Part 8

XC. I say again, if in those natural things that are open to our view, and which we touch with our hands every day, there occur a thousand difficulties, that are insuperable to, and beyond the reach of our understandings, have we not the greatest reason to suppose, that the same thing happens with respect to supernatural matters, they being totally superior to the sphere of our senses? If, maugre all my prying, I can’t perceive how God does an infinite number of things, which I see him do every day, would it not be madness in me, to deny or to doubt the existence of revealed things, only because I can’t descry how God executes those things?

If there was a man so short-sighted, that he could not see objects that were very near him, and should pretend that he saw those which were at the distance of a hundred miles from his eyes, or else should take it into his head to insist, that such objects, although they are well known to be _in esse_, do not exist, only because he can’t see them, would not all the world pronounce him a lunatic? This is exactly the same sort of madness as that of those who deny there are divine mysteries, only because they can’t comprehend or pry into them. Little vain stupid man, if the fabric of those material compositions which are ever before your eyes, and are at all times familiar to your touch, is totally impenetrable to your short and limited capacity, how can you expect to comprehend the ineffable manner, in which Omnipotence performs those supernatural wonders? You will tell me, that you can find no solution of the arguments, which the Gentile urges to you against the mystery of the Trinity, or against that of the Incarnation; and I answer, that neither can you find any, to those the philosopher urges against the composition of universal space, take which side of the question you will, and suppose it to be made up, of either divisible, or indivisible matter; but would you conclude from thence, that it is not composed of either one or the other? you certainly would not; and it would be equal, if not greater delirium, to deny the truth of those mysteries, only because you can’t answer, and remove the objections that are made to them. Is it fit, that an Infinite Power should proportion his works, to the limited measure of your understanding? or is it reasonable to suppose that God can do nothing, which you can’t comprehend?

XCI. No north wind, so quickly disperses the clouds which interrupt the rays of the sun, as these reflexions clear up the doubts, which natural reason opposes to the mysteries of faith. Leave then the presumptuous dogmatists to chew their scepticism, and to make the most of the objections it furnishes against religion. But the sort of scepticism, which is precisely limited and confined to physics, is so far from prejudicing faith, that it serves to confirm and rivet it; by removing the obstacles, which the presumption of natural reason throws in the way, to interrupt the effect of that humble docility, which is so necessary, to preserve the understanding in a due state of subjection to the authority of revelation.

XCII. Those men do great injury, not only to philosophy, but to the church also, who rashly endeavour, to interest the doctrine of revelation in the defence of their particular philosophical opinions. This the heretics lay hold of, to calumniate us with converting philosophical sentiments, into articles of faith; and by this artifice, they persuade their followers, that our belief is arduous, and unnecessarily complicated. Upon this presumption, some strangers found their assertions, when they accuse us of countenancing idiotism, and mixing it with religion. It is but a little while ago, that one of them declared in his writings, that the opinions of men in Spain were not more free, than their persons were in Turkey. In order to preserve a due respect for sacred things, it is necessary, not to confound them with profane ones; whoever should begin to erect habitations in temples, would be the author of temples losing that respectful reverence that ought to be preserved in them. There are judges appertaining to the church, whose province it is, to determine what doctrines are useful, what pernicious, and what indifferent. Let us then leave the decision of those matters to them, and don’t let those who sincerely seek the truth, be terrified and disturbed by those scare-crows that are set up by partiality and faction, and sometimes by the pride of those, who have given their names to particular schools, or by the envy of others, who could not arrive at doing so much.

SECT. XXV.

XCIII. We having shewn now, that we possess no physical science or demonstrative knowledge of natural things, we may entertain a reasonable doubt whether we shall ever be able to attain any such. The most learned Valles, is clear that we shall not; because physical knowledge is confined to singular things, and alledges that from singular things, you can’t derive a science. But as we have observed before, this argument is ill founded, and insufficient.

XCIV. We might lay more stress upon two authorities the sceptics alledge in their favour, which are taken from the Ecclesiastes. The first is from Chap. III. in these words. _Cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo, et mundum tradidit disputationi eorum, ut non inveniat homo opus, quod operatus est Deus ab initio usque ad finem._ The second is more formal and precise, and taken from Chap. VIII. _Et intellexi, quod omnium operum Dei nullam possit homo invenire rationem eorum, quæ sunt sub sole: et quantò plus laboraverit ad quærendum, tantò minus inveniat, etiamsi dixerit sapiens se nosse, non poterit reperire._ But in truth, these texts, when they affirm the impossibility of discovering the causes and reason of natural effects, may be understood to allude to the providential, and not to the natural or physical ones. In fact, this is the sense in which some fathers and expositors understand them.

