Part 20

That is the whole story. I was to make it perfectly clear that in the action Sir Douglas Haig took for the extension of the line he had the full approval of the British Cabinet, having regard to the pressure of the French Government and military authorities. Sir Douglas Haig had no option except to make the extension. He was in our judgment absolutely right in the course he took. Naturally, he would have preferred not to have done it, but the British Government fully approved of the action he took.

The real lesson of the discussion is the importance of unity of command. It would never have arisen if you had had that. Instead of one army and one commander responsible for one part of the line, and another army and another commander responsible for another part of the line, we have one united command responsible for the whole and every part. It was the only method of safety, and I am glad we have it at last.

It was not so much a question of the length of the line held by one force or the length held by another. It was a question of reserves massed behind.

The Premier ended with a plea for a truce to political "sniping." On May 13 it was announced that as a disciplinary measure General Maurice had been placed on "the retired list."

The New British Service Act

Provisions of Law Which Raises Military Age

The new British Military Service act became effective in April, 1918, having passed both houses of Parliament by large majorities; it immediately received the royal assent. The provision applying conscription to Ireland was suspended temporarily, on the assumption that it would not be enforced until a measure of home rule for Ireland was agreed upon. The main provisions of the new service measure are as follows, as analyzed by The London Times:

RAISING OF MILITARY AGE

Men Up to 50.--Obligation to military service imposed upon every male British subject:

1. Who has at any time since Aug. 14, 1915, or who for the time being is in Great Britain, and

2. Who on April 18, 1918, had attained the age of 18 years and had not attained the age of 51 years or who at any subsequent date attains the age of 18 years.

Men Up to 55.--If it appears necessary at any time for the defense of the realm, his Majesty may, by Order in Council, declare the extension of the obligation to military service to men generally or to any class of men up to any age not exceeding 56 years. The draft of any such order is to be presented to each house of Parliament, and will not be submitted to his Majesty in Council unless each house presents an address, praying that the order may be made.

Doctors.--Duly qualified medical practitioners, who have not attained the age of 56 years, are made immediately liable to military service.

FORMER PRISONERS OF WAR

The clause in the act of May, 1916, excepting from military service any person who has been "a prisoner of war, captured or interned by the enemy, and has been released or exchanged," is to cease to have effect. It is, however, provided that the change shall be without prejudice to any undertaking, recognized by the Government, and for the time being in force, that any released or exchanged prisoner of war shall not serve in his Majesty's forces during the present war.

TIME-EXPIRED MEN

The act of May, 1916, provided that the service should not be prolonged of men who, when their times for discharge occurred, had served a period of twelve years or more and had attained the age of 41 years. This section is to cease to have effect.

EXTENSION TO IRELAND

Method of Procedure.--His Majesty may, by Order in Council, extend the act to Ireland, with the necessary modifications and adaptations.

Legal Proceedings.--An Order in Council may be issued to make special provision for the constitution of the civil court before which proceedings for any offenses punishable on summary conviction under the Reserve Forces act, the Army act, and the Military Service acts are to be brought in Ireland. The order may also assign any such proceedings to a specified civil court or courts.

WITHDRAWAL OF EXEMPTIONS

His Majesty may, by proclamation declaring that a national emergency has arisen, direct that any certificates of exemption other than those granted on the grounds of ill-health or of conscientious objection shall cease to have effect.

THE TRIBUNALS

The Local Government Board or the Secretary for Scotland may make regulations for the following purposes:

1. For providing for applications for certificates of exemption, including appeals, being made to such tribunals, constituted in such manner and for such areas as may be authorized.

2. For establishing special tribunals, committees, or panels for dealing with particular classes of cases.

3. For regulating and limiting the making of applications.

4. For making other provision to secure the expeditious making and disposal of applications.

It is provided that such regulations shall not alter the four grounds for applications for certificates of exemption--the expediency, in the national interests, that a man should be engaged in other work, business or domestic reasons, ill-health, and conscientious objection.

PENALTIES

Any person making a false statement with a view to preventing or postponing the calling up of himself or any other person, or for any medical examination, is to be liable to six months' imprisonment.

It is to be the duty of any man whose certificate has been withdrawn, or who no longer satisfies the conditions on which it was granted, to transmit it forthwith to the local office of the Ministry of National Service. If he fails without reasonable cause to do so, he will be liable to a fine of £50.

