Part 7

M'Murdogh turned and did the same service for his preserver, cleaving the head of a Baluchi who was aiming at his back. Captain Jacob and Lieutenant Fitzgerald performed similar exploits. Six European officers and sixty sergeants and privates were killed, and fourteen officers and about 200 men wounded. The loss of the Baluchis was enormous; a careful computation gave it as 6,000--1,000 bodies were heaped in the ravine alone. What greater proof is wanting of the great courage and tenacity of the Baluchi warrior, who is now linking his glorious traditions with ours by deeds worthy of his ancient prowess?

THE FIRST SIKH WAR

(Moodkee, 1845)

It can hardly be said that when Sir H. Hardinge arrived in India in 1844 he found our frontier forces insufficient in numbers or unprepared for action. When the first Sikh War broke out in December, 1845, there were at Umballa 12,000 men with 32 guns, at Ferozepore 10,472 with 24 guns, and at Ludhiana 7,235 with 12 guns. Including the force of 1,800 at the hill stations this made a total of 32,479 men with 68 guns--a very respectable little British army.

On December 7th and 8th news came from Lahore to the effect that preparations were being made on a large scale for artillery, stores, and all the munitions of war, but as yet no infantry or artillery had been reported to have left Lahore, nor had a single Sikh soldier crossed the Sutlej. On the 9th, at night, Captain Nicholson, the assistant political agent at Ferozepore, reported that a portion of the Sikh army had approached within three miles of the river. On the 10th no intelligence was received from Lahore confirmatory of Captain Nicholson's report, and the opinion continued to prevail that the Sikh army would not cross the Sutlej. Our troops, however, moved on the 10th, 11th, 12th, in pursuance of orders given on the 7th and 8th; and the whole of the forces destined to move up to the Sutlej were in full march on the 12th. Some days later the whole of the Ludhiana force was moved up with the Umballa force, restricting the defence of Ludhiana to the fort, which could be securely garrisoned by the soldiers left at that post, unless attacked by heavy artillery, which was a very improbable contingency.

This fine body of men, by a rapid march on Busseean, an important point where the roads leading from Umballa and Kurnaul meet, formed the advanced column of the army, and secured the supplies which had been laid in at Busseean. Up to the morning of the 12th, the information from Lahore had not materially varied; but, by the reports received on that day, the general aspect of affairs appeared more warlike. Still no Sikh aggression had been committed, and no artillery had moved down to the river. On the 13th, however, Sir Henry Hardinge received precise information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej, and was concentrating a great force on the left bank of the river. Sir Henry immediately ordered Brigadier Wheeler to march, with 4,500 men and twenty-one guns, early on the 14th from Ludhiana to Busseean, which place had been filled with provisions by arrangements made through Major Broadfoot with the native chiefs--provisions upon which the British army depended in its advance to Ferozepore. By the afternoon of the 14th, Brigadier Wheeler was in front of Busseean. The main column, under the Commander-in-Chief, from Umballa, did not reach Busseean until the 16th.

The Sikhs had not completed the passage of their heavy guns until the 16th, and, by the 17th, the advance of the force under the Commander-in-Chief began to tell upon them, for on the 17th the main body, consisting, according to the Sikh accounts, of 25,000 regulars and 88 guns, under Lal Singh, took possession of the wells around the village of Ferozeshah, whilst Tej Singh with 23,000 men and 67 guns remained opposite to Ferozepore. Now the only road by which an army can march from Busseean to Ferozepore (on account of the scarcity of water) passes through Moodkee, and is about twenty miles, Ferozeshah being mid-way. Knowing that the Commander-in-Chief must carry these works before he could relieve Ferozepore, the Sikhs commenced on December 17th to throw up entrenchments around the wells at Ferozeshah in order to stop the advance of the column under the Commander-in-Chief. Not knowing the strength of his column, and thinking it was only the advance guard of the British army, 12,000 Sikhs, chiefly cavalry, and 22 guns, under the command of Lal Singh, left the camp at Ferozeshah, early on the 18th, and had taken up their position at Moodkee before the arrival of the British army. No sooner had our troops arrived than a scout sent by the political agent brought the news that the enemy was only three miles away.

