Chapter 20

BRITISH CONFIDENCE IN THE SOUTH

After three years of great Northern efforts to subdue the South and of Southern campaigns aimed, first, merely toward resistance, but later involving offensive battles, the Civil War, to European eyes, had reached a stalemate where neither side could conquer the other. To the European neutral the situation was much as in the Great War it appeared to the American neutral in December, 1916, at the end of two years of fighting. In both wars the neutral had expected and had prophesied a short conflict. In both, this had proved to be false prophecy and with each additional month of the Civil War there was witnessed an increase of the forces employed and a psychological change in the people whereby war seemed to have become a normal state of society. The American Civil War, as regards continuity, numbers of men steadily engaged, resources employed, and persistence of the combatants, was the "Great War," to date, of all modern conflicts. Not only British, but nearly all foreign observers were of the opinion by midsummer of 1864, after an apparent check to Grant in his campaign toward Richmond, that all America had become engaged in a struggle from which there was scant hope of emergence by a decisive military victory. There was little knowledge of the steady decline of the resources of the South even though Jefferson Davis in a message to the Confederate Congress in February, 1864, had spoken bitterly of Southern disorganization[1197]. Yet this belief in stalemate in essence still postulated an ultimate Southern victory, for the function of the Confederacy was, after all, to _resist_ until its independence was recognized. Ardent friends of the North in England both felt and expressed confidence in the outcome, but the general attitude of neutral England leaned rather to faith in the powers of indefinite Southern resistance, so loudly voiced by Southern champions.

There was now one element in the situation, however, that hampered these Southern champions. The North was at last fully identified with the cause of emancipation; the South with the perpetuation of slavery. By 1864, it was felt to be impossible to remain silent on this subject and even in the original constitution and address of the Southern Independence Association a clause was adopted expressing a hope for the gradual extinction of slavery[1198]. This brought Mason some heartburnings and he wrote to Spence in protest, the latter's reply being that he also agreed that the South ought not to be offered gratuitous advice on what was purely "an internal question," but that the topic was full of difficulties and the clause would have to stand, at least in some modified form. At Southern public meetings, also, there arose a tendency to insert in resolutions similar expressions. "In Manchester," Spence wrote, "Mr. Lees, J.P., and the strongest man on the board, brought forward a motion for an address on this subject. I went up to Manchester purposely to quash it and I did so effectually[1199]."

Northern friends were quick to strike at this weakness in Southern armour; they repeatedly used a phrase, "The Foul Blot," and by mere iteration gave such currency to it that even in Southern meetings it was repeated. _The Index_, as early as February, 1864, felt compelled to meet the phrase and in an editorial, headed "The Foul Blot," argued the error of Southern friends. As long as they could use the word "blot" in characterization of Southern slavery, _The Index_ felt that there could be no effective British push for Southern independence and it asserted that slavery, in the sense in which England understood it, did not exist in the Confederacy.

"... It is truly horrible to reduce human beings to the condition of cattle, to breed them, to sell them, and otherwise dispose of them, as cattle. But is it defending such practices to say that the South does none of these things, but that on the contrary, both in theory and in practice, she treats the negro as a fellow-creature, with a soul to be saved, with feelings to be respected, though in the social order in a subordinate place, and of an intellectual organization which requires guardianship with mutual duties and obligations? This system is called slavery, because it developed itself out of an older and very different one of that name, but for this the South is not to blame.

* * * * *

"But of this the friends of the South may be assured, that so long as they make no determined effort to relieve the Southern character from this false drapery, they will never gain for it that respect, that confidence in the rectitude of Southern motives, that active sympathy, which can alone evoke effective assistance.... The best assurance you can give that the destinies of the negro race are safe in Southern hands is, not that the South will repent and reform, but that she has consistently and conscientiously been the friend and benefactor of that race.

* * * * *

"It is, therefore, always with pain that we hear such expressions as 'the foul blot,' and similar ones, fall from the lips of earnest promoters of Confederate Independence. As a concession they are useless; as a confession they are untrue.... Thus the Southerner may retort as we have seen that an Englishman would retort for his country. He might say the South is proud, and of nothing more proud than this--not that she has slaves, but that she has treated them as slaves never were treated before, that she has used power as no nation ever used it under similar circumstances, and that she has solved mercifully and humanely a most difficult problem which has elsewhere defied solution save in blood. Or he might use the unspoken reflection of an honest Southerner at hearing much said of 'the foul blot': 'It was indeed a dark and damnable blot that England left us with, and it required all the efforts of Southern Christianity to pale it as it now is[1200].'"

In 1862 and to the fall of 1863, _The Index_ had declared that slavery was not an issue in the war; now its defence of the "domestic institution" of the South, repeatedly made in varying forms, was evidence of the great effect in England of Lincoln's emancipation edicts. _The Index_ could not keep away from the subject. In March, quotations were given from the _Reader_, with adverse comments, upon a report of a controversy aroused in scientific circles by a paper read before the Anthropological Society of London. James Hunt was the author and the paper, entitled "The Negro's Place in Nature," aroused the contempt of Huxley who criticized it at the meeting as unscientific and placed upon it the "stigma of public condemnation." The result was a fine controversy among the scientists which could only serve to emphasize the belief that slavery was indeed an issue in the American War and that the South was on the defensive. Winding up a newspaper duel with Hunt who emerged rather badly mauled, Huxley asserted "the North is justified in any expenditure of blood or treasure which shall eradicate a system hopelessly inconsistent with the moral elevation, the political freedom, or the economical progress of the American people[1201]...."