XCV. Others again argue, that the desire of knowing the causes of natural effects, is natural to, and implanted in man by nature itself; and as a natural desire can’t prompt a man to an impossible inquiry, it follows, that attaining the science we are speaking of, is within the compass of possibility. To this argument, Valles replies, it is absolutely possible; and although not in this life, it is in that to come, at which period, the blessed will see with God all things most clearly. This solution is attended with the following difficulty, that a natural desire can’t be directed to an impossible object; neither can it terminate in a supernatural one; and the knowledge the blessed will have of supernatural things, must be entitively supernatural, because it will depend immediately on the light of glory. Upon the whole, we may suppose, that there may belong to the soul in a state of separation from the body, abstracted from the supernatural blessing of the light of glory, a certain knowledge of all material things, in consequence of the species, infused in the course and order of nature; which is the sentiment of Egidius Romanus, Father Saurez, and others; and this knowledge being natural, may possibly be the effect of the thirst we possess for acquiring it in this mortal life.

XCVI. But we can’t help remarking, that the foregoing argument does not stand in need of this solution, because it proceeds upon a false supposition not adverted to by Valles; which is, that the desire of knowing things philosophically, is a principle implanted in man by nature. If this was so, all men would be impressed with this desire, which is not the case; for the greatest part of them seem to have no passion at all for physics; and many despise philosophical speculations, as useless, vain, and by no means entertaining. It is true, that all men are desirous of knowledge, but this desire is not directed in all of them to the same object, or to the same species of objects. Generous souls are naturally lovers of truth; but the majority, are only anxious to understand those things, the knowledge of which, may contribute to the gratification of their passions.

XCVII. We have seen the little force of the arguments urged on both sides, with respect to the doubts we have been canvassing. On which account, I won’t venture to give sentence in the question. Nor do I, nor can any one else without the assistance of Revelation, know the just limits of the human understanding with regard to natural things. And although the various philosophical systems which have hitherto been invented, are exposed to great doubts, or are impeachable of containing manifest nullities in them, who knows but that, in future some one may be discovered so compleat, and so well founded, that the understanding may be convinced of the truth of it. My opinion is, that if this is ever to be accomplished, it must be done by pursuing the plan and method prescribed by my Lord Bacon. It is true, that this is so laborious and prolix, that the execution of it may be apprehended to be morally impossible; for although the monarchs of two very powerful kingdoms, France and England, for the space of more than a hundred years, have caused four hundred able men, at a great expence, and under proper regulations, to be employed in making innumerable experiments, and in reasoning upon, and explaining them, the work is not yet far advanced; when then may we expect to see it accomplished? The Academy of Sciences at Paris, and the Royal Society of London, don’t amount to more than a shred of my Lord Bacon’s extensive project.

On the Shew or Affectation of Learning and Knowledge.

SECT. I.

I. Science, like Virtue, has its imitators and its hypocrites; and the vulgar are as much imposed upon by the one as the other. The numbers of unlearned people who pass for men of literature, is considerable; and the false appearances they put on, becomes a copious source of errors, both particular and common. In this earthly region which we inhabit, apparent learning is as much reverenced, and often-times as much respected, as true. There are those, who are very expert at putting on the semblance of learned men, and of imposing themselves as such upon the world, although the portion of literature they possess is but very small; however, if they have the address to make their copied imitation of it appear an original painting, the copy will often make the same impression on mens minds, as if it actually was an original. When Zeuxis with his pencil imitated grapes, the birds flew with as much eagerness to eat the painted, as if they had been real and natural grapes.

II. In the eleventh century, Arnoldus Brixiens, who was a man of but little literature, did great mischief with his errors, both in his own country, and even in Rome itself; for as Gunterus Ligurinus observes, that besides being an elegant reasoner, he had the address of giving himself the air and appearance of a man of learning; _Assumpta sapientis fronte, disserto fallebat sermone rudes_; or as Otho Frinsingens remarks, a copious verbosity passed in him for knowledge and erudition; _Vir quidem naturæ non hebetis; plus tamen verborum profluvio, quam sententiarum pondere copiosus._ Thus Vigilantius, although he was an ignorant man, by his art in gaining over to him booksellers and publishers, who were the proclaimers of his fame, so far acquired the reputation of a person of literature, that he had the assurance to write against Saint Jerom, and to accuse him of being an Origenist.

