Part 16

"Moreover, according to statements made in the United States and Great Britain, the intervention in the present campaign of such a big army no longer comes into consideration. After America's entry into the war material help for the Entente has not only not increased, but has even decreased considerably. President Wilson's gigantic armament program has brought about such economic difficulties that America, the export country, must now begin to ration instead of, as it was hoped, increasingly to help the Entente. To sum up, it can be stated that the economic difficulties of our enemies have been increased by America's entry into the war."

"ENGLAND'S DANGER POINT"

Later in the debate Admiral von Capelle said: "The salient point of the discussion is the economic internal and political results of the U-boat war during the coming months. The danger point for England has already been reached, and the situation of the western powers grows worse from day to day."

Admiral von Capelle then briefly dealt with that calculation of the world tonnage made by a Deputy which received some attention in the Summer of last year. "This calculation," he said, "shows a difference of 9,000,000 tons from the calculation of the Admiralty Staff. In my opinion, the calculation of the Admiralty Staff is correct. Whence otherwise comes the Entente's lack of tonnage, which, in view of the facts, cannot be argued away? The Admiralty Staff in its calculation adapted itself to the fluctuating situation of the world shipping. At first each of the enemy States looked after itself. Later, under Great Britain's leadership, common control of tonnage was established."

Admiral von Capelle quoted the calculation of the American Shipping Department, according to which the world tonnage in the Autumn of 1917 amounted to 32,000,000, of which 21,000,000 were given as transoceanic. He insisted, however, that so much attention must not be paid to all these calculations, but exhorted the people rather to dwell on the joyful fact that the danger point for the western powers had been reached.

At the close of the sitting Admiral von Capelle stated that all orders for the construction of U-boats had been given independently by the Naval Department and that the Naval Administration had never been instructed to give orders for more U-boats by the Chancellor or the Supreme Army Command. Every possible means, he said, for the development of U-boat warfare had been done by the Naval Department.

Admiral von Capelle in a supplemental statement before the Reichstag, May 11, in discussing the naval estimates, said:

The reports for April are favorable. Naturally, losses occur, but the main thing is that the increase in submarines exceeds the losses. Our naval offensive is stronger today than at the beginning of unrestricted submarine warfare. That gives us an assured prospect of final success.

The submarine war is developing more and more into a struggle between U-boat action and new construction of ships. Thus far the monthly figures of destruction have continued to be several times as large as those of new construction. Even the British Ministry and the entire British press admit that.

The latest appeal to British shipyard workers appears to be especially significant. For the present the appeal does not appear to have had great success. According to the latest statements British shipbuilding fell from 192,000 tons in March to 112,000 in April; or, reckoned in ships, from 32 to 22. That means a decline of 80,000 tons, or about 40 per cent. [The British Admiralty stated that the April new tonnage was reduced on account of the vast amount of repairing to merchantmen.--Editor.]

America thus far has built little, and has fallen far below expectations. Even if an increase is to be reckoned with in the future, it will be used up completely by America herself.

In addition to the sinkings by U-boats, there is a large decline in cargo space owing to marine losses and to ships becoming unserviceable. One of the best-known big British ship owners declared at a meeting of shipping men that the losses of the British merchant fleet through marine accidents, owing to conditions created by the war, were three times as large as in peace.

The Admiral's Statements Attacked

The British authorities asserted that Admiral von Capelle's figures were misleading and untrue. The losses published in the White Paper include marine risk and all losses by enemy action. They include all losses, and not merely the losses of food ships, as suggested in the German wireless message dated April 16. Even in the figures of the world's output of shipbuilding von Capelle seems to have been misled. He states that "something over 2,000,000 gross tons were built annually in the last ten years, including allied and enemy countries." The actual figures are 2,530,351 gross tons. He further states that the entire output today can in no case be more, owing to difficulties in regard to labor and material. The actual world's output, as shown in the Parliamentary White Paper, excluding enemy countries, amounted to 2,703,000 gross tons, and the output is rapidly rising. Von Capelle tried to raise confusion with regard to the figures 3,000,000 and 2,000,000 tons and the actual output for 1917. The Admiralty says no forecast was ever given that 3,000,000 tons, or even 2,000,000 tons, would be completed in that year. Three million tons is the ultimate rate of production, which, as the First Lord stated in the House of Commons, is well within the present and prospective capacity of United Kingdom shipyards and marine engineering works. The exaggerated figures of losses are still relied on by the enemy. The average loss per month of British ships during 1917, including marine risk, was 333,000 gross tons, whereas Secretary von Capelle in his statement bases his argument on an average loss from submarine attacks alone of 600,000 tons per month. The figures for the quarter ended March 31, 1918, showed British losses to be 687,576 tons, and for the month of March 216,003 tons, the lowest during any month, with one exception, since January, 1917. With regard to steel, the First Lord has already assured the House of Commons that arrangements have been made for the supply of steel to give the output aimed at, and at the present time the shipyards are in every case fully supplied with the material.

