Chapter 10

When we speak of the relation of grace to free-will, we mean efficacious grace; merely sufficient grace, as such, does not involve consent.

The Protestant reformers and the Jansenists denied the freedom of the human will under the influence of efficacious grace.

Catholic theologians have always staunchly upheld both the freedom of the will and the efficacy of grace, but they disagree in explaining the mutual relations between grace and free-will.

Section 1. The Heresy of The Protestant Reformers And The Jansenists

1. THE HERETICAL ERRORS OF LUTHER, CALVIN, AND JANSENIUS CONTRASTED WITH THE ORTHODOX TEACHING OF THE CHURCH.—Luther and Calvin asserted that the freedom of the will was irretrievably lost by original sin. Jansenius taught that the will is overcome by efficacious grace in exactly the same way as it is overpowered by concupiscence in the absence of grace. Against both these heresies the Church has always maintained that the will remains free under the influence of efficacious grace.

a) Luther taught(681) that original sin has so completely annihilated man’s free-will that he resembles a horse compelled to go in whatever direction it is driven (according as “God or the devil rides him”),(682) and that the grace of Christ, far from restoring man’s liberty, compels him to act with intestine necessity.

Calvin(683) carried this teaching to its logical conclusions by asserting: (1) that the will of our first parents was free in Paradise, but lost its freedom by original sin; (2) that we cannot be delivered from the slavery of Satan except by the grace of Christ, which does not, however, restore liberty, but simply compels the will to do good; (3) that, though the will under the influence of grace is passive, and must needs follow the impulse to which it is subjected, yet its acts are vital and spontaneous.(684)

Against these heresies the Council of Trent maintained the existence of free-will both in the state of original sin(685) and under the influence of efficacious grace: “If any one saith that man’s free-will, moved and excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, ... cannot refuse its consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive: let him be anathema.”(686)

b) Jansenius differed from Luther and Calvin mainly in drawing a sharper distinction between freedom from external constraint (_libertas a coactione_) and freedom from internal compulsion (_libertas a necessitate_), and maintaining that the will, when under the influence of grace, is exempt from external constraint, though not from interior compulsion, and that the _libertas a coactione_ is entirely sufficient to gain merit or demerit in the fallen state.(687)

The Jansenist teaching on the subject of grace may be outlined as follows: (1) By original sin man lost the moral liberty which he had enjoyed in Paradise and became subject to a twofold delectation—_delectatio coelestis victrix_ and _delectatio terrena sive carnalis victrix_. (2) These two delectations are continually contending for the mastery; the stronger always defeats the weaker, (3) and the will, unable to offer resistance, is alternately overpowered now by the one and then by the other.(688) (4) In each case the _delectatio coelestis_ is either stronger than the _delectatio terrena_, or it is weaker, or it is of equal strength. When it is stronger, the will is overcome by grace, which in that case becomes _efficax_ or _irresistibilis_. When it is weaker, the will simply _must_ sin, because the _delectatio coelestis_ is too weak to overcome the _delectatio terrena_. The grace given to a man under such conditions is called by the Jansenists _gratia parva sive sufficiens_. When the two delectations are equally strong, the will finds itself unable to come to a definite decision.

This false teaching inspired the famous “five propositions” of Jansenius, to-wit: (1) Man is unable to keep some of God’s commandments for want of grace; (2) In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace; (3) To merit or demerit in the state of fallen nature it is sufficient to be free from external constraint; (4) The Semipelagian heresy consisted in assuming the existence of a grace which man may either obey or resist; and (5) Christ did not die for all men, but solely for the predestined.

These propositions were condemned as heretical by Pope Innocent X in his dogmatic Bull “_Cum occasione_,” of May 31, 1653. All five are implicitly contained in the second, _viz._: In the state of fallen nature no one ever resists interior grace. “If it is true that fallen man never resists interior grace (second proposition), it follows that a just man who violates a commandment of God has not had the grace to observe it, that he therefore transgressed it through inability to fulfil it (first proposition). If, however, he has sinned and thus incurred demerit, it is clear that the liberty of indifference is not a requisite condition of demerit, and what is said of demerit is likewise true of its correlative, merit (third proposition). On the other hand, if grace is wanting to the just whenever they fall, it is wanting still more to sinners; it is therefore impossible to maintain that the death of Jesus Christ assured to every man the graces necessary for salvation (fifth proposition). As a further consequence, the Semipelagians were in error in admitting the universal distribution of a grace which may be resisted (fourth proposition).”(689)

2. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH PROVED FROM REVELATION.—Far from favoring the determinism of the Reformers and of Jansenius, the Bible and Tradition positively contradict the contention that free-will is overpowered by grace.

a) The operation of grace and the liberty of the will never appear in Sacred Scripture as mutually exclusive, but invariably as coöperating factors, though sometimes the one is emphasized, and sometimes the other, according to the purpose the sacred writer happens to have in view.

The Council of Trent expressly calls attention to this:(690) “When it is said in the sacred writings, ‘Turn ye to me, and I will turn to you,’(691) we are admonished of our liberty; and when we answer: ‘Convert us, O God, to thee, and we shall be converted,’(692) we confess that we are forestalled by the grace of God.”

St. Paul, it is true, asks: “Who resisteth his [God’s] will?”(693) But he also admonishes his favorite disciple Timothy: “Exercise thyself unto godliness.”(694) St. Stephen testifies that the grace of the Holy Ghost does not compel the will. “You always resist the Holy Ghost,” he tells the Jews; “as your fathers did, so do you also.”(695) Our Lord Himself teaches that grace exerts no interior compulsion but invites free coöperation: “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.”(696) The exhortations, promises, and threats uttered in various portions of Holy Writ would be meaningless if it were true that grace destroys free-will.(697)

b) As regards Tradition, the Greek Fathers who wrote before St. Augustine defended the freedom of the will so energetically that they were subsequently accused of harboring Pelagian and Semipelagian errors.(698) Calvin himself admits that with but one exception the Fathers are unanimously opposed to his teaching.(699)

The one exception noted is St. Augustine, to whom both Calvin and Jansenius appeal with great confidence. It should be noted, however, that the point which chiefly concerned St. Augustine in his controversies with the Pelagians and Semipelagians, was the necessity and gratuity of grace, not its relation to free-will. Where he incidentally touches upon the latter, he shows by the manner in which he formulates his sentences that he regards the relation of grace to free-will as a great mystery. But he does not try to solve this mystery in the manner in which Alexander the Great cut the Gordian knot. He does not declare: Grace is everything, free-will is nothing. If the power of grace destroyed the freedom of the human will, their mutual relation would be no problem.(700) Possibly St. Augustine in the heat of controversy now and then expressed himself in language open to misinterpretation, as when he said: “Therefore aid was brought to the infirmity of the human will, so that it might be unchangeably and invincibly influenced by divine grace.”(701) But this and similar phrases admit of a perfectly orthodox interpretation. As the context shows, Augustine merely wished to assert the hegemony of grace in all things pertaining to salvation, and to emphasize the fact that free-will, strengthened by grace, is able to resist even the most grievous temptations.(702) At no period of his life did the Saint deny the freedom of the will under the influence of grace. We will quote but two out of many available passages in proof of this statement. “To yield consent or to withhold it, whenever God calls, is the function of one’s own will.”(703) “For the freedom of the will is not destroyed because the will is aided; but it is aided precisely for the reason that it remains free.”(704) St. Bernard of Clairvaux echoes this teaching when, in his own ingenious way, he summarizes the Catholic dogma as follows: “Take away free will and there will be nothing left to save; take away grace and there will be no means left of salvation.”(705)

