vi. I; similarly Celsus); and this charge was never denied; on the

contrary Origen gloried in it (_c. Celsum_, bk. 7, p. 386). At a comparatively early date, indeed, we read of various Gnostic sects calling in the fine arts to aid their worship; thus Irenaeus (_Haer._ i. 25. 6), speaking of the followers of Marcellina, says that "they possess images, some of them painted, and others formed from different kinds of material; and they maintain that a likeness of Christ was made by Pilate at that time when Jesus lived among men. They crown these images, and set them up along with the images of the philosophers of the world; that is to say, with the images of Pythagoras and Plato and Aristotle and the rest. They have also other modes of honouring these images after the same manner as the Gentiles" (cf. Aug. _De Haer._ c. 7). It is also well known that the emperor Alexander Severus found a place for several Scripture characters and even for Christ in his lararium (Lamprid. _Vit. Alex. Sev._ c. 29). But there is no evidence that such a use of images extended at that period to orthodox Christian circles. The first unmistakable indication of the public use of the painter's art for directly religious ends does not occur until A.D. 306, when the synod of Elvira, Spain, decreed (can. 36) that "pictures ought not to be in a church, lest that which is worshipped and adored be painted on walls."[1] This canon is proof that the use of sacred pictures in public worship was not at the beginning of the 4th century a thing unknown within the church in Spain; and the presumption is that in other places, about the same period, the custom was looked upon with a more tolerant eye. Indications of the existence of allied forms of sacred Christian art prior to this period are not wholly wanting. It seems possible to trace some of the older and better frescos in the catacombs to a very early age; and Bible manuscripts were often copiously illuminated and illustrated even before the middle of the 4th century. An often-quoted passage from Tertullian (_De Pudic._ c. 10, cf. c. 7) shows that in his day the communion cup was wont to bear a representation of the Good Shepherd. Clement of Alexandria (_Paedag._ iii. 11) mentions the dove, fish, ship, lyre, anchor, as suitable devices for Christian signet rings. Origen (c. _Celsum_, bk. 3) repudiates graven images as only fit for demons.

During the 4th and following centuries the tendency to enlist the fine arts in the service of the church steadily advanced; not, however, so far as appears, with the formal sanction of any regular ecclesiastical authority, and certainly not without strong protests raised by more than one powerful voice. From a passage in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa (_Orat. de Laudibus Theodori Martyris_, c. 2) it is easy to see how the stories of recent martyrs would offer themselves as tempting subjects for the painter, and at the same time be considered to have received from him their best and most permanent expression; that this feeling was widespread is shown in many places by Paulinus of Nola (_ob._ 431), from whom we gather that not only martyrdoms and Bible histories, but also symbols of the Trinity were in his day freely represented pictorially. Augustine (_De Cons. Ev._ i. 10) speaks less approvingly of those who look for Christ and his apostles "on painted walls" rather than in his written word. How far the Christian feeling of the 4th and 5th centuries was from being settled in favour of the employment of the fine arts is shown by such a case as that of Eusebius of Caesarea, who, in reply to a request of Constantia, sister of Constantine, for a picture of Christ, wrote that it was unlawful to possess images pretending to represent the Saviour either in his divine or in his human nature, and added that to avoid the reproach of idolatry he had actually taken away from a lady friend the pictures of Paul and of Christ which she had.[2] Similarly Epiphanius in a letter to John, bishop of Jerusalem, tells how in a church at Anablatha near Bethel he had found a curtain painted with the image "of Christ or of some other saint," which he had torn down and ordered to be used for the burial of a pauper. The passage, however, reveals not only what Epiphanius thought on the subject, but also that such pictures must have been becoming frequent. Nilus, the disciple and defender of Chrysostom, permitted the symbol of the cross in churches and also pictorial delineations of Old and New Testament history, but deprecated other symbols, pictures of martyrs, and most of all the representation of Christ. In the time of Gregory the Great the Western Church obtained something like an authoritative declaration on the question about images, but in a sense not quite the same as that of the synod of Elvira. Serenus of Marseilles had ordered the destruction of all sacred images within his diocese; this action called forth several letters from Pope Gregory (viii. 2. III; ix. 4. 11), in which he disapproved of that course, and, drawing the distinction which has since been authoritative for the Roman Church, pointed out that--

"It is one thing to worship a picture and another to learn from the language of a picture what that is which ought to be worshipped. What those who can read learn by means of writing, that do the uneducated learn by looking at a picture.... That, therefore, ought not to have been destroyed which had been placed in the churches, not for worship, but solely for instructing the minds of the ignorant."

With regard to the symbol of the cross, its public use dates from the time of Constantine, though, according to many Christian archaeologists it had, prior to that date, a very important place in the so-called "disciplina arcani." The introduction of the crucifix was later; originally the favourite combination was that of the figure of a lamb lying at the foot of the cross; the council of Constantinople, called "in Trullo," in 692 enjoined that this symbol should be discontinued, and that where Christ was shown in connexion with his cross he should be represented in his human nature. In the catacombs Christ is never represented hanging on the cross, and the cross itself is only portrayed in a veiled and hesitating manner. In the Egyptian churches the cross was a pagan symbol of life borrowed by the Christians and interpreted in the pagan manner. The cross of the early Christian emperors was a _labarum_ or token of victory in war, a standard for use in battle. Religious feeling in the West recoiled from the crucifix as late as the 6th century, and it was equally abhorrent to the Monophysites of the East who regarded the human nature of Christ as swallowed up in the divine. Nevertheless it seems to have originated in the East, perhaps as a protest against the extreme Monophysites, who even denied the passibility of Christ. Perhaps the Nestorians, who clung to the human aspect of Christ, introduced it about 550. From the East it soon passed to the West.

Not until the 8th century were the religious and theological questions which connect themselves with image-worship distinctly raised in the Eastern Church in their entirety. The controversy began with an address which Leo the Isaurian, in the tenth year of his reign (726), delivered in public "in favour of overthrowing the holy and venerable images," as says Theophanes (_Chronogr._, in Migne _Patr. Gr._ 108, 816). This emperor had, in the years 717 and 718, hurled back the tide of Arab conquest which threatened to engulf Byzantium, and had also shown himself an able statesman and legislator. Born at Germanicia in Syria, and, before he mounted the throne, captain-general of the Anatolian theme, he had come under the influence of the anti-idolatrous sects, such as the Jews, Montanists, Paulicians and Manicheans, which abounded in Asia Minor, but of which he was otherwise no friend. But his religious reform was unpopular, especially among the women, who killed an official who, by the emperor's command, was destroying an image of Christ in the vestibule of the imperial palace of Chalcé. This _émeute_ provoked severe reprisals, and the partisans of the images were mutilated and killed, or beaten and exiled. A rival emperor even, Agallianus, was set up, who perished in his attempt to seize Constantinople. Italy also rose in arms, and Pope Gregory II. wrote to Leo blaming his interference in religious matters, though he dissuaded the rebels in Venetia, the Exarchate and the Pentapolis from electing a new emperor and marching against Leo. In 730 Germanus the patriarch resigned rather than subscribe to a decree condemning images; later he was strangled, in exile and replaced by an iconoclast, Anastasius. Meanwhile, inside the Arab empire, John of Damascus wrote his three dogmatic discourses against the traducers of images, arguing that their use was not idolatry but only a relative worship ([Greek: proskynêsis schetkê]). The next pope, Gregory III. convoked a council of ninety-three bishops, which excommunicated the iconoclasts, and the fleet which Leo sent to retaliate on the Latin peninsula was lost in a storm in the Adriatic. The most Leo was able to do was to double the tribute of Calabria and Sicily, confiscate the pope's revenues there, and impose on the bishops of south Italy a servitude to Byzantium which lasted for centuries.

Leo III. died in June 740, and then his son Constantine V. began a persecution of the image-worshippers in real earnest. In his eagerness to restore the simplicity of the primitive church he even assailed Mariolatry, intercession of saints, relics and perhaps infant baptism, to the scandal even of the iconoclast bishops themselves. His reign began with the seizure for eighteen months of Constantinople by his brother-in-law Artavasdes, who temporarily restored the images. He was captured and beheaded with his accomplices in November 742, and in February 754 Constantine held in the palace of Hieria a council of 388 bishops, mostly of the East; the patriarchs of Rome, Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem refused to attend. In it images were condemned, but the other equally conservative leanings of the emperor found no favour. The chief upholders of images, the patriarch Germanus, George of Cyprus and John of Damascus, were anathematized, and Christians forbidden to adore or make images or even to hide them. These decrees were obstinately resisted, especially by the monks, large numbers of whom fled to Italy. In 765 the emperor demanded of his subjects all over his empire an oath on the cross that they detested images, and St Stephen the younger, the chief upholder of them, was murdered in the streets. A regular crusade now began against monks and nuns, and images and relics were destroyed on a great scale. In parts of Asia Minor (Lydia and Caria) the monks were even forced to marry the nuns. In 769 Pope Stephen III. condemned the council of Hieria, and in 775 Constantine V. died. His son Leo IV. died in 780, leaving a widow, Irene, of Athenian birth, who seized the opportunity presented by the minority of her ten-year-old son Constantine VI. to restore the images and dispersed relics. In 784 she invited Pope Adrian I. to come and preside over a fresh council, which was to reverse that of 754 and heal the schism with Rome. In August 786 the council met, but was broken up by the imperial guards, who were Easterns and sturdy iconoclasts. Irene replaced them by a more trustworthy force, and convoked a fresh council of three hundred bishops and monks innumerable in September 787, at Nicaea in the church of St Sophia. The cult of images was now solemnly restored, iconoclast bishops deposed or reconciled, the dogmatic theory of images defined, and church discipline re-established. The order thus imposed lasted twenty-four years, until a military revolution placed a soldier of fortune, half Armenian, half Persian, named Leo, on the throne; he, like his soldiers, was persuaded that the ill-success of the Roman arms against Bulgarians and other invaders was due to the idolatry rampant at court and elsewhere. The soldiers stoned the image of Christ which Irene had set up afresh in the palace of Chalcé, and this provoked a counter-demonstration of the clergy. Leo feigned for a while to be on their side, but on the 2nd of February 815, in the sanctuary of St Sophia, publicly refused to prostrate himself before the images, with the approbation of the army and of many bishops who were iconoclasts at heart. Irene's patriarch Nicephorus was now deposed and one Theodotus, a kinsman of Constantine Copronymus, consecrated in his place on the 1st of April 815. A fresh council was soon convoked, which cursed Irene and re-enacted the decrees of 754. This reaction lasted only for a generation under Leo the Armenian, who died 820, Michael II. 820-829, and Theophilus 829-842; and was frustrated mainly by the exertions of Theodore of Studion and his monks, called the Studitae. Theodore refused to attend or recognize the new council, and was banished first to Bithynia and thence to Smyrna, whence he continued to address his appeals to the pope, to the eastern patriarchs and to his dispersed monks. He died in 826. Theophilus, the last of the iconoclast emperors, was a devoted Mariolater and controversialist who invited the monks to discuss the question of images with him, and whipped or branded them when he was out-argued; he at length banished them from the cities, and branded on the hands a painter of holy pictures, Lazarus by name, who declined to secularize his art; he also raised to the patriarchal throne John Hylilas, chief instigator of the reaction of 815. In 842 Theophilus died, leaving his wife Theodora regent; she was, like Irene, addicted to images, and chose as patriarch a monk, Methodius, whom the emperor Michael had imprisoned for laying before him Pope Paschal I.'s letter of protest. John Hylilas was deposed and flogged in turn. A fresh council was now held which re-enacted the decrees of 787, and on the 20th of February 842 the new patriarch, the empress, clergy and court dignitaries assisted in the church of St Sophia at a solemn restoration of images which lasted until the advent of the Turks. The struggle had gone on for 116 years.

The iconoclastic movement is perhaps the most dramatic episode in Byzantine history, and the above outline of its external events must be completed by an appreciation of its deeper historical and religious significance and results. We can distinguish three parties among the combatants:--

1. The partisans of image worship. These were chiefly found in the Hellenic portions of the empire, where Greek art had once held sway. The monks were the chief champions of images, because they were illuminators and artists. Their doctors taught that the same grace of the Holy Spirit which imbued the living saint attaches after death to his relics, name, image and picture. The latter are thus no mere representations, but as it were emanations from the archetype, vehicles of the supernatural personality represented, and possessed of an inherent sacramental value and power, such as the name of Jesus had for the earliest believers. Here Christian image-worship borders on the beliefs which underlie sympathetic magic (see IMAGE WORSHIP).

2. The iconoclasts proper, who not only condemned image worship in the sense just explained but rejected all religious art whatever. Fleeting matter to their mind was not worthy to embody or reflect heavenly supersensuous energies denoted by the names of Christ and the saints. For the same reason they rejected relics and, as a rule, the worship of the cross. Statues of Christ, especially of him hanging on the cross, inspired the greatest horror and indignation; and this is why none of the graven images of Christ, common before the outbreak of the movement, survive. More than this--although the synod of 692 specially allowed the crucifix, yet Greek churches have discarded it ever since the 8th century.

This idea that material representation involves a profanation of divine personages, while disallowing all religious art which goes beyond scroll-work, spirals, flourishes and geometrical designs, yet admits to the full of secular art; and accordingly the iconoclastic emperors replaced the holy pictures in churches with frescoes of hunting scenes, and covered their palaces with garden scenes where men were plucking fruit and birds singing amid the foliage. Contemporary Mahommedans did the same, for it is an error to suppose that this religion was from the first hostile to profane art. At one time the mosques were covered with mosaics, analogous to those of Ravenna, depicting scenes from the life of Mahomet and the prophets. The Arabs only forbade plastic art in the 9th century, nor were their essentially Semitic scruples ever shared by the Persians.

The prejudice we are considering is closely connected with the Manichaean view of matter, which in strict consistency rejected the belief that God was really made flesh, or really died on the cross. The Manichaeans were therefore, by reason of their dualism, arch-enemies no less of Christian art than of relics and cross-worship; the Monophysites were equally so by reason of their belief that the divine nature in Christ entirely absorbed and sublated the human; they shaded off into the party of the _aphthartodoketes_, who held that his human body was incorruptible and made of ethereal fire, and that his divine nature was impassible. Their belief made them, like the Manichaeans, hostile to material portraiture of Christ, especially of his sufferings on the cross. All these nearly allied schools of Christian thought could, moreover, address, as against the image-worshippers, a very effective appeal to the Bible and to Christian antiquity. Now Egypt, Asia Minor, Armenia, western Syria and the Hauran were almost wholly given up to these forms of opinion. Accordingly in all the remains of the Christian art of the Hauran one seeks in vain for any delineation of human face or figure. The art of these countries is mainly geometrical, and allows only of monograms crowned with laurels, of peacocks, of animals gambolling amid foliage, of fruit and flowers, of crosses which are either _svastikas_ of Hindu and Mycenaean type, or so lost in enveloping arabesques as to be merely decorative. Such was the only religious art permitted by the Christian sentiment of these countries, and also of the large _enclaves_ of semi-Manichaean belief formed in the Balkans by the transportation thither of Armenians and Paulicians. And it is important to remark that the protagonists of iconoclasm in Byzantium came from these lands where image cult offended the deepest religious instincts of the masses. Leo the Isaurian had all the scruples of a Paulician, even to the rejection of the cult of Virgin and saints; Constantine V. was openly such. Michael Balbus was reared in Phrygia among Montanists. The soldiers and captains of the Byzantine garrisons were equally Armenians and Syrians, in whom the sight of a crucifix or image set up for worship inspired nothing but horror.

The issue of the struggle was not a complete victory even in Byzantium for the partisans of image-worship. The Iconoclasts left an indelible impress on the Christian art of the Greek Church, in so far as they put an end to the use of graven images; for the Eastern icon is a flat picture, less easily regarded than would be a statue as a nidus within which a spirit can lurk. Half the realm of creative art, that of statuary, was thus suppressed at a blow; and the other half, painting, forfeited all the grace and freedom, all the capacity of new themes, forms and colours, all the development which we see in the Latin Church. The Greeks have produced no Giotto, no Fra Angelico, no Raphael. Their artists have no choice of subjects and no initiative. Colour, dress, attitude, grouping of figures are all dictated by traditional rules, set out in regular manuals. God the Father may not be depicted at all--a restriction intelligible when we remember that the image in theory is fraught with the virtue of the archetype; but everywhere the utmost timidity is shown. What else could an artist do but make a slavish and exact copy of old pictures which worked miracles and perhaps had the reputation as well of having fallen from heaven?

3. Between these extreme parties the Roman Church took the middle way of common sense. The hair-splitting distinction of the Byzantine doctors between veneration due to images ([Greek: proskynêsis timêtikê]), and the adoration ([Greek: proskynêsis latreutikê]) due to God alone, was dropped, and the utility of pictures for the illiterate emphasized. Their use was declared to be this, that they taught the ignorant through the eye what they should adore with the mind; they are not themselves to be adored. Such was Gregory the Great's teaching, and such also is the purport of the Caroline books, which embody the conclusions arrived at by the bishops of Germany, Gaul and Aquitaine, presided over by papal legates at the council of Frankfort in 794, and incidentally also reveal the hatred and contempt of Charlemagne for the Byzantine empire as an institution, and for Irene, its ruler, as a person. The theologians whom Louis the Pious convened at Paris in 825, to answer the letter received from the iconoclast emperor Michael Balbus, were as hostile to the orthodox Greeks as to the image-worshippers, and did not scruple to censure Pope Adrian for having approved of the empress Irene's attitude. The council of Trent decided afresh in the same sense.

