Part 30

"Prince Lichnowsky's 'optimism' was hardly justified, as he has probably convinced himself since through the revelations of the Sukhomlinoff trial. Besides, the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement (of which, as said before, he was informed) should have made him more skeptical. Unfortunately, the suspicion voiced by the Imperial Chancellor and the Under Secretary of State was well grounded. How does this agree with the assertion that we, relying upon the reports of Count Pourtalès that 'Russia would not move under any circumstances,' had not thought of the possibility of a war? Furthermore, so far as I can recollect, Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador at St. Petersburg] never made such reports.

Blame for Russia

"That Austria-Hungary wished to proceed against the constant provocations stirred up by Russia, (Herr von Hartwig,) which reached their climax in the outrage of Serajevo, we had to recognize as justified. In spite of all the former settlements and avoidances of menacing conflicts, Russia did not abandon her policy, which aimed at the complete exclusion of the Austrian influence (and naturally ours also) from the Balkans. The Russian agents, inspired by Petrograd, continued their incitement. It was a question of the prestige and the existence of the Danube Monarchy. It must either put up with the Russo-Serbian machinations, or command a quos ego, even at the risk of war. We could not leave our ally in the lurch. Had the intention been to exclude the ultima ratio of the war in general, the alliance should not have been concluded. Besides, it was plain that the Russian military preparations, (for instance, the extension of the railroads and forts in Poland,) for which a France lusting for revenge had lent the money and which would have been completed in a few years, were directed principally against us. But despite all this, despite the fact that the aggressive tendency of the Russian policy was becoming more evident from day to day, the idea of a preventive war was far removed from us. We only decided to declare war on Russia in the face of the Russian mobilization and to prevent a Russian invasion.

"I have not the letters exchanged with the Prince at hand--it was a matter of private letters. Lichnowsky pleaded for the abandonment of Austria. I replied, so far as I remember, that we, aside from our treaty obligation, could not sacrifice our ally for the uncertain friendship of England. If we abandoned our only reliable ally later we would stand entirely isolated, face to face with the Entente. It is likely that I also wrote that 'Russia was constantly becoming more anti-German' and that we must 'just risk it.' Furthermore, it is possible that I, in order to steel Lichnowsky's nerves a little and to prevent him from exposing his views also in London, may also have written that there would probably be some 'bluster'; that 'the more firmly we stood by Austria the sooner Russia would yield.' I have said already that our policy was not based upon alleged reports excluding war; certainly at that time I still thought war could be avoided, but, like all of us, I was fully aware of the very serious danger.

"We could not agree to the English proposal of a conference of Ambassadors, for it would doubtless have led to a serious diplomatic defeat. For Italy, too, was pro-Serb and, with her Balkan interests, stood rather opposed to Austria. The 'intimacy of the Russo-Italian relations' is admitted by Prince Lichnowsky himself. The best and only feasible way of escape was a localization of the conflict and an understanding between Vienna and Petrograd. We worked toward that end with all our energy. That we 'insisted upon' the war is an unheard-of assertion which is sufficiently invalidated by the telegrams of his Majesty the Kaiser to the Czar and to King George, published in the White Books--Prince Lichnowsky only cares to tell about 'the really humble telegram of the Czar'--as well as the instruction we sent to Vienna. The worst caricature is formed by the sentence:

"'When Count Berchtold finally decided to come around we answered the Russian mobilization, after Russia had vainly negotiated and waited a whole week, with the ultimatum and the declaration of war.'

[In quoting Lichnowsky, Herr von Jagow omits the former's statement that Count Berchtold "hitherto had played the strong man on instructions from Berlin."]

"Wrong" Conclusions

"Should we, perhaps, have waited until the mobilized Russian Army was streaming over our borders? The reading of the Sukhomlinov trial has probably given even Prince Lichnowsky a feeling of 'Oh si tacuisses!' On July 5 I was absent from Berlin. The declaration that I was 'shortly thereafter in Vienna' 'in order to talk everything over with Count Berchtold' is false. I returned to Berlin on July 6 from my honeymoon trip and did not leave there until Aug. 15, on the occasion of the shifting of the Great Headquarters. As Secretary of State I was only once in Vienna before the war, in the Spring of 1913.

"Prince Lichnowsky lightly passed over the matter of the confusing dispatch that he sent us on Aug. 1--at present I am not in possession of the exact wording--as a 'misunderstanding' and even seems to want to reproach us because 'in Berlin the news, without first waiting for the conversation, was made the basis of a far-reaching action.' The question of war with England was a matter of minutes, and immediately after the arrival of the dispatch it was decided to make an eleventh-hour attempt to avoid war with France and England. His Majesty sent the well-known telegram to King George. The contents of the Lichnowsky dispatch could not have been understood any other way than we understood it.