READINGS:—*Bellarmine, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_ (_Opera Omnia_, ed. Fèvre, Vols. V and VI, Paris 1873).—*Dechamps, S. J., _De Haeresi Ianseniana_, Paris 1645.—F. Wörter, _Die christliche Lehre über das Verhältnis von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf Augustinus_, Freiburg 1856.—*Palmieri, _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 39-48, Gulpen 1885.—S. Schiffini, _De Gratia Divina_, pp. 357 sqq., 377 sqq., Freiburg 1901.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 507 sqq.

Section 2. Theological Systems Devised To Harmonize The Dogmas Of Grace And Free-Will

The relation of grace to free-will may be regarded from a twofold point of view. We may take grace as the primary factor and trace it in its action on the human will; or, starting from the latter, we may endeavor to ascertain how free-will is affected by grace.

The first-mentioned method has given birth to two closely related theological systems, Thomism and Augustinianism; the latter to Molinism and Congruism, which are almost identical in substance.

Besides these there is a fifth theory, which tries to reconcile the two extremes and may therefore be called eclectic.

That the human will is free, yet subject to the influence of grace, is an article of faith unhesitatingly accepted by all Catholic theologians. It is in trying to explain how grace and free-will coöperate, that the above-mentioned schools differ.

In approaching this extremely difficult and obscure problem we consider it our duty to warn the student against preconceived opinions and to remind him that the different systems which we are about to examine are all tolerated by the Church. To-day, when so many more important things are at stake and the faith is viciously assailed from without, the ancient controversy between Thomism and Molinism had better be left in abeyance.

Article 1. Thomism And Augustinianism

Thomism and Augustinianism both hinge on the concept of _gratia efficax ab intrinseco s. per se_, whereas Molinism and Congruism will not admit even the existence of such a grace.

1. THE THOMISTIC THEORY OF GRACE.—The true founder of the Thomistic system is not St. Thomas Aquinas, who is also claimed by the Molinists, but the learned Dominican theologian Bañez (1528-1604). His teaching may be summarized as follows:

a) God is the First Cause (_causa prima_) and Prime Mover (_motor primus_) of all things, and all created or secondary causes (_causae secundae_) derive their being and faculties, nay, their very acts from Him. If any creature could act independently of God, God would cease to be _causa prima_ and _motor primus_.(706)

The influence of the First Cause is universal, that is to say, it produces all creatural acts without exception,—necessary and free, good and bad,—because no secondary cause has power to act unless it is set in motion by the _motor primus_.

In influencing His creatures, however, God adapts himself to the peculiar nature of each. The necessary causes He determines to act necessarily, the free causes, freely. All receive from Him their substance and their mode of action.(707) The rational creature, therefore, though subject to His determining influence, acts with perfect freedom, just as if it were not moved.

b) In spite of free-will, however, the influence which God exerts on His rational creatures is irresistible because it proceeds from an absolute and omnipotent Being whose decrees brook no opposition. What God wills infallibly happens.(708)

Nevertheless, God is not the author of sin. He moves the sinner to perform an act; but He does not move Him to perform a sinful act. The malice of sin derives solely from the free will of man.(709)

c) Since the divine influence causally precedes all creatural acts, God’s concurrence with creatural causes (_concursus generalis_) must be conceived as prevenient, not simultaneous. The Divine Omnipotence not only makes the action possible, but likewise effects it by moving the will from potentiality to actuality.(710) Consequently, the causal influence which the Creator exerts upon His creatures is not a mere _motio_, but a _praemotio_,—and not merely moral, but physical (_praemotio physica_).(711) It is by physical premotion that God’s prevenient influence effects the free actions of His creatures, without regard to their assent.(712) Free-will is predetermined by God before it determines itself.(713)

d) If we analyse God’s physical predeterminations in so far as they are created entities, we find that they are nothing else than the effect and execution of His eternal decrees, embodied in the _praedeterminatio physica_. It is the temporal execution of the latter that is called _praemotio physica_. Hence we are justified in speaking, not only of a temporal _praemotio_, but of an eternal _praedeterminatio_, in fact the terms are often used synonymously.(714)

Viewed in its relation to rational creatures, this eternal predetermination is nothing but a temporal premotion of the free will to determine itself. Since God has from all eternity made absolute and conditional decrees, which possess the power of physical predetermination without regard to the free consent of His creatures, physical predetermination constitutes an infallible medium by which He can foreknow their future free actions, and hence there is no need of a _scientia media_. If God knows His own will, He must also know the free determinations included therein. To deny this would be to destroy the very foundation of His foreknowledge.(715)

This is merely the philosophical basis of the Thomistic system. Its champions carry the argument into the theological domain by reasoning as follows: What is true in the natural must be equally true in the supernatural sphere, as we know from reason and Revelation.(716)

e) To physical predetermination or premotion in the order of nature, there corresponds in the supernatural sphere the _gratia efficax_, which predetermines man to perform salutary acts in such wise that he acts freely but at the same time with metaphysical necessity (_necessitate consequentiae_, not _consequentis_). It would be a contradiction to say that efficacious grace given for the purpose of eliciting consent may co-exist with non-consent, _i.e._, may fail to elicit consent.(717) The will freely assents to the divine impulse because it is effectively moved thereto by grace. Consequently, efficacious grace does not derive its efficacy from the consent of the will; it is efficacious of itself and intrinsically (_gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_).(718)

It follows that efficacious grace must be conceived as a _praedeterminatio ad unum_.(719)

f) If efficacious grace is intrinsically and of its very nature inseparably bound up with the consent of the will, it must differ essentially from merely sufficient grace (_gratia mere sufficiens_), which confers only the power to act (_posse operari_), not the act itself (_actu operari_). Efficacious grace, by its very definition, includes the free consent of the will, while merely sufficient grace lacks that consent, because with it, it would cease to be merely sufficient and would become efficacious.(720)

Here the question naturally arises: How, in this hypothesis, can sufficient grace be called truly sufficient? The Thomists answer this question in different ways. Gazzaniga says that sufficient grace confers the power to perform a good deed, but that something more is required for the deed itself.(721) De Lemos ascribes the inefficacy of merely sufficient grace to a defect of the will.(722) If the will did not resist, God would promptly add efficacious grace.(723)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE THOMISTIC THEORY.—The Thomistic system undoubtedly has its merits. It is logical in its deductions, exalts divine grace as the prime factor in the business of salvation, and magnificently works out the concept of God as _causa prima_ and _motor primus_ both in the natural and the supernatural order.

