CHAPTER XV

THE CONCEPTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS[249]

I.--THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PERSONAL AND THE IMPERSONAL UNCONSCIOUS

Since the breach with the Viennese school upon the question of the fundamental explanatory principle of analysis--that is, the question if it be sexuality or energy--our concepts have undergone considerable development. After the prejudice concerning the explanatory basis had been removed by the acceptance of a purely abstract view of it, the nature of which was not anticipated, interest was directed to the concept of the unconscious.

According to Freud's theory the contents of the unconscious are limited to infantile wish-tendencies, which are repressed on account of the incompatibility of their character. Repression is a process which begins in early childhood under the moral influence of environment; it continues throughout life. These repressions are done away with by means of analysis, and the repressed wishes are made conscious. That should theoretically empty the unconscious, and, so to say, do away with it; but in reality the production of infantile sexual wish-fantasies continues into old age.

According to this theory, the unconscious contains only those parts of the personality which might just as well be conscious, and have really only been repressed by the processes of civilisation. According to Freud the essential content of the unconscious would therefore be _personal_. But although, from such a view-point the infantile tendencies of the unconscious are the more prominent, it would be a mistake to estimate or define the unconscious from this alone, for it has another side.

Not only must the repressed materials be included in the periphery of the unconscious, but also all the psychic material that does not reach the threshold of consciousness. It is impossible to explain all these materials by the principle of repression, for in that case by the removal of the repression a phenomenal memory would be acquired, one that never forgets anything. As a matter of fact repression exists, but it is a special phenomenon. If a so-called bad memory were only the consequence of repression, then those persons who have an excellent memory should have no repression, that is, be incapable of being neurotic. But experience teaches us that this is not the case. There are, undoubtedly, cases with abnormally bad memories, where it is clear that the main cause must be attributed to repression. But such cases are comparatively rare.

We therefore emphatically say that the unconscious contains all that part of the psyche that is found under the threshold, including subliminal sense-perceptions, in addition to the repressed material. We also know--not only on account of accumulated experience, but also for theoretical reasons--that the unconscious must contain all the material that has _not yet_ reached the level of consciousness. These are the germs of future conscious contents. We have also every reason to suppose that the unconscious is far from being quiescent, in the sense that it is inactive, but that it is probably constantly busied with the formation and re-formation of so-called unconscious phantasies. Only in pathological cases should this activity be thought of as comparatively autonomous, for normally it is co-ordinated with consciousness.

It may be assumed that all these contents are of a personal nature in so far as they are acquisitions of the individual life. As this life is limited, the number of acquisitions of the unconscious must also be limited, wherefore an exhaustion of the contents of the unconscious through analysis might be held to be possible. In other words, by the analysis of the unconscious the inventory of unconscious contents might be completed, possibly in the sense that the unconscious cannot produce anything besides what is already known and accepted in the conscious. Also, as has already been said, we should have to accept the fact that the unconscious activity had thereby been paralysed, and that by the removal of the repression we could stop the conscious contents from descending into the unconscious. Experience teaches us that is only possible to a very limited extent. We urge our patients to retain their hold upon repressed contents that have been brought to consciousness, and to insert them in their scheme of life. But, as we may daily convince ourselves, this procedure seems to make no impression upon the unconscious, inasmuch as it goes on producing apparently the same phantasies, namely, the so-called infantile-sexual ones, which according to the earlier theory were based upon personal repressions. If in such cases analysis be systematically continued, an inventory of incompatible wish-phantasies is gradually revealed, whose combinations amaze us. In addition to all the sexual perversions every conceivable kind of crime is discovered, as well as every conceivable heroic action and great thought, whose existence in the analysed person no one would have suspected.

In order to give an example of this, I would like to refer to Maeder's Schizophrenic patient who called the world his picture-book. He was a locksmith's apprentice who fell ill very early in life; he had never been blessed with intellectual gifts. As regards his idea that the world was his picture-book and that he was turning its pages over when he looked about in the world, it is just Schopenhauer's world, conceived as will and representation, expressed in primitive picture-language. This idea has just as universal a character as Schopenhauer's. The difference consists in the fact that the patient's notion has stood still at an embryonic stage in a process of growth, whereas with Schopenhauer the same idea has been changed from a mere image into an abstraction expressed in terms that are universally valid.

It would be false to assume that the patient's idea had a personal character and value. That would be to attribute to him the dignity of a philosopher. But he alone is a philosopher who raises an image that has naturally sprung up into an abstract idea, thereby translating it into terms of universal validity. Schopenhauer's philosophical conception is his personal value, whereas the notion of the patient has merely an impersonal value of natural growth, in which personal proprietary rights can only be acquired by making an abstraction of the images, and translating them into terms that are universally valid. But it would be wrong if an exaggerated sense of the value of this achievement led us to ascribe to the philosopher the merit of having made or conceived the original image itself. The primordial image has also sprung up naturally in the philosopher, and is nothing but a part of the universal human heritage in which, theoretically at least, every one has a share. The golden apples come from the same tree whether they are gathered by a locksmith's apprentice or a Schopenhauer.

The recognition of such primordial images obliges me to differentiate between the contents of the unconscious; a differentiation of another kind than that between the pre-conscious and unconscious, or between the subconscious and unconscious. The justification for those distinctions cannot be discussed here; they have a value of their own and probably merit to be carried further as affording a point of view. The differentiation which I propose follows obviously from what has previously been said, namely, that in the so-called unconscious we must differentiate a layer which may be termed the _personal unconscious_. The materials contained in this layer are of a personal kind, inasmuch as on the one hand they may be characterised as acquisitions of the individual existence, and on the other as psychological factors which might just as well be conscious. It is, for instance, comprehensible that incompatible psychological elements succumb to repression on the one hand and are therefore unconscious, but on the other hand there exists the possibility of bringing the repressed contents into consciousness and keeping them there, once they are known and recognised. We recognise these materials as personal contents, because we can prove their effects, their partial appearance, or their origin to lie in our personal past. They are integral constituents of the personality, and belong to a complete inventory of the same. They are constituents whose omission in consciousness implies an inferiority in one respect or another, not indeed an inferiority bearing the psychological character of an organic deformity or a natural defect, but rather the character of a neglect which arouses a moral reaction. The feeling of moral inferiority always indicates that in the portion omitted is something that according to the feelings should not be missing; or in other words, could be conscious if we took sufficient trouble about it. The sense of moral inferiority is not the result of a collision with the universal, in a certain sense arbitrary, moral law, but rather the result of a conflict with the personal ego, which by reason of the psychic economy demands an adjustment of the deficiency. Wherever a feeling of inferiority appears, it reveals not only the presence of a demand for the assimilation of an unconscious constituent, but also the possibility of such an assimilation. It is, after all, a person's moral qualities that make him assimilate his unconscious self and retain it in consciousness, whether he be forced to it by a recognition of its necessity, or by a painful neurosis. He who continues to tread this path of the realisation of his unconscious self, necessarily transposes the content of the personal unconscious into consciousness, whereby the periphery of the personality is considerably enlarged.

II--THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ASSIMILATION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS.

This process of assimilating the unconscious leads to remarkable results. Some people build up from it an unmistakable, even unpleasantly increased self-consciousness or self-confidence; they "know everything," and are completely aware of everything so far as their unconscious is concerned. They think themselves accurately informed about everything that comes up from the unconscious. Others are increasingly oppressed by the contents of the unconscious, they lose their self-reliance or their self-consciousness more and more, and come near to a state of depressed resignation in regard to all the extraordinary things the unconscious produces. The former undertake in the exuberance of their self-confidence, a responsibility for their unconscious that goes much too far, beyond every reasonable possibility; the latter ultimately decline to accept any responsibility in the depressing recognition of the powerlessness of the ego confronted by relentless Destiny, working through the unconscious.

If we give the two types close analytical consideration, we shall discover that behind the optimistic self-confidence of the former there is hidden a just as deep, or rather a far deeper, helplessness; a helplessness to which the conscious optimism acts as an unsuccessful effort at compensation. Behind the pessimistic resignation of the latter there is hidden a defiant desire for power, far exceeding in self-confidence the conscious optimism of the former type.

This condition of the personality may well be expressed by the idea of "God-Almightiness" (Gottähnlichkeit),[250] to which _Adler_ has particularly drawn our attention.

When the devil wrote the serpent's words in the student's album, _Eritis sicut Deus scientes bonum et malum_, he added:

"Follow the ancient text and the snake thou wast ordered to trample! With all thy likeness to God, thou'lt yet be a sorry example."

The idea of "likeness to God," or "God-Almightiness," is not a scientific one, although it characterises the psychological state of affairs most exactly. Still we must examine whence this attitude comes, and ask why it merits the name of "God-Almightiness." As the expression denotes, the patient's abnormal condition is constituted by the fact that he ascribes to himself qualities or values which obviously do not belong to him, for "God-Almightiness" means being like the spirit which is set above the human spirit.

If for psychological purposes we abstract from the hypostasis of the God-idea, we find that this expression does not only include every dynamic fact discussed in my book on "The Psychology of the Unconscious,"[251] but also a certain mental function having a collective character, which is of another order from that of the individual character of the mind. In the same way as the individual is not only an isolated and separate, but also a social being, so also the human mind is not only something isolated and absolutely individual, but also a collective function. And just as certain social functions or impulses are, so to speak, opposed to the ego-centric interests of the individual, so also the human mind has certain functions or tendencies which, on account of their collective nature, are to some extent opposed to the personal mental functions. This is due to the fact that every human being is born with a highly differentiated brain, which gives him the possibility of attaining a rich mental function that he has neither acquired ontogenetically nor developed. In proportion as human brains are similarly differentiated, the corresponding mental functions are collective and universal. This circumstance explains the fact that the unconscious of far-separated peoples and races possesses a remarkable number of points of agreement. One example among many others which has been demonstrated is the extraordinary unanimity shown by the autochthonous forms and themes of myths.

