Part 10

Even after America entered the war, President Wilson continued to advance the same ideas as to the ultimate conditions of peace. His attitude remained essentially different from that of the Allies, who were hampered by secret treaties wholly at variance with the President's aims. In his war address he declared that we had "no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that their government acted in entering this war." Prussian autocracy was the object of his attack. "We are now about to accept gauge of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall, if necessary, spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no veil of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included: for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them."

About the time that the United States declared war, Austria and Germany began another so-called "peace offensive." Overtures were made by Austria to France in March, and in August the Pope made a direct appeal to the Powers. This move was unmasked by President Wilson in a public address at the Washington Monument, June 14, 1917. "The military masters under whom Germany is bleeding," he declared, "see very clearly to what point fate has brought them: if they fall back or are forced back an inch, their power abroad and at home will fall to pieces. It is their power at home of which they are thinking now more than of their power abroad. It is that power which is trembling under their very feet. Deep fear has entered their hearts. They have but one chance to perpetuate their military power, or even their controlling political influence. If they can secure peace now, with the immense advantage still in their hands, they will have justified themselves before the German people. They will have gained by force what they promised to gain by it--an immense expansion of German power and an immense enlargement of German industrial and commercial opportunities. Their prestige will be secure, and with their prestige their political power. If they fail, their people will thrust them aside. A government accountable to the people themselves will be set up in Germany, as has been the case in England, the United States, and France--in all great countries of modern times except Germany. If they succeed they are safe, and Germany and the world are undone. If they fail, Germany is saved and the world will be at peace. If they succeed, America will fall within the menace, and we, and all the rest of the world, must remain armed, as they will remain, and must make ready for the next step in their aggression. If they fail, the world may unite for peace and Germany may be of the union."

The task of replying to the Pope was left by the Allied governments to Wilson, who was not hampered by secret treaties. In this remarkable document he drove still further the wedge between the German people and the Kaiser. "The American people have suffered intolerable wrongs at the hands of the Imperial German Government, but they desire no reprisal upon the German people who have themselves suffered all things in this war which they did not choose. They believe that peace should rest upon the rights of peoples, not the rights of Governments--the rights of peoples great or small, weak or powerful--their equal right to freedom and security and self-government and to a participation upon fair terms in the economic opportunities of the world, the German people of course included if they will accept equality and not seek domination."

In conclusion he said: "We cannot take the word of the present rulers of Germany as a guarantee of anything that is to endure, unless explicitly supported by such conclusive evidence of the will and purpose of the German people themselves as the other peoples of the world would be justified in accepting. Without such guarantees, treaties of settlement, agreements for disarmament, covenants to set up arbitration in the place of force, territorial adjustments, reconstitutions of small nations, if made with the German Government, no man, no nation could now depend on. We must await some new evidence of the purposes of the great peoples of the Central Powers. God grant it may be given soon and in a way to restore the confidence of all peoples everywhere in the faith of nations and the possibility of covenanted peace."

Early in November, 1917, the Kerensky Government was overthrown in Russia and the Bolsheviki came into power. They at once proposed a general armistice and called upon all the belligerents to enter into peace negotiations. The Central Powers accepted the invitation, and early in December negotiations began at Brest-Litovsk. The Russian peace proposals were: the evacuation of occupied territories, self-determination for nationalities not hitherto independent, no war indemnities or economic boycotts, and the settlement of colonial questions in accordance with the above principles. The Austrian minister, Count Czernin, replied for the Central Powers, accepting more of the Russian program than had been expected, but rejecting the principle of a free plebiscite for national groups not hitherto independent, and conditioning the whole on the acceptance by the Allies of the offer of general peace. The conference called on the Allies for an answer by January 4. No direct reply was made to this demand, but the Russian proposals had made a profound impression on the laboring classes in all countries, and both Lloyd George and President Wilson felt called on to define more clearly the war aims of the Allies.

