Chapter 13

4. ¶Lucius was despatched by the Romans to Tarentum. Now the Tarentini were celebrating the Dionysia, and sitting gorged with wine in the theatre of an afternoon suspected that he was sailing against them as an enemy. Immediately in a passion and partly under the influence of their intoxication they set sail in turn: so without any show of force on his part or the slightest expectation of any hostile act they attacked and sent to the bottom both him and many others. When the Romans heard of this they naturally were angry, but did not choose to take the field against Tarentum at once. However, they despatched envoys in order not to seem to have passed over the affair in silence and by that means render them more impudent. But the Tarentini, so far from receiving them decently or even sending them back with an answer in any way suitable, at once, before so much as granting them an audience, made sport of their dress and general appearance. It was the city garb, which we use in the Forum; and this the envoys had put on, either for the sake of stateliness or else through fear, thinking that this at least would cause the foreigners to respect their position. Bands of revelers accordingly jeered at them,--they were still celebrating the festival, which, although they were at no time noted for temperate behavior, rendered them still more wanton,--and finally a man planted himself in the road of Postumius and, with a forward inclination, threw him down and soiled his clothing. At this an uproar arose from all the rest, who praised the fellow as if he had performed some remarkable deed, and they sang many scurrilous anapæsts upon the Romans, accompanied by applause and capering steps. But Postumius cried: "Laugh, laugh while you may! For long will be the period of your weeping, when you shall wash this garment clean with your blood." (Ursinus, p.375. Mai, 168. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

5. Hearing this they ceased their jests but could accomplish nothing towards obtaining pardon for their insult: however, they took to themselves credit for a kindness in the fact that they let the ambassadors withdraw unharmed. (Mai, ib.)

6. ¶Meton, failing to persuade the Tarentini not to engage in hostilities with the Romans, retired unobserved from the assembly, put garlands on his head, and returned along with some fellow-revelers and a flute girl. At the sight of him singing and dancing the kordax, they gave up the business in hand to accompany his movements with shouts and hand-clapping, as is often done under such circumstances. But he, after reducing them to silence, spoke: "Now it is yours both to be drunken and to revel, but if you accomplish what you plan to do, we shall be slaves." (Mai, p.169.)

[Frag. XL]

[Sidenote: B.C. 281 (_a.u._ 473)] ¶King Pyrrhus was not only king of the district called Epirus, but had made the larger part of the Greek world his own, partly by kindness and partly by fear. The Ætolians, who at that period possessed great power, and Philip [Footnote: The son of Cassander, who ruled only four months in B. C. 296.] the Macedonian, and the chief men in Illyricum did his bidding. By natural brilliancy and force of education and experience in affairs he far surpassed all, so as to be esteemed far beyond what was warranted by his own powers and those of his allies, although these powers were great. (Valesius, p.589. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

2. ¶Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, had a particularly high opinion of his powers in that he was deemed by foreign nations a match for the Romans: and he believed that it would be opportune to assist the fugitives who had taken refuge with him, especially as they were Greeks, and at the same time to anticipate the Romans with some plausible excuse before he received any damage at their hands. So careful was he about a fair pretext that though he had long had his eye on Sicily and had been considering how he could overthrow the Roman dominion, he shrank from taking the initiative in hostilities, when no wrong had been done him. (Mai, p.169. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

3. ¶King Pyrrhus was said to have captured more cities by Cineas than by his own spear. For the latter, says Plutarch, [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 14.] was skilled in speaking,--the only one in fact to be compared in skill with Demosthenes. Notwithstanding, as a sensible man, he spoke in opposition to Pyrrhus, pointing out to him the folly of the expedition. For the king intended by his prowess to rule the whole earth, whereas Cineas urged him to be satisfied with his own possessions, which were sufficient for enjoyment. But the man's fondness for war and fondness for leadership prevailed against the advice of Cineas and caused him to depart in disgrace from both Sicily and Italy, after losing in all of the battles many myriads of his own forces. (Valesius, p.586.)

4. ¶Pyrrhus sent to Dodona and enquired of the oracle about the expedition. And a response having come to him: "You, if you cross into Italy, Romans shall conquer," he construed it according to his wish (for desire has mighty power to deceive any one) and would not even await the coming of spring. (Mai, p.169.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 280 (_a.u._ 474)] 5. ¶The Rhegians had asked of the Romans a garrison, and Decius [Footnote: _Decius Vibellius_.] was the leader of it. The majority of these guards, accordingly, as a result of the excess of supplies and general easy habits,--for they enjoyed a far less strenuous existence than they had known at home,--through the persuasion of Decius formed the desire to kill the foremost Rhegians and occupy the city. It seemed as though they might be quite free to perform whatever they pleased, unconcerned about the Romans, who were busied with the Tarentini and with Pyrrhus. Decius was further enabled to persuade them by the fact that they saw Messana in the power of the Mamertines. The latter, who were Campanians and had been appointed to garrison it by Agathocles, the lord of Sicily, had slaughtered the natives and occupied the town.

