CHAPTER VIII.

CUBAN TACTICS.

There was one incident which occurred in the early part of the disturbances which caused a certain amount of excitement in the United States, as it was thought that it would prove to be a repetition of the Virginius affair.

On the 8th of March, 1895, the ship Allianca was bound from Colon to New York. She was following the usual track of vessels near the Cuban shore. But, outside the three mile limit, she was fired upon by a Spanish gunboat. President Cleveland declared this to be an unwarrantable interference by Spain with passing American ships. Protest was promptly made by the United States against this act as not being justified by a state of war; nor permissible in respect of a vessel on the usual paths of commerce, nor tolerable in view of the wanton peril occasioned to innocent life and property. This act was disavowed by Spain, with full expression of regret, and with an assurance that there should not be again such just cause for complaint. The offending officer was deposed from his command. All this was eminently satisfactory, and the United States took no further action in the matter.

The chief battle of the campaign, while Campos still remained governor-general, was that fought at Bayamo, in July, 1895. Campos himself commanded in person, and for the first time the Spaniards, ever vain-glorious and self-confident, became aware of the mettle of the men arrayed against them.

The Spanish forces numbered some five thousand men, while the Cubans had not much more than half that number. It was the Spanish strategy, however, to divide their men into detachments, and the Cubans were quick to take advantage of this. The fight was a long and bloody affair, but finally the victory, although not pronounced, remained with the Cubans.

The Spanish forces were more or less demoralized, and their loses were heavy. Thirteen Spanish officers were killed, while the Cubans lost two colonels. The Cubans admitted that fifty of their number were killed or disabled, but they claimed that the loss of the Spaniards was over three hundred.

It is impossible to tell much from the Spanish accounts, as they were far from being complete and were highly colored. It has been the same way in the present war, as witness the laughable "one mule" report, with which all are familiar.

In this engagement, General Santocildes was killed. It is said that Santocildes sacrificed his own life to save that of his friend and superior, Campos.

There are two very different stories told of the attitude of Antonio Maceo toward Campos in this battle. One is to the effect that he did not know that Campos was commanding in person, but when he was told of it the following day, he said:

"Had I known it, I would have sacrificed five hundred more of my men, and I would have taken him dead or alive! Thus with one blow I would have ended the war."

The other is quite different, and has been very generally believed amongst the Cubans. It is to the effect that, during the fight, Maceo recognized Campos, and, pointing him out to his men, ordered them not to harm him, as he was a soldier who made war honorably.

Murat Halstead relates two incidents of the battle of Bayamo, which, however, he declares must be taken with a large grain of salt. One, which comes from an insurgent authority is as follows:

"Campos only saved himself by a ruse. Taking advantage of the Cubans' well-known respect for the wounded, he had himself placed in a covered stretcher, which they allowed to pass, without looking inside the cover. When outside of the Cuban lines he was obliged to walk on foot to Bayamo, through six miles of by-paths, under cover of the darkness, only accompanied by a colored guide."

The other tells that a son of Campos, who was a lieutenant, was captured, but released with a friendly message to his father, who of course, was expected to follow so admirable an example.

Whether these anecdotes are true or not, one thing is certain. After the battle, Maceo collected the wounded, whom the Spaniards left upon the field in their retreat, and treated them in the most humane manner possible. He wrote to Campos the following letter:

* * *

"To His Excellency, the General Martinez Campos:

"Dear Sir--Anxious to give careful and efficient attendance to the wounded Spanish soldiers that your troops left behind on the battle-field, I have ordered that they be lodged in the houses of the Cuban families that live nearest to the battle-ground, until you send for them.

"With my assurance that the forces you may send to escort them back will not meet any hostile demonstrations from my soldiers, I have the honor to be, sir,

"Yours respectfully,

"Antonio Maceo."

* * *

While Maceo was thus maneuvering in the eastern part of the island, the general-in-chief, Maximo Gomez, was fighting in Camaguey. The population in the provinces of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba had risen almost to a man, and the movement was well under way in the province of Santa Clara.

Several encounters took place, the most important being the attack upon the little city of Cascorro, which Gomez succeeded in capturing. He found there a large quantity of arms and ammunition, of which the Cubans were greatly in need.

Gomez proved himself quite as magnanimous as Maceo. The wounded were all cared for to the best of his ability, and the prisoners were returned to the Spanish leaders. This example, however, seems to have been utterly lost upon the Spaniards.

The insurgent forces, under Gomez, were at this time divided into six portions, operating in the six provinces, and commanded by Antonio Maceo, Aguerre, Lacret, Carillo, Suarez and Jose Maceo. Suarez was afterwards cashiered for cowardice, and replaced by Garcia.

