Part 2

The country is also rich in minerals, but the mines are undeveloped. By the laws of the land, all minerals belong to the government, hence no private mining enterprises are permitted. Coal is found in many parts of the country, but being a mineral, by government classification, it cannot be mined except officially. Copper, silver, and lead abound, but the few mines worked by the government have not been paying enterprises except to the official in charge.

In a word, Turkey is naturally a rich country, with boundless resources now largely undeveloped, with undreamed-of possibilities of increased production under modern methods of agriculture and mining. It is probably true that the empire includes some of the very richest land and ore deposits in the world.

Exportation from Turkey is limited to the coast borders and to the proximity of the few railways that exist. Railroads are confined to the European district and the eastern section of Asia Minor, with a short line reaching to Tarsus and Adana from Mersin and one from Joppa up to Jerusalem. New lines are under construction intending to connect Damascus with Mecca. Railroads cannot long be kept out of the interior of the country. There are but few made wagon roads, nearly all of which have been constructed since the Crimean war in 1854. One of the most noted of these few roads over which wheeled vehicles can pass extends from Samsoun upon the middle southern coast of the Black Sea, through Marsovan, Tokat, Amasia, Sivas, Malatia, Harpoot, and Diarbekr, ending at Mardin, a distance of nearly six hundred miles. Some of the bridges planned were never built, and many were washed away soon after construction. Another highway of a similar nature extends from Trebizond to Erzerum. Others have been recently built in Northern Syria. These roads never fail to be in poor repair. But the ordinary roads are worse, being in all parts of the empire mere bridle-paths, often worn deep in the solid rock by the hoof-beats of the caravans of fifty centuries.

These conditions necessitate in the interior the transportation of all freight by horse or camel, thus discouraging commerce and trade, increasing the price of imports and making export practically impossible. This explains why a famine may prevail in one part of the country when at the same time, less than three hundred miles away, the crops are abundant. A good system of railroads would revolutionize everything. There is an abundance of foreign capital ready to construct such roads. Some fifteen years ago the plan was practically consummated to build a railroad from Samsoun through Asia Minor down across northern Mesopotamia to Bagdad. At the last moment the plan was thwarted by the sultan himself. In conversation upon this matter with an intelligent Mohammedan official who had been educated in England and France, the writer asked him if he did not understand that such a road would bring much wealth into the country, and at the same time develop far more wealth in the country itself. He was asked if he had studied the railroads of America and Europe and observed the great value they were in every way in those countries. His reply was characteristic. It was in substance, “I know well that all that you say of the value of railroads to a country is true. You have not overstated it. At the same time I know, and so does my master, the sultan, that every dollar of foreign capital that comes into this country under concessions as an investment, curtails by so much the authority of the sultan in his own domains. Such capital always brings with it foreign protection. If his imperial majesty should change his mind, as he has full right to do at any time, in regard to any of these concessions, he is at once confronted by the protests of that country to which the capital belongs, demanding that he adhere to the original agreement or pay damages. The ruler of the Ottoman empire will never willingly submit to such humiliation. When railroads are built through Turkey, his majesty will construct them himself.”

This explains why foreign capital is not building railroads, developing mines, and constructing factories in that country. It explains why, in this respect, Turkey is still in the depths of the dark ages.

The telegraph system of the country is entirely in the hands of the government and reaches every city of any considerable size. This became necessary to the sultan in order to carry on the processes of government. Telegrams are carefully censored; cipher despatches, when known to be such, are not accepted except from ambassadors and from foreign powers to their chief at the Porte, or vice versa. The postal system is antiquated, irregular, and uncertain, reaching only the large towns upon the limited cross-country routes. Telephones are strictly prohibited.

In Constantinople and in several of the port cities like Smyrna, Trebizond, etc., there are foreign post-offices supported and conducted by foreign countries and using foreign stamps. These became necessary because of the unreliability of the Turkish offices. The local government has made several attempts to abolish the sale and use of foreign postage-stamps in the country, but has failed of accomplishing it because the representatives of the leading foreign powers are unwilling to trust their mail to Turkish supervision and control.

III. HISTORY AND GOVERNMENT

Even now, when we all talk of the Turkish empire as moribund, it is doubtful if it will perish under any decay from within. The subject races do not grow stronger, as witness recent scenes in Armenia, where a single tribe, with only tolerance from the sultan, keeps a whole people in agonies of fear. The Arabs, full-blooded and half-caste, who might succeed in insurrection, find the strength of civilized Europe right across their path, and are precipitating themselves, in a fury of fanaticism and greed, upon the powerless states of the interior of Africa. The European subjects of the sultan are cowed, and without foreign assistance will not risk a repetition of Batouk. The army for internal purposes is far stronger than ever, the men being the old Ottoman soldiers, brave as Englishmen, abstemious as Spaniards, to whom the Germans have lent their discipline and their drill. No force within the empire outside Arabia could resist the reorganized troops or hope to reach, as no doubt the first Mahdi if left alone might have reached, Constantinople itself. The financial difficulties of the treasury are great, but the sultans have recently risked and have survived complete repudiation, and the revenue is enough, and will remain enough, to keep the army together and supply the luxury of the palace. —MEREDITH TOWNSEND in “Asia and Europe.”