The conspirators did not, however, make their attempt openly, since they were decidedly inferior in numbers. Letters were forged by Decius, purporting to have been written to Pyrrhus by some citizens with a view to the betrayal of the city. He next assembled the soldiers and read these to them, stating that they had been intercepted, and by his talk (the character of which may easily be conceived) excited them greatly. The effect was enhanced by the sudden announcement of a man (who had been assigned to the role) that a portion of Pyrrhus's fleet had anchored somewhere off the coast, having come for a conference with the traitors. Others, who had been instructed, magnified the matter, and shouted out that they must anticipate the Rhegians before some harm happened, and that the traitors, ignorant of what was being done, would find it difficult to resist them. So some rushed down to the landing places, and others broke into the houses and slaughtered great numbers,--save that a few had been invited to dinner by Decius and were slain there. (Valesius, p.589.)

6. ¶Decius, commander of the garrison, after slaying the Rhegians, ratified friendship with the Mamertines, thinking that the similar nature of their outrages would render them most trustworthy allies. He was well aware that a great many men find the ties resulting from some common transgression stronger to unite them than the obligations of lawful association or the bonds of kinship. (Mai, p.170.)

7. ¶The Romans suffered some reproach from them for a while, until such time as they took the field against them. For since they were busied with concerns that were greater and more urgent, what these men did seemed to some of comparatively little importance. (Mai, p.170.)

8. ¶The Romans, on learning that Pyrrhus was to come, stood in terror of him, since they had heard that he was a good warrior and had a large force by no means despicable as an adversary,--the sort of information, of course, that is always given to enquirers in regard to persons unknown to them who live at a very great distance. (Mai, p.170. Zonaras, 8,3.)

9. For it is impossible that persons not brought up under the same institutions, nor filled with the same ambitions, nor regarding the same things as base or noble, should ever become friends with one another. [Footnote: Nos. 9, 10, and 11 are thought to be possibly from the speech made by Lævinus to the soldiers (Zonaras, VIII, 3, 6).] (Mai, p. 537.)

10. ¶Ambition and distrust are always qualities of tyrants, and so it is inevitable that they should possess no real friend. A man who is distrusted and envied could not love any one sincerely. Moreover, a similarity of habits and a like station in life and the fact that the same objects are disastrous and beneficial to persons are the only forces that can create true, firm friends. Wherever any one of these conditions is lacking, you see a delusive appearance of comradeship, but find it to be without secure support. (Mai, p.170 and 537.)

11. ¶Generalship, if it is assisted by respectable forces of men, contributes greatly both to their preservation and their chances of victory, but by itself is worth nothing. Nor is there any other profession that is of weight without persons to coöperate and to aid in its administration. (Mai, p.171.)

12. ¶When Megacles was dead and Pyrrhus had cast off his cap the battle took an opposite turn. One side was filled with much greater boldness by his preservation and the fact that he had survived contrary to their fears than if the idea had never gained ground that he was dead: the other side, deceived, had no second fund of zeal to expend, but, since they had been cut short in their premature encouragement and because of the sudden change in their feelings to an expectation of less favorable results, had no hope that he might subsequently perish once more. (Mai, p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)

13. ¶When certain men congratulated Pyrrhus on his victory, he accepted the glory of the exploit, but said that if he should ever conquer again in like fashion, it would be his ruin. Besides this story, it is told of him that he admired the Romans even in their defeat and judged them superior to his own soldiers, declaring: "I should already have mastered the whole inhabited world, were I king of the Romans." (Mai, p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)

14. ¶Pyrrhus became famous for his victory and acquired a great reputation from it, to such an extent that many who were standing neutral came over to his side and that all the allies who had been watching the turn of events espoused his cause. He did not openly display anger towards them nor conceal entirely his suspicions; he rebuked them somewhat for their tardiness, but otherwise received them kindly. The result of showing excessive irritation would be, he feared, their open estrangement, while if he failed to reveal his real feelings at all, he thought that he would either be condemned by them for his simplicity in not comprehending what they had done, or would be suspected of harboring secret wrath. Such a surmise would breed in them either contempt or hatred, or would lead to a plot against him, due to the desire to anticipate injuries that they might suffer at his hands. For these reasons, then, he conversed affably with them and presented to them some of the spoils. (Mai, p.172. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

15. ¶Pyrrhus at first undertook to persuade the Roman captives (who were many) to join with him in a campaign against Rome; when, however, they refused, he treated them with the utmost consideration and did not put them in prison or harm them in any other way, his intention being to restore them voluntarily and through their agency to win over the city without a battle. (Valesius, p.590.)