"Objectively taken, the statement of Prince Lichnowsky presents such an abundance of inaccuracies and distortions that it is hardly a wonder that his conclusions are also entirely wrong. The reproach that we sent an ultimatum on July 30 to Petrograd merely because of the mobilization of Russia and on July 31 declared war upon the Russians, although the Czar had pledged his word that not a man should march so long as negotiations were under way, thus willfully destroying the possibility of a peaceful adjustment, has really a grotesque effect. In concluding, the statement seems almost to identify itself with the standpoint of our enemies.

"When the Ambassador makes the accusation that our policy identified itself 'with Turks and Austro-Magyars' and 'subjected itself to the viewpoints of Vienna and Budapest,' he may be suitably answered that he saw things only through London spectacles and from the narrow point of view of his desired rapprochement with England à tout prix. He also appears to have forgotten completely that the Entente was formed much more against us than against Austria.

"I, too, pursued a policy which aimed at an understanding with England, because I was of the opinion that this was the only way for us to escape from the unfavorable position in which we were placed by the unequal division of strength and the weakness of the Triple Alliance. But Russia and France insisted upon war. We were obligated through our treaty with Austria, and our position as a great power was also threatened--hic Rhodus, hic salta. But England, that was not allied in the same way with Russia and that had received far-reaching assurances from us regarding the sparing of France and Belgium, seized the sword.

"In saying this, I by no means share the opinion prevalent among us today that England laid all the mines for the outbreak of the war; on the contrary, I believe in Sir Edward Grey's love of peace and in his earnest wish to arrive at an agreement with us. But he had allowed himself to become entangled too far in the net of the Franco-Russian policy; he no longer found the way out, and he did not prevent the world war--something that he could have done. Neither was the war popular with the English people; Belgium had to serve as a battle cry.

"'Political marriages for life and death' are, as Prince Lichnowsky says, not possible in international unions. But neither is isolation, under the present condition of affairs in Europe. The history of Europe consists of coalitions that sometimes have led to the avoidance of warlike outbreaks and sometimes to violent clashes. A loosening and dissolving of old alliances that no longer correspond to all conditions is only in order when new constellations are attainable. This was the object of the policy of a rapprochement with England. So long as this policy did not offer reliable guarantees we could not abandon the old guarantees--even with their obligations.

"The Morocco policy had led to a political defeat. In the Bosnian crisis this had been luckily avoided, the same as at the London Conference. A fresh diminution of our prestige was not endurable for our position in Europe and in the world. The prosperity of States, their political and economic successes, are based upon the prestige that they enjoy in the world.

"The personal attacks contained in the work, the unheard-of calumnies and slanders of others, condemn themselves. The ever-recurring suspicion that everything happened only because it was not desired to allow him, Lichnowsky, any successes speaks of wounded self-love, of disappointed hopes for personal successes, and has a painful effect.

"In closing, let us draw attention here to what Hermann Oncken has also quoted in his work, 'The Old and New Central Europe,' the memorandum of Prince Bismarck of the year 1879, in which the idea is developed that the German Empire must never dare allow a situation in which it would remain isolated on the European Continent between Russia and France, side by side with a defeated Austria-Hungary that had been left in the lurch by Germany."

German Comments on von Jagow's Views

In commenting upon Herr von Jagow's reply to Prince Lichnowsky, Georg Bernhard, editor in chief of the Vossische Zeitung, took occasion to re-emphasize his favorite theory of a rapprochement with Russia so as to enable Germany to reduce Great Britain to the level of a second-class power. In a long article, printed on March 31, Herr Bernhard asserted that Prince Lichnowsky had been by no means alone in his policy of seeking agreement with England as Herr von Jagow himself had admitted, and that the German Foreign Office had seemed obsessed with the idea that it was a question of a choice between Austria and England, when, in reality, if the diplomats had wanted to pursue a good German policy and at the same time be of service to Austria, they should have made it a question of Russia or England and tried to establish good relations with the former under all circumstances. After quoting von Jagow's remark about the inadvisability of abandoning old alliances until new constellations were attainable, Herr Bernhard said:

"We shall not go into the question here if, during this war, which strains all the forces of the alliance to the utmost, a former German Secretary of State should have written such sentences. It is incomprehensible how they came from the pen of a sensible man--and Herr von Jagow is such a one. And it is still more incomprehensible how they were able to escape the attention of the Foreign Office. Fortunately, they can no longer do any harm now, as through our deeds we have demonstrated our loyalty to the Austrians and Hungarians better than it can be done by any amount of talk."

