Part 26

Kant's reading was of the most extensive and miscellaneous kind. He cared comparatively little for the history of speculation, but his acquaintance with books of science, general history, travels and belles lettres was boundless. He was well versed in English literature, chiefly of the age of Queen Anne, and had read English philosophy from Locke to Hume, and the Scottish school. He was at home in Voltaire and Rousseau, but had little or no acquaintance with the French sensational philosophy. He was familiar with all German literature up to the date of his _Kritik_, but ceased to follow it in its great development by Goethe and Schiller. It was his habit to obtain books in sheets from his publishers Kanter and Nicolovius; and he read over for many years all the new works in their catalogue, in order to keep abreast of universal knowledge. He was fond of newspapers and works on politics; and this was the only kind of reading that could interrupt his studies in philosophy.

As a lecturer, Kant avoided altogether that rigid style in which his books were written. He sat behind a low desk, with a few jottings on slips of paper, or textbooks marked on the margin, before him, and delivered an extemporaneous address, opening up the subject by partial glimpses, and with many anecdotes or familiar illustrations, till a complete idea of it was presented. His voice was extremely weak, but sometimes rose into eloquence, and always commanded perfect silence. Though kind to his students, he refused to remit their fees, as this, he thought, would discourage independence. It was another principle that his chief exertions should be bestowed on the intermediate class of talent, as the geniuses would help themselves, and the dunces were beyond remedy.

Simple, honourable, truthful, kind-hearted and high-minded as Kant was in all moral respects, he was somewhat deficient in the region of sentiment. He had little enthusiasm for the beauties of nature, and indeed never sailed out into the Baltic, or travelled more than 40 miles from Konigsberg. Music he disregarded, and all poetry that was more than sententious prose. His ethics have been reproached with some justice as setting up too low an ideal for the female sex. Though faithful in a high degree to the duties of friendship, he could not bear to visit his friends in sickness, and after their death he repressed all allusion to their memory. His engrossing intellectual labours no doubt tended somewhat to harden his character; and in his zeal for rectitude of purpose he forgot the part which affection and sentiment must ever play in the human constitution.

On the 12th of February 1904, the hundredth anniversary of Kant's death, a Kantian society (_Kantgesellschaft_) was formed at Halle under the leadership of Professor H. Vaihinger to promote Kantian studies. In 1909 it had an annual membership of 191; it supports the periodical _Kantstudien_ (founded 1896; see BIBLIOGRAPHY, _ad init._).

THE WRITINGS OF KANT

No other thinker of modern times has been throughout his work so penetrated with the fundamental conceptions of physical science; no other has been able to hold with such firmness the balance between empirical and speculative ideas. Beyond all question much of the influence which the critical philosophy has exercised and continues to exercise must be ascribed to this characteristic feature in the training of its great author.

The early writings of Kant are almost without exception on questions of physical science. It was only by degrees that philosophical problems began to engage his attention, and that the main portion of his literary activity was turned towards them. The following are the most important of the works which bear directly on physical science.

1. _Gedanken von der wahren Schatzung der lebendigen Krafte_ (1747); an essay dealing with the famous dispute between the Cartesians and Leibnitzians regarding the expression for the _amount of a force_. According to the Cartesians, this quantity was directly proportional to velocity; according to their opponents, it varied with the square of the velocity. The dispute has now lost its interest, for physicists have learned to distinguish accurately the two quantities which are vaguely included under the expression _amount of force_, and consequently have been able to show in what each party was correct and in what it was in error. Kant's essay, with some fallacious explanations and divisions, criticizes acutely the arguments of the Leibnitzians, and concludes with an attempt to show that both modes of expression are correct when correctly limited and interpreted.

2. _Whether the Earth in its Revolution has experienced some Change since the Earliest Times_ (1754; ed. and trans., W. Hastie, 1900, _Kant's Cosmogony_; cf. Lord Kelvin in _The Age of the Earth_, 1897, p. 7). In this brief essay Kant throws out a notion which has since been carried out, in ignorance of Kant's priority, by Delaunay (1865) and Adams. He points out that the action of the moon in raising the waters of the earth must have a secondary effect in the slight retardation of the earth's motion, and refers to a similar cause the fact that the moon turns always the same face to the earth.

3. _Allgemeine Naturgeschichte und Theorie des Himmels_, published anonymously in 1755 (4th ed. 1808; republished H. Ebert, 1890). In this remarkable work Kant, proceeding from the Newtonian conception of the solar system, extends his consideration to the entire sidereal system, points out how the whole may be mechanically regarded, and throws out the important speculation which has since received the title of the nebular hypothesis. In some details, such e.g. as the regarding of the motion of the entire solar system as portion of the general cosmical mechanism, he had predecessors, among others Thomas Wright of Durham, but the work as a whole contains a wonderfully acute anticipation of much that was afterwards carried out by Herschel and Laplace. The hypothesis of the original nebular condition of the system, with the consequent explanation of the great phenomena of planetary formations and movements of the satellites and rings, is unquestionably to be assigned to Kant. (On this question see discussion in W. Hastie's _Kant's Cosmogony_, as above.)