16. ¶The Romans, who by reason of the elephants,--a kind of beast that they had never before seen,--had fallen into dismay, still, by reflecting on the mortal nature of the animals and the fact that no beast is superior to man, but that all of them in every way show inferiority if not as regards strength, at least in respect to understanding, they gradually became encouraged. (Mai, p.172.)

17. ¶The soldiers of Pyrrhus, also, both his native followers and the allies, showed tremendous eagerness for plunder, which seemed to lie ready before them and to be free from danger. (Mai, ib.)

18. ¶The Epirots dishonored the ties of friendship, through vexation that after making the campaign supported by high hopes they were getting nothing except trouble. And this happened very opportunely for the Romans: for the dwellers in Italy that had leagued themselves with him, on seeing that he ravaged the possessions of allies and enemies alike, withdrew. In other words, his acts made a greater impression upon them than his promises. (Mai, ib.)

19. ¶Pyrrhus dreaded being cut off on all sides by the Romans, while he was in unfamiliar regions. When his allies showed displeasure at this he told them that he could see clearly from the country itself what a difference existed between them and the Romans. The subject territory of the latter had all kinds of trees, vineyards and farms, and expensive agricultural machinery; whereas the property of his own friends had been so pillaged, that it was impossible to tell even whether it had ever been settled. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

20. ¶The same man, when as he was retreating it occurred to him to wonder [Footnote: Gap supplied by van Herwerden.] how he beheld the army of Lævinus much larger than it was before, declared that the Roman troops when cut to pieces grew whole again, hydra-fashion. This did not, however, cause him to lose courage: he made preparations in his turn, but did not come to the issue of battle. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8,4.)

21. ¶Pyrrhus, who learned that Fabricius and other envoys were approaching, to treat in behalf of the captives, sent a guard to them as far as the border, to the end that they should suffer no violence at the hands of the Tarentini, met them in due time, escorted them to the city, entertained them brilliantly and honored them in other ways, expecting that they would ask for a truce and make such terms as was proper for a defeated party. (Ursinus, p.376. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

22. ¶When Fabricius made this statement merely: "The Romans sent us to bring back the men captured in battle, and to pay ransoms of such size for them as shall be agreed upon by both of us," he was quite dumbfounded because the man did not say that he was commissioned to treat about peace; and after removing them he took counsel with the friends who were usually his advisers partly, to be sure, about the return of the captives, but chiefly about the war and its management, whether with vehemence or in some other way it [lacuna] (Four pages are lacking.) (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

23 [lacuna]. "to manage, or to run the risk of battles and combats, the outcome of which is doubtful. [Footnote: Cineas is the speaker.] Hence, if you heed me, Milo, and the old proverb, you will not employ violence for any purpose rather than skill, where the latter is feasible, since Pyrrhus knows precisely what he has to do and does not need to be enlightened by us regarding a single detail of his program." By this speech they were all brought to one decision, particularly because this course entailed neither loss nor danger, whereas the others were likely to bring both. And Pyrrhus, being of this mind, said to the ambassadors: "Not willingly, Romans, did I previously make war upon you, and I would not war against you now: I feel that it is of the highest importance to become your friend, and for this reason I release all the captives without ransom and make a treaty of peace." Privately, also, he did them favors, in order that, if possible, they might take his part, or at any rate obtain friendship for him. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

24. Pyrrhus made friends of nearly all, and with Fabricius he conversed as follows: "Fabricius, I do not want to be at war with you any longer, and indeed I repent that I heeded the Tarentini in the first place and came hither, although I have beaten you badly in battle. I would gladly, then, become a friend to all the Romans, but most of all to you. For I see that you are a thoroughly excellent and reputable [Footnote: The two words "and reputable" are a conjecture of Bossevain's. Some ten letters in the MS. have faded out.] man. I accordingly ask you to help me in getting peace and furthermore to accompany me home. I want to make a campaign against Greece and need you as adviser and general." Fabricius replied: "I commend you for repenting of your expedition and desiring peace, and will cordially assist you in that purpose if it is to our advantage (for of course you will not ask me, a man who pretends to uprightness, as you say, to do anything against my country); but an adviser and general you must never choose from a democracy: as for me, I have no leisure whatever. Nor could I ever accept any of these things, because it is not seemly for an ambassador to receive gifts at all. I would fain know, therefore, whether you in very truth regard me as a reputable man or not. If I am a scoundrel, how is it that you deem me worthy of gifts? If, on the other hand, I am a man of honor, how can you bid me accept them? Let me assure you, then, of the fact that I have many possessions and am in no need of more: what I own supplies me and I feel no desire for what belongs to others. You, however, even if you believe yourself ever so rich, are in unspeakable poverty. For you would not have crossed over to this land, leaving behind Epirus and the rest of your dominions, if you had been content with them and had not been reaching out for more. Whenever a man is in this condition and sets no limit to his greed, he is the poorest of beggars. And why? Because he longs for everything not his own as if it were absolutely necessary, and with the idea that he could not live without it.