III. The vulgar, who are incompetent judges of men of letters, are apt, although it is against their own interest, to countenance and give credit to unlearned persons, whose deceptions in consequence of this encouragement become formidable. The delusion of popular ignorance is apt to magnify a very small light, into the blaze of a flaming torch; and to fancy it is as luminous, as the lanthorn placed on the top of the tower of Pharos, which Pliny says, at a great distance off, appears like a star to those who navigate the sea of Alexandria.

IV. It may not be improperly remarked, that in order for a man to be esteemed a person of learning with the populace, it is not so necessary that he should really be one, as that he should put on the pompous appearance of such a person. Arrogance and verbosity, if they are accompanied with a small degree of discernment, that helps a man to judge, when are the proper times to talk, and when to hold his tongue, and what are the subjects he should discourse, and what be silent upon: I say, if he has a little discretion to know how to conduct himself in these particulars, such management will have a notable effect. A confident magisterial air in his decisions, and an artificial gesture, which when he sprinkles about the little he understands of the subject he is talking upon, and which seems to indicate that he has an infinitely greater stock of knowledge of the matter treasured up in his inside; such affected appearances, I say, will have great weight and efficacy to fascinate the ignorant vulgar.

SECT. II.

V. On the other hand, men of true learning, are modest and candid; but these two virtues, are enemies, and also great obstacles to the advancement of their fame. He who knows most, is sensible, that what he really knows, falls greatly short of what he is ignorant of. His discretion teaches him this, and his sincerity induces him to confess it; but his acting in this manner, greatly obstructs his gaining the applause of the world; for these confessions have the same effect, that the evidence of those have, who bear witness against themselves; that is, they are readily believed; and although it is impossible for any man to know every thing, the vulgar are very unwilling to esteem him learned, who owns himself ignorant of the least matter in his own profession.

VI. Men of learning, are also most commonly timid, because they are apt to be diffident of themselves; so that although all they say should be divine, if it is pronounced with a tremulous tongue, and a faltering voice, it makes no impression on those who listen to them. A man would gain more credit with the world in general, by talking loud, and making extravagant bold assertions, than by reasoning diffidently, and as if he was not quite clear; for the estimation due to discreet doubts has always been suppressed, and in consequence of this suppression, has contributed to countenance errors, and beget false conclusions. How has a presumptuous ignorant fellow, frequently availed himself of his imposing gesture, and the loudness of his voice? and how much by the strength of his lungs has he often concealed the weakness of his argument? But in truth, the noise made by a vociferous person, ought to render his solidity suspected; because men, like other sonorous machines, are loudest the more hollow and empty they are.

VII. If to these imposing appearances, there happens to be joined a moderate portion of literature, it has a most powerful effect to captivate the vulgar, and to gain popular applause. In the instance of Luther, who although he might truly and properly be stiled a man of learning, still the forcible manner in which he delivered himself, added to his address, may be supposed to have contributed more to the success of his preaching, than his literature.

SECT. III.

VIII. There are qualities also, which give people the reputation of able and learned men, when in reality they are quite the reverse. Gravity and circumspection, whether they are natural or artificial, contribute much to produce this effect. Gravity, says Magdalen Scuderi in one of her moral conversations, is a bodily mystery, invented to conceal the defects of the mind; and if it is carried to excess, elevates the person who wears this appearance, to the rank of an oracle. But I can see no reason why a person on this account, should be esteemed more than a man, because that the nearer he resembles a statue, he in reality is by so much less than a man; nor why risibility, being the distinguished mark of rationality, he should be esteemed the most rational, who is the least addicted to laughter. The ingenious French author Montaigne, says pleasantly, that among the whole brute creation, there is no animal so grave as an ass.

IX. Aristotle considered melancholy as a token of ingenuity. But I can’t tell why he did this; for every day’s experience convinces us, that there are melancholy people who are very dull and stupid. If we were to judge of things as they appear to us at first sight, we might be easily induced to confound the stupid with the thoughtful, and to mistake the one for the other. People of dark and gloomy geniuses, have in some measure, the air and appearance of profound thinkers; but if we reflect, we shall be convinced, that insociability is not a characteristic quality appertaining to a rational being. In those who look as if they were always absorbed in thought, the negotiation or operation of the interior part of the soul seems to be inverted. Instead of the understanding surveying and contemplating the species, the species seem to seize upon, and take possession of the understanding; and instead of the mind being master of the object, the object appears as if it was master of the mind; and the species that appear to seize upon it seem as if they bound it down, and kept it confined. A person in this state should not be said to be contemplative, but ought more properly to be compared to a man that is stunned; the immobility of whose thoughts, keeps his reason in a state of suspence. I observe, that there is no brute of a more festive and sociable disposition than a dog; and that there is no one which is endued with a more noble instinct; yet, maugre this experience, I look upon the opposite extreme to excessive gravity to be the worst symptom of the two; for men who are always giggling and bantering, are generally very superficial.