Embarrassment caused by the "Foul Blot" issue, the impossibility to many sincere Southern friends of accepting the view-point of _The Index_, acted as a check upon the holding of public meetings and prevented the carrying out of that intensive public campaign launched by Spence and intended to be fostered by the Southern Independence Association. By the end of June, 1864, there was almost a complete cessation of Southern meetings, not thereafter renewed, except spasmodically for a brief period in the fall just before the Presidential election in America[1202]. Northern meetings were continuous throughout the whole period of the war but were less frequent in 1864 than in 1863. They were almost entirely of two types--those held by anti-slavery societies and religious bodies and those organized for, or by, working men. An analysis of those recorded in the files of _The Liberator_, and in the reports sent by Adams to Seward permits the following classification[1203]:

YEAR. NUMBER. CHARACTER. ANTI-SLAVERY AND RELIGIOUS WORKING-MEN. 1860 3 3 - 1861 7 7 - 1862 16 11 5 1863 82 26 56 1864 21 10 11 1865 5 4 1

Many persons took part in these meetings as presiding officers or as speakers and movers of resolutions; among them those appearing with frequency were George Thompson, Rev. Dr. Cheever, Rev. Newman Hall, John Bright, Professor Newman, Mr. Bagley, M.P., Rev. Francis Bishop, P.A. Taylor, M.P., William Evans, Thomas Bayley Potter, F.W. Chesson and Mason Jones. While held in all parts of England and Scotland the great majority of meetings were held in London and in the manufacturing districts with Manchester as a centre. From the first the old anti-slavery orator of the 'thirties, George Thompson, had been the most active speaker and was credited by all with having given new life to the moribund emancipation sentiment of Great Britain[1204]. Thompson asserted that by the end of 1863 there was a "vigilant, active and energetic" anti-slavery society in almost every great town or city[1205]. Among the working-men, John Bright was without question the most popular advocate of the Northern cause, but there were many others, not named in the preceding list, constantly active and effective[1206]. Forster, in the judgment of many, was the most influential friend of the North in Parliament, but Bright, also an influence in Parliament, rendered his chief service in moulding the opinion of Lancashire and became to American eyes their great English champion, a view attested by the extraordinary act of President Lincoln in pardoning, on the appeal of Bright, and in his honour, a young Englishman named Alfred Rubery, who had become involved in a plot to send out from the port of San Francisco, a Confederate "privateer" to prey on Northern commerce[1207].

This record of the activities of Northern friends and organizations, the relative subsidence of their efforts in the latter part of 1864, thus indicating their confidence in Northern victory, the practical cessation of public Southern meetings, are nevertheless no proof that the bulk of English opinion had greatly wavered in its faith in Southern powers of resistance. The Government, it is true, was better informed and was exceedingly anxious to tread gently in relations with the North, the more so as there was now being voiced by the public in America a sentiment of extreme friendship for Russia as the "true friend" in opposition to the "unfriendly neutrality" of Great Britain and France[1208]. It was a period of many minor irritations, arising out of the blockade, inflicted by America on British interests, but to these Russell paid little attention except to enter formal protests. He wrote to Lyons:

"I do not want to pick a quarrel out of our many just causes of complaint. But it will be as well that Lincoln and Seward should see that we are long patient, and do nothing to distract their attention from the arduous task they have so wantonly undertaken[1209]."

Lyons was equally desirous of avoiding frictions. In August he thought that the current of political opinion was running against the re-election of Lincoln, noting that the Northern papers were full of expressions favouring an armistice, but pointed out that neither the "peace party" nor the advocates of an armistice ever talked of any solution of the war save on the basis of re-union. Hence Lyons strongly advised that "the quieter England and France were just at this moment the better[1210]." Even the suggested armistice was not thought of, he stated, as extending to a relaxation of the blockade. Of military probabilities, Lyons professed himself to be no judge, but throughout all his letters there now ran, as for some time previously, a note of warning as to the great power and high determination of the North.

But if the British Government was now quietly operating upon the theory of an ultimate Northern victory, or at least with the view that the only hope for the South lay in a Northern weariness of war, the leading British newspapers were still indulging in expressions of confidence in the South while at the same time putting much faith in the expected defeat of Lincoln at the polls. As always at this period, save for the few newspapers avowedly friendly to the North and one important daily professing strict neutrality--the _Telegraph_--the bulk of the metropolitan press took its cue, as well as much of its war news, from the columns of the _Times_. This journal, while early assuming a position of belief in Southern success, had yet given both sides in the war fair accuracy in its reports--those of the New York correspondent, Mackay, always excepted. But from June, 1864, a change came over the _Times_; it was either itself deceived or was wilfully deceiving its readers, for steadily every event for the rest of the year was coloured to create an impression of the unlimited powers of Southern resistance. Read to-day in the light of modern knowledge of the military situation throughout the war, the _Times_ gave accurate reports for the earlier years but became almost hysterical; not to say absurd, for the last year of the conflict. Early in June, 1864, Grant was depicted as meeting reverses in Virginia and as definitely checked, while Sherman in the West was being drawn into a trap in his march toward Atlanta[1211]. The same ideas were repeated throughout July. Meanwhile there had begun to be printed a series of letters from a Southern correspondent at Richmond who wrote in contempt of Grant's army.

"I am at a loss to convey to you the contemptuous tone in which the tried and war-worn soldiers of General Lee talk of the huddled rabble of black, white, and copper-coloured victims (there are Indians serving under the Stars and Stripes) who are at times goaded up to the Southern lines.... The truth is that for the first time in modern warfare we are contemplating an army which is at once republican and undisciplined[1212]."

At the moment when such effusions could find a place in London's leading paper the facts of the situation were that the South was unable to prevent almost daily desertions and was wholly unable to spare soldiers to recover and punish the deserters. But on this the _Times_ was either ignorant or wilfully silent. It was indeed a general British sentiment during the summer of 1864, that the North was losing its power and determination in the war[1213], even though it was unquestioned that the earlier "enthusiasm for the slave-holders" had passed away[1214]. One element in the influence of the _Times_ was its _seeming_ impartiality accompanied by a pretentious assertion of superior information and wisdom that at times irritated its contemporaries, but was recognized as making this journal the most powerful agent in England. Angry at a _Times_ editorial in February, 1863, in which Mason had been berated for a speech made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, _The Index_ declared:

"Our contemporary is all things to all men. It not only shouts with the largest crowd, according to the Pickwickian philosophy, but with a skill and daring that command admiration, it shouts simultaneously with opposite and contending crowds. It is everybody's _Times_[1215]."

Yet _The Index_ knew, and frequently so stated, that the _Times_ was at bottom pro-Southern. John Bright's medium, the _Morning Star_, said: "There was something bordering on the sublime in the tremendous audacity of the war news supplied by the _Times_. Of course, its prophecies were in a similar style. None of your doubtful oracles there; none of your double-meaning vaticinations, like that which took poor Pyrrhus in[1216]." In short, the _Times_ became for the last year of the war the Bible of their faith to Southern sympathizers, and was frequent in its preachments[1217].