We cannot trace here the story of the rise and spread of Islam from its cradle in Arabia to the period of its greatest virility in 1529, when all Europe trembled at its onward sweep and conquest. We can speak only of the rise of the Ottoman empire that has been perpetuated in unbroken succession to the present time.

Near the middle of the thirteenth century a tribe of Turks, not Suljuks, left their camping-grounds in Khorassan, urged on by the Mongol invaders, and wandered into Armenia. This tribe was divided into four sections; one of these, led by Ertogrul, went into Asia Minor, and there became allied with Aladdin the Suljukian, sultan of Iconium. He settled upon the borders of Phrygia and Bithynia and there his son Othman, or Osman, who became the founder of a dynasty and an empire, was born and nurtured. The name “Ottoman Empire” or “Osmanli Turks” came from him. The name “Othman” signifies “bone-breaker.”

The young man succeeded his father as the head of the tribe. He united in his character the traits of shepherd, freebooter, and warrior. Osman’s ambition was fired by a dream of conquest that seated him upon the Byzantine throne. He was upon the border of the decaying Greek empire to the west, and back of him were the vast, restless populations ready to enlist under any leader of strength and action. He invaded Nicomedia July 27, 1299, from which time his reign is usually dated. This was parallel with Edward I of England, Philip the Fair of France, and Andronicus Palæologus the elder of Constantinople. Slow encroachment was made upon the imperial domains of the Greek empire, while at the same time his authority was extended over considerable districts in the north and west of Asia Minor, including large parts of Phrygia, Galatia, and Bithynia. Prusa (Brusa) was captured and became the residence of Othman, and was the seat of his government when he died in 1326.

Othman was succeeded by Orchan, his son, who extended the boundaries of the infant state with marked rapidity. He took Nicæa, the rest of Bithynia, the greater part of Mysia, and was the first Turkish ruler to pass over into Europe. He coined money in his own name, and assumed the prerogatives of royalty, and began the systematic organization of his government. A permanent military force was established. One of his strongest military organizations was composed of the children of conquered Christians who were reared in Islam, inured from their youth to the profession of arms. These became the famous Janissaries perpetuated in the conquests of the Turkish government until the middle of the nineteenth century. They were distinguished for their valor and fanaticism. Through more than three centuries, marked by a long series of great battles, they experienced only four signal reverses. One of these was by Tamerlane, in 1402, and another by the Hungarian general, John Huniades, in 1442. The present methods of administration of the Ottoman empire are due in no small measure to the despotic nature and fanatical character of the Janissaries. Their assumption finally reached such a state that it became necessary to extirpate them by the sword to prevent their exercise of authority over the sultans themselves. This was accomplished by Mohammed II in 1826.

Amurath I succeeded Orchan in 1359. He began at once to make advance against the Greek throne, which was much weakened by its schismatic separation from the Roman church. In 1361 he took Adrianople in Europe and made it his official residence, and the first European capital of the Ottoman power. His successor, Bajazet I, changed the title of “Emir” for that of “Sultan,” which name has been perpetuated. He set the example, followed so repeatedly since, of putting his only brother to death in order that he might not aspire to the throne. He extended his domains east to the Euphrates and north to the Danube. He boasted that he would yet feed his horses on the altar of St. Peter’s in Rome. He was captured by Tamerlane in 1402, dying the following year in captivity. Tamerlane held undisputed sway over Asia for a few years. A son of Bajazet, Mahomet I, restored the empire of his fathers in its integrity. It was during his reign, 1413-21, that the first Turkish ambassador appeared abroad. He was sent to Venice. The sultan himself paid a visit to the emperor Manuel at Constantinople.

Without dwelling upon the successive sultans and the advances made by each, it is sufficient to record that most important of all the victories, the capture of Constantinople, the capital of the Greek empire, by Mohammed II, the seventh in succession from Othman, on May 29, 1453, in the second year of his reign. This terminated the Greek empire, 1123 years after Constantine the Great had removed his imperial throne to Byzantium, changing its name to Constantinople. Consternation prevailed among the European nations, especially in those immediately contiguous to the Mohammedan empire.