Two incidental results of the iconoclastic movement must be noticed, the one of less, the other of more importance. The lesser one was the flight of Greek iconolatrous monks from Asia Minor and the Levant to Sicily and Calabria, where they established convents which for centuries were the western homes of Greek learning, and in which were written not a few of the oldest Greek MSS. found in our libraries. The greater event was the scission between East and West. The fury of the West against the iconoclastic emperors was such that the whole of Italy clamoured for war. It is true that Pope Stephen II. applied in 753 to Constantine V., one of the worst destroyers of images, for aid against the Lombards, for the emperor of Byzantium was still regarded as the natural champion of the church. But Constantine refused aid, and the pope turned to the Frankish King Pippin. The die was cast. Henceforth Rome was linked with the Carolingian house in an alliance which culminated in the coronation of Charlemagne by the pope on the 25th of December 800.

In the crusading epoch the Cathars and Paulicians carried all over Europe the old iconoclastic spirit, and perhaps helped to transmit it to Wycliffe and Hus. Not the least racy clause in the document compiled about 1389 by the Wycliffites in defence of their defunct teacher is the following: "Hit semes that this offrynge ymages is a sotile cast of Antichriste and his clerkis for to drawe almes fro pore men ... certis, these ymages of hemselfe may do nouther gode nor yvel to mennis soules, but thai myghtten warme a man's body in colde, if thai were sette upon a fire."

At the period of the Reformation it was unanimously felt by the reforming party that, with the invocation of saints and the practice of reverencing their relics, the adoration of images ought also to cease. The leaders of the movement were not, however, perfectly agreed on the question as to whether these might not in some circumstances be retained in churches. Luther had no sympathy with the iconoclastic outbreaks which then occurred; he classed images in themselves as among the "adiaphora," and condemned only their cultus; so also the "Confessio Tetrapolitana" leaves Christians free to have them or not, if only due regard be had to what is expedient and edifying. The "Heidelberg Catechism," however, emphatically declares that images are not to be tolerated at all in churches.

SOURCES.--"Acts of the Seventh Ecumenical Council held in Nicaea, 787," in Mansi's _Concilia_, vols. xii. and xiii.; "Acts of the Iconoclast Council of 815," in a treatise of Nicephorus discovered by M. Serruys and printed in the _Séances Acad. des Inscript._ (May 1903); Theophanes, _Chronographia_, edit. de Boor (Leipzig, 1883-1885); and _Patr. Gr._ vol. 108. Also his "Continuators" in _Patr. Gr._ vol. 109; Nicephorus, _Chronicon_, edit. de Boor (Leipzig, 1880), and _Patr. Gr._ vol. 100; Georgius Monachus, _Chronicon_, edit. Muralt (Petersburg, 1859), and _Patr. Gr._ 110; anonymous "Life of Leo the Armenian" in _Patr. Gr._ 108; _The Book of the Kings_, by Joseph Genesios, _Patr. Gr._ 109; "Life of S. Stephanus, Junior," _Patr. Gr._ 100; "St John of Damascus," three "Sermones" against the iconoclasts, _Patr. Gr._ 95; Nicephorus Patriarch, "Antirrhetici," _Patr. Gr._ 100; Theodore Studita, "Antirrhetici," _Patr. Gr. 99_. For bibliography of contemporary hymns, letters, &c., bearing on the controversy see K. Krumbacher's _History of Byzantine Literature_, 2nd ed. p. 674. Literature: Louis Brehier, _La Querelle des images_, and _Les Origines du crucifix_ (Paris, 1904); Librairie Blond, in French, each volume 60 centimes (brief but admirable); Karl Schwartzlose, _Der Bilderstreit_ (Gotha, 1890); Karl Schenk, "The Emperor Leo III.," in _Byzant. Zeitschrift_ (1896, German); Tel. Uspenskij, _Skizzen zur Geschichte der byzantinischen Kultur_ (St Petersburg, 1892, Russian); Lombard, _Études d'histoire byzantine_; Constantine V.( Paris, 1902, _Biblioth. de l'université de Paris_, xvi.); A. Tougard, _La Persécution iconoclaste_ (Paris, 1897); and _Rev. des questions historiques_ (1891); Marin, _Les Moines de Constantinople_ (Paris, 1897, bk. iv. _Les Moines et les empereurs iconoclastes_); Alice Gardner, Theodore of Studium (London, 1905); Louis Maimbourg, _Histoire de l'hérésie des iconoclastes_ (Paris, 1679-1683); J. Daillé (Dallaeus), _De imaginibus_ (Leiden, 1642, and in French, Geneva, 1641); Spanheim, _Historia imaginum_ (Leiden, 1686). See also the account of this epoch in the _Histories_ of Neander, Gibbon and Milman; Aug. Fr. Gfrörer, "Der Bildersturm" in _Byzantinische Geschichte 2_ (1873); C. J. von Hefele, _Conciliengeschichte_ 3 (1877), 366 ff. (also in English translation; Karl Krumbacher. _Byzant. Literaturgeschichte_ (2nd ed. p. 1090). (F. C. C.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] "Placuit picturas in ecclesia esse non debere, ne quod colitur et adoratur in parietibus depingatur." See Hefele, _Conciliengesch_. i. 170.

[2] The letter, which is most probably, though not certainly, genuine, appears in the _Acta_ of the second council of Nice.

ICONOSTASIS, the screen in a Greek church which divides the altar and sanctuary from the rest of the church. It is generally attached to the first eastern pier or column and rises to the level of the springing of the vault. The iconostasis or image-bearer has generally three doors, one on each side of the central door, beyond which is the principal altar. The screen is subdivided into four or five tiers, each tier decorated with a series of panels containing representations of the saints: of these only the heads, hands and feet are painted, the bodies being covered with embossed metal work, richly gilded. There is a fine example in the Russo-Greek chapel, Welbeck Street, London, which was rebuilt in 1864-1865.

ICOSAHEDRON (Gr. [Greek: eikosi], twenty, and [Greek: hedra], a face or base), in geometry, a solid enclosed by twenty faces. The "regular icosahedron" is one of the Platonic solids; the "great icosahedron" is a Kepler-Poinsot solid; and the "truncated icosahedron" is an Archimedean solid (see POLYHEDRON). In crystallography the icosahedron is a possible form, but it has not been observed; it is closely simulated by a combination of the octahedron and pentagonal dodecahedron, which has twenty triangular faces, but only eight are equilateral, the remaining twelve being isosceles (see CRYSTALLOGRAPHY).

ICTERUS, a bird so called by classical authors, and supposed by Pliny to be the same as the _Galgulus_, which is generally identified with the golden oriole (_Oriolus galbula_).[1] It signified a bird in the plumage of which yellow or green predominated, and hence Brisson did not take an unhappy liberty when he applied it in a scientific sense to some birds of the New World of which the same could be said. These are now held to constitute a distinct family, _Icteridae_, intermediate it would seem between the BUNTINGS (q.v.) and STARLINGS (q.v.); and, while many of them are called troopials (the English equivalent of the French _Troupiales_, first used by Brisson), others are known as the American GRACKLES (q.v.). The typical species of _Icterus_ is the _Oriolus icterus_ of Linnaeus, the _Icterus vulgaris_ of Daudin and modern ornithologists, an inhabitant of northern Brazil, Guiana, Venezuela, occasionally visiting some of the Antilles and of the United States. Thirty-three species of the genus _Icterus_ alone, and more than seventy others belonging to upwards of a score of genera, are recognized by Sclater and Salvin (_Nomenclator_, pp. 35-39) as belonging to the Neotropical Region, though a few of them emigrate to the northward in summer. _Cassicus_ and _Ostinops_ may perhaps be named as the most remarkable. They are nearly all gregarious birds, many of them with loud and in most cases, where they have been observed, with melodious notes, rendering them favourites in captivity, for they readily learn to whistle simple tunes. Some have a plumage wholly black, others are richly clad, as is the well-known Baltimore oriole, golden robin or hangnest of the United States, _Icterus baltimore_, whose brightly contrasted black and orange have conferred upon it the name it most commonly bears in North America, those colours being, says Catesby (_Birds of Carolina_, i. 48), the tinctures of the armorial bearings of the Calverts, Lords Baltimore, the original grantees of Maryland, but probably more correctly those of their liveries. The most divergent form of _Icteridae_ seems to be that known in the United States as the meadow-lark, _Sturnella magna_ or _S. ludoviciana_, a bird which in aspect and habits has considerable resemblance to the larks of the Old World, _Alaudidae_, to which, however, it has no near affinity, while _Dolichonyx oryzivorus_, the bobolink or rice-bird, with its very bunting-like bill, is not much less aberrant. (A. N.)

FOOTNOTE:

[1] The number of names by which this species was known in ancient times--_Chloris_ or _Chlorion_, _Galbula_ (akin to _Galgulus_), _Parra_ and _Vireo_--may be explained by its being a common and conspicuous bird, as well as one which varied in plumage according to age and sex (see ORIOLE). Owing to its general colour, _Chloris_ was in time transferred to the Greenfinch (q.v.), while the names _Galbula_, _Parra_ and _Vireo_ have since been utilized by ornithologists (see JACAMAR and JACANA).

ICTINUS, the architect of the Parthenon at Athens, of the Hall of the Mysteries at Eleusis, and of the temple of Apollo at Bassae, near Phigalia. He was thus active about 450-430 B.C. We know little else about him; but the remains of his two great temples testify to his wonderful mastery of the principles of Greek architecture.

IDA (d. 559), king of Bernicia, became king in 547, soon after the foundation of the kingdom of Bernicia by the Angles. He built the fortress of Bebbanburh, the modern Bamborough, and after his death his kingdom, which did not extend south of the Tees, passed in turn to six of his sons. The surname of "Flame-Bearer," sometimes applied to him, refers, however, not to Ida, but to his son Theodric (d. 587).

See J. R. Green, _Making of England_, vol. i. (London, 1897).

IDAHO, a western state of the United States of America, situated between 42° and 49° N. lat. and 111° and 117° W. long. It is bounded N. by British Columbia and Montana, E. by Montana and Wyoming, S. by Utah and Nevada, and W. by Oregon and Washington. Its total area is 83,888 sq. m., of which 83,354 sq. m. are land surface, and of this 41,851.55 sq. m. were in July 1908 unappropriated and unreserved public lands of the United States, and 31,775.7 sq. m. were forest reserves, of which 15,153.5 sq. m. were reserved between the 1st of July 1906 and the 1st of July 1907.

_Physical Features._--Idaho's elevation above sea-level varies from 738 ft. (at Lewiston, Nez Perce county) to 12,078 ft. (Hyndman Peak, on the boundary between Custer and Blaine counties), and its mean elevation is about 4500 ft. The S.E. corner of the wedge-shaped surface of the state is a part of the Great Basin region of the United States. The remainder of the state is divided by a line running S.E. and N.W., the smaller section, to the N. and E., belonging to the Rocky Mountain region, and the larger, S. and W. of this imaginary line, being a part of the Columbia Plateau region. The topography of the Great Basin region in Idaho is similar to that of the same region in other states (see NEVADA); in Idaho it forms a very small part of the state; its mountains are practically a part of the Wasatch Range of Utah; and the southward drainage of the region (into Great Salt Lake, by Bear river) also separates it from the other parts of the state. The Rocky Mountain region of Idaho is bounded by most of the state's irregular E. boundary--the Bitter Root, the Coeur d'Alene and the Cabinet ranges being parts of the Rocky Mountain System. The Rocky Mountain region reaches across the N. part of the state (the Panhandle), and well into the middle of the state farther S., where the region is widest and where the Salmon River range is the principal one. The region is made up in general of high ranges deeply glaciated, preserving some remnants of ancient glaciers, and having fine "Alpine" scenery, with many sharp peaks and ridges, U-shaped valleys, cirques, lakes and waterfalls. In the third physiographic region, the Columbia plateau, are the Saw Tooth, Boisé, Owyhee and other rugged ranges, especially on the S. and W. borders of the region. The most prominent features of this part of the state are the arid Snake river plains and three mountain-like elevations--Big, Middle and East Buttes--that rise from their midst. The plains extend from near the S.E. corner of the state in a curved course to the W. and N.W. for about 350 m. over a belt 50 to 75 m. wide, and cover about 30,000 sq. m. Where they cross the W. border at Lewiston is the lowest elevation in the state, 738 ft. above the sea. Instead of being one plain formed by erosion, this region is rather a series of plains built up with sheets of lava, several thousand feet deep, varying considerably in elevation and in smoothness of surface according to the nature of the lava, and being greater in area than any other lava beds in North America except those of the Columbia river, which are of similar formation and, with the Snake river plains, form the Columbia plateau. Many volcanic cones mark the surface, but by far the most prominent among them are Big Butte, which rises precipitously 2350 ft. above the plain (7659 ft. above the sea) in the E. part of Blaine county, and East Butte, 700 ft. above the plain, in the N.W. part of Bingham county. Middle Butte (400 ft. above the plain, also in Bingham county) is an upraised block of stratified basalt. The Snake river (which receives all the drainage of Idaho except small amounts taken by the Spokane, the Pend Oreille and the Kootenai in the N., all emptying directly into the Columbia, and by some minor streams of the S.E. that empty into Great Salt Lake, Utah) rises in Yellowstone National Park a few miles from the heads of the Madison fork of the Missouri, which flows to the Gulf of Mexico, and the Green fork of the Colorado, which flows to the Gulf of California. It flows S.W. and then W. for about 800 m. in a tremendous cañon across southern Idaho; turns N. and runs for 200 m. as the boundary between Idaho and Oregon (and for a short distance between Idaho and Washington); turns again at Lewiston (where it ceases to be the boundary, and where the Clearwater empties into it) to the W. into a deep narrow valley, and joins the Columbia in S.E. Washington. Practically all the valley of the Snake from Idaho Falls in S.E. Idaho (Bingham county) to the mouth is of cañon character, with walls from a few hundred to 6000 ft. in height (about 650 m. in Idaho). The finest parts are among the most magnificent in the west; among its falls are the American (Oneida and Blaine counties), and the Shoshone and the Salmon (Lincoln county). At the Shoshone Falls the river makes a sudden plunge of nearly 200 ft., and the Falls have been compared with the Niagara and Zambezi; a short distance back of the main fall is a cataract of 125 ft., the Bridal Veil. Between Henry's Fork and Malade (or Big Wood) river, a distance of 200 m., the river apparently has no northern tributaries; but several streams, as the Camas, Medicine Lodge and Birch creeks, and Big and Little Lost rivers, which fail to penetrate the plain of the Snake after reaching its border, are believed to join it through subterranean channels. The more important affluents are the North Fork in the E., the Raft, Salmon Falls and the Bruneau in the S., the Owyhee and the Payette in the S.W., and the Salmon and Clearwater in the W. The scenery on some of these tributaries is almost as beautiful as that of the Snake, though lacking the grandeur of its greater scale. In 1904 electricity, generated by water-power from the rivers, notably the Snake, began to be utilized in mining operations. Scattered among the mountains are numerous (glacial) lakes. In the N. are: Coeur d'Alene Lake, in Kootenai county, about 30 m. long and from 2 to 4 m. wide, drained by the Spokane river; Priest Lake, in Bonner county, 20 m. long and about 10 m. wide; and mostly in Bonner, but partly in Kootenai county, a widening of Clark Fork, Lake Pend Oreille, 60 m. long and from 3 to 15 m. wide, which is spanned by a trestle of the Northern Pacific 8400 ft. long. Bear Lake, in the extreme S.E., lies partly in Utah. Mineral springs and hot springs are also a notable feature of Idaho's physiography, being found in Washington, Ada, Blaine, Bannock, Cassia, Owyhee, Oneida, Nez Perce, Kootenai, Shoshone and Fremont counties. At Soda Springs in Bannock county are scores of springs whose waters, some ice cold and some warm, contain magnesia, soda, iron, sulphur, &c.; near Hailey, Blaine county, water with a temperature of 144° F. is discharged from numerous springs; and at Boisé, water with a temperature of 165° is obtained from wells.

The fauna and flora of Idaho are similar in general to those of the other states in the north-western part of the United States.

_Climate._--The mean annual temperature of Idaho from 1898 to 1903 was 45.5° F. There are several distinct climate zones within the state. North of Clearwater river the climate is comparatively mild, the maximum in 1902 (96° F.) being lower than the highest temperature in the state and the minimum (-16°) higher than the lowest temperature registered. The mildest region of the state is the Snake river basin between Twin Falls and Lewiston, and the valley of the Boisé, Payette and Weiser rivers; here the mean annual temperature in 1902 was 52° F., the maximum was 106° F., and the minimum was -13° F. In the Upper Snake basin, in the Camas prairie and Lost river regions, the climate is much colder, the highest temperature in 1902 being 101° and the lowest -35° F. The mean annual rainfall for the entire state in 1903 was 16.60 in.; the highest amount recorded was at Murray, Shoshone county (37.70 in.) and the lowest was at Garnet, Elmore county (5.69 in.).