There was one journal in London which claimed to have equal if not greater knowledge and authority in military matters. This was the weekly _Army and Navy Gazette_, and its editor, W.H. Russell, in 1861 war correspondent in America of the _Times_, but recalled shortly after his famous letter on the battle of Bull Run, consistently maintained after the war had ended that he had always asserted the ultimate victory of the North and was, indeed, so pro-Northern in sentiment that this was the real cause of his recall[1218]. He even claimed to have believed in Northern victory to the extent of re-union. These protestations after the event are not borne out by the columns of the _Gazette_, for that journal was not far behind the _Times_ in its delineation of incidents unfavourable to the North and in its all-wise prophecies of Northern disaster. The _Gazette_ had no wide circulation except among those in the service, but its _dicta_, owing to the established reputation of Russell and to the specialist nature of the paper, were naturally quite readily accepted and repeated in the ordinary press. Based on a correct appreciation of man power and resources the _Gazette_ did from time to time proclaim its faith in Northern victory[1219], but always in such terms as to render possible a hedge on expressed opinion and always with the assertion that victory would not result in reunion. Russell's most definite prophecy was made on July 30, 1864:

"The Southern Confederacy, like Denmark, is left to fight by itself, without even a conference or an armistice to aid it; and it will be strange indeed if the heroism, endurance, and resources of its soldiers and citizens be not eventually dominated by the perseverance and superior means of the Northern States. Let us repeat our profession of faith in the matter. We hold that the Union perished long ago, and that its component parts can never again be welded into a Confederacy of self-governing States, with a common executive, army, fleet, and central government. Not only that. The principle of Union itself among the non-seceding States is so shocked and shattered by the war which has arisen, that the fissures in it are likely to widen and spread, and to form eventually great gulfs separating the Northern Union itself into smaller bodies. But ere the North be convinced of the futility of its efforts to substitute the action of force for that of free will, we think it will reduce the Southern States to the direst misery[1220]...."

Such occasional "professions of faith," accompanied by sneers at the "Confederate partisanship" of the _Times_[1221] served to differentiate the _Gazette_ from other journals, but when it came to description and estimate of specific campaigns there was little to choose between them and consequently little variance in the effect upon the public. Thus a fortnight before his "profession of faith," Russell could comment editorially on Sherman's campaign toward Atlanta:

"The next great Federal army on which the hopes of the North have so long been fixed promises to become a source of fearful anxiety. Sherman, if not retreating, is certainly not advancing; and, if the Confederates can interfere seriously with his communications, he must fall back as soon as he has eaten up all the supplies of the district.... All the enormous advantages possessed by the Federals have been nullified by want of skill, by the interference of Washington civilians, and by the absence of an animating homogeneous spirit on the part of their soldiery[1222]."

Hand in hand with war news adverse to the North went comments on the Presidential election campaign in America, with prophecies of Lincoln's defeat. This was indeed but a reflection of the American press but the citations made in British papers emphasized especially Northern weariness of Lincoln's despotism and inefficiency. Thus, first printed in _The Index_, an extract from a New York paper, _The New Nation_, got frequent quotation:

"We have been imposed upon long enough. The ruin which you have been unable to accomplish in four years, would certainly be fully consummated were you to remain in power four years longer. Your military governors and their provost-marshals override the laws, and the _echo of the armed heel rings forth as dearly now in America as in France or Austria. You have encroached upon our liberty without securing victory, and we must have both_[1223]."

It was clearly understood that Northern military efforts would have an important bearing on the election. The _Times_ while expressing admiration for Sherman's boldness in the Atlanta campaign was confident of his defeat:

"... it is difficult to see how General Sherman can escape a still more disastrous fate than that which threatened his predecessor. He has advanced nearly one hundred and fifty miles from his base of operations, over a mountainous country; and he has no option but to retreat by the same line as he advanced. This is the first instance of a Federal general having ventured far from water communications. That Sherman has hitherto done so with success is a proof of both courage and ability, but he will need both these qualities in a far greater degree if he is forced to retreat[1224]."

And W.H. Russell, in the _Gazette_, included Grant in the approaching disaster:

"The world has never seen anything in war so slow and fatuous as Grant's recent movements, except it be those of Sherman. Each is wriggling about like a snake in the presence of an ichneumon. They both work round and round, now on one flank and then on the other, and on each move meet the unwinking eye of the enemy, ready for his spring and bite. In sheer despair Grant and Sherman must do something at last. As to shelling! Will they learn from history? Then they will know that they cannot shell an army provided with as powerful artillery as their own out of a position.... The Northerners have, indeed, lost the day solely owing to the want of average ability in their leaders in the field[1225]."

On the very day when Russell thus wrote in the _Gazette_ the city of Atlanta had been taken by Sherman. When the news reached England the _Times_ having declared this impossible, now asserted that it was unimportant, believed that Sherman could not remain in possession and, two days later, turned with vehemence to an analysis of the political struggle as of more vital influence. The Democrats, it was insisted, would place peace "paramount to union" and were sure to win[1226]. Russell, in the _Gazette_, coolly ignoring its prophecy of three weeks earlier, now spoke as if he had always foreseen the fall of Atlanta:

"General Sherman has fully justified his reputation as an able and daring soldier; and the final operations by which he won Atlanta are not the least remarkable of the series which carried him from Chattanooga ... into the heart of Georgia[1227]."

But neither of these political-military "expert" journals would acknowledge any benefit accruing to Lincoln from Sherman's success. Not so, however, Lyons, who kept his chief much better informed than he would have been if credulous of the British press. Lyons, who for some time had been increasingly in bad health, had sought escape from the summer heat of Washington in a visit to Montreal. He now wrote correctly interpreting a great change in Northern attitude and a renewed determination to persevere in the war until reunion was secured. Lincoln, he thought, was likely to be re-elected:

"The reaction produced by the fall of Atlanta may be taken as an indication of what the real feelings of the people in the Northern States are. The vast majority of them ardently desire to reconquer the lost territory. It is only at moments when they despair of doing this that they listen to plans for recovering the territory by negotiation. The time has not come yet when any proposal to relinquish the territory can be publicly made[1228]."