The British troops hastily got under arms and moved to their positions. Sir Hugh Gough immediately pushed forward the horse artillery and cavalry, and directed the infantry, accompanied by the field batteries, to move forward in support. Sir Hugh's own description is a good one. He says, "We had not proceeded beyond two miles when we found the enemy in position. To resist their attack, and to cover the formation of the infantry, I advanced the cavalry, under Brigadiers White, Gough, and Mactier, rapidly to the front in columns of squadrons, and occupied the plain. They were speedily followed by the five troops of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, who took up a forward position, having the cavalry then on his flank.

"The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low but in some places thick jhow jungle, and dotted with sandy hillocks. The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle and such undulations as the ground afforded; and whilst our twelve battalions formed from echelon of brigade into line they opened a very severe cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously replied to by the battery of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke, which was soon joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse that of the enemy; and as it was necessary to complete our infantry dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle, I directed the cavalry under Brigadiers White and Gough to make a flank movement on the enemy's left, with a view of threatening and turning that flank if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3rd Light Dragoons [now known as the 3rd (King's Own) Hussars], with the second brigade of cavalry, consisting of the Body-guard and 5th Light Cavalry, with a portion of the 4th Lancers,[A] turned the left of the Sikh army, and sweeping along the whole rear of its infantry and guns silenced for a time the latter and put their numerous cavalry to flight. Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy's left, I directed the remainder of the 4th Lancers, the 9th Irregular Cavalry[2] under Brigadier Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right.

"This manoeuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the cavalry would have been productive of greater effect.

"When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-Generals Sir Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John M'Caskill, attacked in echelon of lines the enemy's infantry, almost invisible amongst wood and the approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as might have been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours; but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The attack of the infantry now commenced, and the roll of fire from this powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position after position with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that never-failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained during an hour and a half of dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object."

Our troops in this battle consisted of 3,850 Europeans and 8,500 natives, making a total of 12,350 rank and file, and 41 guns. Sixteen officers were killed and 200 men; forty-eight officers wounded and 609 men, of whom 153 died subsequently of their wounds, or were disabled. Amongst those who fell was the hero of Jellalabad, Sir Robert Sale; he had his left thigh shattered by grape-shot, and the wound proved mortal. Had there been more daylight, the rout of the enemy would have been more complete; as it was, seventeen of their guns out of twenty were captured, and their loss in killed and wounded was very severe. Yet it must be said that, in this battle of Moodkee, our friend the enemy fought bravely and well--so well that, casting a backward glance on that day of glorious deeds, we are now proud to claim him as a friend indeed.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 2: Native regiments.]

ALIWAL AND SOBRAON

(1846)

Badly beaten at Ferozeshah, the Sikhs naturally expected that the British troops would at once follow up their advantage by crossing the Sutlej and advancing on the capital; but in order to do this successfully it was necessary to wait the arrival of the powerful battering train now moving upwards with the Meerut force under Sir John Grey, consisting of the 9th Lancers, the 16th Lancers, and her Majesty's 10th and 53rd Regiments of Foot, with the 43rd and 59th Regiments of Native Infantry.

The Sikhs, mistaking this delay for irresolution, resolved to make another effort to maintain their position on the left bank of the Sutlej; and for this purpose they began to construct a new bridge of boats, not very far from the spot where they crossed the river after having been driven from Ferozeshah. Our Army of the Sutlej was stationed some distance from the river, and no opposition was offered by them. The bridge of boats was soon constructed, and works thrown up in front of it with much military skill, in a position very favourable to defence. The opposite banks were high, and the river, where the bridge was laid, made a slight curve inwards, so as to throw those banks sufficiently forward to afford protection to both flanks of the advanced position from heavy artillery placed in battery. Above the bridge, and not far from it, was a good ford, which facilitated the communications with the forces on the opposite bank. Advantage had also been taken of the slenderness of our troops at Ludhiana to effect a passage for a force of about 10,000 men of all arms, in the neighbourhood of that town. No attack was made either on the town or cantonment of Ludhiana; the object of this force appeared to be rather to entrench itself near the place at which it crossed, in order to obstruct our progress and to cut off the passage of supplies to Ferozepore, and to intercept the communication between the posts.