_Agriculture._--The principal source of wealth in Idaho was in 1900 agriculture, but it had long been secondary to mining, and its development had been impeded by certain natural disadvantages. Except for the broad valleys of the Panhandle, where the soils are black in colour and rich in vegetable mould, the surface of the state is arid; the Snake river valley is a vast lava bed, covered with deposits of salt and sand, or soils of volcanic origin. And, apart from this, the farming country was long without transport facilities. The fertile northern plateaus, the Camas and Nez Perce prairies and the Palouse country--a wonderful region for growing the _durum_ or macaroni wheat--until 1898 had no market nearer than Lewiston, 50-70 m. away; and even in 1898, when the railway was built, large parts of the region were not tapped by it, and were as much as 30 m. from any shipping point, for the road had followed the Clearwater. In the arid southern region, also, there was no railway until 1885, when the Oregon Short Line was begun. Like limitations in N. and S. had like effects: for years the country was devoted to live-stock, which could be driven to a distant market. Timothy was grown in the northern, and alfalfa in the southern region as a forage crop. Even at this earliest period, irrigation, simple and individual, had begun in the southern section, the head waters of the few streams in this district being soon surrounded by farms. Co-operation and colonization followed, and more ditching was done, co-operative irrigation canals were constructed with some elaborate and large dams and head gates. The Carey Act (1894) and the Federal Reclamation Act (1902) introduced the most important period of irrigation. Under the Carey Act the Twin Falls project, deriving water from the Snake river near Twin Falls, and irrigating more than 200,000 acres, was completed in 1903-1905. The great projects undertaken with Federal aid were: the Minidoka, in Lincoln and Cassia counties, of which survey began in March 1903 and construction in December 1904, and which was completed in 1907, commanding an irrigable area of 130,000-150,000 acres,[1] and has a diversion dam (rock-fill type) 600 ft. long, and 130 m. of canals and 100 m. of laterals; the larger Payette-Boisé project in Ada, Canyon and Owyhee counties (372,000 acres irrigable; 300,000 now desert; 60% privately owned), whose principal features are the Payette dam (rock-fill), 100 ft. high and 400 ft. long, and the Boisé dam (masonry), 33 ft. high and 400 ft. long, 200 m. of canals, 100 m. of laterals, a tunnel 1100 ft. long and 12,500 h.p. transmitted 29 m., 3000 h.p. being necessary to pump to a height of 50-90 ft. water for the irrigation of 15,000 acres; and the Dubois project, the largest in the state, on which survey and reconnaissance work were done in 1903-1904, which requires storage sites on the North Fork of the Snake and on nearly all the important branches of the North Fork, and whose field is 200,000--250,000 acres, almost entirely Federal property, in the W. end of Fremont county between Mud Lake and the lower end of Big Lost river. A further step in irrigation is the utilization of underground waters: in the Big Camas Prairie region, Blaine county, water 10 ft. below the surface is tapped and pumped by electricity generated from the only surface water of the region, Camas Creek. In 1899 the value of the crops and other agricultural products of the irrigated region amounted to more than seven-tenths of the total for the state. In 1907, according to the _Report_ of the state commissioner of immigration, 1,559,915 irrigated acres were under cultivation, and 3,266,386 acres were "covered" by canals 3789 m. long and costing $11,257,023.

Up to 1900 the most prosperous period (absolutely) in the agricultural development of the state was the last decade of the 19th century; the relative increase, however, was greater between 1880 and 1890. The number of farms increased from 1885 in 1880 to 6603 in 1890 and to 17,471 in 1900; the farm acreage from 327,798 in 1880 to 1,302,256 in 1890 and to 3,204,903 acres in 1900; the irrigated area (exclusive of farms on Indian reservations) from 217,005 acres in 1889 to 602,568 acres in 1899; the value of products increased from $1,515,314 in 1879 to $3,848,930 in 1889, and to $18,051,625 in 1899; the value of farm land with improvements (including buildings) from $2,832,890 in 1880 to $17,431,580 in 1890 and $42,318,183 in 1900; the value of implements and machinery from $363,930 in 1880 to $1,172,460 in 1890 and to $3,295,045 in 1900; and that of live-stock from $4,023,800 in 1880 to $7,253,490 in 1890 and to $21,657,974 in 1900. In 1900 the average size of farms was 183.4 acres. Cultivation by owners is the prevailing form of tenure, 91.3% of the farms being so operated in 1900 (2.3% by cash tenants and 6.4% by share tenants). As illustrative of agricultural conditions the contrast of the products of farms operated by Indians, Chinese and whites is of considerable interest, the value of products (not fed to live-stock) per acre of the 563 Indian farms being in 1899 $1.40, that of the 16,876 white farms $4.67, and that of the 23 Chinese farms intensively cultivated and devoted to market vegetables $69.83.

The income from agriculture in 1899 was almost equally divided between crops ($8,951,440) and animal products ($8,784,364)--in that year forest products were valued at $315,821. Of the crops, hay and forage were the most valuable ($4,238,993), yielding 47.4% of the total value of crops, an increase of more than 200% over that of 1889, and in 1907, according to the _Year-book_ of the Department of Agriculture, the crop was valued at $8,585,000. Wheat, which in 1899 ranked second ($2,131,953), showed an increase of more than 400% in the decade, and the farm value of the crop of 1907, according to the _Year-book_ of the United States Department of Agriculture, was $5,788,000; the value of the barley crop in 1899 ($312,730) also increased more than 400% over that of 1889, and in 1907 the farm value of the product, according to the same authority, was $1,265,000; the value of the oat crop in 1899 ($702,955) showed an increase of more than 300% in the decade, and the value of the product in 1907, according to the United States Department of Agriculture, was $2,397,000.

More than one-half of the cereal crop in 1905 was produced in the prairie and plateau region of Nez Perce and Latah counties. The production of orchard fruits (apples, cherries, peaches, pears, plums and prunes) increased greatly from 1889 to 1899; the six counties of Ada, Canyon (probably the leading fruit county of the state), Latah (famous for apples), Washington, Owyhee and Nez Perce had in 1900 89% of the plum and prune trees, 85% of all pear trees, 78% of all cherry trees, and 74% of all apple trees in the state, and in 1906 it was estimated by the State Commissioner of Immigration that there were nearly 48,000 acres of land devoted to orchard fruits in Idaho. Viticulture is of importance, particularly in the Lewiston valley. In 1906, 234,000 tons of sugar beets were raised, and fields in the Boisé valley raised 30 tons per acre.

Of the animal products in 1899, the most valuable was live-stock sold during the year ($3,909,454); the stock-raising industry was carried on most extensively in the S.E. part of the state. Wool ranked second in value ($2,210,790), and according to the estimate of the National Association of Wool Manufactures for 1907, Idaho ranked fourth among the wool-producing states in number of sheep (2,500,000), third in wool, washed and unwashed (17,250,000 lb.), and fourth in scoured wool (5,692,500 lb.). In January 1908, according to the _Year-book_ of the Department of Agriculture, the number and farm values of live-stock were: milch cows, 69,000, valued at $2,208,000, and other neat cattle, 344,000, valued at $5,848,000; horses, 150,000, $11,250,000; sheep, 3,575,000, $12,691,000; and swine, 130,000, $910,000. According to state reports for 1906, most of the neat cattle were then on ranges in Lemhi, Idaho, Washington, Cassia and Owyhee counties; Nez Perce, Canyon, Fremont, Idaho, and Washington counties had the largest number of horses; Owyhee, Blaine and Canyon counties had the largest numbers of sheep, and Idaho and Nez Perce counties were the principal swine-raising regions. The pasture lands of the state have been greatly decreased by the increase of forest reserves, especially by the large reservations made in 1906-1907.

_Mining._--The mineral resource of Idaho are second only to the agricultural; indeed it was primarily the discovery of the immense value of the deposits of gold and silver about 1860 that led to the settlement of Idaho Territory. In Idaho, as elsewhere, the first form of mining was a very lucrative working of placer deposits; this gave way to vein mining and a greatly reduced production of gold and silver after 1878, on account of the exhaustion of the placers. Then came an adjustment to new conditions and a gradual increase of the product. The total mineral product in 1906, according to the State Mine Inspector, was valued at $24,138,317. The total gold production of Idaho from 1860 to 1906 has been estimated at $250,000,000, of which a large part was produced in the Idaho Basin, the region lying between the N. fork of the Boisé and the S. fork of the Payette rivers. In 1901-1902 rich gold deposits were discovered in the Thunder Mountain district in Idaho county. The counties with the largest production of gold in 1907 (state report) were Owyhee ($362,742), Boisé ($282,444), Custer ($210,900) and Idaho; the total for the state was $1,075,618 in 1905; in 1906 it was $1,149,100; and in 1907, according to state reports, $1,373,031. The total of the state for silver in 1905 was $5,242,172; in 1906 it was $6,042,606; in 1907, according to state reports, it was $5,546,554. The richest deposits of silver are those of Wood river and of the Coeur d'Alene district in Shoshone county (opened up in 1886); the county's product in 1906 was valued at $5,322,706, an increase of $917,743 over the preceding year; in 1907 it was $4,780,093, according to state reports. The production of the next richest county, Owyhee, in 1907, was less than one tenth that of Shoshone county, which yields, besides, about one half of the lead mined in the United States, its product of lead being valued at $9,851,076 in 1904, at $14,365,265 in 1906, and at $12,232,233 (state report) in 1907. Idaho was the first of the states in its output of lead from 1896, when it first passed Colorado in rank, to 1906, excepting the year 1899, when Colorado again was first; the value of the lead mined in 1906 was $14,535,823, and of that mined in 1907 (state report), $12,470,375. High grade copper ores have been produced in the Seven Devils and Washington districts of Washington county; there are deposits, little developed up to 1906, in Lemhi county (which was almost inaccessible by railway) and in Bannock county; the copper mined in 1905 was valued at $1,134,846, and in 1907, according to state reports, at $2,241,177, of which about two-thirds was the output of the Coeur d'Alene district in Shoshone county. Zinc occurs in the Coeur d'Alene district, at Hailey, Blaine county and elsewhere; according to the state reports, the state's output in 1906 was valued at $91,426 and in 1907 at $534,087. Other minerals of economic value are sandstone, quarried at Boisé, Ada county, at Preston, Oneida county, and at Goshen, Prospect and Idaho Falls, Bingham county, valued at $22,265 in 1905, and at $11,969 in 1906; limestone, valued at $14,105 in 1905 and at $12,600 in 1906, used entirely for the local manufacture of lime, part of which was used in the manufacture of sugar; and coal, in the Horseshoe Bend and Jerusalem districts in Boisé county, in Lemhi county near Salmon City, and in E. Bingham and Fremont counties, with an output in 1906 of 5365 tons, valued at $18,538 as compared with 20 and 10 tons respectively in 1899 and 1900. Minerals developed slightly, or not at all, are granite, valued at $1500 in 1905; surface salt, in the arid and semi-arid regions; nickel and cobalt, in Lemhi county; tungsten, near Murray, Shoshone county; monazite and zircon, in certain sands; and some pumice.

_Manufactures._--The manufactures of Idaho in 1900 were relatively unimportant, the value of all products of establishments under the "factory system" being $3,001,442; in 1905 the value of such manufactured products had increased 192.2%, to $8,768,743. The manufacturing establishments were limited to the supply of local demands. The principal industries were devoted to lumber and timber products, valued at $908,670 in 1900, and in 1905 at $2,834,506, 211.9% more. In 1906 the Weyerhauser Syndicate built at Potlatch, a town built by the syndicate in Latah county, a lumber mill, supposed to be the largest in the United States, with a daily capacity of 750,000 ft. In Bonner county there are great mills at Sand Point and at Bonner's Ferry. In these and the other 93 saw-mills in the state in 1905 steam generated by the waste wood was the common power. The raw material for these products was secured from the 35,000 sq. m. of timber land in the state (6164 sq. m. having been reserved up to 1905, and 31,775.7 sq. m. up to April 1907 by the United States government); four-fifths of the cut in 1900 was yellow pine. Flour and grist mill products ranked second among the manufactures, being valued at $1,584,473 in 1905, an increase of nearly 116% over the product in 1900; and steam-car construction and repairs ranked third, with a value of $913,670 in 1905 and $523,631 in 1900. In 1903-1904 the cultivation of sugar beets and the manufacture of beet sugar were undertaken, and manufacturing establishments for that purpose were installed at Idaho Falls and Blackfoot (Bingham county), at Sugar, or Sugar City (Fremont county), a place built up about the sugar refineries, and at Nampa, Canyon county. In 1906 between 57,000,000 and 64,000,000 lb. of beet sugar were refined in the state. Brick-making was of little more than local importance in 1906, the largest kilns being at Boisé, Sand Point and Coeur d'Alene City. Lime is made at Orofino, Shoshone county, and at Hope, Bonner county.

_Communications._--The total railway mileage in January 1909 was 2,022.04 m., an increase from 206 m. in 1880 and 946 m. in 1890. The Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, and the Oregon Railway & Navigation lines cross the N. part of the state; the Oregon Short Line crosses the S., and the Union Pacific, which owns the Oregon Railway & Navigation and the Oregon Short Line roads, crosses the eastern part. The constitution declares that railways are public highways, that the legislature has authority to regulate rates, and that discrimination in tolls shall not be allowed.

_Population._--The population of Idaho in 1870 was 14,999; in 1880 it was 32,610, an increase of 117.4%; in 1890 it was 88,548, an increase of 158.8%; in 1900 161,772 (82.7% increase); and in 1910 325,594 (101.3% increase). Of the inhabitants 15.2% were in 1900 foreign-born and 4.5% were coloured, the coloured population consisting of 293 negroes, 1291 Japanese, 1467 Chinese and 4226 Indians. The Indians lived principally in three reservations, the Fort Hall and Lemhi reservations (1350 sq. m. and 100 sq. m. respectively), in S.E. and E. Idaho, being occupied by the Shoshone, Bannock and Sheef-eater tribes, and the Coeur d'Alene reservation (632 sq. m.), in the N.W., by the Coeur d'Alene and Spokane tribes. The former Nez Perce reservation, in the N.W. part of the state, was abolished in 1895, and the Nez Perces were put under the supervision of the superintendent of the Indian School at Fort Lapwai, about 12 m. E. of Lewiston, in Nez Perce county. Of these tribes, the Nez Perce and Coeur d'Alene were self-supporting; the other tribes were in 1900 dependent upon the United States government for 30% of their rations. Of the 24,604 foreign-born inhabitants of the state, 3943 were from England, 2974 were from Germany, 2528 were Canadian English, 2822 were from Sweden, and 1633 were from Ireland, various other countries being represented by smaller numbers. The urban population of Idaho in 1900 (i.e. the population of places having 4000 or more inhabitants) was 6.2% of the whole. There were thirty-three incorporated cities, towns and villages, but only five had a population exceeding 2000; these were Boisé (5957), Pocatello (4046), Lewiston (2425), Moscow (2484) and Wallace (2265). In 1906 it was estimated that the total membership of all religious denominations was 74,578, and that there were 32,425 Latter-Day Saints or Mormons (266 of the Reorganized Church), 18,057 Roman Catholics, 5884 Methodist Episcopalians (5313 of the Northern Church), 3770 Presbyterians (3698 of the Northern Church), 3206 Disciples of Christ, and 2374 Baptists (2331 of the Northern Convention).

_Government._--The present constitution of Idaho was adopted in 1889. The government is similar in outline to that of the other states of the United States. The executive officials serve for a term of two years. Besides being citizens of the United States and residents of the state for two years preceding their election the governor, lieutenant-governor and attorney-general must each be at least thirty years of age, and the secretary of state, state auditor, treasurer and superintendent of education must be at least twenty-five years old. The governor's veto may be overridden by a two-thirds vote of the legislature; the governor, secretary of state, and the attorney-general constitute a Board of Pardons and a Board of State Prison Commissioners. The legislature meets biennially; its members, who must be citizens of the United States and electors of the state for one year preceding their election, are chosen biennially; the number of senators may never exceed twenty-four, that of representatives sixty; each county is entitled to at least one representative. The judiciary consists of a supreme court of three judges, elected every six years, and circuit and probate courts, the five district judges being elected every four years. Suffrage requirements are citizenship in the United States, registration and residence in the state for six months and in the county for thirty days immediately before election, but mental deficiency, conviction of infamous crimes (without restoration to rights of citizenship), bribery or attempt at bribery, bigamy, living in "what is known as patriarchal, plural or celestial marriage," or teaching its validity or belonging to any organization which teaches polygamy,[2] are disqualifications. Chinese or persons of Mongolian descent not born in the United States are also excluded from suffrage rights. Women, however, since 1897, have had the right to vote and to hold office, and they are subject to jury service. An Australian ballot law was passed in 1891. The constitution forbids the chartering of corporations except according to general laws. In 1909 a direct primary elections law was passed which required a majority of all votes to nominate, and, to make a majority possible, provided for preferential (or second-choice) voting, such votes to be canvassed and added to the first-choice vote for each candidate if there be no majority by the first-choice vote. The right of eminent domain over all corporations is reserved to the state; and no corporation may issue stock except for labour, service rendered, or money paid in. The waters of the state are, by the constitution of the state, devoted to the public use, contrary to the common law theory of riparian rights. By statute (1891) it has been provided that in civil actions three-fourths of a jury may render a verdict, and in misdemeanour cases five-sixths may give a verdict. Life insurance agents not residents of Idaho cannot write policies in the state. Divorces may be obtained after residence of six months on the ground of adultery, cruelty, desertion or neglect for one year, habitual drunkenness for the same period, felony or insanity. There are a state penitentiary at Boisé, an Industrial Training School at St Anthony, an Insane Asylum at Blackfoot, and a North Idaho Insane Asylum at Orofino. The care of all defectives was let by contract to other states until 1906, when a state school for the deaf and blind was opened in Boisé. No bureau of charities is in existence, but there is a Labor Commission, and a Commissioner of Immigration and a Commissioner of Public Lands to investigate the industrial resources. The offices of State Engineer and Inspector of Mines have been created.

_Education._--The public schools in 1905-1906 had an enrolment of 62,726, or 81.5% of the population between 5 and 21 years of age. The average length of school term was 6-8 months, the average expenditure (year ending Aug. 31, 1906) for instruction for each child was $19.29, and the expenditure for all school purposes was $1,008,481. There was a compulsory attendance law, which, however, was not enforced. Higher education is provided by the University of Idaho, established in 1899 at Moscow, Latah county, which confers degrees in arts, science, music and engineering, and offers free tuition. In 1907-1908 the institution had 41 instructors and 426 regular and 58 special students. In 1901 the Academy of Idaho, another state institution with industrial and technical courses and a preparatory department, was established at Pocatello, Bannock county, to be a connecting link between the public schools and the university. There are two state normal schools, one at Lewiston and the other at Albion. The only private institution of college rank in 1908 was the College of Caldwell (Presbyterian, opened 1891) at Caldwell, Canyon county, with 65 students in 1906-1907. There are Catholic academies at Boisé and Coeur d'Alene and a convent, Our Lady of Lourdes, at Wallace, Shoshone county, opened in 1905; Mormon schools at Paris (Bear Lake county), Preston (Oneida county), Rexburg (Fremont county), and Oakley (Cassia county); a Methodist Episcopal school (1906) at Weiser (Washington county); and a Protestant Episcopal school at Boisé (1892). The Idaho Industrial Institute (non-denominational; incorporated in 1899) is at Weiser.