4. _Meditalionum quarundam de igne succincta delineatio_ (1755): an inaugural dissertation, containing little beyond the notion that bodies operate on one another through the medium of a uniformly diffused, elastic and subtle matter (ether) which is the underlying substance of heat and light. Both heat and light are regarded as vibrations of this diffused ether.

5. _On the Causes of Earthquakes_ (1755); _Description of the Earthquake of 1755_ (1756); _Consideration of some Recently Experienced Earthquakes_ (1756).

6. _Explanatory Remarks on the Theory of the Winds_ (1756). In this brief tract, Kant, apparently in entire ignorance of the explanation given in 1735 by Hadley, points out how the varying velocity of rotation of the successive zones of the earth's surface furnishes a key to the phenomena of periodic winds. His theory is in almost entire agreement with that now received. See the parallel statements from Kant's tract and Dove's essay on the influence of the rotation of the earth on the flow of its atmosphere (1835), given in Zollner's work, _Ueber die Natur der Cometen_, pp. 477-482.

7. _On the Different Races of Men_ (1775); _Determination of the Notion of a Human Race_ (1785); _Conjectural Beginning of Human History_ (1786): three tracts containing some points of interest as regards the empirical grounds for Kant's doctrine of teleology. Reference will be made to them in the notice of the _Kritik of Judgment_.

8. _On the Volcanoes in the Moon_ (1785); _On the Influence of the Moon on the Weather_ (1794). The second of these contains a remarkable discussion of the relation between the centre of the moon's figure and its centre of gravity. From the difference between these Kant is led to conjecture that the climatic conditions of the side of the moon turned from us must be altogether unlike those of the face presented to us. His views have been restated by Hansen.

9. _Lectures on Physical Geography_ (1822): published from notes of Kant's lectures, with the approval of the author.

Consideration of these works is sufficient to show that Kant's mastery of the science of his time was complete and thorough, and that his philosophy is to be dealt with as having throughout a reference to general scientific conceptions. For more detailed treatment of his importance in science, reference may be made to Zollner's essay on "Kant and his Merits on Natural Science" contained in the work on the _Nature of Comets_ (pp. 426-484); to Dietrich, _Kant and Newton_; Schultze, _Kant and Darwin_; Reuschle's careful analysis of the scientific works in the _Deutsche Vierteljahrs-Schrift_ (1868); W. Hastie's introduction to _Kant's Cosmogony_ (1900), which summarizes criticism to that date; and articles in _Kant-Studien_ (1896 foll.).

The notice of the philosophical writings of Kant need not be more than bibliographical, as in the account of his philosophy it will be necessary to consider at some length the successive stages in the development of his thought. Arranged chronologically these works are as follows:--

1755. _Principiorum primorum cognitionis metaphysicae novae dilucidatio._

1756. _Metaphysicae cum geometria junctae usus in philosophia naturali, cujus specimen I. continet monadologiam physicam._

1762. _Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren_, "The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures" (trans. T. K. Abbott, _Kant's Introduction to Logic and his Essay on the Mistaken Subtilty of the Figures_, 1885).

1763. _Versuch den Begriff der negativen Grossen in die Weltweisheit einzufuhren_, "Attempt to introduce the Notion of Negative Quantities into Philosophy."

1763. _Der einzig mogliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes_, "The only possible Foundation for a Demonstration of the Existence of God."

1764. _Beobachtungen uber das Gefuhl des Schonen und Erhabenen_ (Riga, 1771; Konigsberg, 1776).

1764. _Untersuchung uber die Deutlichkeit der Grundsatze der naturlichen Theologie und Moral_, "Essay on the Evidence (Clearness) of the Fundamental Propositions of Natural Theology and Ethics."

1766. _Traume eines Geistersehers, erlautert durch Traume der Metaphysik_, "Dreams of a Ghost-seer (or Clairvoyant), explained by the Dreams of Metaphysic" (Eng. trans. E. F. Goerwitz, with introd. by F. Sewall, 1900).

1768. _Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raum_, "Foundation for the Distinction of Positions in Space."

The above may all be regarded as belonging to the precritical period of Kant's development. The following introduce the notions and principles characteristic of the critical philosophy.