But Thomism also has its weak points.

A. The Thomistic conception of efficacious grace is open to two serious theological difficulties.

(1) To draw an intrinsic and substantial distinction between efficacious and merely sufficient grace destroys the true notion of sufficient grace.

(2) The Thomistic theory of efficacious grace is incompatible with the dogma of free-will.

Though in theory the Thomists defend the sufficiency of grace and the freedom of the will as valiantly as their opponents, they fail in their attempts at squaring these dogmas with the fundamental principles of their system.

a) Sufficient grace, as conceived by the Thomists, is not truly sufficient to enable a man to perform a salutary act, because _ex vi notionis_ it confers merely the power to act, postulating for the act itself a substantially new grace (_gratia efficax_). A grace which requires to be entitatively supplemented by another, in order to enable a man to perform a salutary act, is clearly not sufficient for the performance of that act. “To be truly sufficient for something” and “to require to be complemented by something else” are mutually exclusive notions, and hence “sufficient grace” as conceived by Thomists is in reality insufficient.

Many subtle explanations have been devised to obviate this difficulty. Billuart and nearly all the later Thomists say that if any one who has received sufficient grace (in the Thomistic sense of the term) is denied the _gratia efficax_, it must be attributed to a sinful resistance of the will.(724) But this explanation is incompatible with the Thomistic teaching that together with the _gratia sufficiens_ there co-exists in the soul of the sinner an irresistible and inevitable _praemotio physica_ to the entity of sin, with which entity formal sin is inseparably bound up.(725) If this be true, how can the will of man be held responsible so long as God denies him the _gratia ab intrinseco efficax_?

Speaking in the abstract, the will may assume one of three distinct attitudes toward sufficient grace. It may consent, it may resist, or it may remain neutral. It cannot consent except with the aid of a predetermining _gratia efficax_, to merit which is beyond its power. If it withstands, it _eo ipso_ renders itself unworthy of the _gratia efficax_. If it takes a neutral attitude, (which may in itself be a sinful act), and awaits efficacious grace, of what use is sufficient grace?

To resist sufficient grace involves an abuse of liberty. Now, where does the right use of liberty come in? If coöperation with sufficient grace moves God to bestow the _gratia per se efficax_, as the Thomists contend, then the right use of liberty must lie somewhere between the _gratia sufficiens_ and the _gratia efficax per se_. But there is absolutely no place for it in the Thomistic system. The right use of liberty for the purpose of obtaining efficacious grace is attributable either to grace or to unaided nature. To assert that it is the work of unaided nature would lead to Semipelagianism. To hold that it is owing to grace would be moving in a vicious circle, thus: “Because the will offers no resistance, it is efficaciously moved to perform a salutary act; that it offers no sinful resistance is owing to the fact that it is efficaciously moved to perform a salutary act.”(726)

It is impossible to devise any satisfactory solution of this difficulty which will not at the same time upset the very foundation on which the Thomistic system rests, viz.: “_Nulla secunda causa potest operari, nisi sit efficaciter determinata a prima [scil. per applicationem potentiae ad actum]_,” that is to say, no secondary cause can act unless it be efficaciously determined by the First Cause by an application of the latter to the former as of potency to act.

b) The Thomistic _gratia efficax_, conceived as a _praedeterminatio ad unum_, inevitably destroys free-will.

α) It is important to state the question clearly: Not physical premotion as such,(727) but the implied connotation of _praevia determinatio ad unum_, is incompatible with the dogma of free-will. The freedom of the will does not consist in the pure contingency of an act, or in a merely passive indifference, but in active indifference either to will or not to will, to will thus or otherwise. Consequently every physical predetermination, in so far as it is a _determinatio ad unum_, must necessarily be destructive of free-will. Self-determination and physical predetermination by an extraneous will are mutually exclusive. Now the Thomists hold that the _gratia per se efficax_ operates in the manner of a supernatural _praedeterminatio ad unum_. If this were true, the will under the influence of efficacious grace would no longer be free.

To perceive the full force of this argument it is necessary to keep in mind the Thomistic definition of _praemotio physica_ as “_actio Dei, quâ voluntatem humanam, priusquam se determinet, ita ad actum movet insuperabili virtute, ut voluntas nequeat omissionem sui actus cum illa praemotione coniungere_.”(728) That is to say: As the non-performance of an act by the will is owing simply and solely to the absence of the respective _praemotio physica_, so conversely, the performance of an act is conditioned simply and solely by the presence of a divine premotion; the will itself can neither obtain nor prevent such a premotion, because this would require a new premotion, which again depends entirely on the divine pleasure. If the will of man were thus inevitably predetermined by God, it could not in any sense of the term be called truly free.

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β) The Thomists meet this argument with mere evasions. They make a distinction between _necessitas consequentis_ (_antecedens_), which really necessitates, and _necessitas consequentiae_ (_subsequens_), which does not. A free act, they say, necessarily proceeds from a physical premotion, but it is not on that account in itself necessary. But, we answer, a _determinatio ad unum_, which precedes a free act and is independent of the will, is more than a _necessitas consequentiae_—it is a _necessitas consequentis_ destructive of free-will. The Thomists reply: Considered as a created entity, physical premotion may indeed be incompatible with free-will; not so if regarded as an act of God, who, being almighty, is able to predetermine the will without prejudice to its freedom.(729) The obvious rejoinder is that an intrinsic contradiction cannot be solved by an appeal to the divine omnipotence, because even God Himself cannot do what is intrinsically impossible.(730) He can no more change a _determinatio ad unum_ into a _libertas ad utrumque_ than He can create a square circle, because the two notions involve an intrinsic contradiction. Furthermore, if the Almighty wished intrinsically to compel a man to perform some definite act, would He not choose precisely that _praemotio physica_ which, the Thomists claim, also produces free acts? Not so, replies Alvarez; “for the will remains free so long as the intellect represents to it an object as indifferent.”(731) That is to say: Liberty remains as long as its root, _i.e._ an indifferent judgment, is present. But this new rejoinder, far from solving the riddle, simply begs the question. Liberty of choice resides _formaliter_ in the will, not in the intellect, and consequently the will, as will, cannot be truly free unless it possesses within itself the unimpeded power to act or not to act. This _indifferentia activa ad utrumlibet_, as it is technically termed, is absolutely incompatible with the Thomistic _praemotio ad unum_. What would it avail the will to enjoy the _indifferentia iudicii_ if it had to submit to compulsion from some other quarter?