"Consequently I would gladly, since you call yourself my friend, afford you a little of my own wealth. It is far more secure and imperishable than yours, and no one envies it or plots against it, neither populace nor tyrant: best of all, the larger the number of persons who share it, the greater it will grow. In what, accordingly, does it consist? In using the little one has with as much satisfaction as if it were inexhaustible, in refraining from the goods of others as if they contained some mighty danger, in wronging no man, in doing well to many, and in numberless other details, which only a person of leisure could rehearse. I, for my part, should choose, if it were absolutely necessary to suffer either one or the other, to perish by violence rather than by deceit. The former falls to the lot of some by the decree of Fortune, but the latter only as a result of folly and great greed of gain: it is, therefore, preferable to fall by the crushing hand of Fate [Footnote: Omitting [Greek: ti], and reading [Greek: thehioy], which the MSS. give.] rather than by one's own baseness. In the former instance a man's body is laid low, but in the latter his soul is ruined as well,[lacuna] but in that case a man becomes to a certain extent the slayer of himself, because he who has once taught his soul not to be content with the fortune already possessed, acquires a boundless desire for increased advantages." (Mai, pp.174 and 538. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

25. And they presented themselves for the enlistment with the greatest zeal, believing, each man of them, that his own defection would mean the overthrow of the fatherland. [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 18 (early).] (Mai, p.176.)

26. Such is the nature of oratory and so great is its power that it led even them to change, causing courage and hatred to take the place respectively of the fear inspired by Pyrrhus and the estrangements his gifts had wrought. (Mai, ib.)

27. ¶Every force which, contrary to expectation, is humbled in spirit, suffers a loss also in strength. (Mai, p.177.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 279 (_a.u._ 475)] 28. ¶Pyrrhus sent to Decius, telling him that he would not succeed in accomplishing this even if he wished it [i. e., to die without being seized] and threatened besides that if he were taken alive he should perish miserably. To this the consuls answered that they were in no need of having recourse to such a proceeding as the one to which he alluded, since they were sure to conquer him in other ways. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 5.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 278 (_a.u._ 476)] 29. He did not know how he would repulse the one of them [Footnote: "They" are C. Fabricius Luscinus and Q. Aemilius Papus, Roman consuls.] first, nor how he should repel them both, and was in perplexity. To divide the army, which was smaller than that of his opponents, was something he feared to do, yet to allow one of them to ravage the country with impunity seemed to him almost out of the question. (Mai, p.177.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 277 (_a.u._ 477)] 30. However, he behaved in general toward them with great circumspection, and awarded greater credit for his safety to the fact that no one, even if he wished, could harm him, than to the probability that no one would have desired to inflict an injury. It was for this reason, too, that he expelled and slew many who held office and many who called him in to help in their disputes. This was partly because he was somewhat displeased with them, on account of their statements that he had secured the reins of power in the State through their influence, and partly because he was suspicious of them and thought that as they had come over to his side so they might go over to some one else's [lacuna] (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 5.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 276 (_a.u._ 479)] 31. ¶As the allies were unwilling to contribute anything for the support of Pyrrhus, he betook himself to the treasuries of Persephone, that were widely reputed for their wealth, despoiled them and sent the spoils on ships to Tarentum. And the men almost all perished through a storm, while the money and offerings were cast out on land. (Valesius, p.590.)

32. ¶All admired the following act of Pyrrhus. Some youths at a banquet had ridiculed him, and at first he wished to have them before a court and exact vengeance, but, afterward, when they declared: "We should have said a lot more things a good deal worse, if the wine hadn't failed us," he laughed and let them go. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 6.)

[Frag. XLI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 273 (_a.u._ 481)] ¶Ptolemy, nicknamed Philadelphus, king of Egypt, when he learned that Pyrrhus had fared poorly and that the Romans were growing, sent gifts to them and made a compact. The Romans, accordingly, pleased that a monarch living so very far away should have come to respect them, despatched ambassadors to him in turn. From him the envoys, too, received magnificent gifts; but when they had offered these to the treasury, they would not accept them. (Ursinus, p.374. Zonaras, 8, 6.)

[Frag. XLII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 266 (_a.u._ 488)]¶Though the Romans were faring in this manner and were constantly rising to greater heights they showed no haughtiness as yet: on the contrary, they surrendered to the Appolloniatians (Corinthian colonists on the Ionian Gulf) Quintus Fabius, a senator, because he had insulted some of their ambassadors. The people of this town, however, did him no harm, and even sent him home. (Valesius, p.590. Zonaras, 8, 7.)

[Frag. XLIII]