The universal similarity of brains results in a universal possibility of a similar mental function. This function is the collective psyche, which is divided into _collective mind_ and _collective soul_.[252] In so far as there exist differentiations corresponding to race, descent, or even family, so, beyond the level of the "universal" collective psyche, we find a collective psyche limited by race, descent, and family. To quote _P. Janet_, the collective psyche contains the "parties inférieures" of the mental function, that is, the part of the mental function which, being fixed and automatic in its action, inherited and present everywhere, is therefore super-personal or impersonal. The conscious and the personal unconscious contain as personal differentiations the "parties supérieures" of the mental function, therefore the part that has been acquired and developed ontogenetically.

An individual therefore who joins the _a priori_ and unconsciously-given collective psyche on to his ontogenetically acquired assets, enlarges thereby the periphery of his personality in an unjustifiable way, with the corresponding consequences. Inasmuch as the collective psyche is the "partie inférieure" of the mental function, and therefore is the fundamental structure underlying every personality, it weighs heavily upon and depreciates the personality; a fact that is expressed in the afore-mentioned stifling of self-confidence, and in the unconscious increase of the ego-emphasis up to the point of a morbid will to power. Inasmuch as the collective psyche ranks even above the personality, because it is the mother foundation upon which all personal differentiations are based, and because it is the common mental function of the sum total of the individual, therefore its incorporation in the personality may evoke inflation of self-confidence, an inflation which is then compensated by an extraordinary sense of inferiority in the unconscious.

_A dissolution of the pairs of opposites in the personality sets in_ if, through the assimilation of the unconscious, the collective psyche be included in the inventory of the personal mental functions. Alongside the pairs of opposites already alluded to that are so particularly evident in the neurotic, viz. megalomania and sense of inferiority, there are also many other pairs, of which I will only mention the specifically moral pair, that is, good and evil (_scientes bonum et malum_). They accompany the increase or depreciation of self-confidence. The specific virtues and vices of humanity are contained in the collective psyche, just as everything else is. One man ascribes all the collective virtue to himself as his own personal merit; another accounts as personal guilt what is but collective vice. Both are just as illusionary as the sense of greatness and of inferiority, for imaginary virtues as well as imaginary vices are only the pairs of moral opposites contained in the collective psyche, which have become perceptible or have artificially been made conscious. How far the collective psyche contains these pairs of opposites is shown by primitive peoples, whose great virtue is praised by one observer; whereas another observer of the same race reports only the worst impressions. Both views are true of primitive man, whose personal differentiation is only beginning; his mental function is essentially collective. He is more or less identified with the collective psyche, and therefore without any personal responsibility or inner conflict; his virtues and vices are collective. Conflict only begins when a conscious personal development of the mind has already started, whereby the reason becomes aware of the irreconcilable nature of the pairs of opposites. The struggle to repress is the consequence of this realisation. Man wants to be good, therefore the bad must be repressed; this puts an end to the paradise of the collective psyche.

The repression of the collective psyche, in so far as it was conscious, was a necessity for the development of the personality, because collective psychology and personal psychology are in a certain sense irreconcilable. In the history of thought, whenever a fresh psychological attitude acquires collective value the formation of schisms begins. Nowhere is this more clearly seen than in the history of religion. A collective point of view, although it may be necessary, is always dangerous for the individual. It is dangerous because it is apt to choke and smother personal differentiation. It has derived this capacity from the collective psyche, which is itself a result of psychological differentiation of the strong gregarious instincts of humanity. Collective thought and feeling, and collective accomplishment, are relatively easy in comparison with individual function and performance; a fact that is only too prone to lead to a fining down to the collective level, and is peculiarly disastrous to personal development. The concomitant loss of personality is replaced--as is always the case in psychology--by an unconscious all-compelling binding to and identification with the collective psyche. It cannot be denied, and should be warningly emphasized that in the analysis of the unconscious, the collective psychology is merged into the personal psychology, with the afore-mentioned unpleasant consequences. These consequences are either bad for the individual's vital feeling (Lebensgefühl), or they injure his fellow-beings if he have any power over his environment. Being identified with the collective psyche he will inevitably try to force the claims of his unconscious upon others, for identification with the collective psyche is accompanied by a feeling of universal validity ("God-Almightiness"), which disregards the different psychology of his fellows.

The worst abuses of this kind may be removed by a clear understanding and appreciation of the fact that there are totally different psychological types, and that a psychology of one type cannot be forced into the mould of another. It is indeed almost impossible for one type to understand the other completely, and a perfect comprehension of another's individuality is impossible. _Due regard for another's individuality_ is not only advisable but is absolutely essential in analysis, if the development of the other's personality is not to be stifled. It should not be forgotten that the one type thinks that he is leaving another person free when he grants him freedom of action, and the other type when he grants him freedom of thought. In analysis both must be conceded, in so far as reasons of self-preservation permit the analyst to accord them. An excessive desire to understand or explain things is just as useless and injurious as a lack of comprehension.

The collective natural propensities and primary forms of idea and feeling which analysis of the unconscious has shown to be effective are an acquisition for the conscious personality which cannot be admitted unreservedly without prejudicial results.

In practical treatment[253] it is therefore of the utmost importance to keep the aim of individual development constantly before us. If for instance the collective psyche be conceived as a personal possession or as a personal burden, an unbearable weight or strain is put upon the personality. Hence we must make a clear distinction between the personal and the collective psyche. In practice this distinction is not easy because the personal grows out of the collective psyche, and is most closely joined with it. It is therefore difficult to say which materials are to be termed collective and which personal. There is no doubt, for instance, that the archaic symbols so often found in phantasies and dreams are collective factors. All primary propensities and forms of thought and feeling are collective; so is everything about which men are universally agreed, or which is universally understood, said or done. Upon close consideration it is astonishing to note how much of our so-called individual psychology is really collective; so much that the individual element quite disappears. Individuation, however, is an indispensable psychological requirement. The crushing predominance of what is collective should make us realise what peculiar care and attention must be given to the delicate plant "individuality," if it is to develop.

Human beings have a capacity which is of the utmost use for purposes of collectivism and most prejudicial to individuation, and that is the capacity to _imitate_. Collective psychology cannot dispense with imitation, without which the organization of the State and Society would be impossible. Imitation includes the idea of suggestibility, suggestive effect, and mental infection.

But we see daily how the mechanism of imitation is used, or rather abused, for the purposes of personal differentiation; some prominent personality, or peculiar trait or activity is simply imitated, which at least brings about an external differentiation from the environment. As a rule this delusive attempt to attain individual differentiation by means of imitation comes to a standstill as mere affectation, the individual remaining on the same plane as before, only a few degrees more sterile than formerly, and under an unconscious compulsory bondage to his environment.

In order to find out what is really individual in us, we should have to give the matter deep thought, and we should certainly become aware how exceedingly difficult such a discovery is.

III.--THE INDIVIDUAL AS AN EXCERPT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE.

We now come to a problem the overlooking of which would cause the greatest confusion.

As I said before, the immediate result of the analysis of the unconscious is that additional personal portions of the unconscious are incorporated into the conscious. I called those parts of the unconscious which are repressed but capable of being made conscious, _the personal unconscious_. I showed moreover that through the annexation of the deeper layers of the unconscious, which I called the _impersonal unconscious_, an extension of the personality is brought about which leads to the state of God-Almightiness ("Gottähnlichkeit"). This state is reached by a continuation of the analytical work, by means of which we have already re-introduced what is repressed to consciousness. By continuing analysis further we incorporate some distinctly impersonal universal basic qualities of humanity with the personal consciousness, which brings about the aforesaid enlargement, and this to some extent may be described as an unpleasant consequence of analysis.

From this standpoint, the conscious personality seems to be a more or less arbitrary excerpt of the collective psyche. It appears to consist of a number of universal basic human qualities of which it is _à priori_ unconscious, and further of a series of impulses and forms which might just as well have been conscious, but were more or less arbitrarily repressed, in order to attain that excerpt of the collective psyche, which we call personality. The term _persona_ is really an excellent one, for persona was originally the mask which an actor wore, that served to indicate the character in which he appeared. For if we really venture to undertake to decide what psychic material must be accounted personal and what impersonal, we shall soon reach a state of great perplexity; for, in truth, we must make the same assertion regarding the contents of the personality as we have already made with respect to the impersonal unconscious, that is to say that it is _collective_, whereas we can only concede _individuality to the bounds of the persona_, that is to the particular choice of personal elements, and that only to a very limited extent. It is only by virtue of the fact that the persona is a more or less accidental or arbitrary excerpt of the collective psyche that we can lapse into the error of deeming it to be _in toto_ individual, whereas as its name denotes, it is only a mask of the collective psyche; _a mask which simulates individuality_, making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whilst one is only acting a part through which the collective psyche speaks.

