ii. The possibility of reasonable protection from fire

during deployment and up to the moment of opening fire.

These conditions may be found to obtain for small forces of artillery such as sections or single guns, when they do not obtain for a large number of batteries moving simultaneously. In such cases guns should be dribbled forward a few at a time as may be found practicable. The advancing batteries should, when necessary, be supported by the fire of those in action. In cases of extreme difficulty it may be necessary for the forward movement to take place under cover of darkness.

5. To support an attack with success a battery commander must be able to see the ground over which the infantry is advancing and also be able to control the fire of his battery rapidly and effectively, but the more cover that can be obtained compatible with control by voice the better.

6. Artillery as at present equipped has certain limitations as regards dealing with rapid movement from under cover, such as might be the case if a counter-attack were made unexpectedly, and must reach the crest to develop the full effect of its fire against such targets. Its conduct in such cases must be guided by the principle laid down in Sec. =146= (4).

=157.= _Third phase of the attack._

1. The infantry covered by the fire of the artillery will endeavour to reach a position from which it will be possible to deliver the assault. The distance between this position and the enemy must depend upon the ground and the resisting power of the enemy.

2. The bursts of artillery fire should become frequent and intense at this period, the object of the artillery being to demoralise the defenders and reduce the volume and effect of their fire so as to afford to the infantry the opportunity to assault.

3. =Every effort should be made to bring a converging fire to bear on the immediate objective of the attack, such fire being by far the most demoralizing and decisive in its effect.=

At the same time no portion of the enemy’s position from which effective fire is being brought to bear on the attackers should be ignored.

4. The number of batteries employed should be limited to the number that can be effectively controlled, and should be proportionate to the extent of the objectives that it is necessary to engage. Provided sufficient batteries are in action for the extent of the objectives a greater volume of fire, if required, should be obtained by an increased rapidity of fire from those batteries that have got the range, rather than by engaging fresh batteries.

5. The losses that may be inflicted by wild artillery fire at this period may imperil the success of the whole operation, and unless the infantry has confidence in the artillery the effect of the covering fire of the latter may be to delay and hamper rather than facilitate the delivery of the assault.[13]

[13] The distance at which artillery other than howitzers can with safety fire over the heads of its own troops varies. At ranges under 1,500 yards _on the level_ it would be dangerous to fire over friendly troops; at longer ranges infantry should be sufficiently safe at 500 yards (with heavy artillery 800 yards is necessary) from the guns.

=Battery commanders must, therefore, do all in their power to improve their facilities for observing closely the course of the action and must keep the most complete control over the fire of their batteries that it is possible for them to exert.=

6. Whether the artillery can continue its fire until the assaulting infantry is actually on the point of closing with the enemy, or whether it should increase its range on the first signs of the commencement of the assault, must depend on the circumstances of each case. The distance between the combatants just prior to the assault and the slope of the ground are important factors. Where the ground in front of the enemy’s position is steep and broken this distance will probably be short, but a steep slope gives a better view to the artillery and small errors in elevation will not be so dangerous to the infantry as on flat ground. If the ground is flat and exposed the infantry may be compelled to assault from further off, while the artillery will experience increased difficulties in estimating the relative positions of the combatants, and errors in elevation and fuze setting will be more dangerous to the attacking infantry.

The advantages of artillery support at this period are, however, so great that the danger from a few shells falling short must not be allowed to prevent the artillery from continuing their fire till the latest possible moment. (_See_ F.S. Regs., Part I., Sec. =106=.)

By changing from time shrapnel to percussion shrapnel it may be possible to defer the moment when the artillery must cease firing at the immediate objective of the infantry. When it is no longer possible to continue firing at that objective the range of the artillery should be increased so as to search the rear of the position, but no considerable amount of ammunition should be devoted to this object.

7. If the assault is seen to succeed, it is more important to move some batteries forward to pursue the enemy with fire or to support the successful infantry in holding the ground gained against a possible counter-attack than to continue firing over the position. The flanks of the locality that has been captured will often prove the best positions for support against counter-attack.

ARTILLERY IN DEFENCE.

(_See also_ F.S. Regs., Part I, Secs. 107-109.)

=158.= _General instructions and preliminary measures._

1. When an encounter takes place a force may be thrown temporarily on the defensive by the numerical superiority of the enemy or by his more rapid deployment and greater readiness for action. In such a case time may be required in which to deploy or to bring up reinforcements, or possibly it may be desired to extricate the troops that are engaged and break off the action.

2. If it is desired to gain time for deployment, or to bring up reinforcements, it is usually gained by the action of advanced troops or the occupation of advanced posts. The artillery plays an important part in the support of these troops and in covering their withdrawal later. To give effective support an early deployment of a sufficient force of artillery for the purpose is necessary.

A commander may, however, deliberately assume a defensive attitude in one part of the field in order to exhaust the enemy’s powers, while he prepares an offensive stroke elsewhere. In such a case he will occupy a position with a portion of his force; strengthening it artificially if time permits, in order to reduce as much as possible the force to be locked up in its defence and to free as many as possible for the subsequent offensive. It is the action of the artillery in the defence of a position of this kind that is considered in the following sections.

3. The defence of a position usually takes the form of the occupation of certain localities with unoccupied intervening spaces. (_See_ Sec. =156= (2).) The troops holding these localities are supported by local reserves, whose functions include the attack of any hostile force penetrating between the localities and the recapture at once of any locality that may be successfully assaulted by the enemy.

In order to carry out this general scheme of defence the position to be defended is divided into sections each comprising one or more of these localities. Commanders are appointed to the sections and troops allotted for their defence, including the local reserves. The remainder of the force forms the general reserve, which is kept in hand for the decisive counter-attack. The artillery allotted to the position will be distributed, in accordance with the general scheme of defence, by the divisional commander after a careful reconnaissance of the ground, in which the divisional artillery commander will take part.

4. The tasks which the artillery allotted to the defence of the position may be called upon to perform are:--

i. To make the enemy’s infantry deploy at a distance, to delay the advance through the zone in which the hostile infantry is exposed to artillery fire only, and to make this advance as laborious and as costly as possible.