In a speech delivered January 5, 1918, Lloyd George made the first comprehensive and authoritative statement of British war aims. He had consulted the labor leaders and Viscount Grey and Mr. Asquith, as well as some of the representatives of the overseas dominions, and he was speaking, he said, for "the nation and the Empire as a whole." He explained first what the British were not fighting for. He disclaimed any idea of overthrowing the German Government, although he considered military autocracy "a dangerous anachronism"; they were not fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary, but genuine self-government must be granted to "those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it"; they were not fighting "to deprive Turkey of its capital or of the rich and renowned lands of Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race," but the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea must be "internationalized and neutralized." The positive statement of aims included the complete restoration of Belgium, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, rectification of the Italian boundary, the independence of Poland, the restoration of Serbia, Montenegro, and the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania, and a disposition of the German colonies with "primary regard to the wishes and interests of the native inhabitants of such colonies." He insisted on reparation for injuries done in violation of international law, but disclaimed a demand for war indemnity. In conclusion he declared the following conditions to be essential to a lasting peace: "First, the sanctity of treaties must be reëstablished; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured, based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; and lastly, we must seek, by the creation of some international organization, to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war."

On January 8, 1918, three days after Lloyd George's speech, President Wilson appeared before both Houses of Congress and delivered the most important of all his addresses on war aims. It contained the famous Fourteen Points:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest coöperation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored, without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is forever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated: occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; and the relations of the several Balkan states to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan states should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

In February negotiations at Brest-Litovsk were broken off as a result of the excessive demands of the Germans and the armistice was declared at an end. The Germans quickly overran Poland and the Baltic provinces and occupied Ukraine under a treaty which virtually placed the material resources of that country at the disposal of the Central Powers. In an address at Baltimore, April 6, the anniversary of our entrance into the war, President Wilson denounced the insincerity and perfidy of the German rulers, who, he said, were "enjoying in Russia a cheap triumph in which no brave or gallant nation can long take pride." He concluded with these strong words: "Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether justice and peace shall reign in the affairs of men, whether right as America conceives it or dominion as she conceives it shall determine the destinies of mankind. There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, force to the utmost, force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant force which shall make right the law of the world and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust."

Between the addresses of January 8 and the Armistice, the President delivered other addresses in which he elaborated some of the principles of the Fourteen Points. Of special significance were his speeches of February 11, July 4, and September 27. In the last his mind centered on the League of Nations. "There can be no leagues or alliances or special covenants and understandings within the general and common family of the League of Nations," he declared, and "there can be no special selfish economic combinations within the League, and no employment of any form of economic boycott or exclusion, except as the power of economic penalty, by exclusion from the markets of the world, may be vested in the League of Nations itself as a means of discipline and control." In conclusion he said that the United States was prepared "to assume its full share of responsibility for the maintenance of the common covenants and understandings upon which peace must henceforth rest."

We now know from the published memoirs of German and Austrian statesmen that President Wilson's speeches made a profound impression on the peoples of Central Europe. His utterances in behalf of the oppressed nationalities, not only Belgium, Serbia, and Poland, but also the Czecho-Slovaks and the Jugo-Slavs, became stronger and more frequent during the spring and summer of 1918, and solidified the opposition to Germany at a critical period of the war. On September 3 he recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a belligerent government. This meant the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which had not been contemplated at an earlier period, but, as he stated in his reply to the Austrian request for an armistice in October, conditions had changed since the announcement of the Fourteen Points, and these peoples would no longer be satisfied with mere autonomy.

As a result of the Russian collapse and the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, the Germans withdrew their divisions from the eastern front and staked everything on the great western drive of March, 1918. When this movement was finally checked and the Allied advance began, the German military leaders knew that the game was up, but they did not have the courage to face the facts, for an acknowledgment of defeat meant the overthrow of the old system of government based on military success. They waited in vain for some military advantage which would give them an opportunity to open negotiations without openly acknowledging defeat. Finally the state of demoralization at Headquarters became so complete that there was no alternative but to ask for an immediate armistice. In order to pave the way for this step, the ministry resigned October 1, and Prince Max of Baden was called on to form a new government. On the 4th he dispatched a note to President Wilson through the Swiss Government, requesting him to call a peace conference and stating that the German Government "accepts the program set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of the 8th January, 1918, and in his later pronouncements, especially his speech of the 27th September, as a basis for peace negotiations."

In reply the President asked for a clearer understanding on three points: (1) Did the Imperial Chancellor mean that the German Government accepted the terms laid down in the President's addresses referred to, and "that its object in entering into discussion would be only to agree upon the practical details of their application?" (2) The President would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms to the Allied Governments so long as the armies of the Central Powers were upon their soil. (3) The President asked whether the Chancellor was speaking for the constituted authorities of the Empire who had so far conducted the war.