If we analyse the persona we remove the mask and discover that what appeared to be individual is at bottom collective. We thus trace "the Little God of the World" back to his origin, that is, to a personification of the collective psyche. Finally, to our astonishment, we realise that the persona was only the mask of the collective psyche. Whether we follow Freud and reduce the primary impulse to sexuality, or Adler and reduce it to the elementary desire for power, or reduce it to the general principle of the collective psyche which contains the principles of both Freud and Adler, we arrive at the same result; namely, the dissolution of the personal into the collective. Therefore in every analysis that is continued sufficiently far, the moment arrives when the aforesaid God-Almightiness must be realised. This condition is often ushered in by peculiar symptoms; for instance, by dreams of flying through space like a comet, of being either the earth, the sun, or a star, or of being either extraordinarily big or small, of having died, etc. Physical sensations also occur, such as sensations of being too large for one's skin, or too fat; or hypnagogic feelings of endless sinking or rising occur, of enlargement of the body or of dizziness. This state is characterised psychologically by an extraordinary loss of orientation about one's personality, about what one really is, or else the individual has a positive but mistaken idea of that which he has just become. Intolerance, dogmatism, self-conceit, self-depreciation, contempt and belittling of "not analysed" fellow-beings, and also of their opinions and activities, all very frequently occur. An increased disposition to physical disorders may also occasionally be observed, but this occurs only if pleasure be taken therein, thus prolonging this stage unduly.

The wealth of the possibilities of the collective psyche is both confusing and dazzling. The dissolution of the persona results in the release of phantasy, which apparently is nothing else but the functioning of the collective psyche. This release brings materials into consciousness of whose existence we had no suspicion before. A rich mine of mythological thought and feeling is revealed. It is very hard to hold one's own against such an overwhelming impression. That is why this phase must be reckoned one of the real dangers of analysis, a fact that should not be concealed.

As may easily be understood, this condition is hardly bearable, and one would like to put an end to it as soon as possible, for the analogy with a mental derangement is too close. The essence of the most frequent form of derangement--dementia præcox or schizophrenia--consists, as is well known, in the fact that the unconscious to a large extent ejects and replaces the conscious. The unconscious is given the value of reality, being substituted for the reality function. The unconscious thoughts become audible as voices, or visible as visions, or perceptible as physical hallucinations, or they become fixed ideas of a kind that supersede reality. In a similar, although not in the same way, by the resolution of the persona of the collective psyche, the unconscious is drawn into the conscious. The difference between this state of mind and that of mental derangement consists in the fact that the unconscious is brought up by the help of the conscious analysis; at least that is the case in the beginning of analysis, when there are still strong cultural resistances against the unconscious to be overcome. Later on, after the removal of the barriers erected by time and custom, the unconscious usually proceeds, so to say, in a peremptory manner, sometimes even discharging itself in torrents into the consciousness. In this phase the analogy with mental derangement is very close. But it would only be a real mental disorder should the content of the unconscious _take the place of the conscious reality_, that is, in other words, if the contents of the unconscious were believed absolutely and without reserve.

IV.--THE ENDEAVOURS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY FROM THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE.

1. _The Regressive Restoration of the Persona._

The unbearableness of thus being identified with the collective psyche forces us to find a radical solution. There are two ways open. The first possibility is the regressive one of trying to restore the persona to its former condition, by endeavouring to restrain the unconscious by the application of a reductive theory; for instance, by declaring it to be nothing but long-repressed and overdue infantile sexuality, for which it would really be best to substitute the normal sexual function. This solution is based upon the unmistakable sexualistic symbolism of the language of the unconscious, and upon the concretistic interpretation of the same. Or an attempt may be made to apply the power theory, by conceiving the God-Almightiness as a "virile protest," and as an infantile striving for power and self-preservation: a theory for which support is found in the unmistakable pretensions to power that the unconscious material contains. A further possibility would be to declare the unconscious to be the archaic collective psychology of primitive man, an explanation that would not only cover the sexualistic symbolism and the "God-Almighty" aiming for power of the unconscious content, but would also apparently do justice to the religious, philosophical, and mythological aspects and tendencies of the unconscious content. In every case the conclusion arrived at is the same, viz. that the unconscious is nothing but this or that, which has already been adequately recognised and acknowledged as infantile, useless, meaningless, impossible, and out of date. There is nothing to be done but to shrug one's shoulders and resign one's self to the inevitable.

To the patient there seems to be no alternative, if one wishes to continue to live sensibly, but to restore in so far as is possible that extract of the collective psyche termed persona, to lay the fact of analysis silently aside, and do one's utmost to forget that one possesses an unconscious. We shall find support in Faust's words:--

"The sphere of earth is known enough to me; The view beyond is barred immutably: A fool, who there his blinking eyes directeth, And o'er his clouds of peers a place expecteth! Firm let him stand, and look around him well! This world means something to the capable. Why needs he through Eternity to wend? He here acquires what he can apprehend. Thus let him wander down his earthly day; When spirits haunt go quietly his way; In marching onward, bliss and torment find, Though every moment, with unsated mind!"

This would be a happy solution if one really could succeed in throwing off the unconscious to such an extent as to withdraw the libido from it, and so render it inoperative. But experience proves that energy cannot be withdrawn from the unconscious; it continues operative, for the unconscious contains and is indeed itself the source of libido, from which issue the primary psychic elements, thought-feelings, or feeling-thoughts--undifferentiated germs of idea and sentiment. It would therefore be a delusion to believe that by means of some, so to say, magical theory or method, the libido could be conclusively wrested from the unconscious, or that it could be to a certain extent disconnected. One may yield to this illusion for a time, but some day he will be obliged to declare with Faust:--

"Now fills the air so many a haunting shape, That no one knows how best he may escape. What though one day with rational brightness beams, The night entangles us in webs of dreams. From our young fields of life we come, elate: There croaks a bird; what croaks he? Evil fate! By superstition constantly ensnared, It grows to us and warns and is declared. Intimidated thus we stand alone.-- The portal jars, yet entrance is there none. Is any one here?

CARE: Yes! must be my reply.

FAUST: And, thou, who art thou, then?

CARE: Well--here am I.

FAUST: Avaunt!

CARE: _I am where I should be_: Though no ear should choose to hear me, Yet the shrinking heart must fear me; Though transformed to mortal eyes, Grimmest power I exercise."

The unconscious cannot be "analysed" to a finish, and thus brought to a standstill. No one can wrest active force from it for any length of time. Therefore to act according to the method just described is only to deceive one's self, and is nothing but a new edition of an ordinary repression.

2. _The Identification with the Collective Psyche._

The second way would be that of identification with the collective psyche. That would mean the symptom of "God-Almightiness" developed into a system; in other words, one would be the fortunate possessor of the absolute truth, that had yet to be discovered; of the conclusive knowledge, which would be the people's salvation. This attitude is not necessarily megalomania ("Grössenwahn") in a direct form, but the well-known milder form of having a prophetic mission. Weak minds which, as is so often the case, have correspondingly an undue share of vanity and misplaced naïveté at their disposal, run a considerable risk of succumbing to this temptation. The obtaining access to the collective psyche signifies a renewal of life for the individual, whether this renewal of life be felt as something pleasant or unpleasant. It would seem desirable to retain a hold upon this renewal: for one person, because it increases his feeling for life ("Lebensgefühl"); for another, because it promises a great accretion to his knowledge. Therefore both of them, not wishing to deprive themselves of the rich values that lie buried in the collective psyche, will endeavour by every means possible to retain their newly gained union with the primal cause of life. Identification appears to be the nearest way to it, for the merging of the persona in the collective psyche is a veritable lure to unite one's self with this "ocean of divinity," and, oblivious of the past, to become absorbed in it. This piece of mysticism belongs to every finer individual, just as the "yearning for the mother"--the looking back to the source whence one originated--is innate in every one.

As I have demonstrated explicitly before,[254] there is a special value and a special necessity hidden in the regressive longing--which, as is well-known, Freud conceives as "infantile fixation" or as "incest-wish." This necessity and longing is particularly emphasized in myths, where it is always the strongest and best of people, in other words, the hero, who follows the regressive longing and deliberately runs into danger of letting himself be devoured by the monster of the maternal first cause. But he is a hero only because, instead of letting himself be finally devoured by the monster, he conquers it, and that not only once but several times. It is only through the conquest of the collective psyche that its true value can be attained, whether it be under the symbol of capture of treasure, of an invincible weapon, of a magical means of defence, or whatever else the myth devises as the most desirable possession. Hence whoever identifies himself with the collective psyche, also reaches the treasure which the dragon guards, but against his will and to his own great injury, by thus allowing himself (mythologically speaking) to be devoured by the monster and merged with it.

Identification with the collective psyche is therefore a failure; this way ends just as disastrously as did the first, which led to the severance of the persona from the collective psyche.

V.--LEADING PRINCIPLES FOR THE TREATMENT OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY.

In order to solve the problem how practical treatment can overcome the assimilation of the collective psyche, we must first of all make quite clear to ourselves what was the error of the two ways already described. We saw that neither the one way nor the other led to any appropriate result. The first way simply leads the patient back to the point of departure, having lost the vital values contained in the collective psyche. The second way leads him straight into the collective psyche, having lost that detached human existence which alone renders possible a bearable and satisfying life. There are on both sides values that should not be lost to the individual.

The mistake is, therefore, neither in the collective psyche nor in the individual psyche, _but in allowing the one to exclude the other_. The monistic tendency assists this propensity, for it always suspects and looks for _one_ principle everywhere. As a general psychological tendency, monism is a peculiarity of differentiated feeling and thought, corresponding to the keen desire to make the one or the other function the supreme psychological principle. The introversion type only knows the thought principle, and the extroversion type only that of feeling. This psychological monism--or it would be better to say monotheism--has the advantage of simplicity, and the disadvantage of one-sidedness. On the one hand, it signifies the exclusion of the variety and true riches of life; whilst on the other, it means the practicability of realizing the ideals of the present day and of the near past. But it does not in itself signify any actual possibility of human progress.