_Finance._--The finances of Idaho are in excellent condition. The bonded debt on the 30th of September 1908 was $1,364,000. The revenue system is based on the general property tax and there is a State Board of Equalization. Each year $100,000 is set aside for the sinking fund for the payment of outstanding bonds as fast as they become due. The constitution provides that the rate of taxation shall never exceed 10 mills for each dollar of assessed valuation, that when the taxable property amounts to $50,000,000 the rate shall not exceed 5 mills, when it reaches $100,000,000, 3 mills shall be the limit, and when it reaches $300,000,000 the rate shall not exceed 1½ mills; but a greater rate may be established by a vote of the people. No public debt (exclusive of the debt of the Territory of Idaho at the date of its admission to the Union as a state) may be created that exceeds 1½% of the assessed valuation (except in case of war, &c.); the state cannot lend its credit to any corporation, municipality or individual; nor can any county, city or town lend its credit or become a stockholder in any company (except for municipal works).

_History._--The first recorded exploration of Idaho by white men was made by Lewis and Clark, who passed along the Snake river to its junction with the Columbia; in 1805 the site of Fort Lemhi in Lemhi county was a rendezvous for two divisions of the Lewis and Clark expedition; later, the united divisions reached a village of the Nez Perce Indians near the south fork of the Clearwater river, where they found traces of visits by other white men. In 1810 Fort Henry, on the Snake river, was established by the Missouri Fur Company, and in the following year a party under the auspices of the Pacific Fur Company descended the Snake river to the Columbia. In 1834 Fort Hall in E. Idaho (Bingham county) was founded. It acquired prominence as the meeting-point of a number of trails to the extreme western parts of North America. Missions to the Indians were also established, both by the Catholics and by the Protestants. But the permanent settlements date from the revelation of Idaho's mineral resources in 1860, when the Coeur d'Alene, Palouses and Nez Perces were in the North, and the Blackfoots, Bannocks and Shoshones in the South. While trading with these Indians, Capt. Pierce learned in the summer of 1860 that there was gold in Idaho. He found it on Orofino Creek, and a great influx followed--coming to Orofino, Newsome, Elk City, Florence, where the ore was especially rich, and Warren. The news of the discovery of the Boisé Basin spread far and wide, and Idaho City, Placerville, Buena Vista, Centreville and Pioneerville grew up. The territory now constituting Idaho was comprised in the Territory of Oregon from 1848 to 1853; from 1853 to 1859 the southern portion of the present state was a part of Oregon, the northern a part of Washington Territory; from 1859 to 1863 the territory was within the bounds of Washington Territory. In 1863 the Territory of Idaho was organized; it included Montana until 1864, and a part of Wyoming until 1868, when the area of the Territory of Idaho was practically the same as that of the present state. Idaho was admitted into the Union as a state in 1890. There have been a few serious Indian outbreaks in Idaho. In 1856 the Coeur d'Alenes, Palouses and Spokanes went on the war-path; in April 1857 they put to flight a small force under Col. Edward Tenner Steptoe; but the punitive expedition led by Col. George Wright (1803-1865) was a success. In 1877 the Nez Perces, led by Chief Joseph, refused to go on the reservation set apart for them, defeated a small body of regulars, were pursued by Major-General O. O. Howard, reinforced by frontier volunteers, and in September and October were defeated and retreated into Northern Montana, where they were captured by Major-General Nelson A. Miles. Occasional labour troubles have been very severe in the Coeur d'Alene region, where the attempt in 1892 of the Mine Owners' Association to discriminate in wages between miners and surfacemen brought on a union strike. Rioting followed the introduction of non-union men, the Frisco Mill was blown up, and many non-union miners were killed. The militia was called out and regular troops were hurried to Shoshone county from Fort Sherman, Idaho and Fort Missoula, Montana. These soon quieted the district. But the restlessness of the region caused more trouble in 1899. The famous Bunker Hill and Sullivan mines were wrecked, late in April, by union men. Federal troops, called for by Governor Frank Steunenberg, again took charge, and about 800 suspected men in the district were arrested and shut up in a stockade known as the "bull-pen." Ten prisoners, convicted of destroying the property of the mine-owners, were sentenced to twenty-two months in jail. The feeling among the union men was bitter against Steunenberg, who was assassinated on the 30th of December 1905. The trial in 1907 of Charles H. Haywood, secretary of the Western Federation of Miners, who was charged with conspiracy in connexion with the murder, attracted national attention; it resulted in Haywood's acquittal. Before 1897 the administration of the state was controlled by the Republican party; but in 1896 Democrats, Populists and those Republicans who believed in free coinage of silver united, and until 1902 elected a majority of all candidates for state offices. In 1902, 1904, 1906 and 1908 a Republican state ticket was elected.

GOVERNORS

_Territorial._

William H. Wallace 1863 W. B. Daniels, Secretary, Acting Governor 1863-1864 Caleb Lyon 1864-1865 C. de Witt Smith, Secretary, Acting Governor 1865 Horace C. Gilson " " 1865-1866 S. R. Howlett " " 1866 David W. Ballard 1866-1870 E. J. Curtis, Acting Governor 1870 Thomas W. Bennett 1871-1875 D. P. Thompson 1875-1876 Mason Brayman 1876-1880 John B. Neil 1880-1883 John N. Irwin 1883-1884 William M. Bunn 1884-1885 Edward A. Stevenson 1885-1889 George L. Shoup 1889-1890

STATE GOVERNORS

George L. Shoup,[3] Republican 1890 Norman B. Wiley, Acting Governor 1890-1892 William J. McConnell, Republican 1893-1897 Frank Steunenberg, Democrat Populist 1897-1901 Frank W. Hunt, " " 1901-1903 John T. Morrison, Republican 1903-1905 Frank R. Gooding, " 1905-1909 James H. Brady, " 1909-

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--The physical features and economic resources of Idaho are discussed in J. L. Onderdonk's _Idaho: Facts and Statistics_ (San Francisco, 1885), Israel C. Russell's "Geology and Water Resources of the Snake River Plains of Idaho," _U.S. Geological Survey, Bulletin 199_ (Washington, 1902), _The State of Idaho_ (a pamphlet issued by the State Commissioner of Immigration), Waldmor Lindgren's "Gold and Silver Veins of Silver City, De Lamar and other Mining Districts of Idaho," _U.S. Geological Survey, 20th Annual Report_ (Washington, 1900), and "The Mining Districts of the Idaho Basin and the Boisé Ridge, Idaho," _U.S. Geological Survey, 18th Annual Report_ (Washington, 1898). These reports should be supplemented by the information contained elsewhere in the publications of the Geological Survey (see the Indexes of the survey) and in various volumes of the United States Census. W. B. Hepburn's _Idaho Laws and Decisions, Annotated and Digested_ (Boisé, 1900), and H. H. Bancroft's _Washington, Idaho, and Montana_ (San Francisco, 1890) are the principal authorities for administration and history. The reports of the state's various executive officers should be consulted also.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Of these 80,000 acres are reached directly--72,000 N., and 8000 S. of the Snake river; and from 50,000 to 70,000 acres more are above the level of the canals and will have water pumped to them by the 11,000-30,000 h.p. developed.

[2] This disqualification and much other legislation were due to the large Mormon population in Idaho. In 1884-1885 all county and precinct officers were required to take a test oath abjuring bigamy, polygamy, or celestial marriage; and under this law in 1888 three members of the territorial legislature were deprived of their seats as ineligible. An act of 1889, when the Mormons constituted over 20% of the population, forbade in the case of any who had since the 1st of January 1888 practised, taught, aided or encouraged polygamy or bigamy, their registration or voting until two years after they had taken a test oath renouncing such practices, and until they had satisfied the District Court that in the two years preceding they had been guilty of no such practices. The Constitutional Convention which met at Boisé in July-August 1889 was strongly anti-Mormon, and the Constitution it framed was approved by a popular vote of 12,398 out of 14,184. The United States Supreme Court decided the anti-Mormon legislation case of Davis v. Beason in favour of the Idaho legislature. In 1893 the disqualification was made no longer retroactive, the two-year clause was omitted, and the test oath covered only present renunciation of polygamy.

[3] Governor Shoup resigned in December to take his seat in the U.S. Senate.

IDAR, or EDAR, a native state of India, forming part of the Mahi Kantha agency, within the Gujarat division of Bombay. It has an area of 1669 sq. m., and a population (1901) of 168,557, showing a decrease of 44% in the decade as the result of famine. Estimated gross revenue, £29,000; tribute to the gaekwar of Baroda, £2000. In 1901 the raja and his posthumous son both died, and the succession devolved upon Sir Pertab Singh (q.v.) of Jodhpur. The line of railway from Ahmedabad through Parantij runs mainly through this state. Much of the territory is held by kinsmen of the raja on feudal tenure. The products are grain, oil-seeds and sugar-cane. The town of Idar is 64 m. N.E. of Ahmedabad. Pop. (1901) 7085. It was formerly the capital, but Ahmednagar (pop. 3200) is the present capital.

IDAS, in Greek legend, son of Aphareus of the royal house of Messene, brother of Lynceus. He is only mentioned in a single passage in Homer (_Iliad_, ix. 556 sqq.), where he is called the strongest of men on earth. He carried off Marpessa, daughter of Evenus, as his wife and dared to bend his bow against Apollo, who was also her suitor. Zeus intervened, and left the choice to Marpessa, who declared in favour of Idas, fearing that the god might desert her when she grew old (Apollodorus i. 7). The Apharetidae are best known for their fight with the Dioscuri. A quarrel had arisen about the division of a herd of cattle which the four had stolen. Idas claimed the whole of the booty as the victor in a contest of eating, and drove the cattle off to Messene. The Dioscuri overtook him and lay in wait in a hollow oak. But Lynceus, whose keenness of sight was proverbial, saw Castor through the trunk and warned his brother, who thereupon slew the mortal Castor; finally, Pollux slew Lynceus, and Idas was struck by lightning (Apollodorus iii. 11; Pindar, _Nem._, x. 60; Pausanias iv. 3. 1). According to others, the Dioscuri had carried off the daughters of Leucippus, who had been betrothed to the Apharetidae (Ovid, _Fasti_, v. 699; Theocritus xxii. 137). The scene of the combat is placed near the grave of Aphareus at Messene, at Aphidna in Attica, or in Laconia; and there are other variations of detail in the accounts (see also Hyginus, _Fab._ 80). Idas and Lynceus were originally gods of light, probably the sun and moon, the herd of cattle (for the possession of which they strove with the Dioscuri) representing the heavenly bodies. The annihilation of the Apharetidae in the legend indicates the subordinate position held by the Messenians after the loss of their independence and subjugation by Sparta, the Dioscuri being distinctly Spartan, as the Apharetidae were Messenian heroes. The grave of Idas and Lynceus was shown at Sparta, according to Pausanias (iii. 13. 1), whose own opinion, however, is that they were buried in Messenia. On the chest of Cypselus, Marpessa is represented as following Idas from the temple of Apollo (by whom, according to some, she had been carried off), and there was a painting by Polygnotus of the rape of the Leucippidae in the temple of the Dioscuri at Athens.

In the article GREEK ART, fig. 66 (Pl. iv.) represents Idas and the Dioscuri driving off cattle.

IDDESLEIGH, STAFFORD HENRY NORTHCOTE, 1ST EARL OF (1818-1887), British statesman, was born in London, on the 27th of October 1818. His ancestors had long been settled in Devonshire, their pedigree, according to Burke, being traceable to the beginning of the 12th century. After a successful career at Balliol College, Oxford, he became in 1843 private secretary to Mr Gladstone at the board of trade. He was afterwards legal secretary to the board; and after acting as one of the secretaries to the Great Exhibition of 1851, co-operated with Sir Charles Trevelyan in framing the report which revolutionized the conditions of appointment to the Civil Service. He succeeded his grandfather, Sir Stafford Henry Northcote, as 8th baronet in 1851. He entered Parliament in 1855 as Conservative M.P. for Dudley, and was elected for Stamford in 1858, a seat which he exchanged in 1866 for North Devon. Steadily supporting his party, he became president of the board of trade in 1866, secretary of state for India in 1867, and chancellor of the exchequer in 1874. In the interval between these last two appointments he had been one of the commissioners for the settlement of the "Alabama" difficulty with the United States, and on Mr Disraeli's elevation to the House of Lords in 1876 he became leader of the Conservative party in the Commons. As a finance minister he was largely dominated by the lines of policy laid down by Mr Gladstone; but he distinguished himself by his dealings with the Debt, especially his introduction of the New Sinking Fund (1876), by which he fixed the annual charge for the Debt in such a way as to provide for a regular series of payments off the capital. His temper as leader was, however, too gentle to satisfy the more ardent spirits among his own followers, and party cabals (in which Lord Randolph Churchill--who had made a dead set at the "old gang," and especially Sir Stafford Northcote--took a leading part) led to Sir Stafford's transfer to the Lords in 1885, when Lord Salisbury became prime minister. Taking the titles of earl of Iddesleigh and Viscount St Cyres, he was included in the cabinet as first lord of the treasury. In Lord Salisbury's 1886 ministry he became secretary of state for foreign affairs, but the arrangement was not a comfortable one, and his resignation had just been decided upon when on the 12th of January 1887 he died very suddenly at Lord Salisbury's official residence in Downing Street. Lord Iddesleigh was elected lord rector of Edinburgh University in 1883, in which capacity he addressed the students on the subject of "Desultory Reading." He had little leisure for letters, but amongst his works were _Twenty Years of Financial Policy_ (1862), a valuable study of Gladstonian finance, and _Lectures and Essays_ (1887). His _Life_ by Andrew Lang appeared in 1890. Lord Iddesleigh married in 1843 Cecilia Frances Farrer (d. 1910) (sister of Thomas, 1st Lord Farrer), by whom he had seven sons and three daughters.

He was succeeded as 2nd earl by his eldest son, WALTER STAFFORD NORTHCOTE (1845- ), who for some years was his father's private secretary. He was chairman of the Inland Revenue Board from 1877 to 1892; and is also known as a novelist. His eldest son STAFFORD HENRY NORTHCOTE, Viscount St Cyres (1869- ), was educated at Eton and Merton College Oxford. After taking a 1st class in History, he was elected a senior student of Christ Church, where he resided for a while as tutor and lecturer. His interest in the development of religious thought led him to devote himself specially to the history of the Roman Catholic Church in the 17th century, the first-fruits of which was his _François de Fénelon_ (London, 1901); eight years later he published his _Pascal_ (ib. 1909).

The second son of the 1st earl of Iddesleigh, STAFFORD HENRY NORTHCOTE, 1st Baron Northcote (b. 1846), was educated at Eton and at Merton College, Oxford. He became a clerk in the foreign office in 1868, acted as private secretary to Lord Salisbury, and was attached to the embassy at Constantinople from 1876 to 1877. From 1877 to 1880 he was secretary to the chancellor of the exchequer, was financial secretary to the war office from 1885 to 1886, surveyor-general of ordnance, 1886 to 1887, and charity commissioner, 1891 to 1892. In 1887 he was created a baronet. In 1880 he was elected M.P. for Exeter as a Conservative, and retained the seat until 1899, when he was appointed governor of Bombay (1899-1903), being created a peer in 1900. Lord Northcote was appointed governor-general of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1903, and held this post till 1908. He married in 1873 Alice, adopted daughter of the 1st Lord Mount Stephen.

IDEA (Gr. [Greek: idea], connected with [Greek: idein], to see; cf. Lat. _species_ from _specere_, to look at), a term used both popularly and in philosophical terminology with the general sense of "mental picture." To have no _idea_ how a thing happened is to be without a mental picture of an occurrence. In this general sense it is synonymous with concept (q.v.) in its popular usage. In philosophy the term "idea" is common to all languages and periods, but there is scarcely any term which has been used with so many different shades of meaning. Plato used it in the sphere of metaphysics for the eternally existing reality, the archetype, of which the objects of sense are more or less imperfect copies. Chairs may be of different forms, sizes, colours and so forth, but "laid up in the mind of God" there is the one permanent _idea_ or type, of which the many physical chairs are derived with various degrees of imperfection. From this doctrine it follows that these _ideas_ are the sole reality (see further IDEALISM); in opposition to it are the empirical thinkers of all time who find reality in particular physical objects (see HYLOZOISM, EMPIRICISM, &c.). In striking contrast to Plato's use is that of John Locke, who defines "idea" as "whatever is the object of understanding when a man thinks" (_Essay on the Human Understanding_ (I.), vi. 8). Here the term is applied not to the mental process, but to anything whether physical or intellectual which is the object of it. Hume differs from Locke by limiting "idea" to the more or less vague mental reconstructions of perceptions, the perceptual process being described as an "impression." Wundt widens the term to include "conscious representation of some object or process of the external world." In so doing he includes not only ideas of memory and imagination, but also perceptual processes, whereas other psychologists confine the term to the first two groups. G. F. Stout and J. M. Baldwin, in the _Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology_, i. 498, define "idea" as "the reproduction with a more or less adequate image, of an object not actually present to the senses." They point out that an idea and a perception are by various authorities contrasted in various ways. "Difference in degree of intensity," "comparative absence of bodily movement on the part of the subject," "comparative dependence on mental activity," are suggested by psychologists as characteristic of an idea as compared with a perception.

