Part 2

On June 17, 1908, a freight train, running fully thirty miles per hour, approached my signal tower with a clear right of way east-bound. At the same time an express passenger train, rushing at full speed west-bound, came in sight. From a distance of nearly half a mile I could see that a car on the freight train was enveloped in smoke and flame from a hot box. As an actual fact, the engineman, conductor, and brakemen were aware of it. A brakeman was on top of the car watching the trouble. But they were nearing the terminal, and on a parallel east-bound track there was a train that all hands were very anxious to pass by or “jump.” So, by common consent, they were taking the chance on the hot box, and the engineer “had her wide open.” As the freight approached the tower I could see the chips flying from the ties, which indicated that the melted journal had snapped in two. A few seconds later both east- and west-bound tracks were blocked with the twisted rails, broken ties, and derailed cars. The passenger train, consisting of sleepers and crowded coaches, escaped dashing into the wreck by a miracle,--that is, by a mere fraction of time.

This is but an incident in the history of taking chances. Concealed in it, however, is a personal lesson that vitally concerns every man in the service. Do we actually insist upon disaster such as threatened this passenger train before we can be persuaded to come to our senses? In this business of taking chances, which covers every branch of railroad service, both the traveling public and the railroad corporations are at our mercy. Through a long course of years, influence and discipline of all kinds have utterly failed to check it. It is useless to talk about “spots,” for most of us take chances systematically. In fact I don’t think the managements have any idea of the nature and extent of this evil, for the reason perhaps that they have made no special study of the subject nor watched for and made note of illustrations, as I have. One would think it would have occurred to some railroad manager to issue a general order, with a caption somewhat as follows: “Here is a list of twenty dangerous chances which some of you are in the habit of taking. For goodness’ sake, have a care!”

Here, and elsewhere in this volume, it seems to me that it is demonstrated, beyond possibility of question, that thousands of lives have been sacrificed by reason of the palpable neglect and inefficiency of certain railroad employees. It makes not a particle of difference whether we conclude to call these careless men a majority, a minority, or a scattered few. Fundamentally it is also quite a secondary consideration that rules and methods of management at times can be shown to be partially responsible for accidents that result from this inefficient service. For the time being also, let us forget that elsewhere I call attention to the conduct and influence of the railroad labor organizations as an important factor in the situation, and to the absolute necessity, under existing conditions, of governmental interference. Let us put aside all these considerations, and as thoughtful, well-intentioned railroad men ask ourselves if we are socially and morally interested in this safety problem on American railroads. Do we consider the matter important enough to give to it more than an occasional thought or passing comment? When the lives of our fellow employees, or of passengers, are sacrificed by reason of personal forgetfulness or negligence, have we, the principals, or at least those most nearly concerned in the accidents, any remarks to make or any suggestions to offer? For the future, as in the past, are we going to allow this business to drift? Are we all of the same opinion as the train-master who said to me: “What’s the use of writing up these matters? We always have had careless men. We can’t expect to get rid of them altogether. Like the poor, they are with us always.” This man forgot, as many of us are liable to forget, that “writing up,” as they call it, is the only known method in modern civilization by means of which enlightenment and education can be passed around and disseminated.

But let no one imagine that I have any unreasonable expectations as regards the improvement of conditions on our railroads. I fully recognize and make allowance for the difficulties connected with the problem and for the shortcomings of human nature, but at the same time I insist that if we only open our eyes to our personal responsibilities in the matter, and pay half as much attention to the public interests as we do to our own, an astonishing improvement in the service will immediately result. It is actually a matter of reasonable demonstration that at least seventy-five per cent of the casualties might be avoided by increase of interest on the part of the employee, and the earnest concentration of his best thought on the subject. This awakened interest, however, must not be a subordinate matter. It must be a consecration apart from and above all questions of wages, discipline, or the interests of organized labor. There is no question in my mind as to the efficacy or wonder-working properties of the personal cure. The real question is, Are we big enough to undertake the job? If we continue to avoid the issue, and thus publish the fact that our social conscience is a blank, we may just as well write ourselves down as the most self-centred aggregation of individuals in the industrial world. It is ridiculous to suppose that conditions such as I describe in this book can be permitted to continue much longer. Sooner or later public opinion will be called upon to define, with no uncertain emphasis, just how far our private rights can be permitted to infringe upon our public duties.