As soon as the Meerut force joined the Commander-in-Chief's camp, immediate measures were taken to reinforce the Ludhiana post and the station at Busseean. Some native infantry, some light cavalry, and some guns were sent thither, and the sick, the women, and the children were removed thence to Umballa. Meanwhile Sir Harry Smith had been detached to reduce Dhurmkote and keep open the communication for supplies and ammunition from our rear. Sir Harry was now reinforced, having with him 7,000 men and 24 guns, and it was confidently believed that he could at one and the same time relieve Ludhiana and protect the whole of our rear. Dhurmkote was evacuated at his approach. On the way from Jugraon to Ludhiana he lost a good deal of his baggage, and sustained some heavy fusilades, which he did not wait to return. His troops were much harassed when he reached Ludhiana, but his presence put an end to the consternation which was becoming general in that part of the country.

The Sirdar Runjur Singh had strongly entrenched himself at Aliwal, about eight miles to the westward of Ludhiana. He had 15,000 men and 56 guns, and on the evening of January 26th he received a reinforcement of 12 guns and 4,000 regular troops. Sir Harry Smith most gallantly attacked the Sikhs on January 28th with not more than 16,000 men in all. The right of the Sikh force rested on Bundree, and their left on Aliwal. When they had advanced a short distance from their entrenched camp, they cannonaded the British for half an hour, until our brave fellows stormed the village of Aliwal, the key of their position. The whole of the British line then began to advance. Her Majesty's 16th Lancers charged in the most gallant style, but the Sikhs lay down on the ground and the Lancers could not easily reach them. In this position the Sikhs did deadly work with their muskets and keen swords. The 16th Lancers had upwards of a hundred men killed or wounded. The great mass of Sikh infantry could be broken only by our artillery. One Sikh cannon after another was captured. So ably were the orders of attack conducted, each column and line arriving at its point of attack to the very moment, that the enemy was soon driven headlong back over the river, and all their guns were captured or destroyed. Only one gun was carried by the Sikhs to the opposite bank, and there it was spiked by Lieutenant Holmes, of the Irregular Cavalry, and Gunner Scott, of the Horse Artillery, who forded the river in pursuit. The victory was complete, and great was the confusion among the Sikhs.

After this complete and decisive victory there was a breathing space in the campaign. The Sikhs at Sobraon went on strengthening their position, while Sir Hugh Gough waited for his artillery and reinforcements. From January 14th till the beginning of February the enemy was industriously employed in building defences, under the direction, it is said, of a Spanish engineer. The army under Sir Charles Napier, which had been assembled at Sukkar by order of the Governor-General, consisting of 16,000 men, was moving up to the left bank of the Sutlej towards Ferozepore, and would have proved, had the war lasted, a most valuable reinforcement to the Army of the Sutlej. It had by this time reached Bhawalpur, opposite Mooltan, and as the Nawab of that place had intimated to the British Government his intention of remaining neutral, the Governor-General, feeling that the blow must be struck and the contest decided at Lahore, requested Sir Charles Napier to come on with his staff in advance of his army, and to join him without delay, being desirous of having the assistance of that distinguished officer in the pending struggle. Sir Charles Napier did not, however, arrive in time to add to the glories of Sobraon, but the heavy guns from Delhi reached the Commander-in-Chief's camp on February 9th.

Although on the first intelligence of the battle of Aliwal, and at sight of the numerous bodies which floated from the neighbourhood of that battlefield down to the bridge of boats at Sobraon, the Sikhs seemed much shaken and disheartened, they now appeared to be as confident as ever of being able to defy us in their entrenched position and to prevent our passage of the river. The soldiers were chiefly those who had been trained by the French and Italian officers. They had strong walls, only to be surmounted by scaling ladders, which afforded a secure protection for triple lines of musketry. In all they were 34,000 men with 70 pieces of artillery; their position was united by a good bridge to a reserve of 20,000 men on the opposite bank, on which was a considerable camp and some artillery, commanding and flanking our field-works.

