Part 17

I now give the figures of output in the yards. In the fourth quarter of 1914 the merchant tonnage produced in the United Kingdom was 420,000. From that date it steadily fell, and it must be noted that the fall was concurrent with our great munitions effort. In the fourth quarter of 1915 it had fallen to 92,000. It then began to rise, and the rise is as follows:

1916 Tons. Tons. 1st quarter 95,000 3d quarter 125,000 2d quarter 108,000 4th quarter 213,000

1917 Tons. Tons. 1st quarter 246,000 3d quarter 248,000 2d quarter 249,000 4th quarter 420,000

These figures refer to the British Isles alone. In the fourth quarter of 1917 foreign construction was 512,000 tons, giving a total output for the world, exclusive of enemy countries, of 932,000 tons for the last quarter of last year. Against that we have the losses due to enemy action and to maritime risk.

THE MONTHLY DEFICIENCY

These losses amounted for the last quarter of last year to 1,200,000 tons. That was by far the lowest quarter of sinkings we have had since unrestricted submarine warfare began, and it looks as if this quarter was going to be lower still. So that we have the fact that by increase in output and decrease in sinkings for the last quarter of last year the Allies were within 100,000 tons, on the average per month, of making good the loss due to enemy action and marine risks. Considering British losses and output alone, the proportionate deficiency is somewhat higher. We lost on the average 260,000 tons per month during the last quarter of 1917, and we built 140,000 tons per month, an average deficiency of 120,000 tons per month. We must all regret that the British position has suffered most among the Allies, but we have contributed the greatest naval effort, and have sustained the greatest attacks, and I do not think we, as a nation, will bemoan our stars or our naval efforts in this great war.

The net result of maritime risk and enemy action, whether by surface, air or submarine craft, from the beginning of the war until the end of last year is a reduction of 2,500,000 tons of shipping, and from the last quarter of last year the Allies and neutrals are replacing 75 per cent. of the lost tonnage, or only 100,000 tons a month below the losses from all causes.

It is well within the capacity of the allied yards, or even our own yards, before very long, with a proper supply of material and man power entirely to make good the world losses.

SUMMARY OF PROGRESS

I do not think I am divulging information which should not be made public when I say that the output of guns and ammunition of all calibres in 1917 is not far short of twice the output in 1916. I need not remind the House of the special effort being made in the output of airplanes. These, I understand, are nearly two and a half times the output of 1916, and arrangements for labor and material to secure a still greater output this year were in progress during the later months of 1917. We have been able to accomplish what I think must be admitted as an enormous development in the shipbuilding industry. We have reached in 1917 a total warship and merchant tonnage output practically equal to the biggest shipbuilding year this country has ever known. We have multiplied by ten the number of naval craft repaired and refitted, and in six months we have increased the merchant ship repaired tonnage by 80 per cent.--an increase of 237,000 tons per week. I would ask the House to notice this fact, that, notwithstanding all these great extensions of work in many directions, and notwithstanding all these great extensions of power of the country, we ended 1917 with an output of new merchant tonnage of 420,000 for the last quarter, against 213,000 for the last quarter of 1916. That was done, moreover, with a dislocated industry, with yards only gradually being cleared of unfinished work, and with large numbers of unskilled personnel in the yards.

Admiralty Summary of Shipping Losses

Record of Three Years

_The British Board of Admiralty, with the sanction of the War Cabinet and the concurrence of the Allies, on March 21 published a memorandum revealing the world's total shipping losses from the beginning of the war to Jan. 1, 1918. The essential portions are as follows:_

In the Spring of 1917 the full menace of the submarine campaign was first disclosed. Since that date we have steadily increased our knowledge and our material resources for this novel warfare. Three statements are attached, showing for the United Kingdom and for the world, for the period August, 1914, to December, 1917:

1. Losses by enemy action and marine risk.

2. Mercantile shipbuilding output.

3. Enemy vessels captured and brought into service.

Diagrams showing in graphic form the losses and shipbuilding output for the United Kingdom and for the world are also attached. The situation should be viewed from the standpoint of the world's tonnage, as in these problems the mercantile navies of the whole world, excluding the enemy, may be regarded as one. It will be noticed that the diagrams record facts, and that nothing has been included in the nature of an estimate.

The results of the last year have shown the ability of our seamen to get upon terms with the submarine menace and gradually to gain the upper hand. This has been achieved in spite of an imperfect knowledge of a new and barbarous method of warfare and of a scarcity of suitable material. Our material resources for this warfare are already improved and are being rapidly augmented, while science is placing at our disposal means of offense and defense of which we have been in need.

