Part 1

FOR THE DEFENCE OF CANADA

Issued by THE MILITARY SERVICE COUNCIL October, 1917

FOR THE DEFENCE OF CANADA

I.

There is no serious suggestion among British people that Great Britain could have remained neutral in the Great War which broke across Europe three years ago and which still fills the earth with devastation and mourning. By British people one means not only those of English speech and British origin, but all of any race or tongue or creed who salute the flag, and enjoy the heritage of freedom which belongs to British citizenship. The mother country had an understanding with France which could not be ignored; an obligation to Belgium which could not be repudiated without dishonor. In the conventions and understandings to which the British Empire was committed there was no menace to any other nation. The object was not to make war but to keep peace; not to divide or convulse Europe but to assure international security and the honorable and happy independence of all peoples.

II.

It is true that the British navy was maintained in strength, vigor and efficiency, but the navy was not an instrument of aggression nor even the guardian of exclusive paths for British commerce across the seas. It was the bulwark of freedom; the police force of all nations. The trade of the Empire had no other protection. The Empire itself had no other wall of defence. There was no British army to challenge other communities nor any thought of aggression or conquest. Indeed it is certain that the people of Great Britain and the Dominions could not be united in support of a war for territorial extension or a wanton attack upon the independence of any other country. There may be doubtful chapters in British history. There may have been ages when Great Britain was willing to live by the sword; when her statesmen strove for dominion over other lands and peoples. But with the Victorian era a new spirit entered into British councils. Her statesmen thought of the sword only as a necessary guarantee of British security. They gave earnest support to all movements designed to settle international differences by conciliation and arbitration. They were so “slow to anger” that envious and restless neighbors persuaded themselves that the old might and puissance of Imperial Britain had gone forever.

III.

There is no better evidence of the purity of British motives and the disinterestedness of British action than the complete unity of the Empire in the desperate struggle in which it is now engaged. If there could be better evidence it lies in the fact that the United States, removed for a century from the quarrels of Europe, has entered the conflict, in sheer revolt against Teutonic aggression and driven by a noble impatience with actions that have destroyed the reign of law among nations and put earth and heaven to shame. Thus we have not only the British people, so seldom united in war, animated by a common purpose, but also the American Republic, nurtured in love of peace and distrustful of the old world’s ideals and ambitions, inspired and united by a common sense of danger and a common concern for freedom and civilization.

IV.

It was manifest even before war was declared that there would be no indecision or division in Canada. We knew that with the mother country at war we would be at war. We could not be neutral and remain within the Empire. There was no apprehension of compulsion by the Imperial Government. There was certainty of compulsion by Germany if our attitude was not defined and unequivocal. We had to proclaim independence and neutrality or pledge our manhood and resources to maintain the security and integrity of the Empire. If we had done otherwise than we have we would now be skulking in the world’s byways and writhing under the contempt of decent peoples. Who suggests that in time of peace we can sing God save the King, boast of our British citizenship and send our trade on the seas under protection of the British navy, and do nothing in time of war? There could, however, be no greater mistake than to think that we are in the war at the command of Great Britain or purely to sustain British interests. We are in the war primarily to defend and maintain freedom and self-government in Canada. At least Great Britain is fighting for Canada as surely as Canada is fighting for Great Britain.

V.

It is almost inconceivable that Germany could have doubted what our decision would be. We acted involuntarily and instinctively. There was unanimity in the press and in Parliament. We did not think of degrees of obligation or conditions of alliance. In Quebec there was rejoicing over the compact between Britain and France, while in the English provinces we saw national and Imperial value in a union of French and English, in defence of free institutions. We believed that through the common sacrifices of war would come that happy understanding between the races in Canada which has been the aspiration of Canadian patriots for a century. We took deep satisfaction in the prospect that France, in alliance with Britain, would emerge from a long humiliation with the “lost provinces” recovered and the ancient national dignity restored. Hence we said to the mother country as Jehoshaphat said to the King of Israel, “I am as thou art and my people as thy people and we will be with thee in the war.” For her as for us the choice was between sacrifice and dishonor, and when these are the conditions honor and sacrifice are the immemorial obligation and inheritance of the British people.

VI.