The German reply of October 12 was satisfactory on the first point. With respect to the withdrawal of their troops from occupied territory they proposed a mixed commission to arrange the details. On the third point it was stated that the new government had been formed in agreement with the great majority of the Reichstag. Having accomplished this much, the President's next step was skilfully taken. He replied that the process of evacuation and the conditions of an armistice were matters which must be left to the judgment of the military advisers of the United States and the Allied Governments, but that he would not agree to any arrangement which did not provide "absolutely satisfactory safeguards and guarantees of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the armies of the United States and of the Allies in the field." Referring next to submarine warfare, he declared that the United States and the Allied Governments could not consider an armistice "so long as the armed forces of Germany continue the illegal and inhumane practices which they persist in." In conclusion he referred to a clause contained in his speech of July 4, now accepted by the German Government as one of the conditions of peace, namely, "The destruction of every arbitrary power anywhere that can separately, secretly, and of its single choice disturb the peace of the world." He added: "The power which has hitherto controlled the German nation is of the sort here described. It is within the choice of the German nation to alter it." He demanded that the United States and the Allied Governments "should know beyond a peradventure" with whom they were dealing.

In reply the Chancellor assured the President that a bill had been introduced in the Reichstag to alter the constitution of the Empire so as to give the representatives of the people the right to decide for war or peace, but the President was not satisfied that there had been any real change. "It may be that future wars have been brought under the control of the German people, but the present war has not been; and it is with the present war that we are dealing." He was not willing to accept any armistice which did not make a renewal of hostilities on the part of Germany impossible. If, he concluded, the United States "must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany now, or if it is likely to have to deal with them later in regard to the international obligations of the German Empire, it must demand not peace negotiations but surrender. Nothing can be gained by leaving this essential thing unsaid." This note was written October 23. Four days later the Chancellor replied: "The President knows the deep-rooted changes which have taken place and are still taking place in German constitutional life. The peace negotiations will be conducted by a People's Government, in whose hands the decisive legal power rests in accordance with the Constitution, and to which the Military Power will also be subject. The German Government now awaits the proposals for an armistice which will introduce a peace of justice such as the President in his manifestations has described."

The terms of the Armistice were drawn up by the Interallied Council at Versailles and completed by November 5. They were much more severe than the public had expected them to be. Germany was required immediately to evacuate Belgium, France, Alsace-Lorraine, and Luxemburg; to withdraw her armies from the entire territory on the left bank of the Rhine, and from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, and Turkey; she was to surrender enormous quantities of heavy artillery and airplanes, all her submarines, and most of her battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. This was practically unconditional surrender. Contrary to the general belief at the time, it is now known that Foch and Haig considered these terms too severe and feared that Germany would not accept them. They wanted an armistice that Germany would accept. General Bliss, on the other hand, wanted to demand "the complete disarmament and demobilization of the military and naval forces of the enemy." In America there was much criticism of the President for being willing to negotiate with Germany at all. "On to Berlin" was a popular cry, and it was thought that the President was preventing a complete military triumph. On October 10 Senator Lodge declared in the Senate: "The Republican party stands for unconditional surrender and complete victory, just as Grant stood. My own belief is that the American people mean to have an unconditional surrender. They mean to have a dictated, not a negotiated peace."

After reviewing the Armistice negotiations André Tardieu, a member of the French Cabinet and delegate to the Peace Conference, says:

"What remains of the fiction, believed by so many, of an armistice secretly determined upon by an American dictator; submitted to by the European governments: imposed by their weakness upon the victorious armies, despite the opposition of the generals? The Armistice was discussed in the open light of day. President Wilson only consented to communicate it to his associates on the triple condition that its principle be approved by the military authorities and its clauses would be drawn up by them; that it be imposed upon the enemy and not discussed with him; that it be such as to prevent all resumption of hostilities and assure the submission of the vanquished to the terms of peace. So it was that the discussion went on with Berlin till October 23, and in Paris from that date till November 5. It was to the Commander-in-Chief [Foch] that final decision was left not only on the principle of the Armistice but upon its application. He it was who drew up the text. And it was his draft that was adopted. The action of the governments was limited to endorsing it and making it more severe. That is the truth:--it is perhaps less picturesque but certainly more in accord with common sense."