Part 1

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CONSCIENCE & FANATICISM

An Essay on Moral Values

by

GEORGE PITT-RIVERS

"_Aequam memento servare mentem_"

London: William Heinemann

London: William Heinemann, 1919

PREFACE

In presenting this little volume to the public I am fully conscious of my presumption in introducing my personal views in a region where many hundreds of better qualified writers have devoted their best efforts. Since, however, no apology can justify a profitless task, if such it be, or add to its utility, if indeed it possesses any, I will not attempt to make one.

If I have contributed in ever so slight a degree towards an understanding of the mental state or attitude we call fanaticism, for the purpose of guarding against the catastrophes it begets, I shall have achieved my purpose. It is unfortunately inevitable that a discussion which involves current opinions and beliefs must necessarily encounter strong prejudices and opposition, but it is less on this account that this little work is likely to fail than for the reason to which Hume attributed the failure which attended the publication of his "Treatise of Human Nature," which he described as his guilt "of a very usual indiscretion, in going to the press too early." A circumstance which prevented that "unfortunate literary attempt from reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the zealots."[1]

Needless to say, I have relied for my interpretation of human notions and ideas, and the conduct which results from them, very largely upon the works of past and contemporary writers; and my indebtedness to those with whom I differ no less than those with whom I agree is but very inadequately acknowledged in my references to the works of some of them.

The earlier portions of the essay are devoted chiefly to an examination of moral ideas, the latter portions more exclusively to the facts of nature and of mind from which they derive their meaning. Throughout I have attempted to keep the argument as free as possible from the thin air of philosophical and scholastic dialectic, and as far as possible in terms of common usage and thought. With this end in view, and for the sake of brevity, the authors to whose works I have referred most frequently have been selected either because they are better known or because their opinions are more widely held than in the case of others. But in any case no claim to exhaustive or even adequate treatment can be made for so slight a review of so vast a subject.

The first problem which I have attempted to deal with is one which confronts all moralists. It consists in the difficulty of deriving ethical notions from notions which are not ethical, or of deducing the moral law from the facts of experience and of nature. The attempt to escape from this difficulty often takes the form of adopting a theory by which the whole world is divided into two unrelated worlds, a world of values and a physical world of mechanical sequences. In order to bring these two independent and self-consistent systems within the same reality and to weld them together, God is postulated. God is necessary, it is argued, to prove the objectivity of morality. That is to say, that since moral values are eternally valid, independently of man's capacity to be conscious of them, they can only have existence in the one eternal mind.[2]

The purpose of this essay is to offer a different solution. As this question of the status of moral values is of great importance to the moral argument, a preliminary examination of the ground may be helpful.

The predication of value to an object which elicits moral approbation is not, as most Theistic writers stubbornly maintain, an implicit acknowledgment of the objectivity of the goodness predicated, it is merely the act of appreciating the subject or valuer's attitude in relation to the object (the relationship may be purely hypothetical), but it may, and usually does, invite a similar attitude on the part of any number of subjects.[3] The relation of subject to object--this also applies to all relations--may belong to objective reality, but not the moral worth we ascribe to the object as a result of that relationship. This distinction is important and involves, necessarily, a discrimination (not always made) between the treatment of knowledge and of value. Hume, by denying the objective character of the relations and connexions of nature equally with moral judgment, in his interpretation of individual experience, treated moral judgment and knowledge of natural science in an identical manner. In the following discussion truth, to which I have denied relativity, is accorded a position altogether distinct from value. Appreciation of truth and interest in knowing is treated as a value, but not truth itself to which subjectivity is denied. The method I have adopted of treating this fundamental point may perhaps be made clearer by a simple illustration. Let us take any particular moral judgment, for example, "A [a conscious individual] is good." The assertion implies that A is the habitual doer of desirable actions, or is benevolently disposed towards the valuer, Society at large, or God, according to the valuer's idea of goodness. In any case A's conduct or his attitude must have evoked approbation by reason of its effect (emotional or material) upon the valuer or those with whom he is in sympathy. The valuer might attempt to refute this definition by maintaining that A's habitual conduct does him the greatest injury, but that his predication of good in respect of A is the assertion of an objective fact. In spite of such an objection, I would reply that the moral judgment may indeed be intended to imply certain definite objective qualities or properties _because_ the valuer considers these desirable, and chooses arbitrarily to define "good" as containing those definite properties, or because in the community to which he addresses himself they are customarily so defined. The veracity, however, of the moral judgment, considered as a statement of fact, can only be tested after an agreement has been reached as to the content of the symbol "good." It has then been given a meaning which alone it does not possess. The validity of moral judgment, when it is not merely the expression of individual attitude, will therefore always depend upon the criterion of conduct previously adopted. In this way it is held that a moral judgment differs from a statement of fact, which is valid irrespective of the existence of any mind capable of apprehending that fact.