In August, 1895, Maceo joined his chief at a place called Jimaguaya, where Gomez had called to him a large proportion of the Cuban forces, which numbered at that time about thirty thousand.

And against these undisciplined soldiers was arrayed a regular army of over eighty-five thousand men, not counting the armed volunteers.

The odds were terribly against the Cubans, but Gomez and Maceo were confident of success.

It should be mentioned here that there were quite a number of women fighting under Maceo, and these women did heroic service. In fact, the Cuban women have given innumerable proofs of their devotion, body and soul, to the cause of "Cuba Libre."

Gomez' objective point was Havana, and between Jimaguaya and Havana, there were over fifty thousand Spanish soldiers.

When Gomez started, he had about twelve thousand men, which he divided into three columns. He was quite well aware that the fighting must be of the guerilla stamp. In fact, it was the only species of warfare possible.

He therefore instructed his lieutenants to have recourse to strategy, to foil the enemy at every point. The one object was to reach Havana.

"In the event of a forced battle," he said finally, "overthrow them! Pass over them and on to Havana!"

The march was begun, the instructions being followed to the letter. Actual combat was everywhere avoided. The Spanish papers constantly had reports like this: "After a few shots the rebels ran away." They did not understand that this was exactly Gomez' tactics, and he was succeeding, too.

Every day the insurgents advanced further and further west. At the end of a fortnight they reached the trocha of Jaruco, which had been constructed in the centre of the island. This trocha was occupied by a large and important Spanish force.

Gomez ordered Maceo to make a feigned attack upon the northern portion of the trocha. The Spaniards rushed there in a body, and Gomez, who had counted upon this very thing, crossed the southern part, which was left unprotected, without striking a blow.

As soon as Maceo knew that Gomez had passed over in safety, he immediately disappeared with his men, and soon after managed to rejoin his chief.

It was a very clever ruse, and Campos, whose headquarters were then in Santa Clara realized that he had been outgeneralled. He ordered a hurried march to Cienfuegos, and there took command.

The evasive movements of the insurgents continued, and again and again was Campos outflanked.

With but little difficulty the Cubans crossed two other trochas, and finally entered the Province of Matanzas, which Campos had felt positive could never be invaded; the Spaniards meanwhile constantly retreating, nearer and nearer to the capital.

At last, Campos determined to force an open conflict. He told his lieutenants where they were to meet him.

This was in December, 1895.

Campos lay in wait for Maceo's forces at a point between Coliseo and Lumidero.

It seemed at first as if the insurgents were caught in a trap, and would be forced to accept a battle in the open, which could not fail to be disastrous to them.

But a happy thought came to Maceo, and, in connection with this plan, he issued his orders.

Suddenly, the cane-fields which surrounded the camp of the Spaniards burst into flame, and on each side was a great blazing plain. Campos knew that he had once more been foiled, and he gave the order to retreat at once.

This battle, if battle it can be called, had important results. It enabled Gomez to reach Jovellanos, a city which commanded the railroad lines of Cardenas, Matanzas and Havana. These lines Gomez destroyed as well as every sugar plantation upon his route.

As to the destruction of the sugar fields and the reason therefor, we shall have something to say later on.

Campos, completely outwitted and vanquished in his attempts to stop the onward progress of the insurgents, now fell back upon Havana, which he reached Christmas Day.

His reception in the capital was anything but a pleasant one. The Spaniards there had clamored from the very beginning for revenge without mercy, and they looked upon the successive checks which the army had received as little less than criminal. They demanded of the governor-general the reason for his repeated defeats, and even threatened him personally.

There were three political parties in Cuba, the Conservatives, the Reformists and the Autonomists. Campos met the leaders of these parties in an interview, and asked for their opinions. The consultation was very unsatisfactory, and as a result Campos proposed his resignation to which the ministry made no objection.

Shortly after, his resignation was sent in and accepted. He sailed for Spain the 17th of January, his place being temporarily filled by General Sabas Marin.

In spite of Martinez Campos' failure to subdue the insurrection, nothing but the greatest sympathy and respect can be felt for him, at least out of Spain, where, speaking in a general manner, humanity has no place, and gratitude is an unknown quantity.

Campos' services to his country had been great, including, as they did, the pacification of Cuba in the Ten Years War, the quelling of a revolt in Spain itself, and the restoration and support of the Spanish monarchy. At an advanced age, when he should have been enjoying a well deserved rest, he was sent away to fight a difficult war, and to risk the tarnishing of his laurels as a military commander.

All praise to Martinez Campos for his pure patriotism, his unswerving rectitude, his magnanimity and his exalted ideas of honor! This praise even the enemies of his country cannot refuse to him.