Part 1

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GERMAN WAR PRACTICES

PART I

TREATMENT OF CIVILIANS

Edited by

DANA C. MUNRO Princeton University

GEORGE C. SELLERY and AUGUST C. KREY University of Wisconsin University of Minnesota

Issued by The Committee on Public Information The Secretary of State The Secretary of War The Secretary of the Navy George Creel

November 15, 1917

EXECUTIVE ORDER.

I hereby create a Committee on Public Information, to be composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and a civilian who shall be charged with the executive direction of the Committee. As civilian Chairman of the Committee I appoint Mr. George Creel.

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy are authorized each to detail an officer or officers to the work of the Committee.

WOODROW WILSON.

April 14, 1917.

INTRODUCTION.

[Sidenote: Germany pledged to Hague regulations.]

For many years leaders in every civilized nation have been trying to make warfare less brutal. The great landmarks in this movement are the Geneva and Hague Conventions. The former made rules as to the care of the sick and wounded and established the Red Cross. At the first meeting at Geneva, in 1864, it was agreed, and until the present war it has been taken for granted, that the wounded, and the doctors and nurses who cared for them, would be safe from all attacks by the enemy. The Hague Conventions, drawn up in 1899 and 1907, made additional rules to soften the usages of war and especially to protect noncombatants and conquered lands. Germany took a prominent part in these meetings and with the other nations solemnly pledged her faith to keep all the rules except one article in the Hague Regulations. This was article 44, which forbade the conqueror to force any of the conquered to give information. All the other rules and regulations she accepted in the most binding manner.

[Sidenote: German policy of frightfulness.]

But Germany's military leaders had no intention of keeping these solemn promises. They had been trained along different lines. Their leading generals for many years had been urging a policy of frightfulness. In the middle of the nineteenth century von Clausewitz was looked upon as the greatest military authority, and the methods which he advocated were used by the Prussian army in its successful wars of 1866-1871. Consequently, because these wars had been successful, the wisdom of von Clausewitz's methods seemed to the Prussian army to be fully proven.

Now, the essence of von Clausewitz's teachings was that successful war involves the ruthless application of force. In the opening chapter of his master work, _Vom Kriege_ (_On War_), he says:

"Violence arms itself with the inventions of art and science. * * * Self-imposed restrictions, almost imperceptible and hardly worth mentioning, termed usages of international law, accompany it without essentially impairing its power. * * * Now, philanthropic souls might easily imagine that there is a skillful method of disarming or subduing an enemy without causing too much bloodshed, and that this is the true tendency of the art of war. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be destroyed; for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of 'good-naturedness' are precisely the worst. As the use of physical force to the utmost extent by no means excludes the cooperation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force ruthlessly, without regard to bloodshed, must obtain a superiority, if his enemy does not so use it."

In 1877-78, in the course of a series of articles upon "Military necessity and humanity," Gen. von Hartmann wrote, in the same spirit as von Clausewitz:

[Sidenote: Frightfulness advocated by German generals.]

"The enemy State must not be spared the want and wretchedness of war; these are particularly useful in shattering its energy and subduing its will." "Individual persons may be harshly dealt with when an example is made of them, intended to serve as a warning. * * * Whenever a national war breaks out, terrorism becomes a necessary military principle." "It is a gratuitous illusion to suppose that modern war does not demand far more brutality, far more violence, and an action far more general than was formerly the case." "When international war has burst upon us, terrorism becomes a principle made necessary by military considerations."

In 1881 von Moltke, who had been commander in chief of the Prussian army in the Franco-Prussian War, declared:

"Perpetual peace is a dream and not even a beautiful dream. War is an element in the order of the world established by God. By it the most noble virtues of man are developed, courage and renunciation, fidelity to duty and the spirit of sacrifice--the soldier gives his life. Without war, the world would degenerate and lose itself in materialism." "The soldier who endures suffering, privation, and fatigue, who courts dangers, can not take only 'in proportion to the resources of the country.' He must take all that is necessary to his existence. One has no right to demand of him anything superhuman." "The great good in war is that it should be ended quickly. In view of this, every means, except those which are positively condemnable, must be permitted. I can not, in any way, agree with the Declaration of St. Petersburg when it pretends that 'the weakening of the military forces of the enemy constitutes the only legitimate method of procedure in war. No! One must attack all the resources of the enemy government, his finances, his railroads, his stock of provisions and even his prestige. * * *"

[Sidenote: Kaiser's "Hun" speech in 1900.]