X. But both the silent and the loquacious have their partizans. Some consider men of few words to be the most sagacious, and others give the preference to those who are rather prodigal in their use of them. The talking but little, is occasioned either by excessive caution, or by fear, or else is the effect of modesty, and the want of a ready flow of words; but not, as is commonly thought, does this indicate a want of knowledge. There is no man, who if he was to speak all he thinks, or that occurs to him, would not talk a great deal.

XI. There are some, who observe an artificial medium between talking and holding their tongues, which is very well adapted to attract the veneration of the vulgar; that is, they speak with confidence upon such things as they understand, and take care to be silent upon such as they are ignorant of; but this they do, in a manner as if their silence proceeded from reserve, and an unwillingness to enter upon the subject. By these artifices, men of very moderate capacities, and whose informations are very limited, pass themselves upon the world for persons of deep penetration, and a sort of walking libraries; and although they are possessed of only a very minute or abstracted portion of whatever is the subject of conversation, they engage in the argument in very general terms, always taking care not to advance too far, and to retreat in time; which they do in a manner, as if they were tired of talking further upon the question at present, and therefore would be glad to postpone it, to be discussed more at large another time. In reality, they have said all they know, but behave in this manner, in order to have it thought they have only given a small specimen of their knowledge of the thing; although, like the painter who undertook to paint the eleven thousand virgins, but never finished more than five of them, and declared that all the rest should be supposed coming behind in procession, they would be glad, that what they have already said should conclude the debate; still, if any one, aware of their tricks, should then press them to a further discussion of the point, they either artfully turn the conversation, or affect a scornful dislike to discussing so weighty a matter before so thin an audience; or else get rid of the invitation made to them, with a disdainful smile, and treat both the proposal and the proposer, as if they were beneath their notice. These people are very ready at such sort of expedients, because they study them much, and have a great deal of practice in them.

XII. There are others again, who have recourse to ambiguous and confused expressions; which seem to say a great deal, when in reality they say nothing; and which, like the answers of the oracles of old, are applicable to all kinds of events. In fact, they may be termed the images of those oracles; for although they are listened to with attention, they are little better than mere stocks or stones. The obscurity with which they talk is a dark shade, that conceals what they are ignorant of; and they make use of the stratagem of those who have no other but false money; that is, take care to pass it off under the cover of the night. But notwithstanding all these glaring appearances, there are not wanting weak people, who esteem their embarrassment and confusion as marks of their learning, and who think, that men are like mountains, which the more elevated and sublime they are, the more liable to be covered with clouds, and to cause dark shades which obstruct the fertility, and obscure the chearful appearance of the vallies.

_Majoresque cadunt altis de montibus umbræ._

XIII. This deception, is commonly kept up and assisted by a persuasive carriage, and by certain mysterious gestures and distortions of the features; such as wrinkling the forehead, knitting the eye-brows, rolling the eyes, swelling out the cheeks, thrusting forth the under-lip, and shaking the head; all which affected tokens of wisdom and importance, are displayed and accompanied, with a kind of disdainful countenance. These are a sort of men, who have more than half the wisdom they seem to possess lodged in their features and muscles, which serve them to exhibit and express these symptoms of profundity. Tully very justly ridiculed this artifice in Pison in the following words: _Respondes, altero ad frontem sublato, altero ad mentem depresso supercilio, crudelitatem tibi non placere._

SECT. IV.

XIV. Men, by affecting to despise others who know more than themselves, make use of the most vile and mean artifices imaginable; but notwithstanding this, it is the most sure method, to make them pass for persons of great knowledge, among people of groveling and plebeian minds. There can be no greater injustice committed, nor a vainer effort made, than that, of an envious man’s attempting to transfer the merit which he has purloined from another person to himself. It is true, that a small cloud may obstruct the splendor of the sun; but this obstruction does not prevent this luminary from being the illustrious torch of heaven, nor can such a circumstance be of more consequence than a speck in the atmosphere; nor does it require any science or learning, to enable a man to cast a thousand reflections and blemishes upon other people’s doctrines and writings. When there is no reason to conclude that such behaviour proceeds from envy or malevolence, we ought to suppose that it springs from pure ignorance. I remember to have read in a Treatise intitled The Man of Letters, written by Father Daniel Bartoli, that an ass once happening to stumble over the Iliad of Homer, he in a passion tore it to pieces with his teeth. Thus, in order to outrage, abuse, and destroy a noble writing, nothing is better qualified than a beast.