MEDICAL EXAMINATION

Any man holding a certificate of exemption (other than one from combatant service only) or applying for its renewal may at any time be required to present himself for medical examination or re-examination.

VOLUNTEER OBLIGATION

Every man granted a certificate of exemption is to join the Volunteer Force for the perid of the war, unless the tribunal dealing with the case orders to the contrary.

CONVENTIONS WITH ALLIED STATES

The act is to be read with previous acts in relation to the act of 1917, which confirmed conventions with allied States making subjects of those States in this country liable for military service. That act is also to apply to Ireland, if the act is extended to Ireland.

EXCEPTIONS

The exceptions from the act are the following:

1. Men ordinarily resident in the Dominions.

2. Members of the regular or reserve forces or of the Dominion forces, and territorials liable to foreign service.

3. Men serving in the navy, the Royal Marines, or the air force.

4. Certain categories of officers and men who have left or been discharged from the forces in consequence of disablement or ill-health; and men medically rejected, if, on further medical examination after April 5, 1917, they have been certified to be totally and permanently unfit for any form of military service.

5. Men in holy orders or regular ministers of any religious denomination.

British Aid to Italy

General Plumer's Dispatch

The report was published May 10, 1918, that 250,000 Italian troops had been concentrated in France to swell the reserves of the allied armies against the German offensive, and that this had been accomplished without weakening the Italian front, which was preparing for a threatened Austrian attack. No statement was made regarding the British troops that had gone to Italy's aid during the disaster to the Italian armies in 1917.

General Sir Herbert Plumer, who took over the command of the British troops in Italy after their arrival there, Nov. 10, 1917, submitted his official report March 9, 1918. He stated that he found on his arrival that the situation in Italy was disquieting, the Italian Army having received a severe blow, and the aid that the British and French might give could not be immediate owing to difficulties of transport. As it was then uncertain whether the Italians could hold the Piave line, it was arranged that two British divisions in conjunction with the French should move to the hills north and south of Vicenza. By the time the troops had reached this position the situation had improved and an offer was made by the British in conjunction with the French to take over a sector of the foothills of the Asiago Plateau. But as snow was imminent and special mountain equipment was difficult to provide, the suggestion was made by the Italians that the British should take over the Montsello sector, with the French on their left. This was agreed to.

Sir Herbert considers that the entrance of the French and British had an excellent moral effect and enabled the Italians to withdraw and reorganize. The Montsello sector, which was taken over on Dec. 4 and work immediately begun on its defense, is described by Sir Herbert as a hinge to the whole Italian line, joining the mountain portion facing north, from Mount Tomba to Lake Garda, to the Piave line held by the 3d Italian Army.

December was an anxious month. Several German divisions were east of the Piave, and an attempt to force the river and capture Venice was considered likely. Local attacks grew more and more severe, and, though the progress of the enemy was not great and Italian counterattacks were constantly made, the danger of a break-through increased. The Austrians were being encouraged to persevere in the hope of getting down to the plains for the Winter.

Rear lines of defense were constructed, and as time passed and the preparations were well forward the feeling of security grew, and was further increased by the recapture by the Italians of the slopes of Monte Asolone on Dec. 22. The following day Mount Melago and Col del Rosso, on the Asiago Plateau, were lost, but the Italians regained the former by a counterattack. Though Christmas Day found the situation still serious, especially on the Asiago, where the Italians, while fighting stubbornly, suffered from strain and cold, the situation showed signs of improvement. This outlook was brightened still further by the capture of Mount Tomba, with 1,500 prisoners, by the French. In this action British artillery assisted.

"During all this period," the dispatch continues, "we had carried out continuous patrol work across the River Piave and much successful counterbattery work. The Piave is a very serious obstacle, especially at this season of the year, the breadth opposite the British front being considerably over 1,000 yards, and the current 14 knots. Every form of raft and boat has been used, but wading has proved the most successful, though the icy cold water made the difficulties even greater. In spite of this there has never been any lack of volunteers for these enterprises.

"On Jan. 1 our biggest raid was carried out by the Middlesex Regiment. This was a most difficult and well-planned operation, which had for its objective the capture and surrounding of several buildings held by the enemy to a depth of 2,000 yards inland, provided a surprise could be effected. Two hundred and fifty men were passed across by wading and some prisoners were captured, but, unfortunately, the alarm was given by a party of fifty of the enemy that was encountered in an advanced post, and the progress inland had therefore, in accordance with orders, to be curtailed. The recrossing of the river was successfully effected, and our casualties were very few. An operation of this nature requires much forethought and arrangement, even to wrapping every man in hot blankets immediately on emerging from the icy water.