It should be observed that an idea, in the narrower and generally accepted sense of a mental reproduction, is frequently composite. That is, as in the example given above of the idea of chair, a great many objects, differing materially in detail, all call a single idea. When a man, for example, has obtained an idea of chairs in general by comparison with which he can say "This is a chair, that is a stool," he has what is known as an "abstract idea" distinct from the reproduction in his mind of any particular chair (see ABSTRACTION). Furthermore a complex idea may not have any corresponding physical object, though its particular constituent elements may severally be the reproductions of actual perceptions. Thus the idea of a centaur is a complex mental picture composed of the ideas of man and horse, that of a mermaid of a woman and a fish.

See PSYCHOLOGY.

IDEALISM (from Gr. [Greek: idea], archetype or model, through Fr. _idéalisme_), a term generally used for the attitude of mind which is prone to represent things in an imaginative light and to lay emphasis exclusively or primarily on abstract perfection (i.e. in "ideals"). With this meaning the philosophical use of the term has little in common.

To understand the philosophical theory that has come to be known under this title, we may ask (1) what in general it is and how it is differentiated from other theories of knowledge and reality, (2) how it has risen in the history of philosophy, (3) what position it occupies at present in the world of speculation.

1. _General Definition of Idealism._--Idealism as a philosophical doctrine conceives of knowledge or experience as a process in which the two factors of subject and object stand in a relation of entire interdependence on each other as warp and woof. Apart from the activity of the self or subject in sensory reaction, memory and association, imagination, judgment and inference, there can be no world of objects. A thing-in-itself which is not a thing to some consciousness is an entirely unrealizable, because self-contradictory, conception. But this is only one side of the truth. It is equally true that a subject apart from an object is unintelligible. As the object exists through the constructive activity of the subject, so the subject lives in the construction of the object. To seek for the true self in any region into which its opposite in the form of a not-self does not enter is to grasp a shadow. It is in seeking to realize its own ideas in the world of knowledge, feeling and action that the mind comes into possession of itself; it is in becoming permeated and transformed by the mind's ideas that the world develops the fullness of its reality as object.

Thus defined, idealism is opposed to ordinary common-sense dualism, which regards knowledge or experience as the result of the more or less accidental relation between two separate and independent entities--the mind and its ideas on one side, the thing with its attributes on the other--that serve to limit and condition each other from without. It is equally opposed to the doctrine which represents the subject itself and its state and judgments as the single immediate datum of consciousness, and all else, whether the objects of an external world or person other than the individual subject whose states are known to itself, as having a merely problematic existence resting upon analogy or other process of indirect inference. This theory is sometimes known as idealism. But it falls short of idealism as above defined in that it recognizes only one side of the antithesis of subject and object, and so falls short of the doctrine which takes its stand on the complete correlativity of the two factors in experience. It is for this reason that it is sometimes known as subjective or incomplete idealism. Finally the theory defined is opposed to all forms of realism, whether in the older form which sought to reduce mind to a function of matter, or in any of the newer forms which seek for the ultimate essence of both mind and matter in some unknown force or energy which, while in itself it is neither, yet contains the potentiality of both. It is true that in some modern developments of idealism the ultimate reality is conceived of in an impersonal way, but it is usually added that this ultimate or absolute being is not something lower but higher than self-conscious personality, including it as a more fully developed form may be said to include a more elementary.

2. _Origin and Development of Idealism._--In its self-conscious form idealism is a modern doctrine. In it the self or subject may be said to have come to its rights. This was possible in any complete sense only after the introspective movement represented by the middle ages had done its work, and the thought of the individual mind and will as possessed of relative independence had worked itself out into some degree of clearness. In this respect Descartes' dictum--_cogito ergo sum_--may be said to have struck the keynote of modern philosophy, and all subsequent speculation to have been merely a prolonged commentary upon it. While in its completer form it is thus a doctrine distinctive of modern times, idealism has its roots far back in the history of thought. One of the chief proofs that has been urged of the truth of its point of view is the persistency with which it has always asserted itself at a certain stage in philosophical reflection and as the solution of certain recurrent speculative difficulties. All thought starts from the ordinary dualism or pluralism which conceives of the world as consisting of the juxtaposition of mutually independent things and persons. The first movement is in the direction of dispelling this appearance of independence. They are seen to be united under the relation of cause and effect, determining and determined, which turns out to mean that they are merely passing manifestations of some single entity or energy which constitutes the real unknown essence of the things that come before our knowledge. In the pantheism that thus takes the place of the old dualism there seems no place left for the individual. Mind and will in their individual manifestations fade into the general background of appearance without significance except as a link in a fated chain. Deliverance from the pantheistic conception of the universe comes through the recognition of the central place occupied by thought and purpose in the actual world, and, as a consequence of this, of the illegitimacy of the abstraction whereby material energy is taken for the ultimate reality.

Ancient idealism: Socrates.

Plato

The first illustration of this movement on a large scale was given in the Socratic reaction against the pantheistic conclusions of early Greek philosophy (see IONIAN SCHOOL). The whole movement of which Socrates was a part may be said to have been in the direction of the assertion of the rights of the subject. Its keynote is to be found in the Protagorean "man is the measure." This seems to have been interpreted by its author and by the Sophists in general in a subjective sense, with the result that it became the motto of a sceptical and individualistic movement in contemporary philosophy and ethics. It was not less against this form of idealism than against the determinism of the early physicists that Socrates protested. Along two lines the thought of Socrates led to idealistic conclusions which may be said to have formed the basis of all subsequent advance. (1) He perceived the importance of the universal or conceptual element in knowledge, and thus at a single stroke broke through the hard realism of ordinary common sense, disproved all forms of naturalism that were founded on the denial of the reality of thought, and cut away the ground from a merely sensational and subjective idealism. This is what Aristotle means by claiming for Socrates that he was the founder of definition. (2) He taught that life was explicable only as a system of ends. Goodness consists in the knowledge of what these are. It is by his hold upon them that the individual is able to give unity and reality to his will. In expounding these ideas Socrates limited himself to the sphere of practice. Moreover, the end or ideal of the practical life was conceived of in too vague a way to be of much practical use. His principle, however, was essentially sound, and led directly to the Platonic Idealism. Plato extended the Socratic discovery to the whole of reality and while seeking to see the pre-Socratics with the eyes of Socrates sought "to see Socrates with the eyes of the pre-Socratics." Not only were the virtues to be explained by their relation to a common or universal good which only intelligence could apprehend, but there was nothing in all the furniture of heaven or earth which in like manner did not receive reality from the share it had in such an intelligible idea or essence. But these ideas are themselves intelligible only in relation to one another and to the whole. Accordingly Plato conceived of them as forming a system and finding their reality in the degree in which they embody the one all-embracing idea and conceived of not under the form of an efficient but of a final cause, an inner principle of action or tendency in things to realize the fullness of their own nature which in the last resort was identical with the nature of the whole. This Plato expressed in the myth of the Sun, but the garment of mythology in which Plato clothed his idealism, beautiful as it is in itself and full of suggestion, covered an essential weakness. The more Plato dwelt upon his world of ideas, the more they seemed to recede from the world of reality, standing over against it as principles of condemnation instead of revealing themselves in it. In this way the Good was made to appear as an end imposed upon things from without by a creative intelligence instead of as an inner principle of adaptation.

Aristotle.

On one side of his thought Aristotle represents a reaction against idealism and a return to the position of common-sense dualism, but on another, and this the deeper side, he represents the attempt to restore the theory in a more satisfactory form. His account of the process of knowledge in his logical treatises exhibits the idealistic bent in its clearest form. This is as far removed as possible either from dualism or from empiricism. The universal is the real; it is that which gives coherence and individuality to the particulars of sense which apart from it are like the routed or disbanded units of an army. Still more manifestly in his _Ethics_ and _Politics Aristotle_ makes it clear that it is the common or universal will that gives substance and reality to the individual. In spite of these and other anticipations of a fuller idealism, the idea remains as a form imposed from without on a reality otherwise conceived of as independent of it. As we advance from the logic to the metaphysics and from that to his ontology, it becomes clear that the concepts are only "categories" or predicates of a reality lying outside of them, and there is an ultimate division between the world as the object or matter of thought and the thinking or moving principle which gives its life. It is this that gives the Aristotelian doctrine in its more abstract statements an air of uncertainty. Yet besides the particular contribution that Aristotle made to idealistic philosophy in his logical and ethical interpretations, he advanced the case in two directions, (a) He made it clear that no explanation of the world could be satisfactory that was not based on the notion of continuity in the sense of an order of existence in which the reality of the lower was to be sought for in the extent to which it gave expression to the potentialities of its own nature--which were also the potentialities of the whole of which it was a part. (b) From this it followed that difficult as we might find it to explain the relation of terms so remote from each other as sense and thought, the particular and the universal, matter and mind, these oppositions cannot in their nature be absolute. These truths, however, were hidden from Aristotle's successors, who for the most part lost the thread which Socrates had put into their hand. When the authority of Aristotle was again invoked, it was its dualistic and formal, not its idealistic and metaphysical, side that was in harmony with the spirit of the age. Apart from one or two of the greatest minds, notably Dante, what appealed to the thinkers of the middle ages was not the idea of reality as a progressive self-revelation of an inner principle working through nature and human life, but the formal principles of classification which it seemed to offer for a material of thought and action given from another source.

Modern Idealism.

Modern like ancient idealism came into being as a correction of the view that threatened to resolve the world of matter and mind alike into the changing manifestations of some single non-spiritual force or substance. While, however, ancient philosophy may be said to have been unilinear, modern philosophy had a twofold origin, and till the time of Kant may be said to have pursued two independent courses.

All philosophy is the search for reality and rational certainty as opposed to mere formalism on the one hand, to authority and dogmatism on the other. In this sense modern philosophy had a common root in revolt against medievalism. In England this revolt sought for the certainty and clearness that reason requires In the assurance of an outer world given to immediate sense experience; on the continent of Europe, in the assurance of an inner world given immediately in thought. Though starting from apparently opposite poles and following widely different courses the two movements led more or less directly to the same results. It is easy to understand how English empiricism issued at once in the trenchant naturalism of Hobbes. It is less comprehensible how the Cartesian philosophy from the starting-point of thought allied itself with a similar point of view. This can be understood only by a study of the details of Descartes' philosophy (see CARTESIANISM). Suffice it to say that in spite of its spiritualistic starting-point its general result was to give a stimulus to the prevailing scientific tendency as represented by Galileo, Kepler and Harvey to the principle of mechanical explanations of the phenomena of the universe. True it was precisely against this that Descartes' immediate successors struggled. But the time-spirit was too strong for them. Determinism had other forms besides that of a crude materialism, and the direction that Malebranche succeeded in giving to speculation led only to the more complete denial of freedom and individuality in the all-devouring pantheism of Spinoza.

Berkeley.

The foundations of idealism in the modern sense were laid by the thinkers who sought breathing room for mind and will in a deeper analysis of the relations of the subject to the world that it knows. From the outset English philosophy had a leaning to the psychological point of view, and Locke was only carrying on the tradition of his predecessors and particularly of Hobbes in definitely accepting it as the basis of his _Essay_. It was, however, Berkeley who first sought to utilize the conclusions that were implicit in Locke's starting-point to disprove "the systems of impious and profane persons which exclude all freedom, intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the root and origin of all beings." Berkeley's statement of the view that all knowledge is relative to the subject--that no object can be known except under the form which our powers of sense-perception, our memory and imagination, our notions and inference, give it--is still the most striking and convincing that we possess. To have established this position was a great step in speculation. Henceforth ordinary dogmatic dualism was excluded from philosophy; any attempt to revive it, whether with Dr Johnson by an appeal to common prejudice, or, in the more reflective Johnsonianism of the 18th-century Scottish philosophers, must be an anachronism. Equally impossible was it thenceforth to assert the mediate or immediate certainty of material substance as the cause either of events in nature or of sensations in ourselves. But with these advances came the danger of falling into error from which common-sense dualism and naturalistic monism were free. From the point of view which Berkeley had inherited from Locke it seemed to follow that not only material substance, but the whole conception of a world of objects, is at most an inference from subjective modifications which are the only immediately certain objects of knowledge. The implications of such a view were first clearly apparent when Hume showed that on the basis of it there seemed to be nothing that we could confidently affirm except the order of our own impressions and ideas. This being so, not only were physics and mathematics impossible as sciences of necessary objective truth, but our apparent consciousness of a permanent self and object alike must be delusive.

Kant.

It was these paradoxes that Kant sought to rebut by a more thoroughgoing criticism of the basis of knowledge the substance of which is summed up in his celebrated Refutation of Idealism,[1] wherein he sought to undermine Hume's scepticism by carrying it one step further and demonstrating that not only is all knowledge of self or object excluded, but the consciousness of any series of impressions and ideas is itself impossible except in relation to some external permanent and universally accepted world of objects.

Leibnitz.

But Kant's refutation of subjective idealism and his vindication of the place of the object can be fully understood only when we take into account the other defect in the teaching of his predecessors that he sought in his _Critique_ to correct. In continental philosophy the reaction against mechanical and pantheistic explanations of the universe found even more definite utterance than in English psychological empiricism in the metaphysical system of Leibnitz, whose theory of self-determined monads can be understood only when taken in the light of the assertion of the rights of the subject against the substance of Spinoza and the atoms of the materialist. But Leibnitz also anticipated Kant in seeking to correct the empirical point of view of the English philosophers. True, sense-given material is necessary in order that we may have thought. "But by what means," he asks, "can experience and the senses give ideas? Has the soul windows? Is it like a writing tablet? Is it like wax? It is plain that all those who think thus of the soul make it at bottom corporeal. True, nothing is in the intellect which has not been in the senses, but we must add except the intellect itself. The soul contains the notions of being, substance, unity, identity, cause, perception, reasoning and many others which the senses cannot give" (_Nouveaux essais_, ii. 1). But Leibnitz's conception of the priority of spirit had too little foundation, and the different elements he sought to combine were too loosely related to one another to stand the strain of the two forces of empiricism and materialism that were opposed to his idealism. More particularly by the confusion in which he left the relation between the two logical principles of identity and of sufficient reason underlying respectively analytic and synthetic, deductive and inductive thought, he may be said to have undermined in another way the idealism he strove to establish. It was in seeking to close up the fissure in his system represented by this dualism that his successors succeeded only in adding weakness to weakness by reducing the principle of sufficient reason to that of formal identity (see WOLFF) and representing all thought as in essence analytic. From this it immediately followed that, so far as the connexion of our experiences of the external world does not show itself irreducible to that of formal identity, it must remain unintelligible. As empiricism had foundered on the difficulty of showing how our thoughts could be an object of sense experience, so Leibnitzian formalism foundered on that of understanding how the material of sense could be an object of thought. On one view as on the other scientific demonstration was impossible.

Kant.

The extremity to which philosophy had been brought by empiricism on the one hand and formalism on the other was Kant's opportunity. Leibnitz's principle of the "nisi intellectus ipse" was expanded by him into a demonstration the completest yet effected by philosophy of the part played by the subject not merely in the manipulation of the material of experience but in the actual constitution of the object that is known. On the other hand he insisted on the synthetic character of this activity without which it was impossible to get beyond the circle of our own thoughts. The parts of the _Critique of Pure Reason_, more particularly the "Deduction of the Categories" in which this theory is worked out, may be said to have laid the foundation of modern idealism--"articulum stantis aut cadentis doctrinae." In spite of the defects of Kant's statement--to which it is necessary to return--the place of the concepts and ideals of the mind and the synthetic organizing activity which these involve was established with a trenchancy which has been acknowledged by all schools alike. The "Copernican revolution" which he claimed to have effected may be said to have become the starting-point of all modern philosophy. Yet the divergent uses that have been made of it witness to the ambiguity of his statement which is traceable to the fact that Kant was himself too deeply rooted in the thought of his predecessors and carried with him too much of their spirit to be able entirely to free himself from their assumptions and abstractions. His philosophy was more like Michaelangelo's famous sculpture of the Dawn, a spirit yet encumbered with the stubble of the material from which it was hewn, than a clear cut figure with unmistakable outlines. Chief among these encumbering presuppositions was that of a fundamental distinction between perception and conception and consequent upon it between the synthetic and the analytic use of thought. It is upon this in the last resort that the distinction between the phenomenal world of our experience and a noumenal world beyond it is founded. Kant perceives that "perception without conception is blind, conception without perception is empty," but if he goes so far ought he not to have gone still further and inquired whether there can be any perception at all without a concept, any concept which does not presuppose a precept, and, if this is impossible, whether the distinction between a world of appearance which is known and a world of things-in-themselves which is not, is not illusory?

Hegel.

It was by asking precisely these questions that Hegel gave the finishing strokes to the Kantian philosophy. The starting-point of all valid philosophy must be the perception that the essence of all conscious apprehension is the union of opposites--of which that of subject and object is the most fundamental and all-pervasive. True, before differences can be united they must have been separated, but this merely proves that differentiation or analysis is only one factor in a single process. Equally fundamental is the element of synthesis. Nor is it possible at any point in knowledge to prove the existence of a merely given in whose construction the thinking subject has played no part nor a merely thinking subject in whose structure the object is not an organic factor. In coming, as at a certain point in its development it does, to the consciousness of an object, the mind does not find itself in the presence of an opponent, or of anything essentially alien to itself but of that which gives content and stability to its own existence. True, the stability it seems to find in it is incomplete. The object cannot rest in the form of its immediate appearance without involving us in contradiction. The sun does not "rise," the dew does not "fall." But this only means that the unity between subject and object to which the gift of consciousness commits us is incompletely realized in that appearance: the apparent truth has to submit to correction and supplementation before it can be accepted as real truth. It does not mean that there is anywhere a mere fact which is not also an interpretation nor an interpreting mind whose ideas have no hold upon fact. From this it follows that ultimate or absolute reality is to be sought not beyond the region of experience, but in the fullest and most harmonious statement of the facts of our experience. True a completely harmonious world whether of theory or of practice remains an ideal. But the fact that we have already in part realized the ideal and that the degree in which we have realized it is the degree in which we may regard our experience as trustworthy, is proof that the ideal is no mere idea as Kant taught, but the very substance of reality.