With regard to the other factor, a rapid and continuous increase in the output of merchant tonnage will inevitably follow the united efforts of all engaged in merchant shipbuilding in this country. * * * During the critical period that confronts us we must rely to a large extent on our own shipyards and on ourselves. Our partners in the war are making every effort to increase their production of ships, but a considerable time must elapse before the desired output is secured.

To produce in the United Kingdom 1,800,000 tons in 1918, and to reach an ultimate production at the rate of 3,000,000 tons per annum, is well within the present and prospective capacity of our shipyards and our marine engineering shops. But the ranks of the skilled men must be enlarged without delay by the introduction of men and women at present unskilled. The education of these newcomers, upgrading, and interchangeability of work are essential, and must be pressed on with the good-will of employers, foremen, and men.

It is to insure the vigorous co-operation of all concerned that the Admiralty has recommended the publication of the facts.

POSITION AT THE END OF 1917

The following table summarizes the position at the end of 1917:

British. Foreign. World.

Losses 7,079,492 4,748,080 11,827,572 Gains: New construction 3,031,555 3,574,720 6,606,275 Enemy tonnage captured 780,000 1,809,000 2,589,000 --------- --------- --------- Total gains 3,811,555 5,383,720 9,195,275 Net loss (world) 2,632,297

RECORD OF THREE YEARS

The following statement shows United Kingdom and world's merchant tonnage lost through enemy action and marine risks since the outbreak of war:

United Total for Period. Kingdom. Foreign. World. Gross Gross Gross Tons. Tons. Tons. 1914. August and September 314,000 85,947 *399,947 4th Quarter 154,728 126,688 281,416 1915. 1st Quarter 215,905 104,542 320,447 2d Quarter 223,676 156,743 380,419 3d Quarter 356,659 172,822 529,481 4th Quarter 307,139 187,234 494,373 1916. 1st Quarter 325,237 198,958 524,195 2d Quarter 270,690 251,599 522,289 3d Quarter 284,358 307,681 592,939 4th Quarter 617,563 541,780 1,159,343 1917. 1st Quarter 911,840 707,533 1,619,373 2d Quarter 1,361,870 875,064 2,236,934 3d Quarter 952,938 541,535 1,494,473 4th Quarter 782,889 489,954 1,272,843 -------- ------- --------- Totals 7,079,492 4,748,080 11,827,572

* This figure includes 182,839 gross tonnage interned in enemy ports.

The next statement shows output of merchant shipbuilding of the United Kingdom and the world (excluding enemy countries) since the outbreak of war:

United Total for Period. Kingdom. Foreign. World. Gross Gross Gross Tons. Tons. Tons. 1914. August and September 253,290} 4th Quarter 422,320} 337,310 1,012,920

1915. 1st Quarter 266,267} 2d Quarter 146,870} 3d Quarter 145,070} 551,081 1,202,000 4th Quarter 92,712}

1916. 1st Quarter 95,566} 2d Quarter 107,693} 3d Quarter 124,961} 1,146,448 1,688,000 4th Quarter 213,332}

1917. 1st Quarter 246,239 282,200 528,439 2d Quarter 249,331 377,109 626,440 3d Quarter 248,283 368,170 616,453 4th Quarter 419,621 512,402 932,023 --------- --------- --------- Total 3,031,555 3,574,720 6,606,275

ENEMY TONNAGE CAPTURED

A further statement shows the enemy tonnage captured and brought into service by United Kingdom and by Allies since the outbreak of war:

United Kingdom. Allies. Total. Period. Gross Gross Gross Tons. Tons. Tons.

1914. August and September 725,500 453,000 1,178,500 4th Quarter 28,000 5,000 38,000

1915. 1st Quarter 5,000 1,000 6,000 2d Quarter 500 500 1,000 3d Quarter 3,500 6,000 9,500 4th Quarter 2,500 ... 2,500

1916. 1st Quarter ... 241,000 241,000 2d Quarter 3,500 8,000 11,500 3d Quarter ... 47,500 47,500 4th Quarter ... ... ...