In the same way _rationalism_ tends towards exclusiveness. Its essence is to exclude instantly whatever is opposed to its standpoint, whether it be intellectually logical or emotionally so. In regard to reason it is both monistic and autocratic. Special thanks are due to Bergson for having broken a lance for the right of the irrational to exist. Psychology will probably be obliged to acknowledge and to submit to a plurality of principles, in spite of the fact that this does not suit the scientific mind. Only so can psychology be saved from ship-wreck.

But with regard to individual psychology science must waive its claims. For to speak of a scientific individual psychology is in itself a _contradictio in adjecto_. It is necessarily always only the collective part of an individual psychology that can be the subject of scientific study, for the individual is--according to definition--something unique and incomparable. A "scientific" individual psychology is a denial of individual psychology. It may justly be suspected that individual psychology is indeed a projection of the psychology of him who defines it. Every individual psychology must have its own text-book, for the universal text-book only contains collective psychology.

These remarks are intended to prepare for what has to be said about the treatment of the aforesaid problem. The fundamental error of both the afore-mentioned ways is simply that the subject is collectively identified with the one or the other part of his psychology. His psychology is individual as well as collective, but not in such a manner as to merge the individual with what is collective, or the collective with what is individual. The persona must be strictly separated from the concept of the individual, in so far as the persona can be absolutely merged with the collective. But what is individual is just that which can never be absorbed in the collective, and is, too, never identical with the collective. Therefore, an identification with the collective or an arbitrary cutting-off from the collective is equivalent to illness; it is pathological.

As has already been indicated, what is individual appears at first as the particular selection of those elements of the collective psyche that contribute to the composition of the persona. As I said before, the components are not individual but collective. It is only their combination, or the selection as a model of particular groups that had already been combined, which is individual. That would be the individual nucleus which is concealed by the personal mask. By the particular differentiation of the persona, the resistance is shown of the individuality to the collective psyche. By analysing the persona, we transfer a greater value to the individuality, increasing thereby its conflict with collectivity. This conflict obviously is a psychological conflict in the individual. The dissolution of the compromise between the two halves of a pair of opposites increases the effectiveness of the contrast. This conflict does not exist within the sphere of purely unconscious natural life, although the purely physiological life of the individual also has to comply with collective demands.

The natural unconscious attitude is harmonious; the body, with its capacities and needs, providing immediately indications and limitations, that prevent intemperance and lack of proportion. A differentiated psychological function, however, always inclines towards disproportion, on account of the one-sidedness which is cultivated by the conscious rationality of intention. What is called mental individuality, is, also, an expression of the individual corporeity, being, so to speak, identical with it. This sentence might obviously also be reversed, a fact that does not materially alter the real psychological data concerning the intimate relation of the individuality to the body. At the same time, the body is also that which makes the subject resemble all others to a great extent, although it is the individual body that is differentiated from all others.

Similarly the mental or moral individuality differs from all others, although in every respect it is so constituted as to place one person on an equality with all others. Every living creature that is able freely to develop itself individually without any coercion at all, will, through the perfecting of its individuality, soonest realize the ideal type of its species, and therefore, figuratively speaking, will have collective validity.

The persona is always identical with a _typical_ attitude, in which _one_ pyschological function dominates, _e.g._ feeling, or thought, or intuition. This one-sidedness always causes the relative repression of the other functions. In consequence of this circumstance, the persona is hindering to the development of the individual. The dissolution of the persona is, therefore, an indispensable condition of individuation. It is, therefore, to some extent impossible to achieve individuation by means of conscious intention; for conscious intention leads to a conscious attitude, which excludes everything that "does not suit." But the assimilation of the unconscious contents leads, on the contrary, to a condition in which conscious intention is excluded, being replaced by a process of development that appears to us irrational. This process alone signifies individuation, its _product_ being individuality as defined above, viz. as something individual that is at the same time universal. So long as the persona exists individuality is repressed, betraying itself at most by the particular selection of personal requisites, of what might be called the actor's costumes. Only when the unconscious is assimilated does the individuality become more prominent, and with it also that uniting psychological phenomenon between the ego and non-ego, expressed by the word _attitude_, is now no longer a typical attitude but an individual one.

What is paradoxical in these formulations arises from the same cause from which the conflict about the "universalia" formerly arose. The phrase "animal nullumque animal genus est" makes the fundamental paradox clearly comprehensible. What exists "really" is individual: that which is universal is existing psychologically, but being caused by the real-existing similarities of individual things. The individual is, therefore, the individual thing that has, to a greater or less extent, those attributes upon which the collective conception of "collectivity" rests; and the more individual he is, the more he develops those attributes that are the basis of a collective concept of human nature.

If a grotesque figure, suggested by the initial situation of our problem be permitted, it is Buridan's ass between the two bundles of hay. His questioning is obviously wrong: the question is not whether the hay-bundle on the right or the left be the better one, or whether he should begin to eat on the right or the left hand, _but what he himself would like to do, what he is eager for_--that is the point. He is thinking of the hay and not of himself, and therefore he does not know what he really wants.

The question is: what at this moment is the natural direction of the growth of this individual?

This question cannot be settled by any philosophy, religion or good advice, but solely by an unprejudiced review of the psychological germs of life which have resulted from the natural co-operation of the conscious and unconscious on the one hand, and of the individual and the collective on the other. One person looks for them in the conscious, and another in the unconscious. But the conscious is only one side, and the unconscious is only the other. For it should never be forgotten that dreams are compensatory or complementary to consciousness. Were this not the case, we should be obliged to regard dreams as a source of knowledge superior to the conscious. This view would undoubtedly carry us back to the mentality of the augur, and we should have to accept all the consequences of such a superstitious attitude, unless, indeed, we look upon dreams as valueless, as does the vulgar mind.

We find the _unifying function_ that we are seeking, _in the phantasies_ in which everything that has any effectual determination is present. But phantasies have a bad reputation among psychologists. The psychoanalytical theories hitherto obtaining have treated them accordingly. For both Freud and Adler the phantasy is nothing but a so-called "symbolic" disguise of what both investigators suppose to be the primary propensities and aims. But in opposition to these views it should be emphasised--not for theoretical but for essentially practical reasons--that the phantasy may indeed be thus causally explained and depreciated, but that it nevertheless is the creative soil for everything that has ever brought development to humanity. The phantasy as a psychological function has a peculiar non-reducible value of its own, whose roots are in both the conscious and the unconscious contents, and in what is collective as well as in what is individual.

But whence comes the bad reputation of the phantasy? It owes that reputation chiefly to the circumstance that it ought not to be taken literally. It is worthless if understood concretistically. If we understand semiotically, as Freud does, it is interesting from the scientific standpoint. But if it be understood _hermeneutically, as an actual symbol_, it provides us with the cue that we need in order to develop our life in harmony with ourselves.

For the significance of a symbol is not that it is a disguised indication of something that is generally known,[255] but that it is an endeavour to elucidate by analogy what is as yet completely unknown and only in process of formation.[256] The phantasy represents to us that which is just developing under the form of a more or less apposite analogy. By analytical reduction to something universally known, we destroy the actual value of the symbol; but it is appropriate to its value and meaning to give it an hermeneutical interpretation.

The essence of hermeneutics--an art that was formerly much practised--consists in adding more analogies to that already given by the symbol: in the first place, subjective analogies given by the patient as they occur to him; and in the second place, objective analogies provided by the analyst out of his general knowledge. The initial symbol is much enlarged and enriched by this procedure, the result being a highly complex and many-sided picture, which may now be reduced to _tertia comparationis_. Thence result certain psychological lines of development of an individual as well as collective nature. No science upon earth could prove the accuracy of these lines; on the contrary, rationalism could very easily prove that they are wrong. But these lines vindicate their validity by their _value for life_. The chief thing in practical treatment is that people should get a hold of their own life, not that the principle of their life should be provable or "right."

Of course, true to the spirit of scientific superstition _suggestion_ will be mooted. But it should long ago have been realised that a suggestion is only accepted by one it suits. Beyond that there is no suggestion, otherwise the treatment of neurosis would be extremely simple, for we should only need to suggest health. This pseudo-scientific talk about suggestion is based upon the unconscious superstition that suggestion actually possesses some real magic power. No one succumbs to suggestion unless from the very bottom of his heart he be willing to co-operate.

By means of the hermeneutical treatment of the phantasies we arrive at the synthesis of the individual with the collective psyche, put theoretically, that is, but practically, one indispensable condition is yet lacking. For it belongs to the regressive disposition of the neurotic--a disposition in which he has been confirmed in the course of his illness--to take neither himself nor the world seriously, but always to rely on this or that method or circumstance to effect a cure, quite apart from his own serious co-operation. "But you can't wash the dog without getting his skin wet." No cure can be effected without unlimited willingness and absolute seriousness on the part of the patient. There are no magical cures for neurosis. Just as soon as we begin to elaborate the symbolic outlines of the path, the patient must begin to walk thereon. If he delude himself and shirk it, no cure can result. He must really work and live according to what he has seen and recognised as the direction for the time being of his individual life-line, and must continue thereon until a distinct reaction of his unconscious shows him that he is beginning in good faith to go a wrong way.