Stumbling blocks in Hegel's statements.

Intelligible as this development of Kantian idealism seems in the light of subsequent philosophy, the first statement of it in Hegel was not free from obscurity. The unity of opposites translated into its most abstract terms as the "identity of being and not-being," the principle that the "real is the rational," the apparent substitution of "bloodless" categories for the substance of concrete reality gave it an air of paradox in the eyes of metaphysicians while physicists were scandalized by the premature attempts at a complete philosophy of nature and history. For this Hegel was doubtless partly to blame. But philosophical critics of his own and a later day are not hereby absolved from a certain perversity in interpreting these doctrines in a sense precisely opposite to that in which they were intended. The doctrine of the unity of contraries so far from being the denial of the law of non-contradiction is founded on an absolute reliance upon it. Freed from paradox it means that in every object of thought there are different aspects or elements each of which if brought separately into consciousness may be so emphasized as to appear to contradict another. Unity may be made to contradict diversity, permanence change, the particular the universal, individuality relatedness. Ordinary consciousness ignores these "latent fires"; ordinary discussion brings them to light and divides men into factions and parties over them; philosophy not because it denies but because it acknowledges the law of non-contradiction as supreme is pledged to seek a point of view from which they may be seen to be in essential harmony with one another as different sides of the same truth. The "rationality of the real" has in like manner been interpreted as intended to sanctify the existing order. Hegel undoubtedly meant to affirm that the actual was rational in the face of the philosophy which set up subjective feeling and reason against it. But idealism has insisted from the time of Plato on the distinction between what is actual in time and space and the reality that can only partially be revealed in it. Hegel carried this principle further than had yet been done. His phrase does not therefore sanctify the established fact but, on the contrary, declares that it partakes of reality only so far as it embodies the ideal of a coherent and stable system which it is not. As little is idealism responsible for any attempt to pass off logical abstractions for concrete reality. The "Logic" of Hegel is merely the continuation of Kant's "Deduction" of the categories and ideas of the reason which has generally been recognized as the soberest of attempts to set forth the presuppositions which underlie all experience. "What Hegel attempts to show is just that the categories by which thought must determine its object are stages in a process that, beginning with the idea of 'Being,' the simplest of all determinations is driven on by its own dialectic till it reaches the idea of self-consciousness. In other words the intelligence when it once begins to define an object for itself, finds itself launched on a movement of self-asserting synthesis in which it cannot stop until it had recognized that the unity of the object with itself involves its unity with all other objects and with the mind that knows it. Hence, whatever we begin by saying, we must ultimately say 'mind'" (Caird, _Kant_, i. 443).

While the form in which these doctrines were stated proved fatal to them in the country of their birth, they took deep root in the next generation in English philosophy. Here the stone that the builders rejected was made the head of the corner. The influences which led to this result were manifold. From the side of literature the way was prepared for it by the genius of Coleridge, Wordsworth and Carlyle; from the side of morals and politics by the profound discontent of the constructive spirit of the century with the disintegrating conceptions inherited from utilitarianism. In taking root in England idealism had to contend against the traditional empiricism represented by Mill on the one hand and the pseudo-Kantianism which was rendered current by Mansel and Hamilton on the other. As contrasted with the first it stood for the necessity of recognizing a universal or ideal element as a constitutive factor in all experience whether cognitive or volitional; as contrasted with the latter for the ultimate unity of subject and object, knowledge and reality, and therefore for the denial of the existence of any thing-in-itself for ever outside the range of experience. Its polemic against the philosophy of experience has exposed it to general misunderstanding, as though it claimed some a priori path to truth. In reality it stands for a more thoroughgoing and consistent application of the test of experience. The defect of English empiricism from the outset had been the uncritical acceptance of the metaphysical dogma of a pure unadulterated sense-experience as the criterion of truth. This assumption idealism examines and rejects in the name of experience itself. Similarly it only carried the doctrine of relativity to its logical conclusion in denying that there could be any absolute relativity. Object stands in essential relation to subject, subject to object. This being so, it is wholly illogical to seek for any test of the truth and reality of either except in the form which that relation itself takes. In its subsequent development idealism in England has passed through several clearly marked stages which may be distinguished as (a) that of exploration and tentative exposition in the writings of J. F. Ferrier,[2] J. Hutchison Stirling,[3] Benjamin Jowett,[4] W. T. Harris;[5] (b) of confident application to the central problems of logic, ethics and politics, fine art and religion, and as a principle of constructive criticism and interpretation chiefly in T. H. Green,[6] E. Caird,[7] B. Bosanquet;[8] (c) of vigorous effort to develop on fresh lines its underlying metaphysics in F. H. Bradley,[9] J. M. E. McTaggart,[10] A. E. Taylor,[11] Josiah Royce[12] and others. Under the influence of these writers idealism, as above expounded though with difference of interpretation in individual writers, may be said towards the end of the 19th century to have been on its way to becoming the leading philosophy in the British Isles and America.

New Dualism and Pragmatism.

3. _Reaction against Traditional Idealism._--But it was not to be expected that the position idealism had thus won for itself would remain long unchallenged. It had its roots in a literature and in forms of thought remote from the common track; it had been formulated before the great advances in psychology which marked the course of the century; its latest word seemed to involve consequences that brought it into conflict with the vital interest the human mind has in freedom and the possibility of real initiation. It is not, therefore, surprising that there should have been a vigorous reaction. This has taken mainly two opposite forms. On the one hand the attack has come from the old ground of the danger that is threatened to the reality of the external world and may be said to be in the interest of the object. On the other hand the theory has been attacked in the interest of the subject on the ground that in the statuesque world of ideas into which it introduces us it leaves no room for the element of movement and process which recent psychology and metaphysic alike have taught us underlies all life. The conflict of idealism with these two lines of criticism--the accusation of subjectivism on the one side of intellectualism and rigid objectivism on the other--may be said to have constituted the history of Anglo-Saxon philosophy during the first decade of the 20th century.

I. Whatever is to be said of ancient Idealism, the modern doctrine may be said notably in Kant to have been in the main a vindication of the subjective factor in knowledge. But that space and time, matter and cause should owe their origin to the action of the mind has always seemed paradoxical to common sense. Nor is the impression which its enunciation in Kant made, likely to have been lightened in this country by the connexion that was sure to be traced between Berkeleyanism and the new teaching or by the form which the doctrine received at the hands of T. H. Green, its leading English representative between 1870 and 1880. If what is real in things is ultimately nothing but their relations, and if relations are inconceivable apart from the relating mind, what is this but the dissolution of the solid ground of external reality which my consciousness seems to assure me underlies and eludes all the conceptual network by which I try to bring one part of my experience into connexion with another? It is quite true that modern idealists like Berkeley himself have sought to save themselves from the gulf of subjectivism by calling in the aid of a universal or infinite mind or by an appeal to a total or absolute experience to which our own is relative. But the former device is too obviously a _deus ex machina_, the purpose of which would be equally well served by supposing with Fichte the individual self to be endowed with the power of subconsciously extraditing a world which returns to it in consciousness under the form of a foreign creation. The appeal to an Absolute on the other hand is only to substitute one difficulty for another. For granting that it places the centre of reality outside the individual self it does so only at the price of reducing the reality of the latter to an appearance; and if only one thing is real what becomes of the many different things which again my consciousness assures me are the one world with which I can have any practical concern? To meet these difficulties and give back to us the assurance of the substantiality of the world without us it has therefore been thought necessary to maintain two propositions which are taken to be the refutation of idealism. (1) There is given to us immediately in knowledge a world entirely independent of and different from our own impressions on the one hand and the conceptions by which we seek to establish relations between them upon the other. The relation of these impressions (and for the matter of that of their inter-relations among themselves) to our minds is only one out of many. As a leading writer puts it: "There is such a thing as greenness having various relations, among others that of being perceived."[13] (2) Things may be, and may be known to be simply different. They may exclude one another, exist so to speak in a condition of armed neutrality to one another, without being positively thereby related to one another or altered by any change taking place in any of them. As the same writer puts it: "There is such a thing as numerical difference, different from conceptual difference,"[14] or expressing the same thing in other words "there are relations not grounded in the nature of the related terms."

In this double-barrelled criticism it is important to distinguish what is really relevant. Whatever the shortcomings of individual writers may be, modern idealism differs, as we have seen, from the arrested idealism of Berkeley precisely in the point on which dualism insists. In all knowledge we are in touch not merely with the self and its passing states, but with a real object which is different from them. On this head there is no difference, and idealism need have no difficulty in accepting all that its opponents here contend. The difference between the two theories does not consist in any difference of emphasis on the objective side of knowledge, but in the standard by which the nature of the object is to be tested--the difference is logical not metaphysical--it concerns the definition of truth or falsity in the knowledge of the reality which both admit. To idealism there can be no ultimate test, but the possibility of giving any fact which claims to be true its place in a coherent system of mutually related truths. To this dualism opposes the doctrine that truth and falsehood are a matter of mere immediate intuition: "There is no problem at all in truth and falsehood, some propositions are true and some false just as some roses are red and some white."[15] The issue between the two theories under this head may here be left with the remark that it is a curious comment on the logic of dualism that setting out to vindicate the reality of an objective standard of truth it should end in the most subjective of all the way a thing appears to the individual. The criticism that applies to the first of the above contentions applies _mutatis mutandis_ to the second. As idealism differs from Berkeleyanism in asserting the reality of an "external" world so it differs from Spinozism in asserting the reality of difference within it. Determination is not merely negation. On this head there need be no quarrel between it and dualism. Ours is a many-sided, a many-coloured world. The point of conflict again lies in the nature and ground of the assigned differences. Dualism meets the assertion of absolute unity by the counter assertion of mere difference. But if it is an error to treat the unity of the world as its only real aspect, it is equally an error to treat its differences as something ultimately irreducible. No philosophy founded on this assumption is likely to maintain itself against the twofold evidence of modern psychology and modern logic. According to the first the world, whether looked at from the side of our perception or from the side of the object perceived, can be made intelligible only when we accept it for what it is as a real continuity. Differences, of course, there are; and, if we like to say so, every difference is unique, but this does not mean that they are given in absolute independence of everything else, "fired at us out of a cannon." They bear a definite relation to the structure of our physical and psychical nature, and correspond to definite needs of the subject that manifests itself therein. Similarly from the side of logic. It is not the teaching of idealism alone but of the facts which logical analysis has brought home to us that all difference in the last resort finds its ground in the quality or content of the things differentiated, and that this difference of content shows in turn a double strand, the strand of sameness and the strand of otherness--that _in_ which and that _by_ which they differ from one another. Idealism has, of course, no quarrel with numerical difference. All difference has its numerical aspect: two different things are always two both in knowledge and in reality. What it cannot accept is the doctrine that there are two things which are two in themselves apart from that which makes them two--which are not two _of something_. So far from establishing the truth for which dualism is itself concerned--the reality of all differences--such a theory can end only in a scepticism as to the reality of any difference. It is difficult to see what real difference there can be between things which are differences of nothing.

II. More widespread and of more serious import is the attack from the other side to which since the publication of A. Seth's _Hegelianism and Personality_ (1887) and W. James's _Will to Believe_ (1903) idealism has been subjected. Here also it is important to distinguish what is relevant from what is irrelevant in the line of criticism represented by these writers. There need be no contradiction between idealism and a reasonable pragmatism. In so far as the older doctrine is open to the charge of neglecting the conative and teleological side of experience it can afford to be grateful to its critics for recalling it to its own eponymous principle of the priority of the "ideal" to the "idea," of _needs_ to the conception of their object. The real issue comes into view in the attempt, undertaken in the interest of freedom, to substitute for the notion of the world as a cosmos pervaded by no discernible principle and in its essence indifferent to the form impressed upon it by its active parts.

To the older idealism as to the new the essence of mind or spirit is freedom. But the guarantee of freedom is to be sought for not in the denial of law, but in the whole nature of mind and its relation to the structure of experience. _Without mind no orderly world_: only through the action of the subject and its "ideas" are the confused and incoherent data of sense-perception (themselves shot through with both strands) built up into that system of things we call Nature, and which stands out against the subject as the body stands out against the soul whose functioning may be said to have created it. On the other hand, _without the world no mind_: only through the action of the environment upon the subject is the idealizing activity in which it finds its being called into existence. Herein lies the paradox which is also the deepest truth of our spiritual life. In interpreting its environment first as a world of things that seem to stand in a relation of exclusion to one another and to itself, then as a natural system governed by rigid mechanical necessity, the mind can yet feel that in its very opposition the world is akin to it, bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh. What is true of mind is true of will. Idealism starts from the relativity of the world to purposive consciousness. But this again may be so stated as to represent only one side of the truth. It is equally true that the will is relative to the world of objects and interests to which it is attached through instincts and feelings, habits and sentiments. In isolation from its object the will is as much an abstraction as thought apart from the world of percepts, memories and associations which give it content and stability. And just as mind does not lose but gain in individuality in proportion as it parts with any claim to the capricious determination of what its world shall be, and becomes dominated by the conception of an order which is immutable so the will becomes free and "personal" in proportion as it identifies itself with objects and interests, and subordinates itself to laws and requirements which involve the suppression of all that is merely arbitrary and subjective. Here, too, subject and object grow together. The power and vitality of the one is the power and vitality of the other, and this is so because they are not two things with separate roots but are both rooted in a common reality which, while it includes, is more than either.

Passing by these contentions as unmeaning or irrelevant and seeing nothing but irreconcilable contradiction between the conceptions of the world as immutable law and a self-determining subject pragmatism (q.v.) seeks other means of vindicating the reality of freedom. It agrees with older forms of libertarianism in taking its stand on the fact of spontaneity as primary and self-evidencing, but it is not content to assert its existence side by side with rigidly determined sequence. It carries the war into the camp of the enemy by seeking to demonstrate that the completely determined action which is set over against freedom as the basis of explanation in the material world is merely a hypothesis which, while it serves sufficiently well the limited purpose for which it is devised, is incapable of verification in the ultimate constituents of physical nature. There seems in fact nothing to prevent us from holding that while natural laws express the average tendencies of multitudes they give no clue to the movement of individuals. Some have gone farther and argued that from the nature of the case no causal explanation of any real change in the world of things is possible. A cause is that which contains the effect ("causa aequat effectum"), but this is precisely what can never be proved with respect to anything that is claimed as a real cause in the concrete world. Everywhere the effect reveals an element which is indiscoverable in the cause with the result that the identity we seek for ever eludes us. Even the resultant of mechanical forces refuses to resolve itself into its constituents. In the "resultant" there is a new direction, and with it a new quality the component forces of which no analysis can discover.[16]

It is not here possible to do more than indicate what appear to be the valid elements in these two conflicting interpretations of the requirements of a true idealism. On behalf of the older it may be confidently affirmed that no solution is likely to find general acceptance which involves the rejection of the conception of unity and intelligible order as the primary principle of our world. The assertion of this principle by Kant was, we have seen, the corner-stone of idealistic philosophy in general, underlying as it does the conception of a permanent subject not less than that of a permanent object. As little from the side of knowledge is it likely that any theory will find acceptance which reduces all thought to a process of analysis and the discovery of abstract identity. There is no logical principle which requires that we should derive qualitative change by logical analysis from quantitative difference. Everywhere experience is synthetic: it gives us multiplicity in unity. Explanation of it does not require the annihilation of all differences but the apprehension of them in organic relation to one another and to the whole to which they belong. It was, as we have seen, this conception of thought as essentially synthetic for which Kant paved the way in his polemic against the formalism of his continental predecessors. The revival as in the above argument of the idea that the function of thought is the elimination of difference, and that rational connexion must fail where absolute identity is indiscoverable merely shows how imperfectly Kant's lesson has been learned by some of those who prophesy in his name.

Finally, apart from these more academic arguments there is an undoubted paradox in a theory which, at a moment when in whatever direction we look the best inspiration in poetry, sociology and physical science comes from the idea of the unity of the world, gives in its adhesion to pluralism on the ground of its preponderating practical value.

On the other hand, idealism would be false to itself if it interpreted the unity which it thus seeks to establish in any sense that is incompatible with the validity of moral distinctions and human responsibility in the fullest sense of the term. It would on its side be, indeed, a paradox if at a time when the validity of human ideals and the responsibility of nations and individuals to realize them is more universally recognized than ever before on our planet, the philosophical theory which hitherto has been chiefly identified with their vindication should be turned against them. Yet the depth and extent of the dissatisfaction are sufficient evidence that the most recent developments are not free from ambiguity on this vital issue.

What is thus suggested is not a rash departure from the general point of view of idealism (by its achievements in every field to which it has been applied, "stat mole sua") but a cautious inquiry into the possibility of reaching a conception of the world in which a place can be found at once for the idea of unity and determination and of movement and freedom. Any attempt here to anticipate what the course of an idealism inspired by such a spirit of caution and comprehension is likely to be cannot but appear dogmatic.