γ) To escape from this quandary the Thomists resort to the famous distinction between the _sensus compositus_ and the _sensus divisus_. The Molinists argue: “_Liberum arbitrium efficaciter praemotum a gratia non potest dissentire; ergo non est liberum._” The Thomists reply: “_Distinguo:—non potest dissentire in sensu diviso, nego; non potest dissentire in sensu composito, concedo._” They explain this distinction by certain well-known examples taken from dialectics. Thus Billuart says: “_Ut si dicas, sedens potest stare, significat in sensu composito, quod possit sedere simul et stare; ... in sensu diviso, quod sedens sub sessione retinet potentiam standi, non tamen componendi stationem cum sessione. Uno verbo: sensus compositus importat potentiam simultaneitatis, sensus divisus simultaneitatem __ potentiae._”(732) As one who sits cannot at the same time stand (_sensus compositus_), although he is free to rise (_sensus divisus_), so the consent of the will effected by efficacious grace, cannot become dissent (_sensus compositus_), though the will retains the power to dissent instead of consenting (_sensus divisus_), and this is sufficient to safeguard its freedom.

Is the distinction between _sensus compositus_ and _sensus divisus_ correctly applied here? Can the will, under the predetermining influence of the _gratia efficax_, change its consent into dissent at any time and as easily as a man who is sitting on a chair can rise and thereby demonstrate that his sitting was an absolutely free act? Alvarez(733) describes the Thomistic _potentia dissentiendi_ as a faculty which can never under any circumstances become active. But such a _potentia_ is really no _potentia_ at all. A man tied to a chair is not free to stand; his natural _potentia standi_ is neutralized by external restraint. Similarly, the will, under the influence of the Thomistic _gratia efficax_, no longer enjoys the power to dissent, and the alleged _potentia resistendi_, by which the Thomists claim to save free-will, is a chimera.

δ) It is at this decisive point in the controversy that the Molinists triumphantly bring in the declaration of the Council of Trent that “man ... while he receives that inspiration [_i.e._ efficacious grace], ... is also able to reject it.” And again: “If any one saith that man’s free-will, moved and excited by God, by assenting to God exciting and calling, does in no wise coöperate towards disposing and preparing itself for obtaining the grace of justification; that it cannot refuse its consent if it would, but that, as something inanimate, it does nothing whatever and is merely passive; let him be anathema.”(734) To adjust their system to this important dogmatic decision, the older Thomists claimed that the Tridentine Council had in mind merely the _gratia sufficiens_, to which the will can refuse its consent. But this interpretation is untenable. The Council plainly refers to that grace with which the will coöperates by giving its consent (_cooperatur assentiendo_) and which it can render inefficacious by withdrawing its consent, in other words, with the grace which disposes and prepares a sinner for justification, and under the influence of which, according to Luther and Calvin, the will remains inanimate and merely passive. This can only be the _gratia efficax_. Other Thomist theologians, not daring to contradict the obvious sense of the Tridentine decree, assert that the Council intentionally chose the term _dissentire_ (_sensus divisus_) rather than _resistere_ (_sensus compositus_), in order to indicate that under the predetermining influence of grace it is possible for the will to refuse its consent (_posse dissentire_) but not to offer resistance (_posse resistere_).(735) This interpretation is no longer tenable since the Vatican Council has defined that “Faith, even when it does not work by charity, is in itself a gift of God, and the act of faith is a work appertaining to salvation, by which man yields voluntary obedience to God Himself, by assenting to and coöperating with His grace, which he is able to resist.”(736) If efficacious grace can be successfully resisted, it can not possess that “irresistible” influence which the Thomists ascribe to it.(737)

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B. The Thomistic system is open to two serious objections also from the philosophical point of view. One of these concerns the medium by which God foreknows the future free acts of His rational creatures; the other, His relation to sin.

a) In regard to the first-mentioned point we do not, of course, underestimate the immense difficulties involved in the problem of God’s foreknowledge of the free acts of the future.

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The Molinistic theory also has its difficulties, and they are so numerous and weighty that in our treatise on God(738) we made no attempt to demonstrate the _scientia media_ by stringent arguments, but merely accepted it as a working hypothesis which supplies some sort of scientific basis for the dogmas of divine omnipotence and free-will in both the natural and the supernatural order.

b) A more serious objection than the one just adverted to is that the Thomistic hypothesis involves the blasphemous inference that God predetermines men to sin.

α) Under a rigorous application of the Thomistic principles God would have to be acknowledged as the cause of sin. As the predetermination of the will to justification can take no other form than the _gratia per se efficax_, so sin, considered as an act, necessarily postulates the predetermining influence of the _motor primus_.(739) Without this assumption it would be impossible in the Thomistic system to find in the absolute will of God an infallible medium by which He can foreknow future sins. Bañez says on this point: “God knows sin with an intuitive knowledge, because His will is the cause of the sinful act, as act, at the same time permitting free-will to concur in that act by failing to observe the law.”(740) Though the Thomists refuse to admit that God Himself is the immediate author of sin, the conclusion is inevitable from their premises. And this for two reasons. First, because the alleged _praemotio ad malum_ is as irresistible as the _praemotio ad bonum_; and secondly, because the material element of sin must be inseparable from its formal element; otherwise God would foreknow sin merely _materialiter_ as an act but not _formaliter_ as a sin. The teaching of the Church on this point was clearly defined by the Council of Trent: “If any one saith that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema.”(741)

If the rational creature were compelled to perform a sinful act, as act, resistance would be impossible. And if it were true that the malice of an act practically cannot be separated from its physical entity, then in the Thomistic hypothesis God would be the author not only of the _entitas_ but likewise of the _malitia peccati_. The devil tempts us only by moral means, _i.e._ by suggestion; are we to assume that God tempts us physically by inducing sin as an act and simultaneously withholding the _praemotio ad bonum_, thus making sin an inevitable fatality? This consideration may be supplemented by another. So-called “sins of malice” are comparatively rare. Most sins are committed for the sake of some pleasure or imaginary advantage. It is for this reason that moral theology in forbidding sin forbids its physical entity. How gladly would not those who are addicted to impurity, for instance, separate the malice from the entity of their sinful acts, in order to be enabled to indulge their passion without offending God!

β) Against the logic of this argument some Thomist theologians defend themselves by a simile. The soul of a lame man, they say, enables him indeed to move his disabled limb; however, the cause of limping is not the soul but a crooked shinbone. Father Pesch wittily disposes of such reasoning as follows: “The will of Adam before the fall was not a crooked shinbone, but it was absolutely straight, and became crooked through physical premotion.”(742)

Another and more plausible contention of the Thomist school is that Molinism, too, is compelled to ascribe sin somehow to God. “It is impossible for a man to sin unless God lends His coöperation. Do not, therefore, the Molinists also make God the author of sin?” Those who argue in this wise overlook the fact that there is a very large distinction between the _concursus simultaneus_ of the Molinists and the _praemotio physica_ of the Thomists. The _praemotio physica_ predetermines the sinful act without regard to the circumstance whether or not the will is able to offer resistance. The _concursus simultaneus_, on the other hand, begins as a mere _concursus oblatus_, which is in itself indifferent and awaits as it were the free consent of the will before it coöperates with the sinner as _concursus collatus_ in the performance of the sinful act.(743) For this reason the distinction between _actus_ and _malitia_ has a well-defined place in the Molinistic system, whereas it is meaningless in that of the Thomists.(744)