He who does not possess this moral function of faithfulness to himself will never get rid of his neurosis; but he who has this faithfulness can find the way out.

Neither physician nor patient must yield to the delusion that "being analysed" is in itself sufficient to remove a neurosis. That would be deception and self-delusion. Ultimately it is infallibly the moral factor that decides between health and illness.

By the construction of the individual's life-line the ever-varying trends and tendencies of his libido are made conscious. These life-lines are not identical with the "directing fictions" discovered by Adler, which are none other than arbitrary attempts to cut the persona off from the collective psyche, and to give it independence. It might rather be said that the "directing fiction" is an unsuccessful attempt to construct a life-line. The unsuitability of the "directing fiction" is also proved by the fact that the lines are tenaciously retained for much too long a time. The hermeneutically constructed life-line is short, for life follows no straight lines that indicate the future long beforehand, for, as Nietzsche says, "All truth is crooked." Life-lines are therefore neither principles nor ideals of universal validity, but points of view and adaptations of ephemeral validity. An abatement of vital intensity, a perceptible loss of libido, or an excessive passion or ecstasy--all show that one such line is left, and that a new line begins, or rather should begin. Sometimes it is enough to leave the revealing of the new line to the unconscious; but this course should indeed not be recommended to the neurotic under all circumstances, though there are cases where what is needed is to learn to trust to so-called chance. However, it is not advisable to let one's self drift for any length of time; a watchful eye should at least be kept upon the reactions of the unconscious, that is to say, upon the dreams: these indicate like a barometer the one-sidedness of our attitude.[257] Therefore, I consider it necessary, in contrast to some other analysts, for the patient after analysis to remain in contact with the unconscious, if he would avoid a relapse. That is why I am convinced that the real end of analysis is reached when the patient has acquired adequate knowledge of the method to remain in contact with the unconscious, and sufficient psychological knowledge to be able to understand approximately his ever-changing life-line; otherwise he is not in a position to follow the direction of the libido currents in the unconscious, and thereby to gain conscious support in the development of his individuality. Every serious case of neurosis needs this weapon in order to maintain the cure.

In this sense analysis is not a method that is a medical monopoly, but rather an art or technique or science of psychological life, which he who has been cured must continue to foster, for the sake of his own welfare and that of his environment. If he understands this aright he will not pose as a psychoanalytical prophet nor as a public reformer, but truly understanding the common weal, he will first himself reap the benefit of the self-knowledge acquired in his treatment, and then he will let the example of his life work what good it can, rather than indulge in aggressive talk and missionary propaganda.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 249: Lecture given before the Zürich School for Analytical Psychology, 1916.]

[Footnote 250: In a certain sense the "likeness to God" is always _a priori_ present even before analysis, not only in the neurotic, but also in the normal individual, with the difference only that the normal individual is effectively separated from the perception of the unconscious, whilst this separation becomes increasingly impossible to the neurotic. In consequence of his special sensitiveness, the neurotic is _a priori_ more closely affected by the processes of the unconscious than is the normal person, wherefore the God-Almightiness becomes more distinct in him than in the normal individual. By means of the knowledge of the unconscious acquired through analysis the "God-likeness" is increased.]

[Footnote 251: Pp. 69 and 95.]

[Footnote 252: The collective mind represents collective thought, the collective soul represents collective feeling, and the _collective psyche_ represents the general collective psychological function.]

[Footnote 253: I should here observe that I am intentionally refraining from discussing our problem from the standpoint of the psychology of types. A specialised and somewhat complicated investigation was necessary in order to discover formulations appropriate to the types. For instance, "person" means something totally different to the extrovert from what it does to the introvert. I must content myself here with pointing out the difficulties such a task would involve. In the types, the conscious and real adapted function in childhood is collective, but soon acquires a personal character, and may retain this to the end, unless the individual feels impelled to develop his type to the uttermost. If this happens, the conscious real adapted function attains a degree of perfection which may claim universal validity and therefore bears a collectivistic character, in contrast to its originally collective character. According to this mode of expression collective psyche would be identical with "herd soul" in the individual; but the collectivistic psychology would be a highly differentiated adaptation to society. For the introvert the conscious real adapted function is _thinking_, which in the lower stages of development is entirely personal, but has a tendency to acquire a universal character of a collectivistic kind; his feeling remains distinctly personal so far as it is conscious, and collective-archaic in so far as it has remained unconscious or is repressed. The opposite applies to the _feeling_ and thought of the extrovert. The introvert is always concerned with the endeavour to preserve the integrity of his ego, which results in a different attitude towards his own person from that of the extrovert, whose adaptation is made through his feelings, even at the cost of his own person. These few sentences indicate into what an extraordinarily difficult situation we should have been led had we considered our problem from the standpoint of the types.]

[Footnote 254: "Psychology of the Unconscious."]

[Footnote 255: That is, of a universal primary propensity or a universal primal aim.]

[Footnote 256: Cp. _Silberer_: "Probleme der Mystic und ihrer Symbolik." Wien, 1914. ("Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism.")]

[Footnote 257: It should be borne in mind that no moral function is to be sought in this conception of dreams, nor do I look for it there. This function is just as little "teleological" in the sense of a philosophical teleology, that is to say of a set aim or purpose. It is in the first place compensatory, because it presents a subliminal picture of the actual situation. The phenomenon should first of all be understood from a purely causal standpoint. But it would be unjust to the essence of what is psychological if one were to consider it purely causally. For it does not only tolerate, but also demand, a final point of view. In other words, the question arises, what is the use of bringing just this material to constellation? This is not to assert that the final meaning of a phenomenon had already existed as an _a priori_ given purpose in the preparatory stages of the phenomenon. It would not be permissible, according to the theory of cognition, to presuppose some pre-existing purpose from the unmistakable final meaning of biological mechanisms. But it would be narrow-minded if, with the justifiable omission of the teleological conclusion, one wished also to give up the point of view of finality. The utmost that can be said is, it is _as if_ there were some pre-existing purpose present. In psychology one must be on one's guard against exclusive reliance either upon causality or upon teleology.]

SUMMARY.

A. _Psychological Material must be divided into_ CONSCIOUS _and_ UNCONSCIOUS _Contents_.

1. The _conscious contents_ are partly _personal_, in so far as their universal validity is not recognised; and partly _impersonal_, that is, collective, in so far as their universal validity is recognised.

2. The _unconscious contents_ are partly _personal_, in so far as they concern solely repressed materials of a personal nature, that have once been relatively conscious and whose universal validity is therefore not recognised when they are made conscious; partly _impersonal_, in so far as the materials concerned are recognised as _impersonal_ and of purely universal validity, of whose earlier even relative consciousness we have no means of proof.

B. _The Composition of the Persona._

1. The conscious personal contents constitute the conscious personality, the conscious ego.

2. The unconscious personal contents constitute the _self_, the unconscious or subconscious ego.

3. The conscious and unconscious contents of a personal nature constitute the persona.

C. _The Composition of the Collective Psyche._

1. The conscious and unconscious contents of an _impersonal_ or collective nature compose the psychological _non-ego_, the _image of the object_. These materials can appear analytically as projections of feeling or of opinion, but they are _a priori_ collectively identical with the object-imago, that is they appear as qualities of the object, and are only _a posteriori_ recognised as subjective psychological qualities.

2. The persona is that grouping of conscious and unconscious contents which is opposed as ego to the non-ego. The general comparison of personal contents of different individuals establishes their far-reaching similarity, extending even to identity, by which the _individual_ nature of personal contents, and therewith of the persona, is for the most part suspended. To this extent the persona must be considered an excerpt of the collective psyche, and also a component of the collective psyche.

3. The collective psyche is therefore composed of the object-imago and the persona.

D. _What is Individual._

1. What is individual appears partly as the principle that decides the selection and limitation of the contents that are accepted as personal.

2. What is individual is the principle by which an increasing differentiation from the collective psyche is made possible and enforced.

3. What is individual manifests itself partly as an impediment to collective accomplishment, and as a resistance against collective thinking and feeling.

4. What is individual is the uniqueness of the combination of universal (collective) psychological elements.

E. _We must divide the Conscious and Unconscious Contents into Individualistic and Collectivistic._

1. A content is individualistic whose developing tendency is directed towards the differentiation from the collective.

2. A content is collectivistic whose developing tendency aims at universal validity.

3. There are insufficient criteria by which to designate a given content as simply individual or collective, for uniqueness is very difficult to prove, although it is a perpetually and universally recurrent phenomenon.

4. The life-line of an individual is the resultant of the individualistic and collectivistic tendency of the psychological process at any given moment.