Sir Hugh Gough's forces consisted of 6,533 Europeans and 9,691 natives, making a total of 16,224 rank and file, with 99 guns. Sir Hugh ordered this force to march at half-past three, on the morning of Tuesday, February 10th, when his men would be fresh and there would be a certainty of many hours of daylight. The troops began to move out of camp at the very moment appointed, and they marched in silence to their destination. Sir Hugh was now strong in cavalry and very strong in artillery. He at once put his battering and disposable artillery in position in an extended semicircle, embracing within its fire the works of the Sikhs.

It had been intended that the cannonade should commence at daybreak, but so heavy a mist hung over the plain and river that it was necessary to wait. It was half-past six before the whole of the artillery was developed. Dr. Macgregor, in his "History of the Sikhs," gives a graphic description of the opening of the action. He says: "Nothing could have been conceived grander than the effect of the batteries when they opened, as the cannonade passed along from the Sutlej to Little Sobraon in one continued roar of guns and mortars; while, ever and anon, the rocket like a spirit of fire winged its rapid flight high above the batteries in its progress towards the Sikh entrenchments. Well might the Commander-in-Chief call the opening of the cannonade 'most spirited and well directed.' The Sikh guns responded with shot and shell, but neither appeared to do much execution; the latter were seen bursting in mid-air ere they reached the British batteries, while some of the shot passed over Rhodawala, and struck the ground in front of General Gilbert's division. It now became a grand artillery concert, and the infantry divisions and brigades looked on with a certain degree of interest, somewhat allied, however, to vexation, lest the artillery should have the whole work to themselves. The Commander-in-Chief, however, was determined to give full play to an arm which he had not possessed to an efficient extent in other hard-fought battles. It was reported that the guns were to play for four hours at least; but there is some reason to believe that the rapid firing had nearly exhausted the ammunition before half that time had elapsed, and it was once more to be proved that the British Infantry were not to remain mute spectators of a battle. 'Notwithstanding,' wrote the Commander-in-Chief, 'the formidable calibre of our guns, mortars, and howitzers, and the admirable way in which they were served, and aided by a rocket battery, it would have been visionary to expect that they could have silenced the fire of seventy pieces behind well-constructed batteries of earth, planks, and fascines, or dislodge troops covered either by redoubts or epaulements or within a treble line of trenches.'"

The utmost ingenuity of the Sikhs and their European advisers had been exerted to render the works at Sobraon vastly superior to those at Ferozeshah. They had aimed at absolute impregnability, and a French officer assured Tej Singh that it was utterly impossible for the British to make good their entrance. But it may be said they reckoned without the small host opposing them. The British were now about to try with the musket and the bayonet. At nine o'clock, Brigadier Stacey's brigade, supported on either flank by Captain Horford's and Fordyce's batteries, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lane's troop of horse artillery, moved to the attack in admirable order. The infantry and guns aided each other correlatively. The former marched steadily on in line, which they halted only to correct when necessary, while the latter took up successive positions at the gallop, until at length they were within three hundred yards of the heavy batteries of the Sikhs. But notwithstanding the regularity and coolness, and the scientific character of the assault, which Brigadier Wilkinson well supported, so hot was the fire of cannon and musketry kept up by the Khalsa troops that it seemed for some moments impossible that the entrenchments could be won under it. This fire was all the more formidable from the fact that the Sikhs employed zumburuks--guns mounted on camels and carrying pound shot.

There was a temporary check or pause, but, soon, persevering gallantry triumphed, and the whole army had the satisfaction of seeing Brigadier Stacey's gallant soldiers driving the Sikhs in confusion before them within the area of their encampment. Every impediment was cleared, the entrenchments were passed, and our matchless infantry stood erect and compact within the Sikh camp. Said the Commander-in-Chief: "Her Majesty's 10th, 53rd, and 80th Regiments, with the 33rd, 43rd, 59th, and 63rd Native Infantry, moving at a firm and steady pace, never fired a shot until they had passed the barriers opposed to them--a forbearance much to be commended, and most worthy of constant imitation, to which may be attributed the success of their first effort, and the small loss they sustained."