The _Times_, slowly convinced that Atlanta would have influence in the election, and as always clever above its contemporaries in the delicate process of face-about to save its prestige, arrived in October at the point where it could join in prediction of Lincoln's re-election. It did so by throwing the blame on the Democratic platform adopted at the party convention in Chicago, which, so it represented, had cast away an excellent chance of success by declaring for union first and peace afterwards. Since the convention had met in August this was late analysis; and as a matter of fact the convention platform had called for a "cessation of bloodshed" and the calling of a convention to restore peace--in substance, for an armistice. But the _Times_[1229] now assumed temporarily a highly moral and disinterested pose and washed its hands of further responsibility; Lincoln was likely to be re-elected:

For ourselves we have no particular reason to wish it otherwise. We have no very serious matter of complaint that we are aware of against the present Government of America. Allowance being made for the difficulties of their position, they are conducting the war with a fair regard to the rights of neutral nations. The war has swept American commerce from the sea, and placed it, in great measure, in our hands; we have supplied the loss of the cotton which was suddenly withdrawn from us; the returns of our revenue and our trade are thoroughly satisfactory, and we have received an equivalent for the markets closed to us in America in the vast impulse that has been given towards the development of the prosperity of India. We see a great nation, which has not been in times past sparing of its menaces and predictions of our ruin, apparently resolved to execute, without pause and without remorse, the most dreadful judgments of Heaven upon itself. We see the frantic patient tearing the bandages from his wounds and thrusting aside the hand that would assuage his miseries, and every day that the war goes on we see less and less probability that the great fabric of the Union will ever be reconstructed in its original form, and more and more likelihood that the process of disintegration will extend far beyond the present division between North and South.... Were we really animated by the spirit of hostility which is always assumed to prevail among us towards America, we should view the terrible spectacle with exultation and delight, we should rejoice that the American people, untaught by past misfortunes, have resolved to continue the war to the end, and hail the probable continuance of the power of Mr. Lincoln as the event most calculated to pledge the nation to a steady continuance in its suicidal policy. But we are persuaded that the people of this country view the prospect of another four years of war in America with very different feelings. They are not able to divest themselves of sympathy for a people of their own blood and language thus wilfully rushing down the path that leadeth to destruction[1230].

Sherman's capture of Atlanta did indeed make certain that Lincoln would again be chosen President, but the _Times_ was more slow to acknowledge its military importance, first hinting and then positively asserting that Sherman had fallen into a trap from which he would have difficulty in escaping[1231]. The _Gazette_ called this "blind partisanship[1232]," but itself indulged in gloomy prognostications as to the character and results of the Presidential election, regarding it as certain that election day would see the use of "force, fraud and every mechanism known to the most unscrupulous political agitation." "We confess," it continued, "we are only so far affected by the struggle inasmuch as it dishonours the Anglo-Saxon name, and diminishes its reputation for justice and honour throughout the world[1233]." Again official England was striking a note far different from that of the press[1234]. Adams paid little attention to newspaper utterances, but kept his chief informed of opinions expressed by those responsible for, and active in determining, governmental policy. The autumn "season for speeches" by Members of Parliament, he reported, was progressing with a very evident unanimity of expressions, whether from friend or foe, that it was inexpedient to meddle in American affairs. As the Presidential election in America came nearer, attention was diverted from military events. Anti-slavery societies began to hold meetings urging their friends in America to vote for Lincoln[1235]. Writing from Washington, Lyons, as always anxious to forestall frictions on immaterial matters, wrote to Russell, "We must be prepared for demonstrations of a '_spirited foreign policy_' by Mr. Seward, during the next fortnight, for electioneering purposes[1236]." Possibly his illness made him unduly nervous, for four days later he was relieved to be asked by Seward to "postpone as much as possible all business with him until after the election[1237]." By November 1, Lyons was so ill that he asked for immediate leave, and in replying, "You will come away at once," Russell added that he was entirely convinced the United States wished to make no serious difficulties with Great Britain.

"... I do not think the U.S. Government have any ill-intentions towards us, or any fixed purpose of availing themselves of a tide of success to add a war with us to their existing difficulties. Therefore whatever their bluster and buncome may be at times, I think they will subside when the popular clamour is over[1238]."

In early November, Lincoln was triumphantly re-elected receiving 212 electoral votes to 21 cast for McClellan. No disturbances such as the _Gazette_ had gloomily foretold attended the event, and the tremendous majority gained by the President somewhat stunned the press. Having prophesied disorders, the _Gazette_ now patted America on the back for her behaviour, but took occasion to renew old "professions of faith" against reunion:

"Abraham Lincoln II reigns in succession to Abraham Lincoln I, the first Republican monarch of the Federal States, and so far as we are concerned we are very glad of it, because the measure of the man is taken and known.... It is most creditable to the law-abiding habits of the people that the elections ... passed off as they have done.... Mr. Lincoln has four long years of strife before him; and as he seems little inclined to change his advisers, his course of action, or his generals, we do not believe that the termination of his second period of government will find him President of the United States[1239]."

The _Times_ was disinclined, for once, to moralize, and was cautious in comment:

"Ever since he found himself firmly established in his office, and the first effervescence of national feeling had begun to subside, we have had no great reason to complain of the conduct of Mr. Lincoln towards England. His tone has been less exacting, his language has been less offensive and, due allowance being made for the immense difficulties of his situation, we could have parted with Mr. Lincoln, had such been the pleasure of the American people, without any vestige of ill-will or ill-feeling. He has done as regards this country what the necessities of his situation demanded from him, and he has done no more[1240]."

This was to tread gently; but more exactly and more boldly the real reaction of the press was indicated by _Punch's_ cartoon of a phoenix, bearing the grim and forceful face of Lincoln, rising from the ashes where lay the embers of all that of old time had gone to make up the _liberties_ of America[1241].