2. AUGUSTINIANISM.—This system, so called because its defenders pretend to base it on the authority of St. Augustine, has some points of similarity with Thomism but differs from the latter in more than one respect, especially in this that the Augustinians,(745) though they speak with great deference of the _gratia per se efficax_, hold that the will is not physically but only morally predetermined in its free acts. Hence Augustinianism may fitly be described as the system of the _praedeterminatio moralis_. Its most eminent defender is Lawrence Berti, O. S. A. (1696-1766), who in a voluminous work _De Theologicis Disciplinis_(746) so vigorously championed the Augustinian theory that Archbishop Jean d’Yse de Saléon, of Vienne,(747) and other contemporary theologians combated his teaching as a revival of Jansenism. Pope Benedict XIV instituted an official investigation, which resulted in a decree permitting Augustinianism to be freely held and taught.

a) Whereas Thomism begins with the concept of _causa prima_ and _motor primus_, Augustinianism is based on the notion of _delectatio coelestis_ or _caritas_. Berti holds three principles in common with Jansenius: (1) Actual grace consists essentially in the infusion of celestial delectation. (2) This heavenly delectation (_i.e._ grace) causally precedes free-will in such wise that its relative intensity in every instance constitutes the law and standard of the will’s disposition to do good.

(3) Simultaneously with this celestial delectation, concupiscence (_delectatio carnalis, concupiscentia_) is doing its work in fallen man, and the two powers constantly contend for the mastery. So long as celestial delectation (_i.e._ grace) is weaker than, or equipollent with, concupiscence, the will inevitably fails to perform the salutary act to which it is invited by the former. It is only when the _delectatio coelestis_ overcomes concupiscence (_delectatio coelestis victrix_) that free-will can perform the act inspired by grace. There is a fourth principle, and one, too, of fundamental importance, which brings out the essential difference between Augustinianism and Jansenism, _viz._: the _delectatio coelestis_ never overpowers the will but leaves it free to choose between good and evil.(748)

b) The relation between merely sufficient and efficacious grace in the Augustinian system, therefore, may be described as follows: Merely sufficient grace imparts to the will the _posse_ but not the _velle_, or at best only such a weak _velle_ that it requires the _delectatio victrix_ (_gratia efficax_) to become effective. Efficacious grace (_delectatio coelestis victrix_), on the other hand, impels the will actually to perform the good deed. Hence there is between the two an essential and specific difference, and the efficacy of that grace which leads to the performance of salutary acts does not lie with free-will but depends on the _delectatio coelestis_, which must consequently be conceived as _gratia efficax ab intrinseco sive per se_.(749)

c) Nevertheless, the necessity of the _gratia efficax ab __ intrinseco_, according to the Augustinian theory, is not due to the subordination of the _causa secunda_ to the _causa prima_, as the Thomists contend, but to a constitutional weakness of human nature, consisting in this that its evil impulses can be overcome solely by the _delectatio coelestis victrix_ (_gratia efficax, adiutorium quo_. The case was different before the Fall, when the _gratia versatilis_ (_gratia sufficiens, adiutorium sine quo non_) sufficed for the performance of salutary acts.(750)

d) However, the Augustinians insist against the Jansenists, that the delectatio _coelestis_ (_i.e._ efficacious grace) does not intrinsically compel the will, but acts merely as a _praemotio moralis_, and that while the will obeys the inspiration of grace infallibly (_infallibiliter_) it does not do so necessarily (_non necessario_). With equal certainty, though not necessarily, the will, when equipped solely with sufficient grace, succumbs to concupiscence. The ultimate reason for the freedom of the will is to be found in the _indifferentia iudicii_.(751) By way of exemplification the Augustinians cite the case of a well-bred man who, though physically free and able to do so, would never turn summersaults on a public thoroughfare or gouge out his own eyes.

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF AUGUSTINIANISM.—On account of its uncritical methods Augustinianism has found but few defenders and deserves notice only in so far as it claims to base its teaching on St. Augustine.

Like the Bible, the writings of that holy Doctor have been quoted in support of many contradictory systems.(752) If the use of Augustinian terms guaranteed the possession of Augustinian ideas, Jansenius would have a strong claim to be considered a faithful disciple of St. Augustine. Yet how widely does not the “Augustinus Iprensis,” as he has been called, differ from the “Augustinus Hipponensis”! Augustinianism, too, utterly misconceives the terms which it employs. Space permits us to call attention to one or two points only.

a) In the first place Augustinianism labors under an absolutely false conception of sufficient grace.

How can that grace be sufficient for justification which is first described in glowing colors as _parva et invalida_ and then in the same breath is declared to be insufficient except when reinforced by a _gratia magna_ in the shape of _delectatio victrix_? What kind of “grace” can that be which in its very nature is so constituted that the will, under the prevailing influence of concupiscence, infallibly does the opposite of that to which it is supernaturally impelled? It is quite true that the distinction between _gratia parva_ and _gratia magna_(753) is found in St. Augustine. However, he understands by _gratia parva_ not sufficient grace, but the grace of prayer (_gratia remote sufficiens_), and by _gratia magna_, not efficacious grace as such, but grace sufficient to perform a good act (_gratia proxime sufficiens_).(754)

b) Augustinianism is unable to reconcile its theory of a _praemotio moralis_ with the dogma of free-will.

Under the Augustinian system the influence of efficacious grace can be conceived in but two ways. Either it is so strong that the will is physically unable to withhold its consent; or it is only strong enough that the consent of the will can be inferred with purely moral certainty. In the former alternative we have a prevenient necessity which determines the will _ad unum_ and consequently destroys its freedom. In the latter, there can be no infallible foreknowledge of the future free acts of rational creatures on the part of God, because the Augustinians reject the _scientia media_ of the Molinists and expressly admit that the same grace which proves effective in one man remains ineffective in another because of the condition of his heart.(755)

c) Finally, the three fundamental principles of the Augustinian system are false and have no warrant in the writings of St. Augustine.

It is not true that pleasure (_delectatio_) is the font and well-spring of all supernaturally good deeds. Such deeds may also be inspired by hatred, fear, sorrow, etc.(756) With many men the fear of God or a sense of duty is as strong an incentive to do good as the sweet consciousness of treading the right path. St. Augustine did not regard “celestial delectation” as the essential mark of efficacious grace, nor concupiscence as the characteristic note of sin.(757)

The second and third principles of the Augustinian system are likewise false. If delectation is only one motive among many, its varying intensity cannot be the standard of our conduct; and still less can it be said that the will is morally compelled in each instance to obey the relatively stronger as against the weaker delectation; for any necessitation that does not depend on the free will excludes the _libertas a coactione_, but not that _libertas a necessitate_ which constitutes the notion of liberty. There can be no freedom of the will unless the will is able to resist delectation at all times. Consequently, the fourth principle of the Augustinians, by which they pretend to uphold free-will, is also false.(758)

READINGS:—The literature on the different systems of grace is enormous. We can mention only a few of the leading works.