1770. _De mundi sensibilis et intelligibilis forma et principiis._

1781. _Kritik der reinen Vernunft_, "Kritik of Pure Reason" (revised ed. 1787; ed. Vaihinger, 1881 foll. and B. Erdmann, 1900; Eng. trans., F. Max Muller, 1896, 2nd ed. 1907, and J. M. D. Meiklejohn, 1854).

1783. _Prolegomena zu einer jeden kunftigen Metaphysik die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten konnen_, "Prolegomena to all Future Metaphysic which may present itself as Science" (ed. B. Erdmann, 1878; Eng. trans. J. P. Mahaffy and J. H. Bernard, 2nd ed. 1889; Belfort Bax, 1883 and Paul Carus, 1902; and cf. M. Apel, _Kommentar zu Kants Prolegomena_, 1908).

1784. _Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte im weltburgerlicher Absicht_, "Notion of a Universal History in a Cosmopolitan Sense." With this may be coupled the review of Herder in 1785.

1785. _Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten_, "Foundations of the Metaphysic of Ethics" (see T. K. Abbott, _Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Ethics_, 3rd ed. 1907).

1786. _Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft_, "Metaphysical Elements of Natural Science" (ed. A. Hofler, 1900; trans. Belfort Bax, _Prolegomena and Metaphysical Foundations_, 1883).

1788. _Ueber den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie_, "On the Employment of Teleological Principles in Philosophy."

1788. _Kritik der praktischen Vernunft_, "Kritik of Practical Reason" (trans. T. K. Abbott, ed. 1898).

1790. _Kritik der Urtheilskraft_, "Kritik of Judgment" (trans. with notes J. H. Bernard, 1892).

1790. _Ueber eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine altere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll_, "On a Discovery by which all the recent Critique of Pure Reason is superseded by a more ancient" (i.e. by Leibnitz's philosophy).

1791. _Ueber die wirklichen Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibnitz und Wolff_, "On the Real Advances of Metaphysics since Leibnitz and Wolff"; and _Ueber das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee_.

1793. _Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft_, "Religion within the Bounds of Reason only" (Eng. trans. J. W. Semple, 1838).

1794. _Ueber Philosophie uberhaupt_, "On Philosophy generally," and _Das Ende aller Dinge_.

1795. _Zum ewigen Frieden_ (Eng. trans., M. Campbell Smith, 1903).

1797. _Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Rechtslehre_ (trans. W. Hastie), and _Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Tugendlehre_.

1798. _Der Streit der Facultaten_, "Contest of the Faculties."

1798. _Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht_.

_The Kantian Philosophy._[1]

Historians are accustomed to divide the general current of speculation into epochs or periods marked by the dominance of some single philosophic conception with its systematic evolution. Perhaps in no case is the character of an epoch more clearly apparent than in that of the critical philosophy. The great work of Kant absolutely closed the lines of speculation along which the philosophical literature of the 18th century had proceeded, and substituted for them a new and more comprehensive method of regarding the essential problems of thought, a method which has prescribed the course of philosophic speculation in the present age. The critical system has thus a twofold aspect. It takes up into itself what had characterized the previous efforts of modern thought, shows the imperfect nature of the fundamental notions therein employed, and offers a new solution of the problems to which these notions had been applied. It opens up a new series of questions upon which subsequent philosophic reflection has been directed, and gives to them the form, under which it is possible that they should be fruitfully regarded. A work of this kind is essentially epoch-making.

In any complete account of the Kantian system it is therefore necessary that there should be constant reference, on the one hand, to the peculiar character of the preceding 18th-century philosophy, and, on the other hand, to the problems left for renewed treatment to more modern thought. Fortunately the development of the Kantian system itself furnishes such treatment as is necessary of the former reference. For the critical philosophy was a work of slow growth. In the early writings of Kant we are able to trace with great definiteness the successive stages through which he passed from the notions of the preceding philosophy to the new and comprehensive method which gives its special character to the critical work. Scarcely any great mind, it has been said with justice, ever matured so slowly. In the early essays we find the principles of the current philosophies, those of Leibnitz and English empiricism, applied in various directions to those problems which serve as tests of their truth and completeness; we note the appearance of the difficulties or contradictions which manifest the one-sidedness or imperfection of the principle applied; and we can trace the gradual growth of the new conceptions which were destined, in the completed system, to take the place of the earlier method. To understand the Kantian work it is indispensable to trace the history of its growth in the mind of its author.

