Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition, "Evangelical Church Conference" to "Fairbairn, Sir William" Volume 10, Slice 1

xviii. 15-17; public offences are to be dealt with according to the rule

Chapter 92,687 wordsPublic domain

in 1 Cor. v. 3-5, 13. The public expulsion or suspension of the offender is necessary for the good repute of the church, and its influence over the faithful members. The expelled member may be readmitted on showing the fruits of repentance.

In Scotland three degrees of church censure are recognized--admonition, suspension from sealing ordinances (which may be called temporary excommunication), and excommunication properly so-called. Intimation of the last-named censure may occasionally (but very rarely) be given by authority of a presbytery in a public and solemn manner, according to the following formula:--"Whereas thou N. hast been by sufficient proof convicted (here mention the sin) and after due admonition and prayer remainest obstinate without any evidence or sign of true repentance: Therefore in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, and before this congregation, I pronounce and declare thee N. excommunicated, shut out from the communion of the faithful, debar thee from privileges, and deliver thee unto Satan for the destruction of thy flesh, that thy spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus." This is called the greater excommunication. The congregation are thereafter warned to shun all unnecessary converse with the excommunicate (see _Form of Process_, c. 8). Formerly excommunicated persons were deprived of feudal rights in Scotland; but in 1690 all acts enjoining civil pains upon sentences of excommunication were finally repealed (Burton's _History_, vii. 435).

The question whether the power of excommunication rests in the church or in the clergy has been an important one in the history of English and American churches. Hooker lays down (_Survey_, pt. 3, pp. 33-46) four necessary conditions for the execution of a sentence involving church discipline. "(1) The cause exactly recorded is fully and nakedly to be presented to the consideration of the congregation. (2) The elders are to go before the congregation in laying open the rule so far as reacheth any particular now to be considered, and to express their judgment and determination thereof, so far as appertains to themselves. (3) Unless the people be able to convince them of errors and mistakes in their sentence, they are bound to joyn their judgment with theirs to the compleating of the sentence. (4) The sentence thus compleatly issued is to be solemnly passed and pronounced upon the delinquent by the ruling Elder whether it be of censure or excommunication." In this passage it is clear that the effective power of discipline is regarded as being wholly in the power of the individual church or congregation. Hooker expressly denies the power of synods to excommunicate: "that there should be Synods, which have _potestatem juridicam_ is nowhere proved in Scripture because it is not a truth" (_Survey_, pt. 4, pp. 48, 49).

The confession of faith issued by the London-Amsterdam church (the original of the Pilgrim Fathers' churches) in 1596 declares that the Christian congregation having power to elect its minister has also power to excommunicate him if the case so require (Walker, _Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism_, p. 66). In 1603 the document known as "Points of Difference" (i.e. from the established Anglicanism) submitted to James I. sets forth: "That all particular Churches ought to be so constituted as, having their owne peculiar Officers, the whole body of every Church may meet together in one place, and jointly performe their duties to God and one towards another. And that the censures of admonition and excommunication be in due manner executed, for sinne, convicted, and obstinately stood in. This power also to be in the body of the Church whereof the partyes so offending and persisting are members." The _Cambridge Platform_ of 1648 by which the New England churches defined their practice, devotes ch. xiv. to "excommunication and other censures." It follows in the main the line of Hooker and Calvin, but adds (S 6) an important definition: "Excommunication being a spirituall punishment it doth not prejudice the excommunicate in, nor deprive him of his _civil_ rights, therfore toucheth not princes, or other magistrates, in point of their civil dignity or authority. And, the excommunicate being but as a publican and a heathen, heathen being lawfully permitted to come to hear the word in church assemblyes; wee acknowledg therfore the like liberty of hearing the word, may be permitted to persons excommunicate, that is permitted unto heathen. And because wee are not without hope of his recovery, wee are not to account him as an enemy but to admonish him as a brother." The Savoy Declaration of 1658 defines the theory and practice of the older English Nonconformist churches in the section on the "Institution of Churches and the Order appointed in them by Jesus Christ" (xix.). The important article is as follows:--"The Censures so appointed by Christ, are Admonition and Excommunication; and whereas some offences are or may be known onely to some, it is appointed by Christ, that those to whom they are so known, do first admonish the offender in private: in publique offences where any sin, before all; or in case of non-amendment upon private admonition, the offence being related to the Church, and the offender not manifesting his repentance, he is to be duely admonished in the Name of Christ by the whole Church, by the Ministery of the Elders of the Church, and if this Censure prevail not for his repentance, then he is to be cast out by Excommunication with the consent of the Church."

