121 Hautefeuille, M., 172 Hindenburg, Field-Marshal von, 118, 119, 121, 170 Holy Synod, Appeals from, 176 ---- ---- deposed, 208

Ionia, 234, 235 Italian troops in Macedonia, 108 ---- ---- ---- Epirus, 203 ---- policy, 231, 234

Jagow, Von, 97 Jonnart, M., his mission to Greece, 186, 189-206

Kaiser, The, and King Constantine, 9, 10, 117, 180, 181 ----, ----, ---- Queen Sophie, 169, 170 Kara-Burnu, 85 {241}

Katerini, 96, 147 Kerr, Admiral Mark, 10, 14, 15, 219 Kitchener, Lord, 13 ----, ----, on French policy, 76 ----, ----, in Greece, 81 Krivolak, 79, 95

Lambros, Prof., Premier, 141, 143, 149, 154, 158, 181, 200, 210 Larissa, 118 Lemnos, 58, 130 Leucas, 178 London, Treaties of (1863 and 1864), 86 ----, Conference in, 186

Macedonia, Allies in, 76-80, 82-85, 108 ----, Germano-Bulgarian invasion of, 94, 97, 98, 108, 109 ----, Elections in, 94, 109 ----, British soldiers' conduct in, 232 Mercati, M., 55, 56 Metaxas, Colonel, 29, 8l, 112, 200 Milne, General, 101 Milo, 82, 111 Monastir, 67, 77, 95, 145 Moschopoulos, General, 59, 82 Moudros, 58 Mytilene, 58, 94, 130, 133, 208

Near East, Franco-British rivalry in, 231, 237 Neutral zone, 147, 148, 168, 178, 180 Nicholas, Prince, 123, 200

Oropus, 220 Otho, King, 103, 125, 187

Painlevé, M., 186 Palaeologus, Emperor Constantine, Legend of, 218 Passitch, M., 18, 40, 42, 51 Paul, Prince, 224 Peloponnesus, 146, 167, 169, 171, 192, 195 Phaleron, 198 Piraeus, 103, 110, 120, 127, 141, 143, 159, 165, 176, 190, 202, 213 Poincaré, M., 38, 40, 235 Politis, M., 47, 183

Rallis, M., 30, 80, 210, 227 Regnault, General, 190, 203, 204 Repoulis, M., 222 Reservists, 107, 117, 127, 171, 184, 203 Ribot, M., 184, 186, 190, 217 Rome, Conference at, 169, 185 Roques, General, 147, 152 Rufos, M., 209 Rumania, 9, 10, 18, 21-24, 113, 116 Rupel, 97, 98, 99, 210 Russia and Greece, 31, 32, 43, 104, 126, 157, 184, 185, 189 ---- ---- Bulgaria, 62 ---- ---- Servia, 18 ---- ---- Turkey, 19, 27

Salamis, 111, 149, 190, 195 Salisbury, Lord, on Greek policy in 1897, 74 Salonica, Allies' landing at, 56, 58-62, 64, 74 ---- in state of siege, 100 ----, Revolt at, 110 ----, Fire at, 232 Samos, 130, 133 San Remo, 218 Sarrail, General, 79, 82, 99, 100, 102, 106, 107, 108, 110, 164, 178, 179, 181, 183, 202 Sazonow, M., 18, 19, 31 Schenck, Baron, 140 Secret Services, French and British, 90-93, 107, 112, 117, 127-130, 179 Serres, 109, 118, 120 Servia, Greek alliance with, 7, 8, 17, 33, 51, 52, 55, 58, 65, 66 ----, Entente and, 18, 22, 23, 40, 41, 42, 51 Sèvres, Treaty of, 221, 232, 237 Skouloudis, M., Premier, 69 ---- and Entente, 77-79, 8l-84, 88, 89, 99, 100 ---- ---- Germany, 87, 89, 95-98 {242}

Skouloudis, M., Premier, placed under surveillance, 200 ---- impeached, 209, 210 Smyrna, 35, 36, 221, 223, 234, 235 Sophie, Queen, 160, 169, 170, 173 Staff, Greek General: Dardanelles, Plans of, 15, 16 ----, ---- ----, and Servia, 17, 40, 41, 49, 52 ----, ---- ----, ---- King Constantine, 13, 31, 35, 72, 73 ----, ---- ----, ---- M. Venizelos, 25, 28, 29, 45, 55, 62, 73, 81 ----, ---- ----, ---- Lord Kitchener, 81 ----, ---- ----, on Gallipoli enterprise, 28, 29, 31, 36, 47 ----, ---- ----, opposed to Asiatic expansion, 25, 26 Straits, Russia and the, 31 ----, France and the, 230 ----, England and the, 236 Stratos, M., 192, 193 Streit, M., 8, 12, 13, 15, 34, 45, 112, 200 Struma, 85, 97 Submarines, German, Alleged fuelling of, 90-92 Suda Bay, 86, 128, 133 Syngros gaol, 209 Syra, 177 Syria, 237

Talaat Bey, 18 Tatoi, 53, 55 Thasos, 120, 130 Therisos movement, 134, 136 Thessaly, 145, 147, 168, 178, 180, 181, 186, 190, 192 Thrace, 19, 221, 222, 234, 235, 236 Turkey and Entente, 4, 13, 19, 232, 233, 235, 236 Turkey and Germany, 10, 13, 18, 19 ---- ---- Bulgaria, 19, 52 ---- ---- Greece, 13, 18, 19, 217, 218, 232, 233, 234

Venizelos, Eleutherios: early career, 2-5, 133-136 ----, and King Constantine, 5, 14, 15, 29, 50, 53-57, 109, 110, 136, 137, 183, 220, 225. ----: policy, 7, 8, 12-14, 20, 21-27, 28-32, 51, 53, 55, 61, 68, 127, 205, 207, 221, 230 ----: first resignation, 31 ----: return to power, 50 ----: popularity, 5, 50 ----: second resignation, 63 ----: unpopularity, 75, 94, 107, 108, 175, 176 ----: agitation, 44-48, 70-74, 92-94, 99, 127 ----: rebellion, 106, 110, 128-131, 133, 136-138 ----: Salonica Government, 133, 140, 147, 148, 168, 169, 174, 177, 178 ----: anathematization, 175 ----: elevation, 202-206 ----: rule, 207-216 ----: attempt on his life, 221 ----: fall, 226 ----: character, 229 ----: representative of Greece in Entente capitals, 235 Vlachopoulos, Colonel, 52, 53 Volo, 120

Wellington, Duke of, 188

Zaimis, M., Premier, 65-69, 102, 108, 114-119, 181, 190-203 Zalocostas, M., 210 Zante, 177 Zappeion, 143, 159, 160 Zographos, M., 33, 37, 41

End of Project Gutenberg's Greece and the Allies 1914-1922, by G. F. Abbott