INDEX

_Aberrations of Marriage_ (Michaelis), 365

Abreaction, 242

Absolute unconscious, 430-36

Abstract feelings, 405 " idea, 438, 448

Abstraction, 293

Accidentalness, 398

Accoucheur, the analyst as, 268, 374

Acts, symptomatic (Freud), 281

Adaptation to father, 127, 160, 175 " mother, 125, 159, 171, 232

Adapted function, 405

Adler, viii, ix, 191, 223, 260-61, 290, 297-98, 330, 340, 343-44, 349, 352, 384-85, 390-91, 404, 458, 470

Alcohol, influence of, 12

Altruism, 269

Ambitendency, 200

Ambivalency, 200, 269

Amnesia of Ivenes, 68

" periodic, 9

Amnesic disturbances, 66-7

Anæsthesia, systematic, 68

Analysis not a reasoning method, 208 " prejudices against, 206-07 " sexualistic conception of, vii " _v._ interpretation, 219

Analyst as accoucheur, 268, 374

" must be analysed, 244

Analytical material compared with poet's material, 214

" psychology, moral effect of, 375-76

Anamnesis not psychoanalysis, 207

Anna, little, 132-54

Antithesis, regulating function of, 415

Anxiety dreams, 160, 372

Apollo, Introversion, 295

Archaic view of life, x

"Arrangements" (Adler), 297, 390

Aschaffenburg, 352

Ass, Buridan's, 467

Assimilation by analogy, 223

Assimilation of unconscious, 449

Association, co-ordinance to father, 157 " familiar, 120-32, 159 " method, 80

Association-concordance (Kerner), 92 " test, calculation in, 109 " " guilt complex, 107

Attack, hysterical (Ivenes) ætiology of, 74

Attention, dispersion of, 46-8

_Attitudes passionelles_, 18

Augur, medical, 244, 467

Authority, faith in, 277

Autochthonous myths, 451

Auto-hypnosis, 77, 240

Automatic personalities (Ivenes), 82 " table movements, 49, 53, 57 " writing, 27, 49, 54, 57

Automatism, motor cryptomnesia, 91 " as hypnotist, 79

Automatisms, 13, 47, 49, 54 " of S. W., 20

Autonomous complexes, 375

Auto-suggestion, 51, 53, 61 " " (objective), 79

Azam, case of Albert X., 9 " " Felida, 66

Babel, tower of, 416

Baptism, the rite analysed, 215

Bayle, 315

Bergson, 231, 274, 293, 315, 348, 357, 464

Bernheim, 237

Binet, 2, 12, 47, 56, 59, 60, 85, 289, 353

Binet's definition of somnambulism, 49

Biological duties, 274

Bircher, 250

Birth, theories of child, 134

Bleuler, 5, 14, 201, 312, 354

Bleuler's theory of negativism, 201

Boileau's case, 9

Bonamaison's case, 76

Bourne, Ansel, case of, 9

Bourru and Burot, 66

Brains, similarity of, 451

Bresler's case, 89

Breuer, 236, 241

Breuer's case, 356-358

Brill, 175

Burgholzi, cases of mental disease analysed, 316 " " dementia præcox, 322, 328-35

Buridan's ass, 467

Calculation in association test, 109

Camuset, 66

Case, Azam's, 9, 66 " Boileau's, 9 " Bonamaison's, 76 " Bresler's, 89 " Breuer's, 356-58 " Dyce's, 84 " Flournoy's, 69 " Hoefelt's, 66 " Janet's, 55 " Kalk's, 65 " Macnish's, 11 " Mesnet's, 10-11 " Naef's, 8 " Pronst's, 9, 11 " Renaudin's, 67 " Schreber's, 343-46 " Weir Mitchell's, 64-5, 84

Case of Albert X. (Azam), 9 " American business man, 399 " Christ, 394 " Elise K., 3-7 " Felida (Azam), 66 " Helen Smith (Flournoy), 69 " little Anna, 132-54 " little Hans, 132 " Lucie (Janet), 55 " Mary Reynolds (Weir-Mitchell), 64-5, 84 " S. W., 16-45

Cases of dementia præcox, 322, 328-35 " mental disease analysed (Burgholzi's), 316

Catalepsy (Ivenes), 28

Catharsis, 374

Catholic Church, 271

Causal principle in science, 339 " view (Freud), 261

Cellini, Benvenuto, 63

Censor, Freud, 305

Change in character (Azam's case), 66 " " (Hoefelt's case), 66 " " (Ivenes), 84 " " (Kalk's case), 65 " " (Mary Reynolds), 64 " " (S. W.), 69

Charcot, 8, 356, 361 " classification of somnambulic states, 8 " trauma theory, 361

Chevreul, 50

Christ, religion of, 366

Christian science, 126, 207, 244, 249

Civilisation and neurosis, 224, 374

Claparède, 188, 232, 348 " (footnote), 287

Clark lectures, 94-156

Classification of dreams, 310

Co-function in unconscious, 405

Collective psyche, 431-32, 455-59, 472 " " identification with, 459, 462 " " treatment of, 463 " mind and soul, 451 " vices and virtues, 453

Comparison of dream-symbols with somnambulic personalities, 59

Compensation, unconscious, 201, 236, 280, 284, 285, 467

Complex, concealment, 117 " Electra, 228 " incompatibility, 202 " Kern, 228 " Œdipus, 228, 232 " resistance, 201 " sensibility, 203

Complexes, autonomous, 377 " function, 426 " physicians' own, 216, 243, 257

Comprehension by analogy, 223

Conflict moral, 225, 242, 247, 251

Content, manifest and latent of dream, 372

Conscious invention _v._ dream, 178 " material, use of in analysis, 216

Consciousness alternating, 11 " double, 1

Conservation of energy, 231, 411

Constellation, parental, 160-75

Constellations, familiar, 119-132

Converted _libido_, 141

Cook, Miss Florence, 37

Correspondence of Jung and Loy, 236-77

Counterparts of virtues, 389

Creative work of unconscious, additional, 85

Crucial points in Psychoanalysis, 236-77

Cryptomnesia, 78, 86, 87, 199 " Nietzsche example, 87

Cryptomnesic hallucinations, 91 " motor-automatism, 91

Darkness, effect of, on suggestibility, 59

Dawson Williams, Dr., 278

Deception, Ivenes' wilful, 44 " of doctor by patient, 260, 266-67

"Deep" Psychology, 354

Defence mechanism, 424

Deficiency, emotional, 2

Deficiency, intellectual, 2 " mental, 2 " neurasthenic, 14 " psychopathic, 3, 13

Definition of _libido_, 156, 288

Delbruck, 70

Delirium, hysterical, 7

Dementia præcox, 129, 143, 149, 151, 182, 201, 283, 312-18

_Depreciation_ by introverted type, 289

Depressions of puberty, 127

Dessoir, 85

Diagnosis of facts, 106-13

Diehl, 14

Differentiation of what is individual, 456

Dionysus, 183 " extraversion, 295

Dionysian orgies, 366

"Disposable" energy, 401

Distortion produced by resistances, 285

Dogma, 224

Dominants of unconscious, 432-33

Double consciousness, 1, 84

Dragon, symbol of collective psyche, 463

Dream-analysis the real instrument of the unconscious, 209, 373

Dreams, anxiety, 160, 372 " as myth, 436 " association method, 302 " classification of, 310 " compensatory character of, 278-286, 467 " conception of differing from Freud, 222 " content, manifest and latent, 372 " Freud's conception of, 222 " instances of analysed, 147, 193, 217, 219, 303 " many-sided, 217 " moral function of, 309, 471 " no arbitrary interpretation, 218 " no fixed symbols, 218, 221, 265, 308 " number, 191, 193, 197 " objective interpretation of, 421 " of crab analysed, 418 " St. Augustine's, 307 " subjective interpretation of, 421 " symbolism of, 308 " typical themes of, 310

Dualism in Ivenes' subconscious personalities, 79

Dubois, 208, 243, 255

Duplication of attributes, 182

Duty to children, parental, 153

Duties biological, 274

Ecce Homo, 381-84, 417

Eccentricities pre-exist illness, 282, 289

Ecstasy, 15, 20 " (Bettina Brentano), 75

Ego-complex, 80, 86 " " (Ivenes), 83 " function, 416 " instinct, 383 " powerlessness of, 450 " psychological, 434

Ego, second (Dessoir), 85 " somnambulic (Ivenes), 76

_Elan vital_, 231

Electra-complex, 228

Emotional type, Fourneau Jordan, 402

Empiricism, 291, 301

Enantiodromia, 415-17

Energic view point, 231

Energy as Melungu, 413 " conservation of, 411 " "disposable," 401 " primordial image of, 412 " psychic, 401 " transformation of, 413

Entoptic phenomena, 61

Enuresis nocturna, 170, 237, 239, 246

Epilepsy, 1

Epileptoid attacks, 14

Erler, 71

Erotic conflict, 364-65, 370

Esquirol, 315

_Etat second_, 8

Etiological moment of neurosis, 405

Exhaustive states, 13

Experiments by Dr. Fürst, 157-58

Extroversion, 288, 347, 391, 401-6, 437 " regressive, 288

Familial associations, 120-32, 159

" constellations, influence of, 127

Fanaticism, 283

Fascination, 425-27

Father, adaptation to, 127, 160, 175

Father-complex, 270

Faust analysed, 338-41, 384, 460-61

Fear of unconscious, 434

Fechner, 352

Feeling-thoughts, 461

Feelings of extrovert, 403-5 " introvert, 403-5

Felida, case of, 84

Féré, 12

Feuerbach, 346

Final view (Adler), 261

Finck (types), 296

Fixation, Freud's view of, 227 " infantile, 228, 462

Flournoy, 60, 78, 199, 345-46 " case of Helen Smith, 69

_Folie circulaire_, 67

Forel, 70, 261

Forel, _The Sexual Question_, 365

Frank, 236, 245, 249

Frazer, 413

Freud, 59, 73, 82, 104, 132-33, 156, 170, 191, 227, 241, 281, 297-98, 305-08, 319, 343-44, 349, 354-55, 359, 371, 373, 381, 404, 409, 445, 458

Freudian investigations, 133

Freud's case of paranoid dementia, 336-37

" conception of dreams, 222

" method, 339

" psychology of dreams, 300

" publications, opposition to, 355

" theory, 261

" " of infantile sexuality, 172

Frobenius, 310, 436

Function, adapted, 405 " co-, 405 " complexes, 426 " transcendental, 417, 436, 441, 468