Yet it may be permitted to make a suggestion. Taking for granted the unity of the world idealism is committed to interpret it as spiritual as a unity of spirits. This is implied in the phrase by which it has sought to signalize its break with Spinozism: "from substance to subject." The universal or infinite is one that realizes itself in finite particular minds and wills, not as accidents or imperfections of it, but as its essential form. These on their side, to be subject in the true sense must be conceived of as possessing a life which is truly their own, the expression of their own nature as self-determinant. In saying subject we say self, in saying self we say free creator. No conception of the infinite can therefore be true which does not leave room for movement, process, free creation. Oldness, sameness, permanence of principle and direction, these must be, otherwise there is _nothing_; but newness of embodiment, existence, realization also, otherwise nothing _is_.

Now it is just to these implications in the idea of spirit that some of the prominent recent expositions of Idealism seem to have failed to do justice. They have failed particularly when they have left the idea of "determination" unpurged of the suggestion of time succession. The very word lends itself to this mistake. Idealists have gone beyond others in asserting that the subject in the sense of a being which merely repeats what has gone before is timeless. This involves that its activity cannot be truly conceived of as included in an antecedent, as an effect in a cause or one term of an equation in the other. As the activity of a subject or spirit it is essentially a new birth. It is this failure that has led to the present revolt against a "block universe." But the difficulty is not to be met by running to the, opposite extreme in the assertion of a loose and ramshackle one. This is merely another way of perpetuating the mistake of allowing the notion of determination by an _other_ or a preceding to continue to dominate us in a region where we have in reality passed from it to the notion of determination by self or by self-acknowledged ideals. As the correction from the one side consists in a more whole-hearted acceptance of the conception of determination by an ideal as the essence of mind, so from the other side it must consist in the recognition of the valuelessness of a freedom which does not mean submission to a self-chosen, though not self-created, law.

The solution here suggested is probably more likely to meet with opposition from the side of Idealism than of Pragmatism. It involves, it will be said, the reality of time, the dependence of the Infinite in the finite, and therewith a departure from the whole line of Hegelian thought. (1) It does surely involve the reality of time in the sense that it involves the reality of existence, which it is agreed is process. Without process the eternal is not complete or, if eternity means completeness, is not truly eternal. Our mistake lies in abstraction of the one from the other, which, as always, ends in confusion of the one with the other. Truth lies in giving each its place. Not only does eternity assert the conception of the hour but the hour asserts the conception of eternity--with what adequacy is another question. (2) The second of the above objections takes its point from the contradiction to religious consciousness which seems to be involved. This is certainly a mistake. Religious consciousness asserts, no doubt, that God is necessary to the soul: from Him as its inspiration, to Him as its ideal are all things. But it asserts with equal emphasis that the soul is necessary to God. To declare itself an unnecessary creation is surely on the part of the individual soul the height of impiety. God lives in the soul as it in Him. He also might say, from it as His offspring, to it as the object of His outgoing love are all things. (3) It is a mistake to attribute to Hegel the doctrine that time is an illusion. If in a well-known passage (_Logic_ § 212) he seems to countenance the Spinoxistic view he immediately corrects it by assigning an "actualizing force" to this illusion and making it a "necessary dynamic element of truth." Consistently with this we have the conclusion stated in the succeeding section on the Will. "Good, the final end of the world, has being only while it constantly produces itself. And the world of the spirit and the world of nature continue to have this distinction, that the latter moves only in a recurring cycle while the former certainly also makes progress." The mistake is not Hegel's but ours. It is to be remedied not by giving up the idea of the Infinite but by ceasing to think of the Infinite as of a being endowed with a static perfection which the finite will merely reproduces, and definitely recognizing the forward effort of the finite as an essential element in Its self-expression. If there be any truth in this suggestion it seems likely that the last word of idealism, like the first, will prove to be that the type of the highest reality is to be sought for not in any fixed Parmenidean circle of achieved being but in an ideal of good which while never fully expressed under the form of time can never become actual and so fulfil itself under any other.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.--(A) General works besides those of the writers mentioned above: W. Wallace, _Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel_ (1894), and Hegel's _Philosophy of Mind_ (1894); A. Seth and R. B. Haldane, _Essays in Phil. Criticism_ (1883); John Watson, _Kant and his English Critics_ (1881); J. B. Baillie, _Idealistic Construction of Experience_ (1906); J. S. Mackenzie, _Outlines of Metaphysics_ (1902); A. E. Taylor, _Elements of Metaphysics_ (1903); R. L. Nettleship, _Lectures and Remains_ (1897); D. G. Ritchie, _Philosophical Studies_ (1905).

(B) Works on particular branches of philosophy: (a) _Logic_--F. H. Bradley, _Principles of Logic_ (1883); B. Bosanquet, _Logic_ (1888) and _Essentials of Logic_ (1895). (b) _Psychology_--J. Dewey, _Psychology_ (1886); G. F. Stout, _Analytic Psychology_ (1896); B. Bosanquet, _Psychology of the Moral Self_ (1897). (c) _Ethics_--F. H. Bradley, _Ethical Studies_ (1876); J. Dewey, _Ethics_ (1891); W. R. Sorley, _Ethics of Naturalism_ (2nd ed., 1904); J. S. Mackenzie, _Manual of Ethics_ (4th ed., 1900); J. H. Muirhead, _Elements of Ethics_ (3rd ed., 1910). (d) _Politics and Economics_--B. Bosanquet, _Philosophical Theory of the State_ (1899), and _Aspects of the Social Problem_ (1895); B. Bonar, _Philosophy and Political Economy in their historical Relations_ (1873); D. G. Ritchie, _Natural Rights_ (1895); J. S. Mackenzie, _An Introd. to Social Phil._ (1890); J. MacCunn, _Six Radical Thinkers_ (1907). (e) _Aesthetic_--B. Bosanquet, _History of Aesthetic_ (1892), and _Introd. to Hegel's Phil. of the Fine Arts_ (1886); W. Hastie, _Phil. of Art by Hegel and Michelet_ (1886). (f) _Religion_--J. Royce, _Religious Aspect of Philosophy_ (1885), and _The Conception of God_ (1897); R. B. Haldane, _The Pathway to Reality_ (1903); E. Caird, _Evolution of Religion_ (1893); J. Caird, _Introd. to the Phil. of Religion_ (1880); H. Jones, _Idealism as a Practical Creed_ (1909).

(C) Recent Criticism. Besides works mentioned in the text: W. James, _Pragmatism_ (1907), _A Pluralistic Universe_ (1909), _The Meaning of Truth_ (1909); H. Sturt, _Personal Idealism_ (1902); F. C. S. Schiller, _Humanism_ (1903); G. E. Moore, _Principia Ethica_; H. Rashdall, _The Theory of Good and Evil_ (1907).

See also ETHICS and METAPHYSICS. (J. H. Mu.)

FOOTNOTES:

[1] _Kritik d. reinen Vernunft_, p. 197 (ed. Hartenstein).

[2] _Institutes of Metaphysics_ (1854); _Works_ (1866).

[3] _Secret of Hegel_ (1865).

[4] _Dialogues of Plato_ (1871).

[5] _Journal of Spec. Phil._ (1867).

[6] Hume's _Phil. Works_ (1875).

[7] _Critical account of the Phil. of Kant_ (1877).

[8] _Knowledge and Reality_ (1885); Logic (1888).

[9] _Appearance and Reality_ (1893).

[10] _Studies in Hegelian Cosmology_ (1901).

[11] _Elements of Metaphysics_ (1903).

[12] _The World and the individual_ (1901).

[13] See _Mind_, New Series, xii. p. 433 sqq.

[14] _Proceedings_ of the Aristotelian Society (1900-1901), p. 110.

[15] _Mind_, New Series, xiii. p. 523; cf. 204, 350.

[16] The most striking statement of this argument is to be found in Boutroux's treatise _De la contingence des lois de la nature_, first published in 1874 and reprinted without alteration in 1905. The same general line of thought underlies James Ward's _Naturalism and Agnosticism_ (2nd ed., 1903), and A. J. Balfour's _Foundations of Belief_ (8th ed., 1901). H. Bergson's works on the other hand contain the elements of a reconstruction similar in spirit to the suggestions of the present article.

IDELER, CHRISTIAN LUDWIG (1766-1846), German chronologist and astronomer, was born near Perleberg on the 21st of September 1766. After holding various official posts under the Prussian government he became professor at the university of Berlin in 1821, and eighteen years later foreign member of the Institute of France. From 1816 to 1822 he was tutor to the young princes William Frederick and Charles. He died in Berlin on the 10th of August 1846. He devoted his life chiefly to the examination of ancient systems of chronology. In 1825-1826 he published his great work, _Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie_ (2 vols.; 2nd ed., 1883), re-edited as _Lehrbuch der Chronologie_ (1831); a supplementary volume, _Die Zeitrechnung der Chinesen_, appeared in 1839. Beside these important works he wrote also _Untersuchungen über d. Ursprung und d. Bedeutung d. Sternnamen_ (1809) and _Über d. Ursprung d. Thierkreises_ (1838). With Nolte he published handbooks on English and French language and literature. His son, JULIUS LUDWIG IDELER (1809-1842), wrote _Meteorologia veterum Graecorum et Romanorum_ (1832).

IDENTIFICATION (Lat. _idem_, the same), the process of proving any one's identity, i.e. that he is the man he purports to be, or--if he is pretending to be some one else--the man he really is; or in case of dispute, that he is the man he is alleged to be. As more strenuous efforts have been made for the pursuit of criminals, and more and more severe penalties are inflicted on old offenders, means of identification have become essential, and various processes have been tried to secure that desirable end. For a long time they continued to be most imperfect; nothing better was devised than rough and ready methods of recognition depending upon the memories of officers of the law or the personal impressions of witnesses concerned in the case, supplemented in more recent years by photographs, not always a safe and unerring guide. The machinery employed was cumbrous, wasteful of time and costly. Detective policemen were marched in a body to inspect arrested prisoners in the exercising yards of the prison. Accused persons were placed in the midst of a number of others of approximately like figure and appearance, and the prosecutor and witnesses were called in one by one to pick out the offender. Inquiries, with a detailed description of distinctive marks, and photographs were circulated far and wide to local police forces. Officers, police and prison wardens were despatched in person to give evidence of identity at distant courts. Mis-identification was by no means rare. Many remarkable cases may be quoted. One of the most notable was that of the Frenchman Lesurques, in the days of the Directory, who was positively identified as having robbed the Lyons mail and suffered death, protesting his innocence of the crime, which was afterwards brought home to another man, Duboscq, and this terrible judicial error proved to be the result of the extraordinary likeness between the two men. Another curious case is to be found in American records, when a man was indicted for bigamy as James Hoag, who averred that he was really Thomas Parker. There was a marvellous conflict of testimony, even wives and families and personal friends being misled, and there was a narrow escape of mis-identification. The leading modern case in England is that of Adolf Beck (1905). Beck (who eventually died at the end of 1909) was arrested on the complaint of a number of women who positively swore to his identity as Smith, a man who had defrauded them. An ex-policeman who had originally arrested Smith also swore that Beck was the same man. There was a grave miscarriage of justice. Beck was sentenced to penal servitude, and although a closer examination of the personal marks showed that Beck could not possibly be Smith, it was only after a scandalous delay, due to the obstinacy of responsible officials, that relief was afforded. It has to be admitted that evidence as to identity based on personal impressions is perhaps of all classes of evidence the least to be relied upon.

Such elements of uncertainty cannot easily be eliminated from any system of jurisprudence, but some improvements in the methods of identification have been introduced in recent years. The first was in the adoption of anthropometry (q.v.), which was invented by the French savant, A. Bertillon. The reasons that led to its general supersession may be summed up in its costliness, the demand for superior skill in subordinate agents and the liability to errors not easy to trace and correct. A still more potent reason remained, the comparative failure of results. It was found in the first four years of its use in England and Wales that an almost inappreciable number of identifications were effected by the anthropometric system; namely, 152 in 1898, 243 in 1899, 462 in 1900, and 503 in 1901, the year in which it was supplemented by the use of "finger prints" (q.v.). The figures soon increased by leaps and bounds. In 1902 the total number of searches among the records were 6826 and the identifications 1722 for London and the provinces; in 1903 the searches were 11,919, the identifications 3642; for the first half of 1904 the searches were 6697 and the identifications 2335. In India and some of the colonies the results were still more remarkable; the recognitions in 1903 were 9512, and 17,289 in 1904. Were returns available from other countries very similar figures would no doubt be shown. Among these countries are Ireland, Australasia, Ceylon, South Africa, and many great cities of the United States; and the system is extending to Germany, Austria-Hungary and other parts of Europe.

The record of finger prints in England and Wales is kept by the Metropolitan police at New Scotland Yard. They were at first limited to persons convicted at courts at quarter sessions and assizes and to all persons sentenced at minor courts to more than a month without option of fine for serious offences. The finger prints when taken by prison warders are forwarded to London for registration and reference on demand. The total number of finger-print slips was 70,000 in 1904, and weekly additions were being made at the rate of 350 slips. The advantages of the record system need not be emphasized. By its means identification is prompt, inevitable and absolutely accurate. By forwarding the finger prints of all remanded prisoners to New Scotland Yard, their antecedents are established beyond all hesitation.

In past times identification of criminals who had passed through the hands of the law was compassed by branding, imprinting by a hot iron, or tattooing with an indelible sign, such as a crown, fleur de lys or initials upon the shoulder or other part of the body. This practice, long since abandoned, was in a measure continued in the British army, when offenders against military law were ordered by sentence of court-martial to be marked with "D" for deserter and "B.C." bad character; this ensured their recognition and prevented re-enlistment; but all such penalties have now disappeared. (A. G.)

IDEOGRAPH (Gr. [Greek: idea], idea, and [Greek: graphein], to write), a symbol or character painted, written or inscribed, representing ideas and not sounds; such a form of writing is found in Chinese and in most of the Egyptian hieroglyphs (see WRITING).

IDIOBLAST (Gr. [Greek: idios], peculiar, and [Greek: blastos], a shoot), a botanical term for an individual cell which is distinguished by its shape, size or contents, such as the stone-cells in the soft tissue of a pear.

IDIOM (Gr. [Greek: idiôma], something peculiar and personal; [Greek: idios], one's own, personal), a form of expression whether in words, grammatical construction, phraseology, &c., which is peculiar to a language; sometimes also a special variety of a particular language, a dialect.

IDIOSYNCRASY (Gr. [Greek: idiosynkrasia], peculiar habit of body or temperament; [Greek: idios], one's own, and [Greek: synkrasis], blending, tempering, from [Greek: sygkerannusthai], to put together, compound, mix), a physical or mental condition peculiar to an individual usually taking the form of a special susceptibility to particular stimuli; thus it is an idiosyncrasy of one individual that abnormal sensations of discomfort should be excited by certain odours or colours, by the presence in the room of a cat, &c.; similarly certain persons are found to be peculiarly responsive or irresponsive to the action of particular drugs. The word is also used, generally, of any eccentricity or peculiarity of character, appearance, &c.

IDOLATRY, the worship (Gr. [Greek: latreia]) of idols (Gr. [Greek: eidôlon]), i.e. images or other objects, believed to represent or be the abode of a superhuman personality. The term is often used generically to include such varied, forms as litholatry, dendrolatry, pyrolatry, zoolatry and even necrolatry. In an age when the study of religion was practically confined to Judaism and Christianity, idolatry was regarded as a degeneration from an uncorrupt primeval faith, but the comparative and historical investigation of religion has shown it to be rather a stage of an upward movement, and that by no means the earliest. It is not found, for instance, among Bushmen, Fuegians, Eskimos, while it reached a high development among the great civilizations of the ancient world in both hemispheres.[1] Its earliest stages are to be sought in naturism and animism. To give concreteness to the vague ideas thus worshipped the idol, at first rough and crude, comes to the help of the savage, and in course of time through inability to distinguish subjective and objective, comes to be identified with the idea it originally symbolized. The degraded form of animism known as fetichism is usually the direct antecedent of idolatry. A fetich is adored, not for itself, but for the spirit who dwells in it and works through it. Fetiches of stone or wood were at a very early age shaped and polished or coloured and ornamented. A new step was taken when the top of the log or stone was shaped like a human head; the rest of the body soon followed. The process can be followed with some distinctness in Greece. Sometimes, as in Babylonia and India, the representation combined human and animal forms, but the human figure is the predominant model; man makes God after his own image.

Idols may be private and personal like the teraphim of the Hebrews or the little figures found in early Egyptian tombs, or--a late development, public and tribal or national. Some, like the ancestral images among the Maoris, are the intermittent abodes of the spirits of the dead.

As the earlier stages in the development of the religious consciousness persist and are often manifest in idolatry, so in the higher stages, when men have attained loftier spiritual ideas, idolatry itself survives and is abundantly visible as a reactionary tendency. The history of the Jewish people whom the prophets sought, for long in vain, to wean from worshipping images is an illustration: so too the vulgarities of modern popular Hinduism contrasted with the lofty teaching of the Indian sacred books.

In the New Testament the word [Greek: eidôlolatreia] (_idololatria_, afterwards shortened occasionally to [Greek: eidolatreia], _idolatria_) occurs in all four times, viz. in 1 Cor. x. 14; Gal. v. 20; 1 Peter iv. 3; Col. iii. 5. In the last of these passages it is used to describe the sin of covetousness or "mammon-worship." In the other places it indicates with the utmost generality all the rites and practices of those special forms of paganism with which Christianity first came into collision. It can only be understood by reference to the LXX., where [Greek: eidôlon] (like the word "idol" in A.V.) occasionally translates indifferently no fewer than sixteen words by which in the Old Testament the objects of what the later Jews called "strange worship" (Hebrew: avoda zara) are denoted (see _Encyclopaedia Biblica_). In the widest acceptation of the word, idolatry in any form is absolutely forbidden in the second commandment, which runs "Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image; [and] to no visible shape in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, or in the water under the earth, shalt thou bow down or render service" (see DECALOGUE). For some account of the questions connected with the breaches of this law which are recorded in the history of the Israelites see the article JEWS; those differences as to the interpretation of the prohibition which have so seriously divided Christendom are discussed under the head of ICONOCLASTS.