During the months immediately preceding Lincoln's re-election English friends of the South had largely remained inactive. Constantly twitted that at the chief stronghold of the _Southern Independence Association_, Manchester, they did not dare to hold a meeting in the great Free Trade Hall[1242], they tried ticket meetings in smaller halls, but even there met with opposition from those who attended. At three other places, Oldham, Ashton, and Stockport, efforts to break the Northern hold on the manufacturing districts met with little success[1243], and even, as reported in the _Index_, were attended mainly by "magistrates, clergy, leading local gentry, manufacturers, tradesmen, and cotton operatives," the last named being also, evidently, the last considered, and presumably the least represented[1244]. The Rev. Mr. Massie conducted "follow up" Northern meetings wherever the Southern friends ventured an appearance[1245]. At one town only, Oldham, described by _The Index_ as "the most 'Southern' town in Lancashire," was a meeting held at all comparable with the great demonstrations easily staged by pro-Northern friends. Set for October 31, great efforts were made to picture this meeting as an outburst of indignation from the unemployed. Summoned by handbills headed "_The Crisis! The Crisis! The Crisis!_" there gathered, according to _The Index_ correspondent, a meeting "of between 5,000 and 6,000 wretched paupers, many of whom were women with children in their arms, who, starved apparently in body and spirit as in raiment, had met together to exchange miseries, and ask one another what was to be done." Desperate speeches were made, the people "almost threatening violence," but finally adopting a resolution now become so hackneyed as to seem ridiculous after a description intended to portray the misery and the revolutionary character of the meeting:

"That in consequence of the widespread distress that now prevails in the cotton districts by the continuance of the war in America, this meeting is desirous that Her Majesty's Government should use their influence, together with France and other European powers, to bring both belligerents together in order to put a stop to the vast destruction of life and property that is now going on in that unhappy country[1246]."

No doubt this spectacular meeting was organized for effect, but in truth it must have overshot the mark, for by October, 1864, the distress in Lancashire was largely alleviated and the public knew it, while elsewhere in the cotton districts the mass of operative feeling was with the North. Even in Ireland petitions were being circulated for signature among the working men, appealing to Irishmen in America to stand by the administration of Lincoln and to enlist in the Northern armies on the ground of emancipation[1247]. Here, indeed, was the insuperable barrier, in the fall of 1864, to public support of the South. Deny as he might the presence of the "foul blot" in Southern society, Hotze, of _The Index_, could not counteract that phrase. When the Confederate Congress at Richmond began, in the autumn of 1864, seriously to discuss a plan of transforming slaves into soldiers, putting guns in their hands, and thus replenishing the waning man-power of Southern armies, Hotze was hard put to it to explain to his English readers that this was in fact no evidence of lowered strength, but rather a noble determination on the part of the South to permit the negro to win his freedom by bearing arms in defence of his country[1248].

This was far-fetched for a journal that had long insisted upon the absolute incapacity of the black race. Proximity of dates, however, permits another interpretation of Hotze's editorial of November 10, and indeed of the project of arming the slaves, though this, early in the spring of 1865, was actually provided for by law. On November 11, Slidell, Mason and Mann addressed to the Powers of Europe a communication accompanying a Confederate "Manifesto," of which the blockade had long delayed transmissal. This "Manifesto" set forth the objects of the Southern States and flatly demanded recognition:

"'All they ask is immunity from interference with their internal peace and prosperity and to be left in the undisturbed enjoyment of their inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness which their common ancestry declared to be the equal heritage of all parties to the Social compact[1249].'"

Russell replied, November 25:

"Great Britain has since 1783, remained, with the exception of a short period, connected by friendly relations with both the Northern and the Southern States. Since the commencement of the Civil War which broke out in 1861, Her Majesty's Government have continued to entertain sentiments of friendship equally for the North and for the South; of the causes of the rupture Her Majesty's Government have never presumed to judge; they deplored the commencement of this sanguinary struggle, and anxiously look forward to the period of its termination. In the meantime they are convinced that they best consult the interests of peace, and respect the rights of all parties by observing a strict and impartial Neutrality. Such a Neutrality Her Majesty has faithfully maintained and will continue to maintain[1250]."

If _The Index_ did indeed hope for results from the "Manifesto," and had sought to bolster the appeal by dilating on a Southern plan to "let the slaves win their freedom," the answer of Russell was disappointing. Yet at the moment, in spite of the effect of Lincoln's re-election, the current of alleged expert military opinion was again swinging in favour of the South. The _Times_ scored Russell's answer, portraying him as attempting to pose as "Our Mutual Friend":

"The difficulty, of course, was to be polite to the representatives of the Confederate States without appearing rude to the United States; and, on the other hand, to acknowledge the authority of the United States without affronting the dignity of the Confederates. Between these two pitfalls Lord Russell oscillates in his letter, and now puts his foot a little bit in the hole on one side, and then, in recovering himself gets a little way into the hole on the other side. In this way he sways to and fro for a minute or two, but rights himself at last, and declares he has hitherto stood upright between the two pitfalls, and he will continue to do so.... Lord Russell seems to be in danger of forgetting that _neuter_ does not mean _both_, but _neither_, and that if, therefore, he would maintain even in words a strict neutrality it is necessary to avoid any demonstrations of friendship to either belligerent[1251]."

This was harsh criticism, evincing a _Times_ partisanship justifying the allegations of the _Gazette_, but wholly in line with the opinion to which the _Times_ was now desperately clinging that Grant had failed and that Sherman, adventuring on his spectacular "march to the sea" from Atlanta, was courting annihilation. Yet even Northern friends were appalled at Sherman's boldness and discouraged by Grant's slowness. The son of the American Minister could write, "Grant moves like the iron wall in Poe's story. You expect something tremendous, and it's only a step after all[1252]."

The _Times_ was at least consistent in prophecies until the event falsified them; the _Gazette_ less so. Some six weeks after having acclaimed Sherman's generalship in the capture of Atlanta[1253], the _Gazette's_ summary of the military situation was that:

"... if the winter sees Grant still before Petersburg, and Sherman unable to hold what he has gained in Georgia, the South may be nearer its dawning day of independence than could have been expected a few weeks ago, even though Wilmington be captured and Charleston be ground away piecemeal under a distant cannonade. The position of the Democrats would urge them to desperate measures, and the wedge of discord will be driven into the ill-compacted body which now represents the Federal States of North America[1254]."

But on December 17, W.H. Russell again changed his view and foretold with accuracy Sherman's movements toward Savannah. Not so the _Times_, privately very anxious as to what Sherman's campaign portended, while publicly belittling it. December 2, it was noted that Sherman had not been heard from for weeks, having left Atlanta with 50,000 men. December 5, his objective was stated to be Savannah, and while the difficulties to be encountered were enumerated, no prophecy was indulged in. But on December 22, Sherman's move was called a "desperate" one, forced by his inability to retreat _northward_ from Atlanta:

"If we turn to military affairs, we are informed that the great feature of the year is Sherman's expedition into Georgia. We are not yet able to say whether Sherman will succeed in escaping the fate of Burgoyne; but we know that his apparent rashness is excused by the fact that Sherman was unable to return on the way by which he came; so that the most remarkable feature of the war, according to the President, is the wild and desperate effort of an out-manoeuvred General to extricate himself from a position which, whatever effect it may have had on the election, should never, on mere military grounds, have been occupied at all[1255]."