No one foresaw the duration or the magnitude of the conflict. Armageddon was a vision of poets and prophets. The 20th century, inspired by enthusiasts and instructed by economists, believed that the world had grown soft and “practical.” We were told that war lords were legendary figures of an evil past. It was a common belief that no nation could command the resources for a long struggle. It was said that finance and commerce, interlocked and internationalized, would compel a speedy cessation of hostilities by exhaustion of the combatants. We were assured that the industrial armies of the workshops could not be mobilized for mutual destruction. To the few who were wiser we would not listen. Possibly much of their wisdom was rooted in apprehension and suspicion. There never was so much of mercy and charity and goodwill and brotherhood among men as during the first years of the century. We had the Hague tribunal and treaties of arbitration. We had international law and worldwide organizations for the common protection and enrichment of mankind. It is not strange, therefore, if men believed that there was a happy prospect of enduring peace or if there was general impatience with those who spoke of war and preparation for war.

VII.

It is not necessary to consider at length the immediate causes of the war or to marshal the evidence in proof of Great Britain’s disinterested and resolute endeavor to avert the conflict. Few of the great wars of history stand the cold, unimpassioned scrutiny of later generations. We have, however, overwhelming evidence that Germany plotted and prepared for sovereignty in Europe and an unchallenged primacy among the nations. The world has been astounded by the revelation of German motives, the inflexible persistence of German policy, the extent and efficiency of German preparation. It was only by the mercy of God and the martyrdom of Belgium that France was not brought to her knees before she could organize her valiant defence or the heroic British regiments unite with the French legions to check the advance on Paris. While time lasts the betrayal of Belgium will have shameful pre-eminence in what John Morley calls “The sombre tragedy of human history.” Nor would Great Britain have escaped lasting dishonor if she had failed in fidelity to France and Belgium at any cost of life and treasure. It is not necessary to argue that the violation of Belgian neutrality alone explains the British declaration of war upon Germany. That cause was adequate, if there were no other, but there were other considerations of direct and tremendous consequence to the British Empire.

VIII.

Looking to the future British statesmen could not doubt that Germany, triumphant over France and Belgium, with power of dictation over Russia, with mastery of Turkey, and with Vienna in subjection to Berlin, would organize its resources and consolidate its energies for an attack upon Britain and her Dominions. Indeed all that has been disclosed shows clearly that the destruction of Great Britain and partial or complete suzerainty over the self-governing British nations was the ultimate object of German policy. With a land army unequalled in Europe the Kaiser set himself to rival the British navy and the British merchant marine. A great navy was not required to ensure the political security or protect the commerce of Germany. Only by naval power could the British Empire exist. When we think of the achievements of the Germanic alliance against a world in arms we realize what a mortal hazard the British Empire would have faced in single combat against enemies enriched by the spoils of victory over France, Russia and Belgium, and with all the smaller nations of Europe reduced to submissive neutrality. It was vital, therefore, that Britain should enter the struggle not only by virtue of honorable alliances but to guard her very existence. Moreover, if Britain had hesitated at the outset it is certain that her position would quickly have become intolerable. In a few weeks or months she would have had to send her fleet to sea and organize her manhood for defence. Delay, resulting from foolish confidence or timid counsels, would have been dangerous and possibly fatal to all the vital interests which depend upon a solvent and powerful British Commonwealth.

A thousand years scarce serve to form a state; An hour may lay it in the dust.

IX.

Whether or not there was lack of vigilance or failure in preparation by Great Britain, there is nothing more remarkable in human history than the achievements of the British people in the war. Few doubted that the navy would be vigilant and invincible. It was not feared that the old historic regiments would fail in valor or endurance. But there is nothing even in British annals so wonderful as the voluntary enlistment of an army of four millions. If only as a measure of the danger which threatened the Empire the figures are impressive. Men would not have recruited in hundreds of thousands if they had not felt that the institutions they cherished, even their very households, stood in the shadow of death. No doubt a flame of wrath swept over England as the revolting story of German brutality in Belgium was unfolded, but a living, conscious sense of actual danger to the Empire was the moving impulse to British action. The tremendous voluntary enlistment is only rivalled as a phenomenon in British history by the final adoption of the principle of compulsory service. It was not only in Canada that this method of recruiting was regarded with disfavor. For generations compulsion for military service has been repugnant to the genius of British institutions. It was held to be the essential basis of the militarism of continental countries. The conviction or prejudice which obtained in England was as deeply rooted in the United States. A great standing army was treated in both countries as incompatible with the ideals of a free people.

X.