Of the two preceding stages of modern philosophy, only the second, that of Locke and Leibnitz, seems to have influenced practically the course of Kant's speculation. With the Cartesian movement as a whole he shows little acquaintance and no sympathy, and his own philosophic conception is never brought into relation with the systematic treatment of metaphysical problems characteristic of the Cartesian method. The fundamental question for philosophic reflection presented itself to him in the form which it had assumed in the hands of Locke and his successors in England, of Leibnitz and the Leibnitzian school in Germany. The transition from the Cartesian movement to this second stage of modern thought had doubtless been natural and indeed necessary. Nevertheless the full bearings of the philosophic question were somewhat obscured by the comparatively limited fashion in which it was then regarded. The tendency towards what may be technically called subjectivism, a tendency which differentiates the modern from the ancient method of speculation, is expressed in Locke and Leibnitz in a definite and peculiar fashion. However widely the two systems differ in details, they are at one in a certain fundamental conception which dominates the whole course of their philosophic construction. They are throughout individualist, i.e. they accept as given fact the existence of the concrete, thinking subject, and endeavour to show how this subject, as an individual conscious being, is related to the wider universe of which he forms part. In dealing with such a problem, there are evidently two lines along which investigation may proceed. It may be asked how the individual mind comes to know himself and the system of things with which he is connected, how the varied contents of his experience are to be accounted for, and what certainty attaches to his subjective consciousness of things. Regarded from the individualist point of view, this line of inquiry becomes purely psychological, and the answer may be presented, as it was presented by Locke, in the fashion of a natural history of the growth of conscious experience in the mind of the subject. Or, it may be further asked, how is the individual really connected with the system of things apparently disclosed to him in conscious experience? what is the precise significance of the existence which he ascribes both to himself and to the objects of experience? what is the nature of the relation between himself as one part of the system, and the system as a whole? This second inquiry is specifically metaphysical in bearing, and the kind of answer furnished to it by Leibnitz on the one hand, by Berkeley on the other, is in fact prescribed or determined beforehand by the fundamental conception of the individualist method with which both begin their investigations. So soon as we make clear to ourselves the essential nature of this method, we are able to discern the specific difficulties or perplexities arising in the attempt to carry it out systematically, and thus to note with precision the special problems presented to Kant at the outset of his philosophic reflections.

Consider, first, the application of the method on its psychological side, as it appears in Locke. Starting with the assumption of conscious experience as the content or filling-in of the individual mind, Locke proceeds to explain its genesis and nature by reference to the real universe of things and its mechanical operation upon the mind. The result of the interaction of mind, i.e. the individual mind, and the system of things, is conscious experience, consisting of ideas, which may be variously compounded, divided, compared, or dealt with by the subjective faculties or powers with which the entity, Mind, is supposed to be endowed. Matter of fact and matter of knowledge are thus at a stroke dissevered. The very notion of relation between mind and things leads at once to the counter notion of the absolute restriction of mind to its own subjective nature. That Locke was unable to reconcile these opposed notions is not surprising; that the difficulties and obscurities of the Essay arise from the impossibility of reconciling them is evident on the slightest consideration of the main positions of that work. Of these difficulties the philosophies of Berkeley and Hume are systematic treatments. In Berkeley we find the resolute determination to accept only the one notion, that of mind as restricted to its own conscious experience, and to attempt by this means to explain the nature of the external reality to which obscure reference is made. Any success in the attempt is due only to the fact that Berkeley introduces alongside of his individualist notion a totally new conception, that of mind itself as not in the same way one of the matters of conscious experience, but as capable of reflection upon the whole of experience and of reference to the supreme mind as the ground of all reality. It is only in Hume that we have definitely and completely the evolution of the individualist notion as groundwork of a theory of knowledge; and it is in his writings, therefore, that we may expect to find the fundamental difficulty of that notion clearly apparent. It is not a little remarkable that we should find in Hume, not only the sceptical dissolution of all fixity of cognition, which is the inevitable result of the individualist method, but also the clearest consciousness of the very root of the difficulty. The systematic application of the doctrine that conscious experience consists only of isolated objects of knowledge, impressions or ideas, leads Hume to distinguish between truths reached by analysis and truths which involve real connexion of the objects of knowledge. The first he is willing to accept without further inquiry, though it is an error to suppose, as Kant seems to have supposed, that he regarded mathematical propositions as coming under this head (see HUME); with respect to the second, he finds himself, and confesses that he finds himself, hopelessly at fault. No real connexions between isolated objects of experience are perceived by us. No single matter of fact necessarily implies the existence of any other. In short, if the difficulty be put in its ultimate form, no existence thought as a distinct individual can transcend itself, or imply relation to any other existence. If the parts of conscious experience are regarded as so many distinct things, there is no possibility of connecting them other than contingently, if at all. If the individual mind be really thought as individual, it is impossible to explain how it should have knowledge or consciousness at all. "In short," says Hume, "there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. _that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences_. Did our perceptions either inhere in something simple or individual, or did the mind perceive some real connexion among them, there would be no difficulty in the case" (App. to _Treatise of Human Nature_).