CHAPTER II.

WHAT IS UNITY.

6. The scholastics were right in teaching that every being is one, and that whatever is one is being. Unity is a general attribute of every being, but is not distinct from it. However little we reflect, we cannot fail to perceive that unity and being are not distinguished: the unity of unity, by itself, offers us nothing real or even possible. What then would become of unity, if nothing but unity? This idea is involved in that of being; it is an aspect of it, a reason under which being is presented to the understanding.

7. But what is the conception of unity under which beings are presented to us? There is unity in the object when there is no distinction in the conception presenting it; and there is no distinction, when the perception of relative _not-being_ is not combined in the object with that of _being_. We have unity whenever we perceive an object simply. Suppose that we perceive the object B. No matter what B is, it will to us be always one, unless we perceive it as composed of C, D, one of which is not the other. If we perceive in the object B, a distinction between C and D, unity disappears.

Evidently when we are aware of this composition we can abstract it and simply consider the result, the whole, B; and then unity appears anew.

8. We see by this that unity may be either real or fictitious. It is real and existing when there is no distinction in the thing either real or apparent; it is fictitious in those composites which of themselves include distinct things that may be offered to the understanding, inasmuch as they are subordinated to one unity of order, abstraction made of the real distinction contained in them.

9. The schoolmen sometimes defined what is _one_ to be, "ens indivisum in se, et divisum ab aliis." The former part seems sufficiently exact if by _indivisum_ is meant _non-distinctum_ and not _non-separatum_; but the second part must be regarded at the best as superfluous. If there existed only one most simple and sole being, it would yet be one, although we could not say that it was divided from others, _divisum ab aliis_; for as there would be _no others_ it could not be divided from them. This part of the definition is therefore superfluous.

10. It is no solution of the difficulty to say that this one being is divided from others, real or possible, and that in the supposition of one only being, others are possible although not real. The only being would be _really one_, and the division from others would be only _possible_; since there can be no real distinction between two terms when one of them is only possible. The division from others, _divisis ab aliis_, therefore is not a necessary element of unity, because unity is real, and this element is only possible.

11. However, in confirmation of this doctrine, we may remark, that in common parlance, unity is opposed to distinction, and there is no unity where there is no distinction. If the only being be not conceived as multiple there can be no distinction; and this is so independently of its being compared with the rest. The words, _others_, and _the rest_, suppose single beings; the idea of unity precedes that of distinction; beings are not considered as distinct between themselves until after they are conceived as individually single.

12. It seems, therefore, that a single being ought to be defined as _ens indivisum in se_, or a being which includes no division. Unity, then, will depend upon non-distinction. If non-division denote _non-distinction_, there will be real unity; but if it denote _non-separation_ or re-union, we shall only have a fictitious unity. The molecules without extension, of which many suppose matter to be composed, would be really _one_, because there is no distinction in them. Bodies are fictitiously _one_ because their composite parts though united are really distinct.

13. A difficulty may be raised by asking whether a being, indivisible in itself, but not divided from others, would be really _one_, for in case it would not be _one_, it might be inferred that we had unjustly censured the definition of the schoolmen, since whatever wants the second property required by the definition would not be one. We reply, then, a being that includes no distinction in itself, and is not distinguished from others, would indeed be one, but in such a case there would be no _others_, since they cannot be when there is no distinction. In such an hypothesis, there would be only one unity, the unity of pantheism, the _great all_, the absolute in which all things would be identified.

14. We have already said that the unity which is confounded with being, is not the unity which originates number. We here in fact encounter two different conceptions of unity, the one marking only want of distinction, and the other expressing the property of engendering number. But we are not thence to infer that the one which is identified with being is distinct from that which engenders number. All beings, one in themselves, but distinct from each other, no matter what they may be, may be conceived under the idea of number. The number _three_ enters into the august mystery of the Trinity, and we say with all truth that in God there are _three_ persons.

15. It is not necessary that the unity which engenders number should be real; it suffices if it be fictitious. When we take a foot measure for unity, we employ a fictitious unity, since the foot is composed of parts, but the number which results therefrom is, nevertheless, a true number.