In contemporary English Free Churches the purity of the church is commonly secured by the removal of persons unsuitable for membership from the church books by a vote of the responsible authority. (D. Mn.)

EXCRETION (Lat. _ex_, out of, _cernere_, _cretum_, to separate), in plant and animal physiology, the separation from an organ of some substance, also the substance separated. The term usually refers to the separation of waste or harmful products, as distinguished from "secretion," which refers to products that play a useful or necessary part in the functions of the organism.

EXECUTION (from Lat. _ex-sequor_, _exsecutus_, follow or carry out), the carrying into effect of anything, whether a rite, a piece of music, an office, &c.; and so sometimes involving a notion of skill in the performance. Technically, the word is used in law in the _execution_ of a deed (its formal signing and sealing), an _execution_ (see below) by the sheriff's officers under a "writ of execution" (the enforcement of a judgment on a debtor's goods); and _execution of death_ has been shortened to the one word to denote CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (q.v.).

_Civil Execution_ may be defined as the process by which the judgments or orders of courts of law are made effectual. In Roman law the earliest mode of execution was the seizure, legalized by the _actio per manus injectionem_, of the debtor as a slave of the creditor. During the later Republic, imprisonment took the place of slavery. Under the regime of the _actio per manus injectionem_, the debtor might dispute the debt--the issue being raised by his finding a substitute (_vindex_) to conduct the case for him. By the time of Gaius (iv. 25) the _actio per manus injectionem_ had been superseded by the _actio judicati_, the object of which was to enable the creditor to take payment of the debt or compel the debtor to find security (_pignus in causa judicati captum: Cautio judicatum solvi_), and in A.D. 320 Constantine abolished imprisonment for debt, unless the debtor were contumacious. The time allowed for payment of a judgment debt was by the XII. Tables 30 days; it was afterwards extended to two months, and ultimately, by Justinian, to four months. The next stage in the Roman law of execution was the recognition of bankruptcy either against the will of the bankrupt (_missio in bona_) or on the application of the bankrupt (_cessio bonorum_; and see BANKRUPTCY). Lastly, in the time of Antoninus Pius, judgment debts were directly enforced by the seizure and sale of the debtor's property. Slaves, oxen and implements of husbandry were privileged; and movable property was to be exhausted before recourse was had to land (see Hunter, _Roman Law_, 4th ed. pp. 1029 et seq., Sohm, _Inst. Rom. Law_, 2nd ed. pp. 302-305).

GREAT BRITAIN.--The English law of execution is very complicated, and only a statement of the principal processes can here be attempted.

_High Court.--Fieri Facias._ A judgment for the recovery of money or costs is enforced, as a rule, by writ of _fieri facias_ addressed to the sheriff, and directing him to cause to be made (_fieri facias_) of the goods and chattels of the debtor a levy of a sum sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs, which carry interest at 4% per annum. The seizure effected by the sheriff or his officer, under this writ, of the property of the debtor, is what is popularly known as "the putting-in" of an execution. The seizure should be carried out with all possible despatch. The sheriff or his officer must not break open the debtor's house in effecting a seizure, for "a man's house is his castle" (_Semayne's Case_ [1604], 5 Coke Rep. 91); but this principle applies only to a dwelling-house, and a barn or outhouse unconnected with the dwelling-house may be broken into. The sheriff on receipt of the writ endorses on it the day, hour, month and year when he received it; and the writ binds the debtor's goods as at the date of its delivery, except as regards goods sold before seizure in market overt, or purchased for value, without notice before actual seizure (Sale of Goods Act 1893, s. 26, which supersedes s. 16 of the Statute of Frauds and s. 1 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856). This rule is limited to goods, and does not apply to the money or bank notes of the debtor which are not bound by the writ till seized under it (_Johnson_ v. _Pickering_, Oct. 14, 1907, C.A.). The mere seizure of the goods, however, although, subject to such exceptions as those just stated, it binds the interest of the debtor, and gives the sheriff such an interest in the goods as will enable him to sue for the recovery of their possession, does not pass the property in the goods to the sheriff. The goods are in the custody of the law. But the property remains in the debtor who may get rid of the execution on payment of the claim and fees of the sheriff [as to which see Sheriffs Act 1887, s. 20, and order of 21st of August 1888, _Annual Practice_ (1908), vol. ii. p. 278]. The wearing apparel, bedding, tools, &c., of the debtor to the value of L5 are protected. Competing claims as to the ownership of the goods seized are brought before the courts by the procedure of "interpleader." After seizure, the sheriff must retain possession, and, in default of payment by the execution debtor, proceed to sell. Where the judgment debt, including legal expenses, exceeds L20, the sale must be by public auction, unless the Court otherwise orders, and must be publicly advertised. The proceeds of sale, after deduction of the sheriff's fees and expenses, become the property of the execution creditor to the extent of his claim. The Bankruptcy Act 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 71, s. 11 [2]) requires the sheriff in case of sale under a judgment for a sum exceeding L20 to hold the proceeds for 14 days in case notice of bankruptcy proceedings should be served upon him (see BANKRUPTCY). The form of the writ of _fieri facias_ requires the sheriff to make a return to the writ. In practice this is seldom done unless the execution has been ineffective or there has been delay in the execution of the writ; but the judgment creditor may obtain an order calling on the sheriff to make a return. A sheriff or his officer, who is guilty of extortion in the execution of the writ, is liable to committal for contempt, and to forfeit L200 and pay all damages suffered by the person aggrieved (Sheriffs Act 1887 [50 & 51 Vict. c. 55], s. 29 [2]), besides being civilly liable to such person. Imprisonment for debt in execution of civil judgments is now abolished except in cases of default in the nature of contempt, unsatisfied judgments for penalties, defaults by persons in a fiduciary character, and defaults by judgment debtors (Debtors Act 1869 [32 & 33 Vict. c. 62]; Bankruptcy Act 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 52], ss. 53, 103). Imprisonment for debt has been abolished within similar limits in Scotland (Debtors [Scotland] Act 1880 [43 & 44 Vict. c. 34] and Ireland, Debtors [Ireland] Act 1872, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 57). There may still be imprisonment in England, under the writ--rarely used in practice--_ne exeat regno_, which issues to prevent a debtor from leaving the kingdom.