1917. 1st Quarter ... ... ... 2d Quarter 7,000 702,500 709,500 3d Quarter 4,500 266,500 271,000 4th Quarter ... 78,000 78,000 ------- --------- --------- Total 780,000 1,809,000 2,589,000

The Month's Submarine Record

British merchant ships sunk during the month ended April 7, 1918, were fewer than in the preceding month, the weekly official reports showing a sharp increase followed by an unusually low record, resulting in a considerably decreased total. The British Admiralty figures were:

Over 1,600 Under 1,600 Fishing Tons. Tons. Vessels. Week ended March 17, 1918 11 6 2 Week ended March 24 16 12 1 Week ended March 31 6 7 5 Week ended April 7 4 2 2 -- -- -- Total for four weeks 37 27 10

Total previous 4 weeks 53 16 9

One of the largest vessels sunk was the British steamship Minnetonka, 13,528 gross tons, formerly in the New York-London service of the Atlantic Transport Line. This happened in the Mediterranean in February, 1918, while the Minnetonka was in the service of the British Admiralty. The Minnetonka was the last of the four passenger ships of the line, aggregating 55,099 gross tons, to remain afloat. The others all have been sunk since the war began. The three others were the Minneapolis, sunk March 22, 1916; Minnehaha, sunk Sept. 7, 1917, and the Minnewaska, sunk Nov. 29, 1917.

Incomplete French records show the loss of three vessels of over 1,600 tons and five under 1,600 tons. Italian losses included seven steamships of over 1,500 tons, three sailing vessels of over 100 tons, and fifteen smaller sailing craft.

Official dispatches from Barcelona reported the sinking by German submarines of two Spanish vessels, one in the Mediterranean and the other off the Canary Islands. These reports confirmed the statement that Germany had commenced a blockade of the Spanish coast to prevent the use of Spanish shipping to help the Allies.

A German submarine of the largest seagoing type on April 10 appeared in the port of Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, on the west coast of Africa, and bombarded the wireless and cable stations there. The submarine threw scores of shells from her deck guns into the wireless station, causing extensive damage. She had just turned her attention to the cable offices when a steamer was sighted passing the harbor mouth. The submarine left in chase and did not return. Liberia declared war on Germany Aug. 4, 1917.

Some indication of the losses sustained by the German U-boat fleet is contained in the following reports:

Nine members of the crew of a German submarine which was sunk by an American liner on March 10, when two days out from a French port, were taken prisoners. The rest of the crew perished, the Captain committing suicide when he saw that his submarine was doomed.

Under a heavy attack from three German submarines and three German destroyers, a British seaplane persisted in its efforts against another enemy U-boat and succeeded in sinking it before being damaged by the fire of the other enemy warships. Seaplanes also accounted for three other submarines.

A German U-boat while laying mines on the British coast struck one of them and was blown in two. The only survivor was the Captain, who was taken prisoner. The remainder of the crew, numbering seventeen, were drowned in the submarine.

The German submarine, it is stated in the report of the British War Cabinet, has a surface speed up to 18 knots and a submerged speed of 10 to 11 knots. She carries from fifteen to twenty torpedoes; she can travel 100 miles completely submerged; and she can remain under water on the bottom for a period up to forty-eight hours. A submarine attacking with a torpedo only shows about three inches of periscope at intervals, with the result that few ships which are torpedoed ever see the submarine which has carried out the attack. The range of the torpedoes fired by a submarine is anything up to five miles, and the speed of the torpedo is as high as 40 knots.

Typical U-Boat Methods

From British Admiralty Records

_The British Admiralty on March 17, 1918, permitted publication of the logs of a number of vessels that had been sunk by German submarines. These records reveal many stories of heroism and sacrifice. Some of the incidents recorded are as follows:_

In the case of one ship, on which there were forty-seven hands, the boatswain was standing abreast of the mainmast when he saw the wake of a torpedo as it approached, and he had no time to report before the vessel was struck. After the explosion all hands were sent on deck. The ship sank stern first. There was no time to lower the boats, and practically the whole crew had lifebelts on when thrown into the water. When the submarine came to the surface a line was thrown to a raft which the crew had managed to launch, and it was hauled alongside the enemy vessel. A colored man was ordered on board, and as soon as he stepped on the submarine both his wrists were seized, and he was firmly held while being interrogated. The enemy took a photograph of him and also of a man on the raft. When the interrogation was completed the colored sailor dived from the submarine and swam to the raft. As the ship was sinking the master dived off the bridge; he was not seen later. A number of men were rescued after being in the water for four hours.

Robbery was reported in connection with another attack. After the vessel had been shelled many times, the master and crew abandoned the ship, lowered the lifeboat, and rowed toward the submarine. Eight shots were fired at the lifeboat, followed by four revolver shots. It was only then that the crew saw the submarine, which was about 500 yards away. The Captain and his men were taken on board; and the commander of the submarine boarded the vessel, removed the clothes, provisions, and papers, and left bombs on board which afterward blew her up. The master was searched, and £22 5s., with his watch and chain, was taken from him. The commander of the enemy vessel said that there was no food left in the submarine, which had been six weeks out, and he also mentioned that food in Germany was very short. During the night the crew were picked up by a destroyer.