In the last two chapters, where an examination of psychological processes has been necessary, I have experienced no slight difficulty in finding appropriate terms by which to distinguish certain conceptions which are in some respects new. An inapt terminology and the misuse of terms is so grave a fault, and so habitually results in errors, obscurity, and confusion, that it may not be superfluous to call attention to the terms that are more liable to misinterpretation and in many ways least satisfactory. For this purpose it will be necessary to give the briefest possible account of the use to which they are put, while their more precise definition will be left to the chapters in which they occur.

The psychic life and the mental activity of human beings is conditioned by three factors. The first, heredity, denotes the accumulation of experiences and consequent structural modifications acquired by the race during the process of its adjustment to its environment; the manifestation of the result of this experience in behaviour is called instinct. The second is the result of the habits and acquirements of the individual from the moment of conception to the end of his existence: this, together with the first, produces what we call character. The third, those external influences operating upon the individual, we refer to as environment.

If we would reflect upon the mental life of humanity we must consider the individual mind in relation to the world of mankind. In considering the individual mind I have adopted the terms _objective mind_ and _subjective mind_ to denote two aspects of mind. The words "objective" and "subjective" in conjunction with mind are used in a special sense which has to be defined. The world of men has been considered as the psychic environment of the individual mind, and I have introduced a term to denote the power of aggregations of human thoughts and impulses. It has been viewed as an aspect of the universal process underlying the conative disposition and will-to-power of all living beings, and on account of the mode of its operation it has been termed "cosmic suggestion." The term is not intended to imply that the psychic forces of the human mind can be "given off" and have separate existence, like the "odylic fluid" of the early Mesmerists. The power is that of collective minds; suggestion an effect of its activity, not a derived essence. It must be understood that these three terms are provisional, and will be discarded if, in the course of time, better ones suggest themselves.

Finally, I would crave the indulgence of my readers to say a few words about the philosophy of egoism. There is a view of egoism--the principle of self-interest--as distinguished from altruism, which is seen in opposition to asceticism and mysticism, a view which prompted Lecky when he wrote: "Taking human nature with all its defects, the influence of an enlightened self-interest first of all upon the actions and afterwards upon the character of mankind, is shown to be sufficient to construct the whole edifice of civilization; and if that principle were withdrawn, all would crumble in the dust.... When, therefore, the ascetic, proclaiming the utter depravity of mankind, seeks to extirpate his most natural passions, to crush the expansion of his faculties, to destroy the versatility of his tastes, and to arrest the flow and impulse of his nature, he is striking at the very force and energy of civilization." How infinitely preferable is the spirit of enlightened egoism to the blind altruism of the fanatic! The egoism that enhances rather than dims the love of others. It is only through the realization of community of interests and aims that like thought will result in like conduct. It is a recognition of this principle of systematic integration of interests and their concomitant obligations, starting from egoism, in the sense of a realization of the relation of self to environment, and then through successive stages of widening appreciation of the full contents of environment to the identification of the self with the community, which alone leads to State or National morality, and will lead, ultimately it may be hoped, to the morality of a community of all nations--that is, a world morality. It is for this reason that we say that the end and aim of a true ethical system is to find the interests of mankind in the interests of the individual.

And now, as we stand on the threshold of a new era--a new world in search of its soul--what better precept can we have than the simple words of the great thinker who, three hundred years ago, also stood on the threshold of a new world of thought?

"Il suffit de bien juger pour bien faire, et de juger le mieux qu'on puisse, pour faire aussi tout son mieux, c'est-a-dire, pour acquerir toutes les vertus, et ensemble tous les autres biens, qu'on puisse acquerir; et lorsqu'on est certain que cela est, on ne saurait manquer d'etre content."--Descartes, "Discours de la Methode."

G. P. R.

HINTON ST. MARY, DORSET _January 1, 1919_

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Hume's "Autobiography."

[2] This is the position of the Idealistic schools and is adopted in Professor Sorley's recently published Gifford Lectures, "Moral Values and the Idea of God."

[3] This relationship may be expressed in psychological terms. Dr. McDougall expresses it thus: "Objects have value for us in proportion as they excite our conative tendencies; our consciousness of their value, positive or negative, is our consciousness of the strength of the conation they awake in us."--"Body and Mind," p. 329.