This was followed up four days later by a long and careful review of Sherman's whole western campaign, concluding with the dictum that his sole object now was to escape to some undefended point on the coast where he could be rescued by the Northern navy. The war had taken a definite turn in favour of the South; it was impossible to conceive that Sherman would venture to attack Savannah:

"For the escape or safety of Sherman and his army it is essential he should reach Beaufort, or some neighbouring point on the sea-coast as rapidly as possible. Delay would be equivalent to ruin, and he will do nothing to create it[1256]."

Rarely, if ever, did the _Times_, in its now eager and avowed championship so definitely commit itself in an effort to preserve British confidence in the Southern cause[1257]. Even friends of the North were made doubtful by the positiveness of prediction indulged in by that journal whose opinions were supposed to be based on superior information. Their recourse was to a renewal of "deputations" calling on the American Minister to express steady allegiance to the Northern cause[1258], and their relief was great when the news was received that Savannah had fallen, December 20, without a struggle. The _Times_ recorded the event, December 29, but with no comment save that Southern prospects were less rosy than had been supposed. Then ensued a long silence, for this time there was no possibility of that editorial wiggling about the circle from excuses for misinterpretation to a complacent resumption of authoritative utterance.

For the editor, Delane, and for wise Southern sympathizers the fall of Savannah was a much harder blow than the mere loss of prestige to the _Times_[1259]. Courage failed and confidence in the South waned--momentarily almost vanished. Nearly two weeks passed before the _Times_ ventured to lift again the banner of hope, and even then but half-heartedly.

"The capture of the city completes the history of Sherman's march, and stamps it as one of the ablest, certainly one of the most singular military achievements of the war.

"... The advantage gained for the Federal cause by the possession of Savannah is yet to be shown. To Sherman and his army 'the change of base' is indisputably a change for the better. Assuming that his position at Atlanta was as desperate as shortness of supplies and an interrupted line of retreat could make it, the command of a point near the sea-coast and free communication with the fleet is obviously an improvement. At the least the army secures full means of subsistence, and a point from which further operations may be commenced. On the other hand, the blow, as far as the Confederate Government is concerned, is mitigated by the fact that Savannah has been little used as a seaport since the capture of Fort Pulaski by the Federals at an early stage of the war.

"... But the fall of the city is a patent fact, and it would be absurd to deny that it has produced an impression unfavourable to the _prestige_ of the Confederacy[1260]."

Far more emphatic of ultimate Northern victory was the picture presented, though in sarcasm, by the _Times_ New York correspondent, printed in this same issue:

"No disappointments, however fast they may follow on the heels of each other, can becloud the bright sunshine of conceit and self-worship that glows in the heart of the Yankee. His country is the first in the world, and he is the first man in it. Knock him down, and he will get up again, and brush the dirt from his knees, not a bit the worse for the fall. If he do not win this time, he is bound to win the next. His motto is 'Never say die.' His manifest destiny is to go on--prospering and to prosper--conquering and to conquer."

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1197: Dodd, _Jefferson Davis_, p. 233.]

[Footnote 1198: See _ante_, p. 192.]

[Footnote 1199: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 22, 1864.]

[Footnote 1200: _The Index_, Feb. 18, 1864, p. 105.]

[Footnote 1201: _The Index_, March 24, 1864, p. 189, quoting the _Reader_ for March 19.]

[Footnote 1202: The first Southern meeting in England I have found record of was one reported in the _Spectator_, Nov. 16, 1861, to honour Yancey on his arrival. It was held by the _Fishmongers of London_. Yancey was warmly received and appealed to his hosts on the ground that the South was the best buyer of English goods.]

[Footnote 1203: The 134 meetings here listed represent by no means all held, for Goldwin Smith estimated at least 500 after the beginning of 1862. (_The Civil War in America_, London, 1866.) The list may be regarded as an analysis of the more important, attracting the attention of _The Liberator_ and of Adams.]

[Footnote 1204: At a banquet given to Thompson in 1863 he was declared by Bright to have been the "real liberator of the slaves in the English colonies," and by P.A. Taylor as, by his courage "when social obloquy and personal danger had to be incurred for the truth's sake," having rendered great services "to the cause of Abolition in America."]

[Footnote 1205: _The Liberator_, Jan. 15, 1864. Letter to James Buffum, of Lynn, Dec. 10, 1863.]

[Footnote 1206: Goldwin Smith's pamphlet: "The Civil War in America: An Address read at the last meeting of the Manchester Union and Emancipation Society" (held on January 26, 1866), pays especial tribute to Thomas Bayley Potter, M.P., stating "you boldly allied yourself with the working-men in forming this association." Smith gives a five-page list of other leading members, among whom, in addition to some Northern friends already named, are to be noted Thomas Hughes, Duncan McLaren, John Stuart Mill. There are eleven noted "Professors," among them Cairnes, Thorold Rogers, and Fawcett. The publicity committee of this society during three years had issued and circulated "upwards of four hundred thousand books, pamphlets, and tracts." Here, as previously, the activities of Americans in England are not included. Thus George Francis Train, correspondent of the _New York Herald_, made twenty-three speeches between January, 1861, and March, 1862. ("Union Speeches in England.")]

[Footnote 1207: For text of Lincoln's pardon see Trevelyan, _Bright_, p. 296. Lincoln gave the pardon "especially as a public mark of the esteem held by the United States of America for the high character and steady friendship of the said John Bright...." The names of leading friends of the South have been given in Chapter XV.]

[Footnote 1208: This was a commonplace of American writing at the time and long after. A Rev. C.B. Boynton published a book devoted to the thesis that England and France had united in a "policy" of repressing the development of America and Russia (_English and French Neutrality and the Anglo-French Alliance in their relations to the United States and Russia_, Cincinnati, C.F. Vest & Co., 1864). Boynton wrote: "You have not come to the bottom of the conduct of Great Britain, until you have touched that delicate and real foundation cause--we are too large and strong a nation" (Preface, p. 3). The work has no historical importance except that it was thought worth publication in 1864.]

[Footnote 1209: Lyons Papers. July 16, 1864. Copy.]

[Footnote 1210: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Aug. 23, 1864.]