In an earlier editorial Herr Bernhard referred as follows to von Jagow's admission that he did not believe that England had laid all the mines leading to the world war:

"In spite of all experiences, therefore, here is another--almost official--attempt made to represent the war as merely the result of the aggressive desires of France and Russia. As if France (through whose population went a shudder of fear as it saw itself on the edge of the abyss of war) would ever have dared to go to war without knowing that England stood back of her! And were Edward's trips to Paris without any effect upon our diplomats? Has it not also finally become sufficiently well known through the reports of the Belgian Ambassador how France repeatedly tried to escape from the alliance, but was always again forced into the net by Nicolson, [former British Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs,] through Edward? The Imperial Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, himself admitted in the Reichstag the harmful rôle of King Edward. Only he, as probably did Herr von Jagow also, thought that Edward's death put an end to the policy of encircling. But this policy of encircling--and here is where the mistake entailing serious consequences is made by our diplomats--was not at all merely a personal favorite idea of Edward VII., but the continuation of the traditional English policy toward the strongest Continental power."

Thanks for Hindenburg

Herr Bernhard then asserted that England desired the publication of the proposed Anglo-German treaty regarding the division of the Portuguese colonies into spheres of economic interests so as to make Portugal's eventual support of the Entente all the surer, and continued:

"And Lichnowsky wanted to fall into this trap set by England. It was avoided by the Foreign Office more through instinct than sagacity. And these diplomats have guided Germany's destiny before and during the war! Let us give the warmest thanks to Hindenburg because his sword has now, it is to be hoped, put an end once for all to the continued spinning of plans by such and similar diplomats even during the war."

Theodor Wolff, editor in chief of the Berliner Tageblatt, probably the leading organ of the German business elements and liberal politicians who were opposed to the war from the beginning, and who still hope for a negotiated peace that will facilitate an early resumption of trade relations with Great Britain and the rest of the allies, expressed the hope that the "battle of minds will finally create a clearer atmosphere," and then remarked:

"Only quite incidentally would I like to allow myself to direct the attention of Herr von Jagow to an erroneous expression that appears twice in his reply. Herr von Jagow writes: 'We informed him [Lichnowsky] of the secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement,' and in another place: 'The secret Anglo-Russian naval agreement might also have made him a little more skeptical.' Only the day before, on Saturday, it was said in an article of the Norddeutshe Allgemeine Zeitung, also directed against Lichnowsky: 'Negotiations were pending with Russia over a naval agreement that the Prince characteristically passes over in silence.' In reality, although hasty historians also speak without further ceremony of a treaty, it is manifest that no Anglo-Russian agreement existed; there was merely a Russian proposal, and the most that can be said is that 'negotiations were pending.' * * *

"His [von Jagow's] remark, 'It is not true that the Foreign Office did not believe the reports that England would protect France under all circumstances,' is in contradiction with the well-known report of the then English Ambassador, Goschen, which describes into what surprise and consternation Herr von Bethmann and Herr von Jagow were thrown by the news of the English declaration of war."

In beginning his comment upon von Jagow, Herr Wolff threw a little more light upon the way in which Prince Lichnowsky's memorandum "for the family archives" got into more or less general secret circulation in Germany before it was printed by the Swedish Socialist paper Politiken last March, and also described the character of Captain Beerfelde, the member of the German General Staff who, according to some cabled reports, is to be tried for his part in distributing copies of the memorandum.

Herr Wolff said that Prince Lichnowsky had had five or six copies made, of which he had sent one to Wolff, one to Albert Ballin, head of the Hamburg-American line, and another to Arthur von Gwinner, head of the Deutsche Bank. All of these persons carefully hid the "dangerous gift" in the deepest recesses of their writing desks, but a fourth copy went astray and got into hands for which it had not been intended, and from these hands passed into those of still another individual. Then the editor wrote:

How Manuscript Became Public

"I made the acquaintance some years before the war of the officer who obtained the memorandum 'on loan,' and sent copies of it to State officials and politicians. He belongs to an old noble family, was treated with sympathy by General von Moltke, the Chief of the General Staff, occupied himself enthusiastically with religious philosophy or theosophy, and was a thoroughly manly but mystic person. * * * After hard war experiences, he felt the longing to serve the dictates of peace with complete devotion, and he surrendered himself to a pacifism which is absolutely incompatible with the uniform.

"Late one evening he visited me in a state of great excitement, and told me that he had manifolded a memorandum by Prince Lichnowsky which had been lent to him, and that, without asking the author, he had sent it to the 'leading men.' It was impossible to convince him by any logic or on any grounds of reason that his action was wrong, senseless, and harmful. He was a Marquis Posa, or, still more, a Horatius Cocles, who, out of love for Rome or for mankind, sprang into the abyss."