The American production of new tonnage reached its stride in May, and the estimate of over 4,000,000 tons per annum was regarded as conservative. It was estimated that the total British and American new tonnage in the year ending May, 1919, would exceed 6,000,000, as against total U-boat sinkings, based on the record of the first quarter of 1918, of 4,500,000.

OFFICIAL RETURNS OF LOSSES

The following was the official report of losses of British, allied, and neutral merchant tonnage due to enemy action and marine risk:

Allied Period. British. and Neutral. Total. 1917. Month. Month. Month. January 193,045 216,787 409,832 February 343,486 231,370 574,856 March 375,309 259,376 634,685 -------- -------- ---------- Quarter 911,840 707,533 1,619,373

April 555,056 338,821 893,877 May 374,419 255,917 630,336 June 432,395 280,326 712,721 -------- -------- ---------- Quarter 1,361,870 875,064 2,236,934

July 383,430 192,519 575,949 August 360,296 189,067 519,363 September 209,212 159,949 369,161 -------- -------- --------- Quarter 952,938 541,535 1,494,473

October 289,973 197,364 487,337 November 196,560 136,883 333,443 December 296,356 155,707 452,063 -------- -------- --------- Quarter 782,889 489,954 1,272,843

1918. January 217,270 136,187 353,457 February 254,303 134,119 388,422 March 216,003 165,628 381,631 -------- -------- --------- Quarter 687,576 435,934 1,123,510

The Secretary of the Ministry of Shipping stated that the tonnage of steamships of 500 gross tons and over entering and clearing United Kingdom ports from and to ports overseas was as under:

Period. Period. 1917. Gross Tons. 1918. Gross Tons. October 6,908,189 January 6,336,663 November 6,818,564 February 6,326,965 December 6,665,413 March 7,295,620

This statement embraces all United Kingdom seaborne traffic other than coastwise and cross Channel.

The Month's Submarine Record

The British Admiralty, in April, 1918, discontinued its weekly report of merchant ships destroyed by submarines or mines, and announced that it would publish a monthly report in terms of tonnage. These figures are shown in the table above. The last weekly report was for the period ended April 14, and showed that eleven merchantmen over 1,600 tons, four under 1,600 tons, and one fishing vessel had been sunk.

In regard to the sinkings in April, French official figures showed that the total losses of allied and neutral ships, including those from accidents at sea during the month, aggregated 381,631 tons.

Norway's losses from the beginning of the war to the end of April, 1918, amounted to 755 vessels, aggregating 1,115,519 tons, and the lives of 1,006 seamen, in addition to about 700 men on fifty-three vessels missing, two-thirds of which were declared to be war losses.

The American steamship Lake Moor, manned by naval reserves, was sunk by a German submarine in European waters about midnight on April 11, with a loss of five officers and thirty-nine men. Five officers and twelve enlisted men were landed at an English port. Eleven men, including five navy gunners, were lost when the Old Dominion liner Tyler was sunk off the French coast on May 3. The Canadian Pacific Company's steamer Medora also was sunk off the French coast. The Florence H. was wrecked in a French port by an internal explosion on the night of April 17. Out of the crew of fifty-six men, twenty-nine were listed as dead or missing, twelve were sent to hospital badly burned, two were slightly injured, and only thirteen escaped injury. Of the twenty-three men of the naval guard only six were reported as survivors.

Six officers and thirteen men were reported missing as the result of two naval disasters reported on May 1 by the British Admiralty. They formed part of the crews of the sloop Cowslip, which was torpedoed and sunk on April 25, and of Torpedo Boat 90, which foundered.

According to Archibald Hurd, a British authority on naval matters, the area in the North Sea which was proclaimed by the British Government as dangerous to shipping and therefore prohibited after May 15 is the greatest mine field ever laid for the special purpose of foiling submarines. It embraces 121,782 square miles, the base forming a line between Norway and Scotland, and the peak extending northward into the Arctic Circle.

