Part 21

[97] From this definition of an idea, the following proposition must be evident, That there can be no such thing as an innate idea. If the original perception of an object be not innate, which is obvious, it is not less obvious, that the idea or secondary perception of that object cannot be innate. And yet to prove this self-evident proposition, Locke has bestowed a whole book of his treatise upon human understanding. So necessary it is to give accurate definitions, and so preventive of dispute are definitions when accurate. Dr Berkeley has taken great pains to prove another proposition equally evident, That there can be no such thing as a general idea. All our original perceptions are of particular objects, and our secondary perceptions or ideas must be equally so.

[98] Bacon, in his natural history, makes the following observations. Sounds are meliorated by the intension of the sense, where the common sense is collected most to the particular sense of hearing, and the sight suspended. Therefore sounds are sweeter, as well as greater, in the night than in the day: and I suppose they are sweeter to blind men than to others: and it is manifest that between sleeping and waking, when all the senses are bound and suspended, music is far sweeter than when one is fully waking.

End of Project Gutenberg's Elements of Criticism, Volume III., by Henry Home