"The 3d Italian Army also opened the year well by clearing the Austrians from the west bank of the Piave about Zenson. This was followed on Jan. 14 by the attack of the 4th Italian Army on Mount Asolone, which, although not entirely successful, resulted in capturing over 400 Austrian prisoners. The situation had by this time so far improved that I offered to take over another sector of defense on my right in order to assist the Italians. This was agreed to, and was completed by Jan. 28. On this day and the following the 1st Italian Army carried out successful operations on the Col del Rosso--Mont Val Bella front, on the Asiago Plateau. The infantry attacked with great spirit, and captured 2,500 Austrians. British artillery took part in the above operation."

General Plumer states that in February the weather was bad, much snow having fallen, and operations were hampered. Although the British had not taken part in serious fighting, yet they had some share in the improvement which, he says, had taken place.

The work of the R. F. C., under Brig. Gen. Webb-Bowen, during the period under review (says Sir Herbert) has been quite brilliant. From the moment of arrival they made their presence felt, and very soon overcame the difficulties of the mountains. They have taken part in all operations, and rendered much assistance to the Italians in the air. They have carried out a large number of successful raids on enemy aerodromes, railway junctions, &c., and have during the period destroyed sixty-four hostile machines, a large proportion of which were German, and nine balloons, our losses to the enemy during the period being twelve machines and three balloons.

A comparison of the photographs of hostile battery positions when our artillery entered the line with the positions now occupied shows that the enemy batteries have been successfully forced back almost throughout the whole front. Some British artillery assisted both in French and Italian operations, and a frequent interchange of British and Italian batteries was made, together with counterbattery staff officers, in order that experience of each other's methods might be gained. Every effort was made to illustrate the value of counterbattery work, the value of which we had learned by experience in France, but which the Italians had not hitherto fully appreciated.

"The Italians were only too anxious to profit by any experience we could give them, and this was done not only by frequent interchange of visits of commanders and staffs to the various sectors of defense, but by the establishment of schools of instruction, at which a large number of Italian officers actually underwent the courses. About 100 Italian officers attended the courses at the various schools, together with some French officers. Similarly, British officers underwent courses at French and Italian schools."

Sir Herbert thanks the Italian authorities for their assistance, especially General Diaz, Chief of the Staff, and expresses indebtedness to Generals Fayolle and Maistre, in command of the French troops.

Emperor Charles's "Dear Sixtus" Letter

French Supplemental Statement Corroborates Its Authenticity

The publication of the letter of Emperor Charles of Austria to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixtus, in which he sought a separate peace with France, referring to the "just claims" of France to Alsace-Lorraine, and which caused the downfall of Count Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Secretary, was followed by this official denial by the Austrian Government:

The letter by his Apostolic Majesty, published by the French Premier in his communiqué of April 12, 1918, is falsified, (verfaelscht.) First of all, it may be declared that the personality of far higher rank than the Foreign Minister, who, as admitted in the official statement of April 7, undertook peace efforts in the Spring of 1917, must be understood to be not his Apostolic Majesty but Prince Sixte of Bourbon, who in the Spring of 1917 was occupied with bringing about a rapprochement between the belligerent States. As regards the text of the letter published by M. Clemenceau, the Foreign Minister declares by All Highest command that his Apostolic Majesty wrote a purely personal private letter in the Spring of 1917 to his brother-in-law, Prince Sixte of Bourbon, which contained no instructions to the Prince to initiate mediation with the President of the French Republic or any one else, to hand on communications which might be made to him, or to evoke and receive replies. This letter, moreover, made no mention of the Belgian question, and contained, relative to Alsace-Lorraine, the following-passage: "I would have used all my personal influence in favor of the French claims for the return of Alsace-Lorraine, if these claims were just. They are not, however." The second letter of the Emperor mentioned in the French Premier's communique of April 9, in which his Apostolic Majesty is said to have declared that he was "in accord with his Minister," is significantly not mentioned by the French communiqué.

This statement drew forth from the French Government the following reply:

There are rotten consciences. The Emperor Charles, finding it impossible to save his face, falls into the stammerings of a man confounded. He is now reduced to accusing his brother-in-law of forgery, by fabricating with his own hand a lying text. The original document, the text of which has been published by the French Government, was communicated in the presence of M. Jules Cambon, Secretary General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and delegated for this purpose by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Republic, who, with the authorization of the Prince, handed a copy of it to the President of the Council.