[Footnote 1211: June 3, 1864.]

[Footnote 1212: The _Times_, August 4, 1864. Letters dated June 27 and July 5, 1864.]

[Footnote 1213: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 126. Henry Adams to his brother, May 13, 1864. "The current is dead against us, and the atmosphere so uncongenial that the idea of the possibility of our success is not admitted."]

[Footnote 1214: _Ibid._, p. 136. Henry Adams to his brother, June 3, 1864.]

[Footnote 1215: _The Index_, Feb. 19, 1863, p. 265.]

[Footnote 1216: This was written immediately after the battles of Vicksburg and Gettysburg, but the tone complained of was much more marked in 1864.]

[Footnote 1217: The _Times_ average of editorials on the Civil War ran two in every three days until May, 1864, and thereafter one in every three days.]

[Footnote 1218: Russell wrote to John Bigelow, March 8, 1865: "You know, perhaps, that, as I from the first maintained the North must win, I was tabooed from dealing with American questions in the _Times_ even after my return to England, but _en revanche_ I have had my say in the _Army and Navy Gazette_, which I have bought, every week, and if one could be weak and wicked enough to seek for a morbid gratification amid such ruins and blood, I might be proud of the persistence with which I maintained my opinions against adverse and unanimous sentiment" (Bigelow, _Retrospections_, Vol. II, p. 361). Also on June 5, 1865, Russell wrote in his diary: "...had the _Times_ followed my advice, how different our position would be--not only that of the leading journal, but of England. If ever I did State service, it was in my letters from America." (Atkins, _Life of W.H. Russell_, Vol. II, p. 115.) See also Bigelow, _Retrospections_, I, pp. 344-45. Russell was editor of the _Gazette_ on its first appearance as a weekly, January 6, 1860, but left it to go to America. On his return he settled down to his editorial task in November, 1862, and thereafter, throughout the war, the _Gazette_ may be regarded as reflecting his views. His entire letters from America to the _Times_ constitute a most valuable picture of the months preceding the outbreak of war, but the contempt poured on the Northern army for its defeat at Bull Run made Russell much disliked in the North. This dislike was bitterly displayed in a pamphlet by Andrew D. White ("A Letter to William Howard Russell, LL.D., on passages in his 'Diary North and South'"), published in London in 1863.]

[Footnote 1219: June 25, 1864.]

[Footnote 1220: The _Army and Navy Gazette_, July 30, 1864.]

[Footnote 1221: _Ibid._, June 25, 1864.]

[Footnote 1222: _Ibid._, July 16, 1864. Similar articles and editorials might be quoted from many of the more important papers, but the _Times_ and the _Gazette_ will suffice as furnishing the keynote. I have not examined in detail the files of the metropolitan press beyond determining their general attitude on the Civil War and for occasional special references. Such examination has been sufficient, however, to warrant the conclusion that the _weight_ of the _Times_ in influencing opinion was very great. Collating statistics given in:

(1) Grant's _The Newspaper Press_; (2) in a speech in Parliament by Edward Banes in 1864 (Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXV, p. 295); and (3) in _Parliamentary Papers_, 1861, _Commons_, Vol. XXXIV, "Return of the Registered Newspapers in the United Kingdom ... from 30 June, 1860, to 30 June, 1861," the following facts of circulation are derived:

(A) _Daily Papers_:

(1) _The Telegraph_ (evening), 150,000 (neutral).

(2) _The Standard_ (morning and evening), 130,000 (Southern). Under the same management was also _The Herald_ (morning), but with small circulation (Southern).

(3) The _Times_ (morning), 70,000 (Southern). Grant says: "The prestige of the _Times_ was remarkable. The same articles appearing in other papers would not produce the same effect as in the _Times_." Of Delane, the editor, Grant declared "His name is just as well-known ... throughout the civilized world as that of any of our European kings.... The _Times_ may, indeed, be called the Monarch of the Press." (Grant, II, p. 53.)

(4) _The Morning Advertiser_ (circulation uncertain, probably 50,000), but very largely taken in the trades, in public-houses, and in the Clubs (neutral).

(5) _The Daily News_ (morning), 6,000 (Northern).

(6) _The Morning Star_, 5,500 (but with evening edition 10,000) (Northern). Grant says that contrary to general belief, John Bright was never a shareholder but at times raised money to meet deficits. _The Star_ was regarded as an _anti-British paper_ and was very unpopular.

(7) _The Morning Post_, 4,500 (Southern). It was regarded as Palmerston's organ.

(8) _The Morning Chronicle_. Very small circulation in the 'sixties (neutral).

(B) _Weekly Papers._--No approximate circulation figures are available, but these papers are placed by Grant in supposed order of subscribers.

(1) _Reynolds' Weekly_. Circulation upwards of 350,000. A penny paper, extreme Liberal in politics, and very popular in the manufacturing districts (Northern).

(2) _John Bull_ (Southern). "The country squire's paper."

(3) _The Spectator_ (Northern).

(4) _The Saturday Review_ (Southern).

(5) _The Economist_ (Neutral).

(6) _The Press and St. James' Chronicle_. Small circulation (Southern).

In addition to British newspapers listed above as Northern in sentiment _The Liberator_ names for Great Britain as a whole _Westminster Review, Nonconformist, British Standard, Birmingham Post, Manchester Examiner, Newcastle Chronicle, Caledonian Mercury, Belfast Whig_, and some few others of lesser importance. (_Liberator_, June 30, 1863.) The attitude of the _Manchester Guardian_ seemed to _The Liberator_ to be like that of the _Times_. ]

[Footnote 1223: _The Index_, April 14, 1864, p. 231.]

[Footnote 1224: August 8, 1864.]

[Footnote 1225: Sept. 3, 1864.]

[Footnote 1226: Sept. 20 and 22, 1864.]

[Footnote 1227: Sept. 24, 1864.]

[Footnote 1228: Russell Papers. Lyons to Russell, Sept. 16, 1864.]

[Footnote 1229: General McClellan, the nominee of the convention, modified this in his letter of acceptance.]

[Footnote 1230: Oct. 10, 1864.]

[Footnote 1231: Nov. 10, 1864.]

[Footnote 1232: Nov. 12, 1864.]