In framing the constitution the fathers of the American Republic were chiefly concerned to repose power in Congress and to establish conditions under which a military dictatorship would be forever impossible. Across the world for a century fell the shadow of Napoleon. Behind stood the sinister figures of ancient dictators and despots. During the American Civil War the draft produced disaffection and riot in the North, while Lincoln was permitted to exercise autocratic power because he held his authority from “the people.” There was confusion of thinking through facts of history which had no validity under democracy, and sincere devotion to theories and prejudices which challenge the basic ideals and principles of popular government. A writer in The London Times Literary Supplement, discussing “The ways of Revolution,” said, “In modern times democracy has almost invariably had the best of the fighting. France herself was never led to defeat by a Republican Government; Waterloo and Sedan were lost by her Emperors. Swiss history is one long tale of democratic success in defence; two Dutch provinces defied the arms of Philip II., and thirteen American colonies the might of the British Empire. Democracy is more prone to suicide than liable to conquest.”

XI.

It is idle to suggest that compulsion should have been applied in Great Britain when the war began. The certain result would have been resistance and disorder. The nation would have been weakened, divided, disabled for the mighty task before it. Only actual experience and the undesirable consequences of unregulated enlistment established the necessity for selection and made compulsory service possible. Railway workers, coal miners and various classes of skilled mechanics had to be brought back from the trenches. It was found necessary to reserve and organize labor for the shipyards and the munition factories. Agriculture had to be stimulated to the utmost. For a time there was a degree of industrial confusion, and under-production of essential war materials because men had joined the colors who could give better service to the Empire in the shops and mines than they could give in the field. It was essential that transportation should be efficient and the armies well fed and well equipped if battles were to be won against the long preparation, the scientific machinery and the accumulated war stores of Germany. Hence selection became necessary in order that the industrial forces should be competent and adequate and organized to secure the maximum of production. Unexpected revelations of German brutality and ruthlessness affected the thinking of multitudes of the British people. They began to realize that all the energies and resources of the kingdom must be employed if victory over the Germanic alliance was to be achieved. There was reason to rejoice over the results of voluntary recruiting. What had been done was magnificent. But it was recognized that there was still man-power available and that the situation required the enrolment of every citizen who was physically equal to military service, and engaged in activities less vital to the security of the State. Great Britain adopted every expedient to secure recruits before the selective draft was applied. It was found that the voluntary system was costly, partial and undemocratic. Enlistment was uncertain, haphazard and uneven. Many incidents, when appeals for recruits became strident and coercive, were repugnant to national self-respect and national dignity. Through adversity Great Britain discovered that equality of service and sacrifice is the essential basis of democracy. Under the system of National Service there is no distinction of race or creed or class or position. There is restriction upon freedom but only that the State may be preserved and the citizen secured in life and liberty, under the flag of his choice and in the land of his fathers.

XII.

In the light of history the ready submission of the United States to compulsory draft when peace with Germany could no longer be maintained is remarkable. If the Republic had been among the original combatants it is inconceivable that the draft at the outset would have been sanctioned. There is nothing in the history of the Revolutionary War, the war of 1812 or the Civil War to suggest that the United States would raise armies by compulsion while the forces required could be secured by the voluntary system. Nearly three years elapsed before the statesmen at Washington resolved to engage in the great struggle between freedom and despotism. It is not necessarily a reproach to the American people that there was long delay before friendly relations with Germany were severed. A divided nation cannot strike with all its strength. Until the people were substantially united compulsion was impracticable and dangerous. Through the patience and wise dealing of the President and the arrogance, insolence and devious manœuvring of Germany a common national feeling was finally developed upon which Mr. Wilson could rely for support in all measures necessary to secure appropriations, raise armies and ensure sympathetic and effective co-operation between the Government and the people. Supported by the national feeling the President was able to establish national service and save his country from the waste, strain, clamor and inequity of raising armies by voluntary appeal.

XIII.