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE I. INTRODUCTION 1

The importance ascribed to the word "conscience" by public opinion: by the State: by the Church: need for examination of its credentials

II. THE VALIDITY OF MORAL JUDGMENTS 7

Theism and Determinism: the Intuitive schools: the Rationalistic schools: recognition of Good: the facts stated: the Utilitarian standard demanded

III. THE MEANING OF MORAL OBLIGATION 20

The argument against Utilitarianism: Mill's defence of Utilitarianism: a variation of Mill's position: the principle of proximity: the meaning of Truth: duty: an illustration from history: Robert E. Lee

IV. RELIGION AND MORALITY 32

Probing the essentials: the need for a moral code: its artificial character: the deeper morality: Morality and Religion: religious and political fanaticism: moral values and psychic force: Monism and Duality: a reconciliation of systems: conservation of the soul: education and the formation of opinion.

V. THE LAWS OF SUGGESTION AND "SUBJECTIVE MIND" 44

The power of ideas: origin of the World War: psychodynamics and the law of suggestion: Haeckel on emotion: Dr. Samuel Johnson on the progress of an agitator: consciousness: Hudson's hypothesis: the two aspects of mind: Theology on the origin of Good and Evil: self-knowledge: Socrates and Joan of Arc: the phenomena of madness: men of genius: evolution and organic memory: telepathy: the power of suggestion: psychotherapeutics: faith-healers: Christian Science: memory: Coleridge's case: William James: Bernard Shaw on Art.

VI. VALUER AND VALUATION 73

Factors determining valuation and arrangement of the discussion.

(1) INSTINCT AND HEREDITY 73

Prof. Ward on heredity: Haeckel on instincts: McDougall on instincts: imitation and morality: demagogues and fanatics: geniuses and politicians: maternal impressions: heredity versus environment: conscience as an emotional and instinctive organ, and conscience as a thinking and intellectual organ: the force of cosmic suggestion on morality: remorse.

(2) THE FACTOR OF EMOTION 86

Emotion defined: its manifestations: its control: Ward on emotion: James on emotion: the aesthetic emotions: Racine and the element of mystery in Art: William Hazlitt on the worship of names: emotional sensibility: aesthetic appreciation.

(3) JUDGMENT OF ENDS 96

The intellectual and critical processes: realization of ends: recognition of Good: the norm of valuation.

(4) COSMIC SUGGESTION 99

Public opinion: emotional suggestions: individual suggestibility: gregarious attraction: ecstatic oratory: Rasputin: Mark Antony: propaganda: the Press: Mr. Hilaire Belloc's views: the influence of literature: the worship of symbols: Bergson's definition of metaphysics: the necessary task of religion: progress or decline: the highest form of morality.

CONSCIENCE AND FANATICISM

I

INTRODUCTION

In all ages conscience has been the theme of priest, politician, philanthropist and obstructionist. So often used and so seldom analysed, beyond a bare assertion of its function, it is curious to reflect on the strange medley of uses to which this word is put.

Conscience is at once the standard and the refuge of orthodox and fanatic, patriot and anarchist--according as they are described by admirer or detractor--but, let us believe with Lecky,[4] least often of the genuine hypocrite.

Never was a nation so beset with "conscientious" men and women as England is to-day; some helping, some hindering, some having little effect on the national welfare. Some flaunt the badge obtrusively, they label themselves "conscientious objectors to military service," "conscientious objectors to vaccination," "conscientious teetotallers"; in some cases anti-vivisectionists,[5] social reformers and (formerly) suffragettes proclaim their exertions endured for "conscience' sake"; so, for the most part, do missionaries and religious functionaries, and, in fact, all and any who engage in propaganda or obstruction, "because," they say, "something higher than reason prompts our motives--'conscience'."[6] Others refer to conscience shyly as of something too sacred to be spoken of publicly, and again others only in moments of intense earnestness--or alcoholic remorse.

A conscience, in fact, is an invaluable asset; where it does not gain approbation, it at least gains some measure of respect.

Most people, then, admit the existence and the reality of what we popularly call "conscience," and although fewer people are agreed as to its origin and nature, it is, nevertheless, accorded a high place of importance and almost universal recognition as an arbiter in the affairs of men.

So undisputed is this claim to inviolability of conscience in twentieth-century England that the State, in framing her laws, modifies their application by the interspersion of _caveats_ in the form of "conscience clauses."