On the Thomist side: *Bañez, O. P., _Comment. in S. Theol. S. Thom._, Salamanca 1584 sqq.—*Alvarez, O. P., _De Auxiliis Gratiae et Humani Arbitrii Viribus_, Rome 1610.—IDEM, _Responsionum Libri Quatuor_, Louvain 1622.—Ledesma, O. P., _De Divinae Gratiae Auxiliis_, Salamanca 1611.—*Gonet, O. P., _Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae_, 16 vols., Bordeaux 1659-69.—Contenson, O. P., _Theologia Mentis et Cordis_, Lyons 1673.—De Lemos, O. P., _Panoplia Divinae Gratiae_, 4 vols., Liège 1676.—Goudin, O. P., _De Scientia et Voluntate Dei_, new ed., Louvain 1874.—*Gotti, O. P., _Theologia Scholastico-Dogmatica iuxta Mentem __ Divi Thomae_, Venice 1750.—Gazzaniga, O. P., _Theologia Dogmatica in Systema Redacta_, 2 vols., Vienne 1776.—*Billuart, _De Gratia_, diss. 5 (ed. Lequette, t. III, pp. 123 sqq.).—IDEM, _Le Thomisme Triomphant_, Paris 1725.—*Fr. G. Feldner, O. P., _Die Lehre des hl. Thomas über die Willensfreiheit_, Prague 1890.—IDEM, in Commer’s _Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie_, 1894 sqq.—*Dummermuth, O. P., _S. Thomas et Doctrina Praemotionis Physicae_, Paris 1886.—I. A. Manser, _Possibilitas Praemotionis Physicae Thomisticae_, Fribourg (Switzerland) 1895.—Joh. Ude, _Doctrina Capreoli de Influxu Dei in Actus Voluntatis Humanae_, Graz 1905.—Del Prado, _De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio_, 3 vols., Fribourg (Switzerland) 1907.—P. Garrigou-Lagrange, _S. Thomas et le Néomolinisme_, Paris 1917.

On the Augustinian side: Card. Norisius, _Vindiciae Augustinianae,_ Padua 1677.—*Berti, _De Theologicis Disciplinis_, 8 vols., Rome 1739 sqq.—Bellelli, _Mens Augustini de Modo Reparationis Humanae Naturae_, 2 vols., Rome 1773.—L. de Thomassin, _Mémoires sur la Grâce, etc._, Louvain 1668.

For a list of Molinistic and Congruistic authors see pp. 269 sq.

Article 2. Molinism And Congruism

The point in which these two systems meet, and in regard to which they differ from Thomism and Augustinianism, is the definition of efficacious grace as _efficax ab extrinseco sive per accidens_.

This conception was violently attacked by the Spanish Dominican Bañez and other divines. About 1594, the controversy between the followers of Bañez and the Molinists waxed so hot that Pope Clement VIII appointed a special commission to settle it. This was the famous _Congregatio de Auxiliis_, consisting of picked theologians from both the Dominican and the Jesuit orders. It debated the matter for nine full years without arriving at a decision. Finally Pope Paul V, at the suggestion of St. Francis de Sales, declared both systems to be orthodox and defensible, and strictly forbade the contending parties to denounce each other as heretical.(759)

While Thomism devoted its efforts mainly to the defense of grace, Molinism made it its chief business to champion the dogma of free-will.

1. MOLINISM.—Molinism takes its name from the Jesuit Luis de Molina, who published a famous treatise under the title _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis_ at Lisbon, in 1588. His teaching may be outlined as follows:

a) In _actu primo_ there is no intrinsic and ontological but merely an extrinsic and accidental distinction between efficacious and sufficient grace, based upon their respective effects. Sufficient grace becomes efficacious by the consent of the will; if the will resists, grace remains inefficacious (_inefficax_) and _merely_ sufficient (_gratia mere sufficiens_). Consequently, one and the same grace may be efficacious in one case and inefficacious in another. It all depends on the will.(760)

b) This theory involves no denial of the priority and superior dignity of grace in the work of salvation. The will, considered as a mere faculty, and _in actu primo_, is raised to the supernatural order by prevenient grace (_gratia praeveniens_), which imparts to it all the moral and physical power necessary to perform free salutary acts. Neither can the _actus secundus_ be regarded as a product of the unaided will; it is the result of grace coöperating with free-will.(761) Consequently, the will by giving its consent does not increase the power of grace, but it is grace which makes possible, prepares, and aids the will in performing free acts. To say that the influence of grace goes farther than this would be to assert that it acts independently of the will, and would thereby deny the freedom of the latter.(762)

c) The infallibility with which efficacious grace works its effects is to be explained not by God’s absolute will, but by His infallible foreknowledge through the _scientia media_,—a Molinistic postulate which was first defined and scientifically demonstrated by Father Fonseca, S. J., the teacher of Suarez.(763) God foreknows not only the absolutely free acts (_futura_) of His rational creatures by the _scientia visionis_, but likewise their hypothetically free acts (_futuribilia_) by means of the _scientia media_, and hence He infallibly knows from all eternity what attitude the free-will of man would assume in each case if grace were given him. Consequently, when God, in the light of this eternal foreknowledge, actually bestows a grace, this grace will prove efficacious or inefficacious according as He has foreknown whether the will will give or withhold its consent. Thus can the infallibility of efficacious grace be reconciled with the dogma of free-will without prejudice to such other dogmas as final perseverance and the predestination of the elect, because God by virtue of the _scientia media_ has it absolutely in His power to give or withhold His graces in each individual case.(764)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF MOLINISM.—Even the most determined opponents of Molinism admit that this system possesses three important advantages.

a) First, it gives a satisfactory account of the sufficiency of “merely sufficient grace,” which in its physical nature does not differ essentially from efficacious grace.

Second, Molinism safeguards free-will by denying that efficacious grace either physically or morally predetermines the will to one course of action.

Third, Molinism explains in a fairly satisfactory manner why efficacious grace is infallibly efficacious. God in virtue of the _scientia media_ knows with metaphysical certainty from all eternity which graces in each individual case will prove efficacious through the free consent of the will and which will remain inefficacious, and is thereby enabled to bestow or withhold grace according to His absolute decrees.

b) The question may justly be raised, however, whether, in endeavoring to safeguard freewill, the Molinists do not undervalue grace, which is after all the primary and decisive factor in the work of salvation.