The United States was in a position to profit by the experiences of Britain and Canada. It had knowledge of the disadvantages of the voluntary system as revealed in the British countries and freedom from the illusions which delayed and embarrassed the original combatants. We hardly yet realize what a revolution in opinion was necessary before the draft could be applied in Britain or the United States. We have a new revelation in democracy which would have come slowly, if at all, if the war had gone more prosperously for the Allies. It would not have come had the war ended in one or two campaigns. Sheer military necessity chiefly explains the change in popular feeling. At least in Britain and Canada the demand for compulsion became so general and formidable that the Governments could not resist. Jean Jaures, an extreme Socialist and idealist, argues that the rooted objection to national service which has been so common in democratic countries finds its support in the spirit of caste and the vested interests of a class who cling to the idea of commanding a great army, segregated from the nation in a world of its own, with its own laws, its own pomp and circumstance, rather than of accepting their position as the leading citizens in an armed nation. He insists that “just as there is no power more majestic than that of the national will embodied in law, so there is no army more powerful and more capable of endowing its leaders with moral authority and prestige, if they are in harmony with it, than an army which is the armed nation itself, inspired with the determination to defend its independence and organized for the purpose.” Events justify Jaures and go far to establish national service as the sound and necessary military system for a democracy at war. The feeling that the army necessarily constitutes a separate class is dying. So is the idea that only those who choose to bear arms are responsible for the national safety. Passing, too, is the notion which divides armies into free men and “conscripts” and regards compulsory national service as destructive of individual freedom and personal independence.

XIV.

Napoleon conscripted for aggression and conquest. Under National Service Republican France has had freedom from internal convulsions and Chauvinistic military adventures. In defence the French people have made sacrifices of blood and treasure beyond computation. But for nearly half a century, notwithstanding the brutal arrogance and avarice of Prussia in 1870, they kept the peace themselves and were among the active forces for peace in the councils of Europe. In Germany national service is not the “Will of the people,” but the instrument of rulers lusting for dominion and intolerant of the privileges and ideals of democracy. If France had trusted to the voluntary system she would have been overcome in 1914, before her forces could have been organized to resist the German attack. We reach false conclusions because we think of the origin of “conscription” rather than of the equity of national service. A democracy chooses its rulers; an autocracy commands its subjects. In France and Germany we have the conflicting ideals of an autocracy organized for attack and a democracy organized for defence. A looser military organization in France would have ensured the success of the attack. Failure to arm the nation would have been equivalent to self-destruction. Where the power to command, without assent of the people, exists, democracy has not come to birth. Where democracy rejects the supreme obligation of citizenship it is not full born. One may not think that the world must “stand to arms” forever but until the free democracies develop the power and the spirit to disarm autocracies and command peace, enduring peace will not prevail. Whether or not any league of nations will ever “fight for peace” only the gods know. From the welter of blood and ruin upon which we look to-day it would be a dark prospect if we could not cherish the vision.

XV.

As has been said there was no thought of a draft in Canada when the war began. The press and the political leaders gave many assurances that compulsion would not be employed. It was assumed that the response to the appeal of the Department of Militia would be adequate. There was a common expectation that the war would not last for twelve months and that at most Canada would provide an army of 50,000 or 100,000. In the first months of war more men offered themselves that we could arm and equip. In the course of ten weeks over 30,000 had embarked at Quebec for England. Among these were many British-born, instant in response to the call to arms, and peculiarly conscious of the danger which threatened the mother country. It was natural that they should predominate in the first Canadian contingent. If there had been immediate danger to Canada, such as that to which the old countries were exposed, the enlistment of Canadians would have exceeded all other elements of the population. But notwithstanding that the causes of the war lay in Europe natives of Canada were numerous in the first oversea regiments. Many of those who enlisted as officers made great sacrifices. Many who enlisted as privates made even greater sacrifices. They abandoned responsible and remunerative positions and the certainty of commissions if they had sought to avoid service in the ranks. All put life at stake. In those heroic battalions East and West, Quebec and Ontario, were represented, and whether English-speaking or French speaking they displayed valor and endurance in the field.

XVI.

From month to month and from year to year the call for men has been continuous and insistent. When we had organized an army of 100,000 another 100,000 was demanded. When 200,000 had enlisted there was an appeal for 300,000. When 350,000 had enrolled a Canadian contribution of 500,000 was authorized. By voluntary enlistment 430,000 men were secured and 332,000 of these have crossed the sea. In all the long span of human history there is nothing more romantic and majestic than this great gift of manhood from the new world to restore freedom in the old. Even when the bells ring for peace many of those who left Canada in the pride of youth and strength will not come back. The loss is grievous even though they were where they should have been when they fell. The casualties in the Canadian army exceed 100,000 and 30,000 sleep in France and Flanders. Many of those in the trenches have borne the strain and shock of war for years, separated from wives and children, from fathers and mothers, from all the associations and interests which give normal life zest and value. They have no obligation to country or Empire which does not lie as clearly upon all of us. If we deny the support which they need we shall be dishonored.

If ye break faith with us who die, We shall not sleep though poppies grow In Flanders’ fields.

XVII.