But while our apathy in these matters must be evident to any thoughtful man, it will certainly add to the impressiveness of the situation if it can be shown that our conduct differs from, and is altogether less praiseworthy than that of other men and other organizations, under very similar conditions. Is it not remarkable that all over the United States, business and scientific associations should be actively bestirring themselves in regard to the railroad accidents?

The railroad labor organization alone is inactive and silent in the matter. The railroad business is a profession, in the operation of which there are certain features that threaten the public welfare. The business of a doctor or a surgeon is also a profession, in which there are many dangers and difficulties that also relate to the public health and safety. There is actually no more reason why surgeons should come together and consult for the good of humanity and the honor of their profession, than there is for railroad men to do so. As a matter of fact, every profession on earth is jealous of its good name, and plans early and late for the improvement of the service it is called upon to render to the public. In my opinion railroad men should be equally sensitive to the call of the social conscience.

Of course the discussion of these matters relating to the personality of railroad men, to be of any practical value, must be followed by action or experiment of some kind. Years ago, I proposed to the managements of several railroads that we, the men in the operating departments, should be invited to form a “Safety League.” I thought it would be a good idea to have a badge or button of some kind. There would then be no doubt in the public mind as to our interest in the problem. “Let us try the experiment,” I said. “We can at least show that there is one division of one railroad in the United States where the men have come together, talked over the difficulties, and determined to make an improvement in the records.”

But it was pointed out to me that the one great objection to the plan was the fact that leaders of our organizations would immediately veto anything of the kind. They have always frowned upon any such democratic relationship between men and management, such as a Safety League would initiate. It is doubtful, however, if these objections would stand a little public investigation and pressure, and therefore I think the present is an opportune moment to revive the proposition. There would be no chance for friction between labor men and management in the efforts of the League to improve the service. The main object of the League would be to arouse our interest and concentrate our attention upon the routine of our daily work, into which certain factors that imperil the safety of travel have been allowed to enter. We railroad men are still too human to render the best service without a certain amount of emulation and encouragement. A Safety League could be depended upon to furnish this much-needed stimulus. If managers and labor leaders would come out in the open, in the way I have indicated, and let the public see by this practical demonstration of their interest that they are thoroughly in earnest, I am sure they would find the employees ready and willing to second their efforts. That a Safety League among American railroad men would be worth the candle can be thoroughly comprehended if we give a moment’s attention to the endless string of fatalities and the millions in money losses that are now the recognized tribute that is being paid to these failures in duty.

For the rest, to the thoughtful railroad man, a final word remains to be said:--

In any comprehensive study of efficiency, prosperity is one of the most important factors to be considered. There is always an intimate relationship between struggle and efficiency. The general rule is from shirt-sleeves to shirt-sleeves, with prosperity as the halfway house. In all manner of human affairs it takes high moral exertion to stave off this fate. In the railroad business to-day the marked prosperity and power, political and otherwise, of the employee, is a positive menace to the safety of travel, on account of the lack of the moral safeguards to which I refer. This statement should not have an irritating effect upon railroad men; it should stimulate thought. The significance of the above conclusion is emphasized, from the fact that our labor leaders appear to be utterly unmindful of “the writing on the wall.” With shorter runs, increase of pay, larger personal privileges in every direction, and an ever-widening sphere of power and influence, a corresponding enlargement of our appreciation of our social and moral responsibilities is absolutely essential.

It is obvious, therefore, that the safety problem in regard to preventable accidents must depend to a great extent upon the thought which we are now willing to devote to it. What the managements of corporations and the public can do about it without our assistance can be judged from what they have been able to accomplish in the past. Up to date we railroad men have permitted our leaders to do all our thinking for us. This arises from the fact that we have never thought about or desired anything but material advantages; consequently labor leaders to-day are only too often a reflection of our material desires and of our lack of social responsibility. These men are good, bad, or indifferent, according to the returns we receive from them in cash. In this way they have been uniformly faithful to our interests. But we must not forget that we railroad men, millions of us, are part of the democratic fabric of the nation, and no democracy can possibly flourish upon purely materialistic principles.

The matters to which I direct attention in this volume call for the serious thought of employees, and let us take for our inspiration the truth that the democratic idea of government is itself founded upon the hope that every man will do his own thinking.