The Berlin Vorwärts, the leading organ of the pro-Government Socialists, began its editorial on the von Jagow reply by remarking that the article of the former State Secretary for Foreign Affairs was hardly calculated to convince the reader that Prince Lichnowsky's self-esteem was the only thing that had had a "painful effect" upon the German people in July, 1914, and since that time. It then said that "Herr von Jagow agrees with Lichnowsky upon the decisive point!" quoted what von Jagow had said about his desire for an Anglo-German rapprochement, and continued:

"These words show that, in 1913, the Wilhelmstrasse and the London Embassy were in the complete harmony of common beliefs and intentions. Herr von Jagow, exactly like Lichnowsky, exactly like Bethmann, and exactly like Wilhelm II., believed in the possibility of creating 'an atmosphere of confidence,' as Jagow says, between Germany and England, through a series of agreements, of which those regarding the Bagdad Railroad and Africa were to have been the first."

Vorwärts then proceeded to point out that the Albanian crisis had strengthened this faith instead of weakening it, took up von Jagow's reasons for Germany's refusal to have the proposed Anglo-German agreement on the Portuguese African colonies published, and exclaimed:

"What a fear of Tirpitz! A disturbing of the new relations through his intrigues and the howling of his jingo press was to be avoided through an affectation of secrecy. But three weeks later the war with England was here and the Pan-German sheets welcomed 'the longed-for day!' What had happened in the meantime? Of course, 'perfidious Albion' (even Jagow puts quotation marks on these words) had in the meantime thrown off the mask and revealed her perfidy! Let's hear what--after Lichnowsky--Herr von Jagow, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in July, 1914, has to say about it!"

Then Vorwärts quoted Jagow's description of how the war began, and went on:

"All that remains of the accusations against the English Government is that it did not prevent the world war, 'although it could have done so.' Now Herr von Jagow also did not prevent the world war, but he must certainly be acquitted of the charge that he could have prevented it. He really could not, and so an emphatic statement of inability is the best excuse for him and his fellow-disputants.

"Let us establish the facts. England did not desire the war; she merely did not prevent it. The war was not popular in England; it also was not popular in Russia and France. But it has become popular. The whole world--right away across the Atlantic and the Pacific--is united in hatred against us. We, however, have for almost four years been inoculated with the view that 'England laid all the mines which caused the war'--a view which the Secretary of State, in accordance with the evidence of the Ambassador, has now declared to be false! It is, however, by this false view that the whole war policy of the German Empire has been directed--from the declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare, which brought us war with America, down to those Chancellor speeches which say that Belgium must not again become England's area of military concentration.

"If all the parties concerned were convinced that the belief in England's guilt is a fiction, why did they feed this belief, and why did they pursue a policy which was based upon it? They ought rather to have appointed to the Chancellorship Tirpitz, who, perhaps, believes what he says. Instead of that, a policy of fear of Tirpitz has been pursued. Sometimes a policy against Tirpitz has been attempted, but it has always been reversed at decisive moments, out of fear of the nationalistic terror.

"This fear was, perhaps, not entirely unfounded, for agitation is unscrupulous. The older ones among us still remember very well 'an Englishwoman' who was very unpopular in many circles, but this Englishwoman was the mother of the German Kaiser. No doubt there was no more convenient method for the Government to guard the dynasty than for it to take part in, or at least to tolerate, the agitation against the English. This was the only way of preventing the agitation from turning ultimately against the wearer of the German imperial crown. But ought such intimate considerations to have been permitted to play a part when the fate of the nations was at stake?

"Let us put an end to this! At this moment we are in a battle which may be decisive and which is going in favor of the empire. But even after this battle we shall possess neither the possibility nor the moral right to treat our opponent according to the principle of 'With thumbs in his eyes and knee on his breast.' Even after the greatest military successes there exists the necessity for political negotiation. It will be easier for us to enter into this negotiation after the poisonous fog of the war lies shall have lifted. Now that Herr von Jagow has cleared up the rôle played by England at the beginning of the war, there is nothing in the way of the fulfillment of the promise made by Bethmann to 'make good the wrong committed against Belgium'!

"If it is perhaps true that everything Wilhelm II., Bethmann, von Jagow, and Lichnowsky thought was true up to three weeks before the outbreak of the war was false, then let the mistake be acknowledged and the conservative Pan-Germans be put openly in the Government, so that they, both within and without, may complete the work of a peace by force. But if this is neither desirable nor possible, then there is nothing left to do but to take a decided step ahead. For the German people cannot be satisfied with the methods of governing exercised before and during the war. * * * The German people can only endure after the war as a peace-loving nation that governs itself."

Lichnowsky's Testimony as to Germany's Long Plotting for Domination

By H. Charles Woods, F. R. G. S.

To a Britisher who has followed the trend of events in the Near East, and who has witnessed the gradual development of German intrigues in that area, there has never been published a document so important and so condemnatory of Germany as the disclosures of Prince Lichnowsky.