The Prince spoke of the matter to M. Ribot himself in terms which would have been devoid of sense if the text had not been that published by the French Government, is it not evidence that no conversation could have been opened, and that the President of the Republic would not even have received the Prince a second time, if the latter, at Austria's instance, had been the bearer of a document which contested our rights instead of affirming them?

The Emperor Charles's letter, as we have quoted it, was shown by Prince Sixte himself to the Chief of State. Moreover, two friends of the Prince can attest the authenticity of the letter, especially the one who received it from the Prince to copy it.

The Serbian Government, moreover, gave the lie direct to Count Czernin's statement in reference to offering peace to Serbia. Premier Pashitch was asked in the Skupshtina at Corfu by Deputy Marco Trifcovitch whether Count Czernin's statement was true. He replied that he had denied Count Czernin's statements as soon as he had received the text of the speech from Amsterdam, and that he welcomed this fresh opportunity of declaring before Parliament that, so far as Serbia was concerned, the statements were totally inaccurate. (Exclamations from the right, "Czernin lied!") The Premier then proceeded to say that Count Czernin had never made peace overtures to Serbia, and that, if he had, such proposals would not have been accepted. "All the statements of Count Czernin," continued M. Pashitch, "are only the result of Austro-Hungarian intrigues."

Premier Clemenceau explained in detail before three committees of the French Chamber, the Committees on Foreign Affairs, the Army, and the Navy, which represented practically one-fourth of the total membership, the circumstances connected with the letters; it was unanimously agreed that there was nothing in the situation to justify any further consideration than had been given them. The Paris Temps gave the following details concerning their receipt:

The Emperor's two letters, and the conversations arising out of them, will form an essential part of the proceedings before the committees today. The letter from the Emperor to Prince Sixte of Bourbon-Parma was communicated to M. Poincaré on March 31 last year, but it remained in the possession of the Prince, who gave a copy of it to M. Ribot, by whom it was placed in the archives of the French Foreign Office. "Let us add," says the Temps, "that in the course of the interview which he had with Lloyd George at Folkestone a few days after the copy of the letter came into his possession that M. Ribot handed a copy of this copy to the British Premier. A little later in the interview which took place at St. Jean de Maurienne, in Savoy, between the chiefs of the British, French, and Italian Cabinets the question was raised as to what should be done in case the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet took steps toward peace negotiations. An agreement was come to without difficulty between the Allies as to the line of conduct to be adopted in such an eventuality. Let us add that this first letter sent to Prince Sixte had determined the Allies to ask for further explanations, as the result of which Prince Sixte received from his imperial brother-in-law a second letter, which was also communicated to M. Poincaré and M. Ribot. We have no right to give any indication on this subject, but we believe we can state that this second letter was regarded unanimously by the Allies as of such a nature that it would not permit them to pursue the conversations further."

Kaiser Wilhelm in the following telegram accepted without reserve Emperor Charles's statement that the Sixtus letter had been distorted:

Accept my heartiest thanks for your telegram, in which you repudiate as entirely baseless the assertion of the French Premier regarding your attitude toward French claims to Alsace-Lorraine, and in which you once again accentuate the solidarity of interest existing between us and our respective empires. I hasten to inform you that in my eyes there was no need whatever for any such assurance on your part, for I was not for a moment in doubt that you have made our cause your own, in the same measure as we stand for the rights of your monarchy. The heavy but successful battles of these years have clearly demonstrated this fact to every one who wants to see. They have only drawn the bonds close together. Our enemies, who are unable to do anything against us in honorable warfare, do not recoil from the most sordid and the lowest methods. We must, therefore, put up with it, but all the more is it our duty ruthlessly to grapple with and beat the enemy in all the theatres of war. In true friendship, WILHELM.

As a sequel to the matter it was reported from Vienna that the mother of Empress Zita and Prince Sixtus had been compelled to leave Vienna and live in retirement at her estates, remote from the Austrian capital.

THE ISSUES IN IRELAND

Official Report of the Irish Convention--Full Text of the Chairman's Summary of the Proceedings

The Irish home-rule question, in consequence of the failure of the Irish Convention to agree, became an important war issue in the Spring of 1918 on account of its effect upon Great Britain's man-power measures.