A Secret Chapter of U-Boat History

How Ruthless Policy Was Adopted

_The causes that led to Germany's adoption of the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare on Feb. 1, 1917, were revealed a year later by the Handelsblad, an Amsterdam newspaper, whose correspondent had secured secret access to "a number of highly interesting and important documents" long enough to read them and make notes of their contents. The Dutch paper vouched for the accuracy of the following information:_

At the close of the year 1915 the German Admiralty Staff prepared a semi-official memorandum to prove that an unrestricted submarine campaign would compel Great Britain to sue for peace "in six months at the most." The character of the argument conveys the impression that the chiefs of the German Admiralty Staff had already made up their minds to adopt the most drastic measures in regard to submarine warfare, but that they wished to convince the Kaiser, the Imperial Chancellor, and the German diplomatists of the certainty of good results on economic and general, rather than merely military, grounds. To this end the memorandum based its arguments on statistics of food prices, freight, and insurance rates in Great Britain. It pointed out that the effects on the prices of essential commodities, on the balance of trade, and, above all, on the morale of the chief enemy, had been such, even with the restricted submarine campaign of 1915, that, if an unrestricted submarine war were decided upon, England could not possibly hold out for more than a short period.

The memorandum was submitted to the Imperial Chancellor, who passed it on to Dr. Helfferich, the Secretary of State for Finance. He, however, rejected the document on the ground that, in the absence of authentic estimates of stocks, it was impossible to set a time-limit to England's staying power, and also that he was exceedingly doubtful as to what line would be taken by neutrals, especially the United States. Dr. Helfferich maintained that so desperate a remedy should only be employed as a last resource. The authors of the memorandum then sent a reply, in which they developed their former arguments, and pointed to the gravity of the internal situation in Germany. They emphasized the importance of using the nearest and sharpest weapons of offense if a national collapse was to be avoided. They reinforced their argument by adducing the evidence of ten experts, representing finance, commerce, the mining industry, and agriculture. They were Herr Waldemar Müller, the President of the Dresdner Bank; Dr. Salomonsohn of the Disconto Gesellschaft; Dr. Paul Reusch of Oberhausen, Royal Prussian Councilor of Commerce; Dr. Springorum of Dortmund, Chancellor of Commerce, member of the Prussian Upper House, (Herren Haus,) General Director of Railways and Tramways at Hoesch, an ironmaster, and a great expert in railways; Herr Max Schinkel of Hamburg, President of the Norddeutsche Bank in Hamburg and of the Disconto Gesellschaft in Berlin; Herr Zuckschwerdt of Madgeburg, Councilor of Commerce, late member of the Prussian Upper House; Herr Wilhelm von Finck of Munich, Privy Councilor, chief of the banking house of Merck, Finck & Co., Munich; Councilor of Economics R. Schmidt of Platzhof, member of the Württemberg Upper Chamber and of the German Agricultural Council; Herr Engelhard of Mannheim, Councilor of Commerce, President of the Chamber of Commerce and member of the Baden Upper Chamber.

These experts were invited to send answers in writing to the three following questions: (1) What would be the effect on England of unrestricted submarine warfare? (2) What would be its effect on Germany's relations with the United States and other neutrals? (3) To what extent does the internal situation in Germany demand the use of this drastic weapon?

The reader will do well to remember that the replies were written in February, 1916--nearly two years ago. All agreed on the first point--the effect on Great Britain. The effect of unrestricted submarine warfare on England would be that she would have to sue for peace in six months at the most. Herr Müller, who seemed to be in a position to confirm the statistics given in the memorandum, pointed out that the supply of indispensable foodstuffs was, at the time of writing, less than the normal supply in peace time. He held that the submarine war, if relentlessly and vigorously pursued, would accomplish its purpose in less time than calculated in the memorandum--in fact, three months should do it. Dr. Salomonsohn also thought that six months was an excessive estimate, and that less time would suffice.

On the question of the effect on neutrals the experts were divided. Dr. Reusch suggested that the neutrals despised the restricted submarine warfare of 1915, and held that every ship in British waters, whether enemy or neutral, should be torpedoed without warning. According to him, the world only respects those who, in a great crisis, know how to make the most unscrupulous use of their power.

Herr Müller predicted that ruthless submarine war would cause a wholesale flight of neutrals from the war zone. Their newspapers might abuse Germany at first, but they would soon get tired. The danger was from the United States, but that would become less in proportion as Germany operated more decisively and ruthlessly. Dr. Salomonsohn adopted the same attitude. He recognized the possibility of war with the United States, but was loath to throw away so desirable a weapon on that account.

As to the third point, all the experts agreed that the internal situation in Germany demanded that the most drastic methods of submarine warfare should be employed. Herr Zuckschwerdt urged the advisability of the most drastic measures owing to the feeling of the nation. The nation would stand by the Government, but not if it yielded to threats from America. Such weakness would lead to serious consequences. Herr Schmidt admitted the possibility of Germany not being able to hold out, and emphasized the importance of taking drastic steps before disorder and unrest arose in the agricultural districts.