II

THE MEN

Money, brains, and intelligent labor form the combination that is attempting to solve the problem of safe and expeditious transportation on American railroads. In order to secure the desired result no expenditure, either of effort or of treasure, is considered too extravagant. So far as concerns speed and comfort, the conditions at the present day leave little to be asked for; but when we come to take account of the human lives that have paid toll to American systems of railroading, we cannot avoid the conclusion that something must be fundamentally wrong in the methods of handling the traffic.

To account for the unsatisfactory state of affairs, there are various popular excuses and explanations. Discussions in regard to block signals, tired employees, faulty rules, and so forth, are seemingly as endless as, up to date, they have proved fruitless. For the most part these discussions are being carried on by professors and students of economic conditions and by clever collectors of statistics, but the men who know all the details of railroad life, the men who pull the signals and handle the trains that are concerned in the trouble, have yet to be heard from.

However, regardless of the nature or value of the discussion, the fact remains that we railroad men still continue in the same blind rut, and there is no perceptible improvement in efficiency. Managers and superintendents appear to be helpless in the matter. They are evidently unable to stem the tide of preventable casualties.

The story of one accident is the story of them all. There is a smash-up. Property is destroyed, perhaps passengers are hurt. The superintendent at once starts an investigation. It is practically secret. Not a word in regard to it is allowed to leak out. After a while a decision is arrived at and a verdict is rendered,--in secret. Then discipline is administered. A private communication containing verdict and penalty is sent to the accused party. This, of course, he keeps to himself, and the incident is closed.

But before long another employee, in utter ignorance of the first man’s blunder, commits the same mistake. Both of these wrecks may have been serious, perhaps with loss of life, but that makes no difference. Our traditions and ancient habits have not been interfered with and the bills have been paid. Such is discipline in the dark. Great, indeed, is secrecy.

Yet it is useless to question either the ability or the integrity of superintendents. As a rule they have risen from the ranks, and are thoroughly capable and conscientious. Every avoidable accident is a reflection on their management, and therefore it can be taken for granted that they render the best service possible under the circumstances. But unfortunately they are beset on all sides with obstacles and difficulties. What they would like to do, even in the matter of secrecy and discipline, must frequently wait upon what they are able to do. Time was when an offending employee could be discharged on the spot, without appeal. To-day he claims a hearing. A brother employee, an expert on railroad law and precedent, stands at his elbow as prompter and assistant. In this way, as we railroad men figure it out, the “law’s delay” puts a curb on the “insolence of office.” Thus the initiative of a superintendent is held in restraint, and management by means of schedules and agreements takes the place of personal direction, while over all hovers the watchful eye of the grievance committee. Meanwhile, we, the employees, look on, watching the game.

When people are killed, when property is wrecked, we have nothing to say. It is for the management to figure out reasons and remedies. Of course, as individuals, we are interested and sorry when accidents happen, but personally we do not bestir ourselves, nor do we call upon our organizations to bestir themselves in the matter. We simply stand pat on our rights. If a prominent railroad man is questioned on the subject of railroad accidents, he will shrug his shoulders and say, “Human nature.” So far as he is concerned, railroad men are to be protected, not criticised. If you turn to the management your errand will be equally fruitless. The superintendent will have little to say. Generally speaking, he has no fault to find with the men, and the men have little fault to find with him. This seems to be a tacit understanding in the interests of harmony. It being impossible to move without treading on somebody’s toes, by all means let us remain motionless. As for the public interests, they must shift for themselves. Consequently, in place of earnest coöperation in the interests of efficiency and improved service, there is something in the nature of a friendly deadlock between men and management.

Nevertheless, in spite of many appearances to the contrary, the problem of the efficient and safe running of trains is a very simple one. Fundamentally it is not a question of rules or safety devices, but of personal conduct and habits of thought.

In everyday life when a man fails to make a satisfactory score with a first-class gun we do not place the blame on the weapon. If we desire greater efficiency in marksmanship we direct our attention to the man. But in the railroad business such commonplace logic does not seem to apply. When a man violates an unmistakable rule or runs a signal with disastrous results, there immediately arises on all sides a peremptory demand for a different kind of rule or an improved signal. Public opinion, with little understanding of the issues at stake, has a constant tendency to blame systems and managements. Even the Railroad Commissioners, agreeing with or responsive to this public sentiment, almost invariably recommend improvements along these lines. In this way for many years attention has been concentrated upon the machinery of management, its rules and safety appliances, and the personality of the men has been side-tracked. The injurious effects of this policy and the manner in which all hands have conspired to obliterate personality from the railroad business will be evident from the following illustration.