In the ancient church, idolatry was naturally reckoned among those _magna crimina_ or great crimes against the first and second commandments which involved the highest ecclesiastical censures. Not only were those who had gone openly to heathen temples and partaken in the sacrifices (_sacrificati_) or burnt incense (_thurificati_) held guilty of this crime; the same charge, in various degrees, was incurred by those whose renunciation of idolatry had been private merely, or who otherwise had used unworthy means to evade persecution, by those also who had feigned themselves mad to avoid sacrificing, by all promoters and encouragers of idolatrous rites, and by idol makers, incense sellers and architects or builders of structures connected with idol worship. Idolatry was made a crime against the state by the laws of Constantius (_Cod. Theod._ xvi. 10. 4, 6), forbidding all sacrifices on pain of death, and still more by the statutes of Theodosius (_Cod. Theod._ xvi. 10. 12) enacted in 392, in which sacrifice and divination were declared treasonable and punishable with death; the use of lights, incense, garlands and libations was to involve the forfeiture of house and land where they were used; and all who entered heathen temples were to be fined. See Bingham, _Antiqq._ bk. xvi. c. 4.

See also IMAGE-WORSHIP; and on the whole question, RELIGION.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] According to Varro the Romans had no animal or human image of a god for 170 years after the founding of the city; Herodotus (i. 131) says the Persians had no temples or idols before Artaxerxes I.; Lucian (_De sacrif._ 11) bears similar testimony for Greece and as to idols (_Dea Syr._ 3) for Egypt. Eusebius (_Praep. Evang._ i. 9) sums up the theory of antiquity in his statement "the oldest peoples had no idols." Images of the gods indeed presuppose a definiteness of conception and powers of discrimination that could only be the result of history and reflection. The iconic age everywhere succeeded to an era in which the objects of worship were aniconic, e.g. wooden posts, stone steles, cones.

IDOMENEUS, in Greek legend, son of Deucalion, grandson of Minos and Pasiphaë, and king of Crete. As a descendant of Zeus and famous for his beauty, he was one of the suitors of Helen; hence, after her abduction by Paris, he took part in the Trojan War, in which he distinguished himself by his bravery. He is mentioned as a special favourite of Agamemnon (_Iliad_, iv. 257). According to Homer (_Odyssey_, iii. 191), he returned home safely with all his countrymen who had survived the war, but later legend connects him with an incident similar to that of Jephtha's daughter. Having been overtaken by a violent storm, to ensure his safety he vowed to sacrifice to Poseidon the first living thing that met him when he landed on his native shore. This proved to be his son, whom he slew in accordance with his vow; whereupon a plague broke out in the island, and Idomeneus was driven out. He fled to the district of Sallentum in Calabria, and subsequently to Colophon in Asia Minor, where he settled near the temple of the Clarian Apollo and was buried on Mount Cercaphus (Virgil, _Aeneid_, iii. 121, 400, 531, and Servius on those passages). But the Cretans showed his grave at Cnossus, where he was worshipped as a hero with Meriones (Diod. Sic. v. 79).

IDRIA, a mining town in Carniola, Austria, 25 m. W. of Laibach. Pop. (1900) 5772. It is situated in a narrow Alpine valley, on the river Idria, an affluent of the Isonzo, and owes its prosperity to the rich mines of quicksilver which were accidentally discovered in 1497. Since 1580 they have been under the management of the government. The mercurial ore lies in a bed of clay slate, and is found both mingled with schist and in the form of cinnabar. A special excellence of the ore is the greatness of the yield of pure metal compared with the amount of the refuse. As regards the quantity annually extracted, the mines of Idria rank second to those of Almaden in Spain, which are the richest in the world.

IDRIALIN, a mineral wax accompanying the mercury ore in Idria. According to Goldschmidt it can be extracted by means of xylol, amyl alcohol or turpentine; also without decomposition, by distillation in a current of hydrogen, or carbon dioxide. It is a white crystalline body, very difficultly fusible, boiling above 440° C. (824° F.), of the composition C40H28O. Its solution in glacial acetic acid, by oxidation with chromic acid, yielded a red powdery solid and a fatty acid fusing at 62° C., and exhibiting all the characters of a mixture of palmitic and stearic acids.

IDRISI, or EDRISI [Abu Abdallah Mahommed Ibn Mahommed Ibn Abdallah Ibn Idrisi, c. A.D. 1099-1154], Arabic geographer. Very little is known of his life. Having left Islamic lands and become the courtier and panegyrist of a Christian prince, though himself a descendant of the Prophet, he was probably regarded by strict Moslems as a scandal, whose name should not, if possible, be mentioned. His great-grandfather, Idrisi II., "Biamrillah," a member of the great princely house which had reigned for a time as caliphs in north-west Africa, was prince of Malaga, and likewise laid claim to the supreme title (Commander of the Faithful). After his death in 1055, Malaga was seized by Granada (1057), and the Idrisi family then probably migrated to Ceuta, where a freedman of theirs held power. Here the geographer appears to have been born in A.H. 493 (A.D. 1099). He is said to have studied at Cordova, and this tradition is confirmed by his elaborate and enthusiastic description of that city in his geography. From this work we know that he had visited, at some period of his life before A.D. 1154, both Lisbon and the mines of Andalusia. He had also once resided near Morocco city, and once was at (Algerian) Constantine. More precisely, he tells us that in A.D. 1117 he went to see the cave of the Seven Sleepers at Ephesus; he probably travelled extensively in Asia Minor. From doubtful readings in his text some have inferred that he had seen part of the coasts of France and England. We do not know when Roger II. of Sicily (1101-1154) invited him to his court, but it must have been between 1125 and 1150. Idrisi made for the Norman king a celestial sphere and a disk representing the known world of his day--both in silver. These only absorbed one-third of the metal that had been given him for the work, but Roger bestowed on him the remaining two-thirds as a present, adding to this 100,000 pieces of money and the cargo of a richly-laden ship from Barcelona. Roger next enlisted Idrisi's services in the compilation of a fresh description of the "inhabited earth" from observation, and not merely from books. The king and his geographer chose emissaries whom they sent out into various countries to observe, record and design; as they returned, Idrisi inserted in the new geography the information they brought. Thus was gradually completed (by the month of Shawwal, A.H. 548 = mid-January, A.D. 1154), the famous work, best known, from its patron and originator, as _Al Rojari_, but whose fullest title seems to have been, _The going out of a Curious Man to explore the Regions of the Globe, its Provinces, Islands, Cities and their Dimensions and Situation_. This has been abbreviated to _The Amusement of him who desires to traverse the Earth_, or _The Relaxation of a Curious Mind_. The title of _Nubian Geography_, based upon Sionita and Hezronita's misreading of a passage relating to Nubia and the Nile, is entirely unwarranted and misleading. The _Rogerian Treatise_ contains a full description of the world as far as it was known to the author. The "inhabited earth" is divided into seven "climates," beginning at the equinoctial line, and extending northwards to the limit at which the earth was supposed to be rendered uninhabitable by cold. Each climate is then divided by perpendicular lines into eleven equal parts, beginning with the western coast of Africa and ending with the eastern coast of Asia. The whole world is thus formed into seventy-seven equal square compartments. The geographer begins with the first part of the first climate, including the westernmost part of the Sahara and a small (north-westerly) section of the Sudan (of which a vague knowledge had now been acquired by the Moslems of Barbary), and thence proceeds eastward through the different divisions of this climate till he finds its termination in the Sea of China. He then returns to the first part of the second climate, and so proceeds till he reaches the eleventh part of the seventh climate, which terminates in north-east Asia, as he conceives that continent. The inconveniences of the arrangement (ignoring all divisions, physical, political, linguistic or religious, which did not coincide with those of his "climates") are obvious.

Though Idrisi was in such close relations with one of the most civilized of Christian courts and states, we find few traces of his influence on European thought and knowledge. The chief exception is perhaps in the delineation of Africa in the world-maps of Marino Sanuto (q.v.) and Pietro Vesconte. His account of the voyage of the _Maghrurin_ or "Deceived Men" of Lisbon in the Atlantic (a voyage on which they seem to have visited Madeira and one of the Canaries) may have had some effect in stimulating the later ocean enterprise of Christian mariners; but we have no direct evidence of this. Idrisi's Ptolemaic leanings give a distinctly retrograde character to certain parts of his work, such as east Africa and south Asia; and, in spite of the record of the Lisbon Wanderers, he fully shares the common Moslem dread of the black, viscous, stormy and wind-swept waters of the western ocean, whose limits no one knew, and over which thick and perpetual darkness brooded. At the same time his breadth of view, his clear recognition of scientific truths (such as the roundness of the world) and his wide knowledge and intelligent application of preceding work (such as that of Ptolemy, Masudi and Al Jayhani) must not be forgotten. He also preserves and embodies a considerable amount of private and special information--especially as to Scandinavia (in whose delineation he far surpasses his predecessors), portions of the African coast, the river Niger (whose name is perhaps first to be found, after Ptolemy's doubtful Nigeir, in Idrisi), portions of the African coast, Egypt, Syria, Italy, France, the Adriatic shore-lands, Germany and the Atlantic islands. No other Arabic work contains a larger assortment of valuable geographical facts; unfortunately the place-names are often illegible or hopelessly corrupted in the manuscripts. Idrisi's world-map, with all its shortcomings, is perhaps the best product of that strangely feeble thing--the Mahommedan cartography of the middle ages.

Besides the _Rojari_, Idrisi wrote another work, largely geographical, cited by Abulfida as _The Book of Kingdoms_, but apparently entitled by its author _The Gardens of Humanity and the Amusement of the Soul_. This was composed for William the Bad (1154-1166), son and successor of Roger II., but is now lost. He likewise wrote, according to Ibn Said, on _Medicaments_, and composed verses, which are referred to by the Sicilian Mahommedan poet Ibn Bashrun.

Two manuscripts of Idrisi exist in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, and other two in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. One of the English MSS., brought from Egypt by Greaves, is illustrated by a map of the known world, and by thirty-three sectional maps (for each part of the first three climates). The second manuscript, brought by Pococke from Syria, bears the date of A.H. 906, or A.D. 1500. It consists of 320 leaves, and is illustrated by one general and seventy-seven particular maps, the latter consequently including all the parts of every climate. The general map was published by Dr Vincent in his _Periplus of the Erythraean Sea_. A copy of Idrisi's work in the Escorial was destroyed by the fire of 1671.

An epitome of Idrisi's geography, in the original Arabic, was printed, with many errors, in 1592 at the Medicean press in Rome, from a MS. preserved in the Grand Ducal library at Florence (_De geographia universali. Hortulus cultissimus ..._ ). Even the description of Mecca is here omitted. Pococke supplied it from his MS. In many bibliographical works this impression has been wrongly characterized as one of the rarest of books. In 1619 two Maronite scholars, Gabriel Sionita, and Joannes Hezronita, published at Paris a Latin translation of this epitome (_Geographia Nubiensis, id est, accuratissima totius orbis in VII. climata divisi descriptio_). Besides its many inaccuracies of detail, this edition, by its unlucky title of _Nubian Geography_, started a fresh and fundamental error as to Idrisi's origin; this was founded on a misreading of a passage where Idrisi describes the Nile passing into Egypt through Nubia--not "_terram nostram_," as this version gives, but "_terram illius_" is here the true translation. George Hieronymus Velschius, a German scholar, had prepared a copy of the Arabic original, with a Latin translation, which he purposed to have illustrated with notes; but death interrupted this design, and his manuscript remains in the university library of Jena. Casiri (_Bib. Ar. Hisp._ ii. 13) mentions that he had determined to re-edit this work, but he appears never to have executed his intention. The part relating to Africa was ably edited by Johann Melchior Hartmann (_Commentatio de geographia Africae Edrisiana_, Göttingen, 1791, and _Edrisii Africa_, Göttingen, 1796), Here are collected the notices of each region in other Moslem writers, so as to form, for the time, a fairly complete body of Arabic geography as to Africa. Hartmann afterwards published Idrisi's Spain (_Hispania_, Marburg, 3 vols., 1802-1818).

An (indifferent) French translation of the whole of Idrisi's geography (the only complete version which has yet appeared), based on one of the MSS. of the Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris, was published by Amédée Jaubert in 1836-1840, and forms volumes v. and vi. of the _Recueil de voyages_ issued by the Paris Société de Géographie; but a good and complete edition of the original text is still a desideratum. A number of Oriental scholars at Leiden determined in 1861 to undertake the task. Spain and western Europe were assigned to Dozy; eastern Europe and western Asia to Engelmann; central and eastern Asia to Defrémery; and Africa to de Goeje. The first portion of the work appeared in 1866, under the title of _Description de l'Afrique et de l'Espagne par Edrisi, texte arabe, publié avec une traduction, des notes et un glossaire par R. Dozy et M. J. de Goeje_ (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1866); but the other collaborators did not furnish their quota. Other parts of Idrisi's work have been separately edited; e.g. "Spain" (_Descripcion de España de ... Aledris_), by J. A. Condé, in Arabic and Spanish (Madrid, 1799); "Sicily" (_Descrizione della Sicilia ... di Elidris_), by P. D. Magri and F. Tardia (Palermo, 1764); "Italy" (_Italia descritta nel "libro del Re Ruggero," compilato da Edrisi_), by M. Amari and C. Schiaparelli, in Arabic and Italian (Rome, 1883); "Syria" (_Syria descripta a ... El Edrisio ..._ ), by E. F. C. Rosenmüller, in Arabic and Latin, 1825, and (_Idrisii ... Syria_), by J. Gildemeister (Bonn, 1885) (the last a Beilage to vol. viii. of the _Zeitschrift d. deutsch. Palästina-Vereins_). See also M. Casiri, _Bibliotheca Arabico-Hispana Escurialensis_ (2 vols., Madrid, 1760-1770); V. Lagus, "Idrisii notitiam terrarum Balticarum ex commerciis Scandinavorum et Italorum ... ortam esse" in _Atti del IV° Congresso internaz. degli orientalisti in Firenze_, p. 395 (Florence, 1880); R. A. Brandel "Om och ur den arabiske geografen Idrisi," _Akad. afhand._ (Upsala, 1894). (C. R. B.)

IDUMAEA ([Greek: 'Idoumaia]), the Greek equivalent of Edom ([Hebrew: Edom]), a territory which, in the works of the Biblical writers, is considered to lie S.E. of the Dead Sea, between the land of Moab and the Gulf of Akaba. Its name, which is connected with the root meaning "red," is probably applied in reference to the red sandstone ranges of the mountains of Petra.[1] This etymology, however, is not certain. The apparently theophorous name Obed-Edom (2 Sam. vi. 10) shows that Edom is the name of a divinity. Of this there is other evidence; a Leiden papyrus names Etum as the wife of the Semitic fire-god Reshpu.

The early history of Edom is hidden in darkness. The Egyptian references to it are few, and do not give us much light regarding its early inhabitants. In the early records of the Pentateuch, the country is often referred to by the name of Seir, the general name for the whole range of mountains on the east side of the Jordan-Araba depression south of the Dead Sea. These mountains were occupied, so early as we can find any record, by a cave-dwelling aboriginal race known as Horites, who were smitten by the much-discussed king Chedorlaomer (Gen. xiv. 6) and according to Deut. ii. 22 were driven out by the Semitic tribes of Esau's descendants. The Horites are to us little more than a name, though the discovery of cave-dwellers of very early date at Gezer in the excavations of 1902-1905 has enabled us to form some idea as to their probable culture-status and physical character.

The occupants of Edom during practically the whole period of Biblical history were the Bedouin tribes which claimed descent through Esau from Abraham, and were acknowledged by the Israelites (Deut. xxiii. 7) as kin. That they intermarried with the earlier stock is suggested by the passage in Gen. xxxvi. 2, naming, as one of the wives of Esau, Oholibamah, daughter of Zibeon the Horite (corrected by verse 20). Among the peculiarities of the Edomites was government by certain officials known as [Hebrew: alufim][2] which the English versions (by too close a reminiscence of the Vulgate _duces_) translate "dukes." The now naturalized word "sheikhs" would be the exact rendering. In addition to this Bedouin organization there was the curious institution of an elective monarchy, some of whose kings are catalogued in Gen. xxxvi. 31-39 and 1 Chron. i. 43-54. These kings reigned at some date anterior to the time of Saul. No deductions as to their chronology can be based on the silence regarding them in Moses' song, Exodus xv. 15. There was a king in Edom (Num. xx. 14) who refused passage to the Israelites in their wanderings.

The history of the relations of the Edomites and Israelites may be briefly summarized. Saul, whose chief herdsman, Doeg, was an Edomite (1 Sam. xxi. 7), fought successfully against them (1 Sam. xiv. 47). Joab (1 Kings xi. 16) or Abishai, as his deputy (1 Chron. xviii. 11, 13), occupied Edom for six months and devastated it; it was garrisoned and permanently held by David (2 Sam. viii. 14). But a refugee named Hadad, who escaped as a child to Egypt and grew up at the court of the Egyptian king, returned in Solomon's reign and made a series of reprisal raids on the Israelite territory (1 Kings xi. 14). This did not prevent Solomon introducing Edomites into his harem (1 Kings xi. 1) and maintaining a navy at Ezion-geber, at the head of the Gulf of Akaba (1 Kings ix. 26). Indeed, until the time of Jehoram, when the land revolted (2 Kings viii. 20, 22), Edom was a dependency of Judah, ruled by a viceroy (1 Kings xxii. 47). An attempt at recovering their independence was temporarily quelled in a campaign by Amaziah (2 Kings xiv. 7), and Azariah his successor was able to renew the sea trade of the Gulf of Akaba (2 Kings