Many other examples might be cited from the writings of German generals. The very best illustration of this attitude, however, is to be found in the Emperor's various speeches, and especially in his speech to his soldiers on the eve of their departure for China in 1900. On July 27 the Kaiser went to Bremerhaven to bid farewell to the German troops. As they were drawn up, ready to embark for China, he addressed to them a last official message from the Fatherland. The local newspaper reported his speech in full. In it appeared this advice and admonition from the Emperor, the commander in chief of the army, the head of all Germany.

"As soon as you come to blows with the enemy he will be beaten. No mercy will be shown! No prisoners will be taken! As the Huns, under King Attila, made a name for themselves, which is still mighty in traditions and legends to-day, may the name of German be so fixed in China by your deeds that no Chinese shall ever again dare even to look at a German askance. * * * Open the way for _Kultur_ once for all."

[Sidenote: Opposition in Reichstag.]

Even the imperial councillors seem to have been shocked at the Emperor's speech, and efforts were promptly made to suppress the circulation of his exact words. The efforts were only partly successful. A few weeks later, when letters from the German soldiers in China were being published in local German papers, the leading socialist newspaper, _Vorwärts_, excerpted from them reports of atrocities under the title "Letters of the Huns." Many of the leaders in the Reichstag felt very keenly the brutality of the Emperor's speech. The obnoxious word "Huns" had excited almost universal condemnation. When the Reichstag met, in November, the speech was openly discussed. Herr Lieber, of the Center (the Catholic party), after quoting the "no mercy" portion of the speech, added, "There are, alas, in Germany groups enough who have regarded the atrocities told in the letters which have been published as the dutiful response of soldiers so addressed and encouraged." The leader of the Social Democrats, Herr Bebel, spoke even more pointedly. Toward the end of a two-hour address on the atrocities committed by the German soldiers in China and on the speech of the Emperor he said:

"If Germany wishes to be the bearer of civilization to the world, we will follow without contradiction. But the ways and means in which this world policy has been carried on thus far, in which it has been defined by the Emperor * * * are not, in our opinion, the way to preserve the world position of Germany, to gain for Germany the respect of the world."

The consequences of the Emperor's speech Bebel aptly described:

"By it a signal was given, garbed in the highest authority of the German Empire, which must have most weighty consequences, not only for the troops who went to China but also for those who stayed at home." "An expedition of revenge so barbarous as this has never occurred in the last hundred years and not often in history; at least, nothing worse than this has happened in history, either done by the Huns, by the Vandals, by Genghis Khan, by Tamerlane, or even by Tilly when he sacked Magdeburg."

[Sidenote: Atrocities in China.]

These stories of atrocities in China or "Letters of the Huns" continued to be published in the _Vorwärts_ for several years and appeared intermittently in the debates of the Reichstag as late as 1906. At that time the socialist, Herr Kunert, reviewing the procedure in a trial of which he had been the victim in the previous summer, stated that he had offered to prove "that German soldiers in China had engaged in wanton and brutal ravaging; that plunder, pillage, extortion, robbery, as well as rape and sexual abuses of the worst kind, had occured on a very large scale and that German soldiers had participated in them." He had not been given an opportunity to prove his allegations, but had been sentenced to prison for three months for assailing the honor of the "whole German Army." The outrageousness of this sentence was made clear by the revelations, made in the Reichstag shortly afterwards, of similar atrocities committed by German officials and soldiers in Africa in the campaign against the Hereros.

The teachings of Treitschke and Nietzsche and their evil influence upon the present generation in Germany are well known. The minds of the responsible officials were filled with ideas wholly different from those to which Germany had agreed at The Hague. The cult of might, and of war as its expression, found many disciples who flooded the press with pamphlets and panegyrics on war and its place in the natural and political development of a nation. Before the war the average number of volumes concerning war published each year in Germany was 700, and the vast majority of those written by the German Army officers advocated the ruthless policy of von Clausewitz, von Hartmann, and von Moltke.

These ideas, which have come to control the minds of the military class, are best shown in the _German War Book_ (_Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege_), published in 1902. The tone of this authoritative book may be judged from the following extracts:

[Sidenote: Teachings of the German War Book.]

"But since the tendency of thought in the last century was dominated essentially by humanitarian considerations which not infrequently degenerated into sentimentality and flabby emotion (_Sentimentalität und weichlicher Gefühlschwärmerei_), there have not been wanting attempts to influence the development of the usages of war in a way which was in fundamental contradiction with the nature of war and its object. Attempts of this kind will also not be wanting in the future, the more so as these agitations have found a kind of moral recognition in some provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Brussels and Hague Conferences."

"By steeping himself in military history an officer will be able to guard himself against excessive humanitarian notions; it will teach him that certain severities are indispensable to war, nay more, that the only true humanity very often lies in a ruthless application of them."