From that time to the present day, Constantinople has been the residence of the sultans ruling over the Ottoman empire, and the seat of the Turkish power. Much of the machinery of government now in use was organized and put into operation by Mohammed II. The administrative departments were constituted in what was then called “The Porte,” while the head of the department was given the well-known name of “Sublime Porte.” This name came from the metaphorical resemblance between a state and a house or tent. The most important part of the tent was the entrance in which the chiefs sat for the administration of justice, as well as for the performance of other duties.

Mohammed died in 1481. Succeeding sultans for a century seriously threatened the institutions of Western nations. In the religious conflicts of the sixteenth century the pope of Rome was undecided which to fear the more, the Protestants or the Turks.

The Ottoman empire reached the zenith of its power under Suliman, the tenth sultan, whose reign was the longest in the annals of the empire, from 1520-1566. He is often known in Europe as Suliman “the great” or “the magnificent,” but Moslem writers name him “the lawgiver.” In 1525 the French ambassador appeared at the Ottoman court. The first European states to stipulate regular capitulations with the Porte were Genoa and Venice, which accomplished this in 1453 and 1454 respectively. These were confirmed and enlarged by succeeding sovereigns to 1733. France next secured capitulations in 1528, which were afterwards amplified, renewed, and confirmed down to 1861. The first treaty relations of England with Turkey were in 1579. Other European nations followed in orderly succession, until the United States concluded its first treaty at Constantinople, May 7, 1830, which was ratified at Washington, Feb. 4, 1832.

At the beginning of the seventeenth century the Ottoman empire covered Europe, Macedonia, Adrianople, Greece, and the greater part of Hungary, while in Asia it held all of Asia Minor, Armenia, Georgia, Daghestan, the western part of Koordistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, Cyprus, and the chief part of Arabia. In Africa, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers acknowledged allegiance to the sultan at Constantinople; and the khanate of Crimea, the principalities of Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania with the republic of Ragusa were vassal states. Diplomatic and commercial relations had been established between the Porte and the leading European nations. From that time the great power then possessed began to wane.

Fundamentally the laws of Turkey are based upon the teachings of the Koran. The only restraint upon the acts of the sultan are the accepted truths of Islam as laid down in the sacred book of the prophet Mohammed. Next to the Koran the authority is a code of laws formed of the supposed sayings and opinions of Mohammed, and of sentences and decisions of his immediate successors. These are called the “Multeka,” and are binding upon both the sovereign and his subjects. Beyond these the will of the man who occupies the throne of the Ottoman empire is absolute and must be unquestioned by every subject.

The sultan, therefore, is at the head of every department of government, amenable to no laws except the law of the Koran. He appoints two high dignitaries,—the grand vizier, to be the nominal head of the temporal government, and the Sheik-ul-Islam, to be the head of the spiritual government. The Sheik-ul-Islam presides over the “Ulema,” a body made up of the Mohammedan clergy, the great judges, theologians, and jurists, as well as the noted teachers of Mohammedan literature and science.

There is no constitution to exercise directing influence over either the sultan or his subordinates. The grand vizier is nominally at the head of the government and represents the sultan. At the present time he has come to be only the agent of the sultan in carrying out his wishes, having little authority to act independently. The privy council, over which the grand vizier presides, is composed of the following officials or cabinet officers:

Sheik-ul-Islam Minister of Justice “ “ War “ “ Marines President of the Council of State Minister of Foreign Affairs “ “ the Interior “ “ Finance “ “ Pious Foundations “ “ Public Instruction “ “ Commerce and Public Works

The whole of the country is divided into vilayets or states, and these are subdivided into sanjaks or provinces, which, in turn, are also divided and subdivided. The ruler in a vilayet is a vali or governor-general, who receives his appointment directly from the sultan, and who, with the assistance of a provincial council, is master of the vilayet. He has power over the inferior officers of his district, whom, theoretically at least, he appoints and removes at will. There are eight of these vilayets in Europe, eleven in Asia, five in Armenia, three in Mesopotamia, six in Syria, two in Arabia, and two in Africa, making thirty-seven in all. The man at the head of each one of these states, averaging a population of about 700,000 souls each, is accountable to the sultan alone for his position and to him he makes constant secret reports. These valis are frequently recalled and more frequently changed from place to place by orders issued directly from the throne. In this way the sultan controls all parts of his dominions and personally determines the character of the administration. All policies carried out in any part of the empire are his own and cannot be otherwise under present conditions.