Fürst's experiments, 119, 157-58

Future character (Felida), 84 " " (Mary Reynolds), 84

Gall, 315

Genesis of dreams, 212

Genius, 1

Gley, 50

Glossolalia, 89-91 " instances of, 28

God-Almightiness, 450, 457, 462 " " physical symptoms of, 458

God's existence, 415

" idea, 451

" primitive concept of, 434

" projection of, 432

Goethe, 12, 339, 384, 460-61 " psychic stimulation of, 75

Gottähnlichkeit, 450

Grandfathers I. and II. (Ivenes), 80

Grebelskaja, 337

Gross, 348 " (types), 296-97

Guilt complex, association test, 107

Guinon and Waltke, experiment of, 10, 47

Hallucination, cryptomnesia, 91 " hypnosis in production of, 58

_Hallucination téléologique_, 84

Hallucinations, 11, 15, 49, 58, 282 " Helen Smith's, 63, 64 " hypnagogic, 13, 23, 62 " hypnopompic, 23, 62 " in somnambulism, 60 " intuitive, 64 " negative, 68

Hallucinatory persons, why separated, 83

Hans, little, 132

Haôma, 413

Hecker, 64

Hedonism, viii

Hegel, 290

Heim, 412

Heimarmenê, 413

Herd-animal, man a, 263

" -soul, 455

Hermeneutics, 468-69

Hero, the, 462 " myth, 438

Hiawatha, 436

Hoch, 289

Hoche, 355

Hoefelt, spontaneous somnambulism, 66

Homunculus, 404

Homosexual tendencies, 165, 172, 420

Hypermnesia (footnote), 86

Hypnagogic activities, 23, 71, 204

" flashes, 22

Hypnopompical dreams, 23

Hypnosis in production of hallucination, 58

Hypnotic treatment, 6, 237 " " diametrically opposed to psychoanalysis, 207

Hypnotism, essential character of, 243 " in automatic writing, 54, 56

Hysteria, 1, 7 " case of, 385 " and extroversion, 406

Hysteric, extreme sensibility of, 85

Hysterical attack (Ivenes), ætiology of, 74 " " induced by automatism, 79 " deafness and paralysis (Breuer), 356 " delirium, 71 " dissociation, 81, 287 " forgetfulness, 72

Hysterical identification, 71 " somnambulism (case of Elise K.), 3

Hystero-epilepsy (Janet), 81

Hystero-epileptic attacks, 81

Hystero-hypnosis (Ivenes), 79

Idea, abstract, 438, 448

Identification with collective psyche, 420-25, 462-65 " " God, 337 " " reason, 416

Images, primordial, 410, 448 " psychic, 438

Imitation, 456

Imperialism, 399

Impersonal unconscious, 437

Importance of the unconscious, 278 " " types, 348

Incest-barrier, 230 " -wish, 462

Individual, the, a changing identity, ix " metaphysical needs of, 223

Individuality, 473, 457, 465

Individuation, 440, 456

Infantile fixation, 228, 462 " milieu, influence of, 131 " transference, 298

Infantility in primitive people, 230

Inferiority, moral, 449

Inspiration, 15

Instances of dreams analysed, 217, 219

Instinct-ego, 383

Intelligence-complex, 114

Interpolations in dreams, 176 " in rumour, 176 " _v._ analysis, 219

Interpretation, causal reductive, 419 " objective, 421 " subjective, 421 " synthetic, 417

Interpretation of Viennese school, one-sided, 217

Introjection, 414

Introversion, 137, 140, 288, 347, 391, 437, 401-3 " neurosis in child, 140

Intuitive hallucinations, 64

Itten, 337

_Ivenes_, 33-34, 68-84 " journeys on other side, 34 " mystic character, 69 " oracular sayings, 36 " race-motherhood, 39

James, William, 290-92, 401 " " pragmatism, 348

Janet, 46, 74, 81, 104, 232, 234, 452 " automatic writing (case of Lucie), 55 " Lucie and Léonie, 66 " Léonie, 69

Janus face, 174

Jeanne d'Arc, 63, 84 " " visions of, 63

Jonah, 436

Jung, correspondence with Loy, 236-277

K., Miss Elise, case of, 15

Kadi, the, 390

Kalk's case, 65

Kant, 278, 303, 339

Katatonic dementia præcox, 324 " negativism, 202

Kern-complex, 228

Kerner, 87, 88

Kerner's book, 27, 35, 93 " _Prophetess of Prevorst_, 27, 69

Kræpelin, 352

Kraepelin-Aschaffenburg scheme, 157

Kraft-Ebing, 7

Lapses (case of S. W.), 20-23

Laughter, symptomatic, 388

Lebensgefühl, 462

Legrand du Saulle, 66

Lehmann, 50, 51

Leibniz, 278

Lethargy hysterical (Ivenes), 74 " " (Loewenfeld), 76

Let-instinct-live theory, 379

Libido, 231, 347-48, 407, 471 " animal rôle of, 423-26 " canalisation of, 260, 274 " defined, 156, 288 " emanates from unconscious, 461 " stored-up, 234

Life, archaic view of, x

Life-lines psychological, 470, 474

Literature of psychoanalysis, 154-55

Little Anna, 132-54

Little Hans, 132

Loewenfeld, 74-76

Longfellow, 436

Loy's correspondence with Jung, 236-77

Lumpf-theory, 147

Lying, pathological, 15, 70, 71

Macario, 64

Macnish's case, 11

Maeder, 337, 447

Man a herd animal, 263, 269 " hylic, etc., 405

Martian language (Helen Smith), 90

Masculinity, unconscious, 420, 427

Masochism, 165

Materia medica of filth, 243-44

Maury, 62

Mayer, Robert, 231, 411

Medical augur, 244

Medium, S. W. as, 18

Megalomania, 462

Megarian school of philosophy, 402

Melungu, 413

Memory, bad, due to repression, 446

Mental balance, 282

Mental deficiency (neurasthenic), 14

Mesnet's case, 10-11

Metaphysical needs of individual, 223

Metempsychosis, 413

Method of association, 370

Meynert, 316

Mind the, a Becoming, 341 " collective, 451

Mirror-writing, 54

Misreading, 17, 46, 48

Misunderstanding between types, 404

Mithras, religion of, 366

Moment, etiological, of neurosis, 405

Monism psychological, 464

Moral conflict, 225, 242, 247, 251

Moral effect of analytical psychology, 375-76

Mörchen, 14

Mother, adaptation to, 125, 159, 171, 232

Myers, automatic writing, 54

Mysticism, 462

Mystic science, S. W., 40-44

Myth, the, 436 " unanimity of autochthonous forms, forms of, 451

Mythology, 226

Naef's case, 8

Naïve and sentimental types, 294

Nancy school, 356

Nebuchadnezzar's dream discussed, 281

Necessity, vital, ix, 375

Negativism, 200-201 " causes of (Bleuler), 202 " katatonic, 202

Negativism, schizophrenic, 200

Nelken, 337

Neumann, 353

Neurasthenia, 1, 129

Neurosis, 256, 370, 375 " ætiology of, 234 " and civilisation, 224, 374 " cause of, 232, 404 " " outbreak of, 229 " counter-argument against husband, 129-31 " failure in adaptation, 234 " Freud's theory of, 227 " good effect of, 395 " introversion in child, 140 " no magical cures of, 470 " psychogenic in essence, 356 " sexual ætiology of, too narrow, 231 " the cause in present, 232 " used for power effects, 388

Neurotic, a bearer of social ideals, 271, 277 " regressive tendency of, 469

Neurotic's faith in authority, 268 " special task, 233

Nietzsche, 87, 88, 295-96, 310, 326, 343, 378, 381, 393, 414, 417, 470

Nominalism, 402

Non-ego, 416, 434

Nucleus-complex, 228

Number dreams, 292

Objective interpretation on plane of, 421

Occultism's premature conclusions, 85

Occultist literature, gnostic systems, 93

Œdipus-complex, 228, 232

Opposition to Freud's publications, 355

Ostwald, 292, 398, 402

Pairs of opposites, 417, 452

Paranoia, 128, 313

Paranoid dementia, Freud's case, 336-37

Parental duty to children, 153 " constellation, 160-75

_Parties supérieures_ (Janet), 232, 452

Pathological cheat, psychology of, 70 " dreaming of saints, 70

Patient and doctor, personal relation, 216-219

Patients' resistances, 117, 202-05, 216

Perseveration, 106, 111

Personality of doctor, 238, 243, 259

Personal unconscious, 437, 448

Persona, 457-66, 472

Persuasion methods, 237

Perversion, sexual, 447

Phales, 183

Phantasies, release of, 458, 447 " sexual, 228 " unifying function of, 468

Phenomena, entoptic, 61 " of double consciousness as character formations, 84

Philosophy world, 350

Physical sensations as evidence of unconscious feelings, 405

Physician as "father," 408

Physician's own complexes, 243, 257

Pick, 70, 71

Pinel, 315

Platonic school, 402

Power, evaluation, 274 " " (Adler), 340, 394

Power standpoint, Adler on, viii, ix

Predicate type, 125

Predisposition to neurosis, 233, 359

Press of ideas, 203

Preyer, 51

Primitive non-differentiation, 453

Primordial images, 410, 414, 448

Prism, parable of, 252

Problems of the day, sexual, 276, 367-77

Projection, 427-33 " on doctor, 273, 407-8 " of phantasies on to parents, 409 " to religions, 435