For the guidance of the officers in case the inhabitants of conquered territory should take up arms against the German Army, the _German War Book_ quotes with approval the letter Napoleon sent to his brother Joseph, when the inhabitants of Italy were attempting to revolt against him:

"The security of your dominion depends on how you behave in the conquered province. Burn down a dozen places which are not willing to submit themselves. Of course, not until you have first looted them; my soldiers must not be allowed to go away with their hands empty. Have three to six persons hanged in every village which has joined the revolt; pay no respect to the cassock" [that is, to members of the clergy.]

[Sidenote: German war proclamations in French translations.]

Some of the rules laid down in the _German War Book_ are illustrated and their spirit made more definite in _L'Interprète Militaire_. _Zum Gebrauch im Feindesland_ (Military Interpreter for Use in the Enemy's Country). This is a manual edited at Berlin in 1906. "It contains," says the introduction, "the French translation of the greater part of the documents, letters, and proclamations, and some orders of which it may be necessary to make use in time of war." Thus, eight years before this war began, the German military authorities were not only preparing their officers to wage war in a manner wholly contrary to the Hague regulations, but also were looking forward to the use of these proclamations in French or Belgian territory. Among its forms, ready for use by inserting names, date, and place, are the following:

"A fine of 600,000 marks in consequence of an attempt made by ---- to assassinate a German soldier, is imposed on the town of O. By order of ----.

"Efforts have been made, without result, to obtain the withdrawal of the fine.

"The term fixed for payment expires to-morrow, Saturday, December 17, at noon ----.

"Bank notes, cash, or silver plate will be accepted."

* * * * *

"I have to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 7th of this month, in which you bring to my notice the great difficulty which you expect to meet in levying the contributions. * * * I can but regret the explanations which you have thought proper to give me on this subject; the order in question which emanates from my Government is so clear and precise, and the instructions which I have received in the matter are so categorical that if the sum due by the town of R---- is not paid the town will be burned down without pity!"

* * * * *

"On account of the destruction of the bridge of F----, I order: The district shall pay a special contribution of 10,000,000 francs by way of amends. This is brought to the notice of the public who are informed that the method of assessment will be announced later and that the payment of the said sum will be enforced with the utmost severity. The village of F---- will be destroyed immediately by fire, with the exception of certain buildings occupied for the use of the troops."

These forms have been of great use to the German commanders in Belgium and northern France. The closeness with which they have been followed in these conquered lands, during the present war, may be seen by reading the following proclamations and the other proclamations which are printed elsewhere in this pamphlet.

"The City of Brussels, exclusive of its suburbs, has been punished by an additional fine of 5,000,000 francs on account of the attack made upon a German soldier by Ryckere, one of its police officials.

"The Governor of Brussels, "BARON VON LUETTWITZ.

"_November 1, 1914._"

Placard posted on the walls of Lunéville by order of the German authorities:

"Notice to the People.

"Some of the inhabitants of Lunéville made an attack from ambuscade on the German columns and wagons (_trains_). The same day [some of the] inhabitants shot at sanitary formations marked with the Red Cross. In addition, German wounded and the military hospital containing a German ambulance were fired upon.

"Because of these acts of hostility a fine of 650,000 francs is imposed upon the commune of Lunéville. The mayor is ordered to pay this sum in gold or silver up to 50,000 francs, September 6, 1914, at nine o'clock in the morning, to the representative of the German military authority. All protests will be considered null and void. No delay will be granted.

"If the commune does not punctually obey the order to pay the sum of 650,000 francs, all property that can be levied upon will be seized.

"In case of non-payment, visits from house to house will be made and all the inhabitants will be searched. If anyone knowingly has concealed money or attempted to hold back his goods from the seizure by the military authorities, or if anyone attempts to leave the city, he will be shot.

"The Mayor and the hostages taken by the military authorities will be held responsible for the exact execution of the above orders.

"The Mayor is ordered to publish immediately this notice to the Commune.

"Hénaménil, Sept. 3, 1914.

"The General in Chief,

"VON FASBENDER."

The German officers were provided with the forms to be used in terrorizing the conquered people. The common soldiers were provided with phrase books which would enable them to impose their will upon the terrified people. Minister Brand Whitlock in his report to the State Department on September 12, 1917, writes:

"The German soldiers were provided with phrase books giving alternate translations in German and French of such sentences as:

"'Hands up.' (It is the very first sentence in the book.)

"'Carry out all the furniture.

"'I am thirsty. Bring me some beer, gin, rum.