_Writ of Elegit._--The writ of _elegit_ is a process enabling the creditor to satisfy his judgment debt out of the lands of the debtor. It derives its name from the election of the creditor in favour of this mode of recovery. It is founded on the Statute of Westminster (1285, 13 Ed. I. c. 18), under which the sheriff was required to deliver to the creditor all the chattels (except oxen and beasts of the plough) and _half_ the lands of the debtor until the debt was satisfied. By the Judgments Act 1838 the remedy was extended to _all_ the debtor's lands, and by the Bankruptcy Act 1883 the writ no longer extends to the debtor's goods. The writ is enforceable against legal interests whether in possession or remainder (_Hood-Barrs_ v. _Cathcart_, 1895, 2 Ch. 411), but not against equitable interests in land (_Earl of Jersey_ v. _Uxbridge Rural Sanitary Authority_, 1891, 3 Ch. 183). When the debtor's interest is equitable, recourse is had to equitable execution by the appointment of a receiver or to bankruptcy proceedings.

The writ is directed to the sheriff, who, after marking on it the date of its receipt, at once in pursuance of its directions holds an inquiry with a jury as to the nature and value of the interest of the debtor in the lands extended under the writ, and delivers to the creditor at a reasonable price and extent in accordance with the writ, the lands of which the debtor was possessed in the bailiwick. When the sheriff has returned and filed a record (in the central office of the High Court) of the writ and the execution thereof, the execution creditor becomes "tenant to the elegit." Where the land is freehold the creditor acquires only a chattel interest in it; where the land is leasehold he acquires the whole of the debtor's interest (_Johns_ v. _Pink_, 1900, 1 Ch. 296). The creditor is entitled to hold the land till his debt is satisfied, or enough to satisfy it is tendered to him, and under the Judgments Act 1864 the creditor may obtain an order for sale. Until the land is delivered on execution and the writs which have effected the delivery are registered in the Land Registry, the judgment does not create any charge on the land so as to fetter the debtor's power of dealing with it. Land Charges Registration Acts 1888 and 1900. (See R.S.C., O. xliii.)

_Writs of Possession and Delivery._--Judgments for the recovery or for the delivery of the possession of land are enforceable by writ of possession. The recovery of specific chattels is obtained by writ of delivery (R.S.C., O. xlvii., xlviii.).

_Writ of Sequestration._--Where a judgment directing the payment of money into court, or the performance by the defendant of any act within a limited time, has not been complied with, or where a corporation has wilfully disobeyed a judgment, a writ of sequestration is issued, to not less than four sequestrators, ordering them to enter upon the real estate of the party in default, and "sequester" the rents and profits until the judgment has been obeyed (R.S.C., O. xliii. r. 6).

_Equitable Execution._--Where a judgment creditor is otherwise unable to reach the property of his debtor he may obtain equitable execution, usually by the appointment of a receiver, who collects the rents and profits of the debtor's land for the benefit of the creditor (R.S.C., O. l. rr. 15A-22). But receivers may be appointed of interests in personal property belonging to the debtor by virtue of the Judicature