There is something incongruous in the notion that the efficacy or inefficacy of divine grace should depend on the arbitrary pleasure of a created will. If sufficient grace does not become efficacious except by the consent of the will, how can the resultant salutary act be said to be an effect of grace? St. Paul, St. Augustine, and the councils of the Church do not say: “_Deus facit, si volumus_,” but they declare: “_Deus facit, ut faciamus_,” “_Deus ipse dat ipsum velle et facere et perficere_,” and so forth. What can this mean if not: Divine grace need not concern itself with external circumstances, occasions, humors, etc., but it takes hold of the sinner and actually converts him, without regard to anything except the decree of the Divine Will. On account of this and similar difficulties Cardinal Bellarmine, who was a champion and protector of P. Molina, seems to have rejected Molinism(765) in favor of Congruism.(766)

c) The same reasons that induced Bellarmine to embrace Congruism probably led the Jesuit General Claudius Aquaviva, in 1613, to order all teachers of theology in the Society to lay greater emphasis on the Congruistic element in the notion of efficacious grace. This measure was quite in harmony with the principles defended by the Jesuit members of the _Congregatio de Auxiliis_ before Clement VIII and Paul V. Aquaviva’s order is of sufficient importance to deserve a place in the text of this volume: “_Nostri in posterum omnino doceant, inter eam gratiam quae effectum re ipsâ habet atque efficax dicitur, et eam quam sufficientem nominant, non tantum discrimen esse in actu secundo, quia ex usu liberi arbitrii etiam cooperantem gratiam habentis effectum sortiatur, altera non item; sed in ipso actu primo, quod positâ scientiâ conditionalium [scientiâ mediâ] ex efficaci Dei proposito atque intentione efficiendi certissime in nobis boni, de industria ipse ea media seligit atque eo modo et tempore confert, quo videt effectum, infallibiliter habitura, aliis usurus, si haec inefficacia praevidisset. Quare semper moraliter et in ratione beneficii plus aliquid in efficaci, quam in sufficienti gratia est, in actu primo contineri: atque hac ratione efficere Deum, ut re ipsâ faciamus, non tantum quia dat gratiam quâ facere possimus. Quod idem dicendum est de perseverantia, quae procul dubio donum est._” This modified, or perhaps we had better say, more sharply determined form of Molinism is called Congruism.(767)

2. CONGRUISM.—The system thus recommended by Aquaviva in its fundamental principles really originated with Molina himself. It was developed by the great Jesuit theologians Suarez, Vasquez, and Lessius, and became the official system of the Society of Jesus under Muzio Vitelleschi (d. 1645) and Piccolomini (d. 1651).

a) The distinction between _gratia congrua_ and _gratia incongrua_ is founded on the writings of St. Augustine, who speaks of the elect as “_congruenter vocati_.”(768) The Congruists maintain against the extreme Molinists that the efficacy of grace is not attributable solely to a free determination of the will, but, at least in part, to the fact that grace is bestowed under circumstances favorable to its operation, _i.e._ “congruous” in that sense. When the circumstances are comparatively adverse (_incongrua_), grace remains merely sufficient. A prudent father who knows how to govern his children without physical force will speak the right word to each at the proper time. Similarly God adapts His grace, if it is to prove efficacious, to the circumstances of each individual case, thereby attaining His purpose without fail. Thus the reckless youth on the city streets needs more powerful graces than the pious nun in her secluded convent cell, because he is exposed to stronger temptations and his environment is unfavorable to religious influences. Since grace is conferred with a wise regard to temperament, character, inclinations, prejudices, time and place, there exists between it and free-will a sort of intrinsic affinity, which in the hands of God becomes an infallible means of executing His decrees.(769)

b) The actual bestowal of congruous grace, considered _in actu primo_, is undoubtedly a special gift of God, and hence the _gratia congrua_ possesses a higher value than the _gratia incongrua sive inefficax_. An entitatively weaker impulse of grace, if conferred under comparatively favorable conditions, is more precious than a stronger impulse which fails in its purpose by reason of unfavorable circumstances created by inclination, training, or environment. Little David accomplished more with a handful of pebbles in his scrip than had he been heavily armed.(770)

c) Congruism assigns a far more important rôle to grace than extreme Molinism. It makes the will depend on efficacious grace, not the efficacy of grace upon the will. Bellarmine illustrates this difference by the example of a sermon which, under an entirely equal distribution of internal grace, converts one sinner while it leaves another untouched.(771)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF CONGRUISM.—Among the different systems devised for the purpose of harmonizing the dogmas of grace and free-will, Congruism probably comes nearest the truth. It strikes a golden mean between the two extremes of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism on the one hand, and Calvinism and Jansenism on the other, and its principal theses can be supported by clear and unmistakable passages from the writings of St. Augustine.

a) Other points in its favor are the following: “Sufficient grace,” in the Congruist hypothesis, is truly sufficient so far as God is concerned, because its inefficaciousness is attributable solely to the human will. That free-will is properly safeguarded under the influence of efficacious grace (_gratia congrua_) is admitted even by theologians of the opposing schools. True, Congruism does not regard the will as an abstract notion, but as a factor closely interwoven with the concrete circumstances of daily life. As favorable circumstances (education, association, temperament) merely influence the will but do not compel it, so supernatural grace (_gratia congrua s. efficax_) may soften the will and occasionally even break down its resistance, but (rare cases excepted)(772) will never compel it to do good. Congruism marks a distinct advance over extreme Molinism also in this, that it bases the difference between _gratia efficax_ (_congrua_) and _gratia inefficax_ not entirely on the will of man, but likewise on the will of God, whereby it is able to explain such formulas as “_Deus facit, ut faciamus_,” “_Deus est, qui discernit_,” _etc._, in a manner entirely compatible with the dogmatic teaching of the Church.(773)

The _modus operandi_ of the _gratia congrua_ (efficacious grace) is explained by Congruism, in common with Molinism, as follows: There is a threefold efficacy: the efficacy of power (_efficacia virtutis_), the efficacy of union (_efficacia connexionis_), and the efficacy of infallible success (_efficacia infallibilitatis_). Grace (both efficacious and sufficient) does not derive its _efficacia virtutis_ from the free-will of man, nor from the knowledge of God (_scientia media_), but from itself. The _efficacia connexionis_ (of union between act and grace) on the other hand, depends entirely on the free-will, since, according to the Council of Trent as well as that of the Vatican, efficacious grace does not operate irresistibly but can be “cast off.” The _efficacia infallibilitatis_ springs from God’s certain foreknowledge (_scientia media_), which cannot be deceived.(774)

b) Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to contend that Congruism solves all difficulties. The mystery surrounding both the unequal distribution of efficacious grace and the _scientia media_ still remains. Moreover, the theory that God adjusts himself slavishly to all the circumstances of His creatures, can hardly be reconciled with His dignity and omnipotence. It would no doubt be far worthier of His majesty to seize upon the free will of man and compel it to perform the salutary act which He wishes it to perform. Whoever has studied the lives of saints and eminent converts knows that the sudden and seemingly unaccountable changes of heart which many of them have experienced can hardly be regarded as miracles in the strict sense, though on the other hand it seems certain that grace worked in them with little or no regard to the “congruity” of circumstances. Again, it is one of the highest and most sublime missions of grace not to be balked by unfavorable circumstances but to re-shape them by changing a man’s temperament, dulling concupiscence, weakening the power of temptation, and so forth. In other words, grace does not depend on but controls and fashions the circumstances of the recipient.