A short time ago, in the vicinity of Boston, an express train telescoped an accommodation passenger train. The track in question was protected by no less than four cautionary rules and signals. In this way the express train received four distinct and emphatic intimations that a train was on the block ahead of it. With the slightest attention to the rules or to the dictates of common sense, the protection was sufficient, yet the train ahead was telescoped as it was pulling out of a station. Of course, in placing the responsibility, the plain and real issue in this case was the question whether the express train was or was not running slowly and with extreme caution, as called for by the rules. In order to determine whether the rules and signals were sufficient to prevent a collision, it was surely proper and reasonable to ascertain whether, on this occasion, they were obeyed. But the Railroad Commissioners, after an exhaustive investigation, took a different view of the matter. Their finding or verdict in their own words was as follows:--

“It is not necessary to determine whether the engineman did or did not exercise proper caution; the significant fact is that the discretion actually used led to disastrous results. Under the conditions the signal should have been _red_.”

The harmfulness of this decision will at once be apparent. It cuts the personality out of the business at points where obedience to the rules is the vital issue. Green signals or red signals are equally valueless if ducks and drakes can be played with the rules in regard to them. A decision like this one is confusing and demoralizing to conscientious railroad men, and it converts the management and discipline of a railroad into a thing of shreds and patches.

To emphasize this point, it should be added that another collision of a similar nature took place about the same time on the same railroad. An express passenger train approached a fixed signal which indicated _caution_. The engineman, on the lookout, but with the caution up his sleeve, kept on his way without any reduction in speed. A moment later he encountered a red fusee which called for an absolute stop, but it was too late. Neither the fusee nor the flagman frantically waving his red flag availed to arrest the momentum of the flyer, which dashed into the rear of another passenger train standing at a station.

Now, with all deference to the Railroad Commissioners, the “significant facts” in these accidents are the personal conduct of the employees and not the nature of the signals or the wording of the rules.

Of course, taking a wider view of preventable accidents, it is always an easy matter to divide the responsibility for them between the men and the management. This is the usual and popular method of treating the subject. But the idea, reasonable at times, has been overworked, and has now degenerated into a principle that responsibility should always be divided. Consequently, while we are busy adjusting the division, we frequently lose sight of the real issues, and the offenders are allowed to escape.

Fundamentally, then, it must be confessed, we railroad men are to blame for these preventable accidents. Most of the trouble can be directly traced to our own personal behavior, that is to say, to our conduct and habits of thought as railroad men. This is by no means a reflection on our character as sympathetic and reasonable human beings. Our intentions are all right, but our training in the railroad business has been all wrong.

But it is of little use to talk or write about personality in the abstract. As practical men dealing with a practical topic, we must follow the railroad man out on the road, we must watch him at his work, and we must take notice of the common sense, the caution, and the good judgment or otherwise, which he habitually displays in the execution of his duties. Then, and not until then, can we expect to become qualified to place our opinions or conclusions on record.

Now the regulations relating to the running and protection of trains are very similar on all railroads, and therefore the following rule taken from one of our current working time-tables may be looked upon as thoroughly representative.

“A freight train must not leave a station to follow a passenger train until five minutes after the departure of said passenger train.”

To any ordinary thinker this rule will appear to be plain, positive, and for the most part necessary. Yet as a matter of fact no attention whatever is paid to it either by enginemen, by conductors, or for that matter by superintendents. Its violation has been the cause of collisions and loss of life, but that does not seem to bother us, for we continue to disregard it. Let us take another illustration.

At the point where the writer has been employed for many years, there is a junction of four-track and two-track systems. The rule for the handling of trains at this point is as follows:--

“All trains will approach and enter upon four-track sections under complete control.”

There is nothing misleading or uncertain about this rule. The instructions to enginemen are positive. The towermen at these points understand how necessary and important this rule is. Besides, it is the written result of the experience of the officials. Nevertheless, it is totally and consistently ignored by enginemen. But enginemen are not alone to blame. Conductors should at least be conversant with the rules. The railroad officials who ride on these trains might also very reasonably be expected to notice the persistent violation of regulations for which they themselves are responsible. Yet even the trains bearing the Railroad Commissioners will rush over the territory in question as fast as the wheels can turn. The conditions and the rules in this case are practically the same as were those at Salisbury, England, at the time of the recent disaster in that city.