"'You have to supply a barrel of wine and a keg of beer.

"'If you lie to me, I will have you shot immediately.

"'Lead me to the wealthiest inhabitants of this village. I have orders to requisition several barrels of wine.

"'Show us the way to ----. If you lead us astray, you will be shot.'"

[Sidenote: The system of frightfulness.]

The quotations and proclamations printed above show clearly the attitude of mind of the German military authorities. The policy of frightfulness had been exalted into a system with every minute detail worked out in advance. The _German War Book_ with its "cold-blooded doctrines of the nature of war and of the means which may be employed in prosecuting war," did its work in training the German military officials. Of this book it has been well said: "It is the first time in the history of mankind that a creed so revolting has been deliberately formulated by a great civilized State." The generals gave their sanction to this policy of frightfulness. Gen. von Bernhardi was quoted in an interview in the _Neue Freie Presse_ of Vienna, as follows:

"One cannot make war in a sentimental fashion. The more pitiless the conduct of the war, the more humane it is in reality, for it will run its course all the sooner. The war which of all wars is and must be most humane is that which leads to peace with as little delay as possible."

This interview was reproduced in the _Berliner Tageblatt_ of November 20, 1914.

Mr. F.C. Walcott, of the Belgian Relief Commission, tells, in the _Geographical Magazine_ for May, 1917, of meeting Gen-von Bernhardi:

[Sidenote: Interview with Bernhardi.]

"As I walked out, General von Bernhardi came into the room, an expert artillery-man, a professor in one of their war colleges. I met him the next morning, and he asked me if I had read his book, _Germany and the Next War_.

"I said I had. He said, 'Do you know, my friends nearly ran me out of the country for that. They said, "You have let the cat out of the bag." I said, "No, I have not, because nobody will believe it." 'What did you think of it?'

"I said, 'General, I did not believe a word of it when I read it, but I now feel that you did not tell the whole truth;' and the old general looked actually pleased."

Speaking on August 29, 1914, at Münster, of the extreme measures which the Germans had felt obliged to take against the civil population of Belgium, Gen. von Bissing said:

[Sidenote: Statement by von Bissing.]

"The innocent must suffer with the guilty. * * * In the repression of infamy, human lives cannot be spared, and if isolated houses, flourishing villages, and even entire towns are annihilated, that is assuredly regrettable, but it must not excite ill-timed sentimentality. All this must not in our eyes weigh as much as the life of a single one of our brave soldiers--the rigorous accomplishment of duty is the emanation of a high _Kultur_, and in that, the population of the enemy countries can learn a lesson from our army."

Gen. von Bissing, after his appointment as governor general of Belgium, repeated in substance the above opinion to a Dutch journalist. The interview is published in the _Düsseldorfer Anzeiger_ of December 8, 1914.

Irvin S. Cobb states his conclusions on the responsibility of the higher German command for the atrocities:

"But I was an eyewitness to crimes which, measured by the standards of humanity and civilization, impressed me as worse than any individual excess, any individual outrage, could ever have been or can ever be; because these crimes indubitably were instigated on a wholesale basis by order of officers of rank, and must have been carried out under their personal supervision, direction, and approval. Briefly, what I saw was this: I saw wide areas of Belgium and France in which not a penny's worth of wanton destruction had been permitted to occur, in which the ripe pears hung untouched upon the garden walls; and I saw other wide areas where scarcely one stone had been left to stand upon another; where the fields were ravaged; where the male villagers had been shot in squads; where the miserable survivors had been left to den in holes, like wild beasts.

"Taking the physical evidence offered before our own eyes, and buttressing it with the statements made to us, not only by natives but By German soldiers and German officers, we could reach but one conclusion, which was that here, in such and such a place, those in command had said to the troops: 'Spare this town and these people.' And there they had said: 'Waste this town and shoot these people.' And here the troops had discriminately spared, and there they had indiscriminately wasted, in exact accordance with the word of their superiors." Irvin S. Cobb, _Speaking of Prussians_, New York, 1917, pp. 32-34.

These ideas, then, were systematically impressed upon the military and official classes. It was necessary, however, to work upon the minds of the German people, so that they might lend themselves to the inhuman policies advocated by the military leaders. To do this was difficult, for, as has been shown above, many of the civilian leaders of public opinion, time and again, expressed their horror of the new spirit which was animating the military authorities. The Reichstag debates give ample evidence of this, and the task of the military leaders would have been still more difficult if the Reichstag had had any real power. (See War Information Series, No. 3, _The Government of Germany_; see also Gerard's _My Four Years in Germany_, Chap. II.)

[Sidenote: Hatred against Belgians.]