After all is said, therefore, the relation of grace and free-will still remains an unsolved mystery.(775)

3. SYNCRETISM.—Seeing that each of the different systems which we so far reviewed contains grains of truth, some theologians(776) have adopted the good points of all four and combined them into a fifth, called Syncretism.

These authors begin by assuming the existence of two quite distinct sorts of efficacious grace, the (Thomistic-Augustinian) _gratia efficax ab intrinseco_, and the (Molinistic-Congruistic) _gratia efficax ab extrinseco_. The former, they contend, is bestowed for the performance of more difficult good works, such as resisting grievous temptations, observing onerous precepts, exercising patience in severe tribulation, etc.; while the latter enables man to accomplish less difficult acts, such as short prayers, slight mortifications, etc. The connecting link between the two is prayer, which has been instituted for the purpose of enabling man to obtain that _gratia efficax ab intrinseco_ which is necessary for the performance of the more difficult works of salvation. Sacred Scripture teaches that prayer originates in grace, that it is binding upon all men, and that it accomplishes its purpose infallibly.(777)

CRITICAL ESTIMATE OF SYNCRETISM.—The outstanding characteristic of Syncretism is its insistence on prayer as a highly important, not to say the most important, factor in the work of salvation.

a) In this the Syncretistic school is undoubtedly right. Sacred Scripture and Tradition both strongly emphasize the importance and necessity of prayer, so much so that one naturally expects to find prayer playing an essential and indispensable rôle in every complete and orthodox system of grace. “The present economy of grace is essentially and intrinsically an economy of prayer,” is a theological axiom which cannot be too strongly insisted upon. To have brought out this great truth forcibly and luminously is the merit of Syncretism.

b) We do not mean to intimate, however, that the Syncretistic theory has solved the problem of the relation between free-will and grace. On the contrary, by adopting two such heterogeneous concepts as _gratia efficax ab intrinseco_ and _gratia efficax ab extrinseco_ it has actually increased the difficulties found in the other systems. For now we are put before the dilemma:—the Thomistic _gratia efficax_ either supposes free-will or it does not: if it does, there is no reason to limit this grace to the more difficult works of salvation; if it does not, then the _gratia efficax_ can be of no assistance in the performance of more difficult works, because these too, to be meritorious, require the coöperation of free-will.

The Syncretists try to evade this dilemma by contending that prayer, as the connecting link, communicates its own liberty and meritoriousness to the salutary acts performed through its agency, in other words, that these acts are the effect of prayer (_effectus orationis_). But aside from the fact that prayer itself is quite often a difficult act, the more arduous works of salvation would in the Syncretist hypothesis be stripped of their meritoriousness and degraded to the level of a _voluntarium in causa_, which is an untenable assumption.(778) Finally, there is something illogical and unsatisfactory in admitting on equal terms, as it were, two such incompatible notions as the Thomistic _cognitio Dei in decretis praedeterminantibus_ and the Molinistic _scientia media_.

Thus in the end all attempts to harmonize the dogmas of grace and free-will fail to solve the mystery, and we are compelled to exclaim with St. Paul: “O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God! How incomprehensible are His judgments, and how unsearchable His ways!”(779)

READINGS:—Molinistic and Congruistic works of importance are: *Molina, S. J., _Concordia Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis_, Lisbon 1588 (repr. Paris 1876).—Platel, S. J., _Auctoritas contra Praedeterminationem Physicam pro Scientia Media_, Douai 1669.—Henao, S. J., _Scientia Media Historice Propugnata_, Lyons 1655.—IDEM, _Scientia Media Theologice Defensa_, Lyons 1674-6.—De Aranda, S. J., _De Deo Sciente, Praedestinante et Auxiliante seu Schola Scientiae Mediae_, Saragossa 1693.—*Suarez, S. J., _De Concursu, Motione et Auxilio Dei_, new ed., Paris 1856.—IDEM, _De Auxilio Efficaci_, Paris ed., 1856, t. XI.—IDEM, _De Vera Intelligentia Auxilii Efficacis_ (_Op. Posthum._, t. X, Appendix).—*Lessius, S. J., _De Gratia Efficaci_ (_Opusc._, t. II, Paris 1878).—Sardagna, S. J., _Theologia Dogmatico-Polemica_, Ratisbon 1771.—Wirceburgenses (Kilber, S. J.), _De Gratia_, new ed., Paris 1853.—Murray, _De Gratia_, Dublin 1877.—B. Jungmann, S. J., _De Gratia_, 6th ed., Ratisbon 1896.—Th. de Régnon, S. J., _Bañez et Molina, Histoire, Doctrines, Critique, Métaphysique_, Paris 1883.—Card. Mazzella, S. J., _De Gratia Christi_, 3rd ed., Rome 1882.—Palmieri, S. J., _De Gratia Divina Actuali_, thes. 49-58, Gulpen 1885.—*V. Frins, S. J., _S. Thomae Doctrina de Cooperatione Dei cum Omni __ Natura Creata, Praesertim Libera, seu S. Thomas Praedeterminationis Physicae Adversarius_, Paris 1890.—*Schiffini, S. J., _De Gratia Divina_, disp. 5, Freiburg 1901.—Card. Billot, S. J., _De Gratia Christi et Libero Hominis Arbitrio_, I, Rome 1908.—Limbourg, S. J. “_Selbstzeichnung der thomistischen Gnadenlehre_,” in the Innsbruck _Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie_, 1877.—B. J. Otten, S. J., _A Manual of the History of Dogmas_, Vol. II, St. Louis 1918, pp. 493 sqq.

Among the theologians who have tried to harmonize Thomism and Molinism we may mention, besides Ysambert and St. Alphonsus de’ Liguori, *Tournely, _De Gratia_, Venice 1755.—Card. Jos. Pecci, _Sentenza di S. Tommaso circa l’Influsso di Dio sulle Azioni delle Creature Ragionevoli e sulla Scienza Media_, Rome 1885.—A. Adeodatus, J. _Pecci’s Schrift: Lehre des hl. Thomas über den Einfluss Gottes, etc., analysiert_, Mainz 1888.—C. Krogh-Tonning, _De Gratia Christi et de Libero Arbitrio S. Thomae Doctrina_, Christiania 1898.—J. Herrmann, C. SS. R., _De Divina Gratia_, Rome 1904.

The history of the great controversy between Thomism and Molinism can be studied in H. Serry, O. P., _Historia Congregationum de Auxiliis Divinae Gratiae_, Louvain 1700 and Antwerp 1709.—Livinus de Meyer, S. J., _Historia Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae Auxiliis_, Antwerp 1705.—*Schneemann, S. J., _Entstehung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse_, Freiburg 1879.—*IDEM, _Weitere Entwicklung der thomistisch-molinistischen Controverse_, Freiburg 1880.—*IDEM, _Controversiarum de Divinae Gratiae Liberique Arbitrii Concordia Initia et Progressus_, Freiburg 1881.