Sea-Raider Wolf and Its Victims

Story of Its Operations

_A third chapter of sea-raider history similar to those of the Möwe and Seeadler was revealed when the Spanish steamship Igotz Mendi, navigated by a German prize crew, ran aground on the Danish coast, Feb. 24, 1918, while trying to reach the Kiel Canal with a cargo of prisoners and booty. The next day the German Government announced that the sea-raider Wolf, which had captured the Igotz Mendi and ten other merchant vessels, with 400 prisoners, had successfully returned after fifteen months in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. The story of the Wolf's operations, as gleaned by Danish and English correspondents from the narratives of released prisoners, is told below. Some of the most interesting passages were furnished by Australian medical officers who had been captured on the British steamer Matunga:_

The Wolf, a vessel of about 6,000 gross tonnage, armed with several guns and torpedo tubes, carried a seaplane, known as the Wolfchen, which was frequently used in the operations of the sea raider. On some days the seaplane made as many as three flights. The Wolf, apparently, proceeded from Germany to the Indian Ocean, laying minefields off the Cape, Bombay, and Colombo. Early in February, 1917, she captured the British steamship Turritella, taking off all the officers and putting on board a prize crew which worked the vessel with her own men. In every case of capture, when the vessel was not sunk at once, this procedure was adopted.

The Wolf transferred a number of mines to the Turritella, with instructions that they should be laid off Aden. A few days later the Turritella encountered a British warship, whereupon the prize crew, numbering twenty-seven, sank the Turritella, and were themselves taken prisoner.

Three weeks later the Wolf overhauled the British steamer Jumna. The Wolf thought that the British vessel was about to ram her, and the port after-gun was fired before it was properly trained, killing five of the raider's crew and wounding about twenty-three others. The Jumna remained with the Wolf for several days, after which her coal and stores were transferred to the raider, and she was sunk with bombs. The next vessels to be captured and sunk were the British steamships Wordsworth and Dee.

Early in June the Wolf, while at anchor under the lee of an island in the Pacific, sighted the British steamship Wairuna, bound from Auckland, N. Z., to San Francisco with coal, Kauri gum, pelts, and copra. The Wolf sent over the seaplane which, flying low, dropped a canvas bag on the Wairuna's deck, containing the message, "Stop immediately; take orders from German cruiser. Do not use your wireless or I will bomb you." The Wairuna eased down, but did not stop until the seaplane dropped a bomb just ahead of her. By this time the Wolf had weighed anchor and proceeded to head off the Wairuna. A prize crew was put on board with orders to bring the ship under the lee of the island and anchor. All the officers, except the master, were sent on board the Wolf. The following day possibly a thousand tons of cargo were transferred.

CAPTURE OF THE MATUNGA

While the two vessels were anchored, the chief officer and second engineer of the Turritella let themselves over the side of the Wolf with the intention of swimming ashore. Later, the Wairuna was taken out and sunk by gunfire, the bombs which had been placed on board having failed to accomplish their purpose. The next captures were the American vessels, Winslow, Beluga, and Encore, which were either burned or sunk.

For nearly a week following this the Wolf hove to, sending the seaplane up several times each day for scouting purposes. Apparently she had picked up some information by her wireless apparatus and was on the lookout for a vessel. On the third day the Wolfchen went up three times, and, on returning from its last flight, dropped lights. Early the next morning none of the prisoners was allowed on deck. A gun was fired by the Wolf, and it was afterward found that it was to stop the British steamer Matunga, with general cargo and passengers, including a number of military officers and men.

BETRAYED BY WIRELESS

It was on the morning of Aug. 5, when the Matunga was nearing the coast of the territory formerly known as German New Guinea, that she fell in with the Wolf, which was mistaken for an ordinary tramp steamer, as the two vessels ran parallel to each other for about two miles. Then the Wolf suddenly revealed her true character by running up the German flag, dropping a portion of her forward bulwarks, exposing the muzzles of her guns, and firing a shot across the bows of the Matunga. At the same time the Wolf sent a seaplane to circle over the Matunga at a low altitude for the obvious purpose of ascertaining whether the latter was armed. Apparently satisfied with the seaplane's report, the German Captain sent a prize crew, armed with bayonets and pistols, to take possession of the British ship. Before their arrival, however, all the Matunga's code books, log books, and other papers were thrown overboard. During the time the prize crew, all of whom spoke English well, were overhauling the Matunga, it was learned that the Germans had been lying in wait for her for five days, as they had somehow learned that she was carrying 500 tons of coal, which they needed badly, and that the German wireless operator had been following her course from the time of her departure from Sydney toward the end of July.