The principle on which the conscience proviso is allowed to negative the universal applicability of the State's demand for service or compliance with her rules appears, however, to be somewhat arbitrary and uncertain, and can hardly be said to be devised solely in deference to any possible religious sanction, since, although a man's conscience is allowed to exempt him from vaccinating his children, the plea of religious sanction, in the case of a man professing the polygamous doctrine of Brigham Young,[7] would not exempt him from amenability to the law concerning bigamy; or, again, the conscience of a Quaker or of a Christadelphian[8] is recognized as a stronger qualification for exemption from combatant service than the equally recalcitrant consciences of, e.g. an Atheist or a Member of the Church of England. Yet the standardization of "privileged" denominational consciences is strongly disavowed! In spite, however, of a certain illogical inconsistency in practice, it is virtually conceded as a right that a man should justify any conduct by the plea of "conscience," even, in many cases, when it militates directly against the good of the State.

Even more than the State and public opinion does the Protestant Church insist upon the authority and inviolability of "conscience." Driven, step by step, from the time of the Reformation, by the encroachments of science and the progress of Rationalism, from her defence of the infallibility of Doctrine and Scripture, the Protestant Church has sought to render her position impregnable by increased insistence upon the inviolability and sanctity of revelation and conscience. Lecky, speaking of the trend of "Protestant Rationalism," says: "Its central conception is the elevation of conscience into a position of supreme authority as the religious organ, a verifying faculty discriminating between truth and error."[9]

The most recent stalwarts of the Church of England are equally insistent upon this point, thus the Rev. G. L. Richardson writes: "We shall appeal to and invigorate the conscience in proportion as we rely upon the Holy Spirit as the one source of spiritual power.... 'The fellowship of the Holy Ghost' and His grace through the Church is the master word of the twentieth century."[10] This passage well illustrates the supreme importance, with regard to her position, which the Church attaches to the appeal to conscience at the present day. In another passage the same author says, "the authority of conscience is ... paramount for the individual." Dr. J. N. Figgis in his "Churches in the Modern State" says that any doctrine which would "destroy the springs of spiritual life in the individual conscience would be disastrous to civic as well as to religious life."

Having raised the individual conscience to a pinnacle of ethical omniscience, the ecclesiastic next proceeds to bring it into line with, or rather into synchronous subordination to, the aggregate "Church Conscience." "The Church is a Divine society, her members will feel an obligation to be loyal to her discipline.... The conscience of her members will respond with approval or shame when they keep, or neglect to keep, her standards." From this the resulting "code and sentiment" is the "Church Conscience."[11]

Mr. G. K. Chesterton throws further light on this interrelationship. "The 'Church Conscience' is rather to be conceived as a fortress to which the individual may return for shelter and strength when the attacks of temptation threaten to overwhelm him. At such times it is well to feel that we are not dependent on the 'inner light' of conscience alone, but that we can throw ourselves on a social force mightier than our own, and behold with astonishment and enthusiasm a Divine company and a Divine Captain."[12]

Whilst Church and State are in agreement regarding its importance and sanctity, the same unanimity is not exhibited in dealing with the origin and character of conscience. Equally divided in this respect are the philosophers and psychologists.

Priests are fond of telling us that conscience is "the voice of God within us." To some men it appears strange that the voice of the same God should frequently induce men to oppose each other with such particular bitterness. This objection is sometimes met by the explanation that although it is the voice of God speaking through the medium of our souls, we fail to recognize or interpret rightly its significance. This explanation, again, is not altogether satisfactory, since, if that were the case, the voice of God must be so uncertain a guide it were better not to rely on it.

When we look back through the pages of History and consider the actions of men and the motives to which they ascribe them, and see what an orgy of blood, of persecutions, of burnings, of torturings, of blind passions and religious frenzy, of diabolical imaginings and monstrous eschatology has been conceived at the instigation of conscience and religion, and prescribed in the name of God, we are inclined to inquire more deeply into the meaning and credentials of this watchword of all ages.

FOOTNOTES:

[4] "Hypocrites, who from interested motives profess opinions which they do not really believe, are probably rarer than is usually supposed."--"Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe."

[5] A few years ago the Animal Defence and Anti-Vivisection Society distributed pamphlets from their headquarters in Piccadilly, beginning "Do not ask of your doctor his opinion on this matter, ask your _conscience_," etc.

[6] This distinction is commonly made between conscience and the intellectual faculty of reason; thus, when a man says, "My conscience tells me," he usually means, "No _reason_ will deter me."

[7] Mormon leader and preacher, died in 1877, leaving seventeen wives.

[8] The establishment of _bona fide_ membership of either of the above-mentioned religious societies (_inter alia_) by a "conscientious objector" was recognized by Military Service Tribunals (acting under official instructions) as sufficient cause for a verdict of exemption.