"Torpedoed, and on her beam ends, but not actually seen to sink," is the description given by a Captain of an attack on his vessel. She was struck between the stokehold and No. 2 hold, both of which were blown in. The crew had time to take to the boats. The German Captain, speaking perfect English, asked for the name of the ship and her tonnage, and verified the particulars given to him by reference to _Lloyd's Register_. The master's boat, with twenty-three men, reached shore the following day, and the mate's boat, with the remainder of the crew, was picked up. It was reported by the master that the officers and men of the submarine were "quite friendly and polite."

One night a vessel was struck by a torpedo. The engines were stopped, and all hands went to the boat stations. The port boat was lowered safely, but within three minutes the ship sank and the davit caught it and capsized it, all hands being thrown into the water. The second officer went down with the ship, but seized hold of the capsized boat and climbed on top of it. The boatswain also was taken down, and he, too, as well as a seaman, got on the boat. After they had been on the upturned boat for some minutes a submarine appeared and hailed them to come on board. They explained that it was impossible. The submarine went ahead, and about a quarter of an hour later returned, and the men were again asked, in a rough voice, to come on board. The same answer was given, whereupon the submarine again went ahead, putting her helm over, and the men were thrown into the water. Those on the submarine must have known that there was a man under the boat, as they could easily have heard him knocking. His comrades, however, pulled out the plug and gave him air, and eventually the boat was righted and he was rescued.

One of a group of other ships was torpedoed and the crew took to the boats, one of which capsized, and seven of the men managed to reach the lifeboat. The submarine came close, flashed her searchlight on the boat and on the men in the water, and, after jeering at them, made off. The survivors were picked up by a French torpedo boat next morning.

Attacked by a U-boat, which fired two shots, the master got out the boats, left the ship, and pulled toward the enemy vessel. The commander took four or five of his own men in the ship's boat and put some bombs on board. As these failed to explode he went back for more explosives, taking with him everything out of the ship that could be carried--food, clothing, compass, and all the metal that the enemy could lay hands on. The vessel was then blown up, the crew in the meantime being on the deck of the submarine. They were treated very badly, their clothes being thrown out of the boat into the sea. Only one oar was left them, five having been flung overboard. The master begged for another, but he could not get any more.

Two submarines were sighted at a distance of about six miles attacking a bark. The master of the observing vessel altered his course and lit a smoke cowl to screen his ship, but it was not very effective. Shortly afterward he was attacked by one of the submarines. Being armed, the vessel opened fire, but the U-boat was not within range, and a shot from the submarine struck the ship. Orders were given to haul down the ensign, and steps were taken to abandon her. The boats were lowered and the ship was abandoned, the enemy still firing. The ship was hit nineteen times before the crew was properly clear. When the submarine came up the vessel was "generally looted," everything the enemy could lay their hands on being taken, including the spirits in the bonded room. Some of the Germans were seen drinking on the bridge. The enemy were alongside for about an hour, and "treated our men quite fairly, even returning some of their personal gear which they had looted." The enemy crew were very particular in getting all the leather they possibly could, even going so far as to take old boots which were long past usage. Soap was also in great request, and a tin of lard was considered a prize.

In another instance a vessel struck on the port side in the engine room went down at once, the crew having only time to launch the boats. About ten minutes before the ship was torpedoed a floating object was sighted, which appeared like a small vessel bottom upward. This was reported by flag code to another vessel close by, but no reply was received before the ship was hit. The master was of opinion that this object must have been placed there as a decoy by the submarine to draw the attention of the lookouts away from herself.

When a motor schooner was struck the ship's boat was rowed to the submarine and the master and one man were taken aboard. The submarine then towed the boat to the disabled ship, and sent two men on her with bombs. An officer asked the master, "What was the cargo? Where from? Where bound? Why did the ship not come with convoy?" The officer spoke very good English, being prompted in German by the Captain of the U-boat. The master and crew were much struck by the pallid appearance of the officers and crew of the submarine and by their nervous and excited manner. The commander was continually urging haste, and the officer who was placing the bombs on board could hardly hold them, owing to his nervous tension. One of the crew of the submarine who had lived long in England, speaking to the ship's crew, cursed the war and said that he wished it was over, exclaiming that it was not their fault, but that they had to do their duty. "You won't believe it in England," he added, "but it's true." The submarine appeared to be of an old type and to have been a long time at sea.

The Story of an Indomitable Captain

Told by Joseph Conrad

_The story of a certain British steamship traveling from Lerwick to Iceland and torpedoed on the way has been told in The London Daily Mail by the British novelist, Joseph Conrad, in these words:_

The ship went down in less than four minutes. The Captain was the last man on board, going down with her, and was sucked under. On coming up he was caught under an upturned boat to which five hands were clinging.