Prophetess of Prevorst, 27, 37, 69, 91-93

Proust's case, 9-11

Prudishness, 154 " case of, 119

Pseudologia phantastica, 72

Pseudological representation, 71

Psyche, collective, 431, 455, 458, 472

Psychic images, 438 " life of child, 132-56 " material unconscious, 279

Psychoanalysis a high moral task, 235 " defined, 206, 256 " literature of, 154-55 " prejudices against, 206-07 " technique of, 257

Psychoanalyst, education of, 244, 258, 266

Psychocatharsis, 237

Psychographic communications, 25

Psychological disturbances, new theory of, 404 " ego and non-ego, 434 " realities, consolation of, 435

Psychological types, study of, 287-98, 391

Psychology, deep (Bleuler), 354 " of dreams, 299-311 " of individual, 464 " of pathological cheat, 70 " of rumour, 176

Puberty, changes in character at, 67 " dreams of, 74, 178 " of psychopathic, 68 " somnambulic attacks at, 84 " want of balance at, 45

Race-motherhood (Ivenes), 39

Rapport effective with hysterics, 81, 287

Rationalism, 431, 464 " antithesis of, 416

Reaction-times, 98-102 " -type, 157 " " hysterical, 97 " " normal, 96

Realism, 402

Reasoning method of Dubois, 208

Reconstruction of life, 236

Reflection, power of, 397

Regression, 230, 232, 469

Regressive extroversion, 288 " introversion, 289

Reincarnation (Ivenes), 37-9

Renaudin's case, _Folie circulaire_, 67

Repressed contents to be retained in consciousness, 447 " thoughts, independent growth of, 82

Repression, 446 " new edition of, 461

Reproduction experiment, 116

Resistances, patients', 117, 202-05, 216 " productive of distortion, 285

Revenge, unconscious, 190

Revolution, French, 431

Reynolds, Mary, case of (change of character), 65

Ribot, 66

Richer, 66

Richet, 92 " definition of somnambulism, 49

Rieger, 66

Riegl, 293

Riklin, 149

Rumour, case of, 176 " interpolations in, 176 " not conscious invention, 178

S. W., case of, 16-45

Saints, pathological dreaming of, 70

Sallust, 231

Schiller, 294

Schisms, 453

Schizophrenia, 201, 312, 447, 459 " Bleuler's summary, 203

Schizophrenic introversion, 204 " splitting, 201

Scholasticism, 340, 352, 373

School, Megarian _v._ Platonic, 402 " the Nancy, 356 " " Valentinian, 405 " " Zürich, 355

Schoolmaster view, 264

Schopenhauer, 295, 368, 447-48

Schreber case, 337, 343, 346, 440

Schüle, 61

Semiotics, vii, 468

Semi-somnambulic states, 23

Semi-somnambulism (S. W.), 23, 37, 48-9

Sexual enlightenment of children, 152, 247 " morality, 380 " perversion, 447 " phantasies, 228 " problems of the day, 277, 367-77

_Sexual question_, Forel, 365

Sexual surrogates, 172

Sexuality, importance of infantile, 172 " primitive man's view of, 306

Sexualisation of thought, 204

Significance of the father, 156 " " " case 1 160 " " " " 2 162 " " " " 3 165 " " " " 4 170 " of number dreams, 191

Slips of tongue, 179

Smith, Helen, case of, 61, 63-64, 72, 91

Socrates, 332, 374

Somnambulic attacks, S. W., 28 " " origin of, 75 " dialogues, 18 " personalities, 30-33

Somnambulism, 2, 8, 16, 18, 240

Somnambulist's suggestibility, 92 " thought in plastic images, 60

Spielrein, 337

Standpoint, causal, final, viii

Stanley Hall, Dr., 94

Star-dwellers, 35, 36

Stekel, 191, 259, 261

Stereotypic acts, 282

Stimulus word, 101 " " repetition of, 105

Study of psychological types, 287-98, 391-403

Subconscious personality, how constructed, 55 " personalities, Grandfather I. and II., 80

Subjective interpretation of dreams, 421 " roots of dreams, 73

Sublimation, 140, 397-99

Sucking as sexual act, 231

Suggestibility, influence of darkness on, 59 " somnambulist's, 92

Suggestion, analysis not a method of, 207 " by analyst, 261, 265, 266, 456, 469

Superman, 414

Super-personal unconscious, 426

Superstition, scientific dread of, 211 " unconscious, 280

Swedenborg, 37 " visions of, 63

Symbol interpreted semiotically, vii, 468 " not fixed, 218, 221, 265, 308 " psychological, two aspects of, viii " value of religious, xi

Symbolic meaning of sexual phantasies, 222

Symbolism, 198, 224, 337 " an experience, 222 " book of Tobias, 174 " chestnuts, meaning of, 183 " God and devil, 174 " of dreams, 59, 218, 308 " value of religious, 224

Sympathy (extraversion), 293

Symptomatic acts, 46, 179, 281 " laughter, 388

Synesius, 417

Synthetic procedure, 417

Systematic anæsthesia, 68

Table movements, 85

Table-turning, 17, 24, 50

Tachypnoea (case of S. W.), 19

Taylor, 413

Teleology, meaning in double consciousness, 84

Telepathic thought-reading, 266

Tender-minded and tough-minded, 290, 402

Theories new, as caustics, 394 " " of psychogenic disturbances, 404 " " reductive, 394

Thought of extroverts, 403

Thought-feelings, 411, 461

Thought-pressure, 204

Thought-reading, 85-92

Thought, somnambulic, in plastic images, 60 " transference, 24, 51, 56

Till Eulenspiegel, 387

Tongue, slips of, 179

Tower of Babel, 446

Transcendental function, 417, 436, 441

Transference, 245-46, 270, 289, 407-13, 429, 435 " infantile, 298 " positive and negative, 270-72

Trauma, sexual, 227, 242, 358, 361-62 " theory (Charcot), 361

Trumbull Ladd, 62

Truth, what is it, 252, 256

Twilight states, 71, 81

Type, complex, 114 " definition, 114 " extroverted, 288, 391, 439, 401 " introverted, 288, 391, 439, 401 " objective, 11 " predicate, 115

Types (Finck), 296 " (Gross), 296-97 " importance of, 348 " marriages between, 402 " naïve and sentimental, 294 " psychological, 287, 391, 439, 401

Tough and tender-minded, 290

Typical themes of dreams, 310

Unconscious, absolute, 435 " analysable to a finish, 461 " an extension of the individual, vi " assimilation of, 449 " compensation, 284 " cannot be emptied, 447 " cause of neurosis, 404 " feelings as physical sensations, 405 " homosexuality, 420 " impersonal, 437, 472 " importance of the, 278 " personal, 437, 448, 456, 472 " personalities (Ivenes), 77 " prospective aspect of, 442 " psychic material, 279 " source of libido, 461 " " " wisdom, 442 " superstition, 280 " uprush of, 459

Understanding, prospective, 338, 442

Understanding, retrospective, 338

Unifying function of phantasies, 468

Value of religious symbolism, 224

"Values," 392, 396, 404

Viennese school, one-sided interpretations of, 217

Vices and virtues, collective, 453

Virtues, unconscious counterparts, 389

Vischer, 348-49

Visions, Benvenuto Cellini, 63 " hypnagogic, 63, 71 " of Jeanne d'Arc, 63 " of S. W., 21 " of Swedenborg, 63

Visual images, 60 " _v._ auditory hallucinations, 61

"Vital necessity," ix

Voisin, 66

Volitional meaning of dreams, 222

Wagner, 383

Wandering impulse, cases of, 9

War, vi, xi, 398, 399, 416

Warringer, 293-94

Washing mania, 246

Wernicke, 316

Westphal, 13

Will, 397-99 " to power, 381, 388, 458

Wisdom of unconscious, 442

Wish-phantasies, 447

Witch-sleep, 75

Word predicate, type defined, 158

Word-presentation, 53

Works of the Zürich school, 345-46

World-philosophy, 350

Wundt, 352

Zarathustra, 381

Zagreus, 417

Zschokke, 92

Zürich school, 355 " " works of, 345-46

* * * * *

THE END

_Baillière, Tindall & Cox, 8, Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, W.C._

* * * * * +----------------------------------------------------------------------+ | | | Transcriber notes: | | | | P.XXI. 'C. C.' changed to 'C. G.'. | | P.22. 'Occasionlly' typo for 'Occasionally', changed. | | P.23. 'third kind of taste' changed 'taste' to 'state'. | | P.72. 'Our patent develops', 'patent' changed to 'patient'. | | P.103. added '+ denotes' in footnote 9 for multiple footnote. | | P.201. 'Pyschology' typo for 'Psychology', changed. | | P.217. 'unnecessary' typo for 'unnecessary', changed. | | P.305. Freud's view-point of casuality', changed 'casuality' to | | 'causality'. | | P.340. 'beween' typo for 'between', changed. | | P.345. Placed footnote anchor after 'mythological formations', | | but could be elsewhere on the page. It may be an independant | | reference to the whole section. | | P.384. 'castastrophe' typo for 'catastrophe', changed. | | P.451. 'colective' typo for 'collective', changed. | | P.471. 'devolopment' typo for 'development' changed. | | P.482. in index, 'Hommunculus' is 'Homunculus' in the book, changed. | | Fixed various punctuation. | | Underscore before and after _text_ indicates italics. | | | +----------------------------------------------------------------------+