[Footnote 1233: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 1234: According to _The Index_, the French press was more divided than was the London press in portrayal of military events in America. The _Siècle_ and the _Opinion Nationale_ pictured Sherman as about to capture Atlanta. Readers of the _Constitutionel, Patrie, Moniteur_, and _La France_ "know quite well that Sherman has neither occupied the centre, the circumference, nor, indeed, any part of the defences of Atlanta; and that he was completely defeated by General Hood on July 22." (_Index_, Aug. 18, 1864, p. 522.) The Paris correspondent wrote, October 19, after the news was received of Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley:

"The _Siècle_ is triumphant. According to this humanitarian journal, whose sole policy consists in the expression of a double hatred, part of which it bestows on the priests, and part on the slave-dealers, the American contest has assumed its last phase, the Confederates are running in breathless haste to demand pardon, and true patriotism is at last to meet with its reward. This great and noble result will be due to the Northern generals, _who have carried military glory to so high a pitch without at the same time compromising American Democracy!_

"Your readers will doubtless consider that the writer of the above lines undertakes to speak on a subject of which he knows nothing; but what will they say of a writer who, in the same journal, thus expresses himself relative to the issues of the coming election?

'Lincoln being elected, the following will be the results: The South will lose courage and abandon the contest; the lands reduced to barrenness by servile labour will be again rendered productive by the labour of the freeman; the Confederates, _who know only how to fight, and who are supported by the sweat of others_, will purify and regenerate themselves by the exercise of their own brains and of their own hands....'

"These strange remarks conclude with words of encouragement to the robust-shouldered, iron-fronted, firm-lipped Lincoln, and prayers for the welfare of the American brethren.

"You will not easily credit it, but this article--a very masterpiece of delirium and absurdity--bears the signature of one of the most eminent writers of the day, M. Henri Martin, the celebrated historian of France. (_Index_, Oct. 20, 1864, p. 667.)

A week later _The Index_ was vicious in comment upon the "men and money" pouring out of _Germany_ in aid of the North. German financiers, under the guise of aiding emigration, were engaged in the prosperous business of "selling white-skinned Germans to cut Southern throats for the benefit, as they say, of the poor blacks." (Oct. 27, 1864, p. 685.) This bitter tone was indulged in even by the Confederate Secretary of State. Benjamin wrote to Slidell, September 20, 1864, that France was wilfully deceiving the South by professions of friendship. The President, he stated, "could not escape the painful conviction that the Emperor of the French, knowing that the utmost efforts of this people are engrossed in the defence of their homes against an atrocious warfare waged by greatly superior numbers, has thought the occasion opportune for promoting his own purposes, at no greater cost than a violation of his faith and duty toward us." (Richardson, II, p. 577.)]

[Footnote 1235: e.g., Meeting of Glasgow Union and Emancipation Society, Oct. 11, 1864. (_The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.)]

[Footnote 1236: Russell Papers, Oct. 24, 1864.]

[Footnote 1237: _Ibid._, Lyons to Russell, Oct. 28, 1864.]

[Footnote 1238: Lyons Papers. Russell to Lyons, Nov. 19, 1864. Lyons reached London December 27, and never returned to his post in America. Lyons' services to the friendly relations of the United States and Great Britain were of the greatest. He upheld British dignity yet never gave offence to that of America; he guarded British interests but with a wise and generous recognition of the difficulties of the Northern Government. No doubt he was at heart so unneutral as to hope for Northern success, even though at first sharing in the view that there was small possibility of reunion, but this very hope--unquestionably known to Seward and to Lincoln--frequently eased dangerous moments in the relations with Great Britain, and was in the end a decided asset to the Government at home.]

[Footnote 1239: Nov. 26, 1864.]

[Footnote 1240: Nov. 22, 1864.]

[Footnote 1241: The gradual change in _Punch's_ representation of a silly-faced Lincoln to one which bore the stamp of despotic ferocity is an interesting index of British opinion during the war. By 1864 those who watched his career had come to respect Lincoln's ability and power though as yet wholly unappreciative of his still greater qualities.]

[Footnote 1242: _The Liberator_, Sept. 23, 1864. Letter from T.H. Barker to Garrison, August 27, 1864.]

[Footnote 1243: _Ibid._, Nov. 4, 1864.]

[Footnote 1244: _The Index_, Sept. 29, 1864, p. 618, describing the meeting at Ashton.]

[Footnote 1245: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.]

[Footnote 1246: _The Index_, Nov. 3, 1864, p. 699.]

[Footnote 1247: _The Liberator_, Nov. 4, 1864.]

[Footnote 1248: _The Index_, Nov. 10, 1864, p. 713.]

[Footnote 1249: F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Slidell, Mason and Mann to Russell, Nov. 11, 1864, Paris. Replies were received from England, France, Sweden and the Papal States. (Mason Papers, Mason to Slidell, Jan. 4, 1865).]

[Footnote 1250: F.O., Am., Vol. 975. Draft. Russell to the "Commissioners of the so-called Confederate States," Nov. 25, 1864.]

[Footnote 1251: Dec. 1, 1864.]

[Footnote 1252: _A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 207. Henry Adams to his brother, Oct. 21, 1864.]

[Footnote 1253: See _ante_, p. 233.]

[Footnote 1254: Nov. 12, 1864.]

[Footnote 1255: Dec. 22, 1864.]

[Footnote 1256: Dec. 26, 1864. But this was in reality a mere "keeping up courage" editorial. See Ch. XVIII, p. 300.]

[Footnote 1257: That this was very effective championship is shown by Henry Adams' letter to his brother, Dec. 16, 1864. (_A Cycle of Adams' Letters_, II, p. 232.) "Popular opinion here declares louder than ever that Sherman is lost. People are quite angry at his presumption in attempting such a wild project. The interest felt in his march is enormous, however, and if he arrives as successfully as I expect, at the sea, you may rely upon it that the moral effect of his demonstration on Europe will be greater than that of any other event of the war."]

[Footnote 1258: State Department, Eng, Adams to Seward, Dec. 16, 1864. Adams expressed to Seward doubts as to the propriety of his receiving such deputations and making replies to them. _The Index_ (Dec. 22, 1864, p. 808) was "indignant" that Adams should presume to "hector and threaten" England through his replies. But Adams continued to receive deputations.]

[Footnote 1259: Delane's position on the Civil War and the reasons for the importance of Savannah to him, personally, are described in Ch. XVIII.]

[Footnote 1260: Jan. 9, 1865.]