IV. THE SULTAN, THE HEART OF TURKEY

The general tendency of Islam is to stimulate intolerance and to engender hatred and contempt not only for polytheists, but also, although in a modified form, for all monotheists who will not repeat the formula which acknowledges that Mohammed was indeed the Prophet of God. Neither can this be any matter for surprise. The faith of Islam admits of no compromise. The Moslem is the antithesis of the pantheistic Hindoo. His faith is essentially exclusive. Its founder launched fiery anathemas against all who would not accept the divinity of his inspiration, and his words fell on fertile ground, for a large number of those who have embraced Islam are semi-savages, and often warlike savages, whose minds are too untrained to receive the idea that an honest difference of opinion is no cause for bitter hatred. More than this, the Moslem has for centuries past been taught that the barbarous principles of the _lex talionis_ are sanctioned, and even enjoined by his religion. He is told to revenge himself on his enemies, to strike them that strike him, to claim an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth. Islamism, therefore, unlike Christianity, tends to engender the idea that revenge and hatred, rather than love and charity, should form the basis of the relations between man and man; and it inculcates a special degree of hatred against those who do not accept the Moslem faith. “When ye encounter the unbelievers,” says the Koran, “strike off their heads until ye have made a great slaughter among them, and bind them in bonds.... O true believers, if ye assist God, by fighting for his religion, he will assist you against your enemies; and will set your feet fast; but as for the infidels, let them perish; and their works God shall render vain.... Verily, God will introduce those who believe and do good works into gardens beneath which rivers flow, but the unbelievers indulge themselves in pleasures, and eat as beasts eat; and their abode shall be hell fire.” It is true that when Mohammed denounced unbelievers he was alluding more especially to the pagans who during his lifetime inhabited the Arabian Peninsula, but later commentators and interpreters of the Koran applied his denunciations to Christians and Jews, and it is in this sense that they are now understood by a large number of Mohammedans. Does not the word “Ghazi,” which is the highest title attainable by an officer of the sultan’s army, signify “one who fights in the cause of Islam; a hero; a warrior; one who slays an infidel”? Does not every Mollah, when he recites the Khutbeh at the Mosque, invoke Divine wrath on the heads of unbelievers in terms which are sufficiently pronounced at all times, and in which the diapason of invective swells still more loudly when any adventitious circumstances may have tended to fan the flame of fanaticism? Should not every non-Moslem land be considered in strict parlance a Dar-el-Harb, a land of warfare? When principles such as these have been dinned for centuries past into the ears of Moslems, it can be no matter for surprise that a spirit of intolerance has been generated. —LORD CROMER in “Modern Egypt.”

The present sultan, Abdul Hamid II, is the thirty-fourth in direct male succession from Othman and the second son of Sultan Abdul Medjid. He succeeded to the throne upon the deposition of his brother, Murad V, August 31, 1876, at the age of thirty-four. By the Turkish law of succession the crown is inherited according to seniority by the male descendants of Othman springing from the imperial harem. All children born in the harem, whether from free women or slaves, are legitimate and possess equal rights. The sultan is succeeded by his eldest son, in case there are no uncles or cousins of greater age. The present heir apparent to the throne is the oldest brother of the sultan, who outranks all of the five sons of Abdul Hamid as heir to the throne. It is not the custom of the sultans to contract regular marriages. The harem is kept full of women by purchase, capture, or voluntary offering. Most of the inmates come from districts beyond the limits of the empire, largely from Circassia.

The sultan is, without question, the most phenomenal person sitting upon any throne to-day. Educated within his own palace, having passed but once beyond the borders of the land in which he was born, he is able to outwit and outmatch in diplomacy the combined rulers of Europe. He has administered his widely-extended and varied empire in accordance with the unmodified Moslem principles of the Middle Ages, and has successfully defied all attempts upon the part of Christian nations to change his policy. Without a navy he has succeeded in averting repeated threats of attack by the strongest navies of the world. With depleted and diminishing resources he has held his creditors at bay, capitalized his indebtedness, and continued to live in lavish luxury. It is true that his refusal to comply with the demands for reform have at times in the past led to the loss of some of his possessions, still he does not seem to have learned therefrom any permanent lesson.

Turkey as a whole has never been so unrighteously governed as it is to-day, and, in spite of the pressure of European governments, there is little prospect of radical reforms so long as the present sultan sits upon the throne. While he is an astute and unprincipled diplomat and a tireless sovereign, he is not a reformer in any sense of the word. So long as he is sultan, he proposes to be master, preferring to lose entire provinces rather than to share the administration with any. He yields only when subterfuge fails and the policy of delay is rejected; after he has yielded, he devotes himself to vitiating the advantages his subjects might gain by his concessions.

Personally timid and fearful, he astonishes the world by the boldness of his strokes at home and his stubborn resistance to pressure from abroad. Himself profoundly religious, he horrifies all by the wholesale murder of his subjects through his lieutenants acting upon direct orders from the palace. This he has done repeatedly, and it is a part of his method of administering his home affairs and keeping his subjects properly subdued.