Part 8

Iwo Jima represented at once the supreme test and the pinnacle of American amphibious capabilities in the Pacific War. The sheer magnitude of the task--planning the assault and sustaining of that many troops against such a formidable objective--made Operation Detachment an enduring model of “detailed planning and violent execution.” Here the element of surprise was not available to the attacker. Yet the speed of the American landing and the toughness with which assault units withstood the withering barrages astounded the Japanese defenders. “The landing on Iwo was the epitome of everything we’d learned over the years about amphibious assaults,” said Colonel Wornham of the 27th Marines. Bad as the enemy fire became on D-day, there were no reports of “Issue in doubt.” Lieutenant Colonel Galer compared Iwo Jima with his Guadalcanal experience: “Then it was ‘can we hold?’ Here at Iwo Jima the question was simply ‘When can we get it over?’”

The ship-to-shore assault at Iwo was impressive enough, but the real measure of amphibious effectiveness can be seen in the massive, sustained logistical support which somehow flowed over those treacherous beaches. Not only did the Marines have all the ammunition and flamethrower refills they needed, around the clock, but they also had many of the less obvious necessities and niceties which marked this battle as different from its predecessors. Marines on Iwo had ample quantities of whole blood, some of it donated barely two weeks in advance, flown in, refrigerated, and available. The Marines also had mail call, unit newsletters, fresh water, radio batteries, fresh-baked bread, and prefabricated burial markers, thousands of them.

Iwo Jima featured superior inter-service cooperation. The Navy-Marine Corps team rarely functioned more efficiently. The blue-water Navy continued to earn the respect of the Marines, especially on D-2 when the flotilla of tiny LCI gunboats bravely attacked the coastal defense guns to protect the Navy and Marine frogmen. Likewise, the Marines welcomed the contributions of the Army, Coast Guard, Coast and Geodetic Survey, Red Cross, and the host of combat correspondents--all of whom shared both the misery and the glory of the prolonged battle.

Two aspects of the battle remain controversial: the inadequate preliminary bombardment and the decision to use piecemeal replacements instead of organized units to strengthen the assault forces. Both decisions, rendered in the context of several competing factors, were made by experienced commanders in good faith. Unavoidably, Iwo Jima’s biggest cost to the V Amphibious Corps was the loss of so many combat veterans in taking the island. While the battle served to create a new generation of veterans among the survivors, many proud regiments suffered devastating losses. With these same units already designated as key components of the landing force against the Japanese home islands, such losses had serious potential implications. These factors may well have influenced General Holland Smith’s unpopular decision to withhold the 3d Marines from the battle. From the perspective of an exhausted company commander on Iwo Jima, Smith’s decision seemed inexcusable, then and now; from the wider perspective of the commanding general, Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific, the decision makes more sense.

Whatever his shortcomings, Holland Smith probably knew amphibious warfare better than anyone. Of the hundreds of after-action reports filed immediately following the battle, his official analysis best captured the essence of the struggle:

There was no hope of surprise, either strategic or tactical. There was little possibility for tactical initiative; the entire operation was fought on what were virtually the enemy’s own terms.... The strength, disposition, and conduct of the enemy’s defense required a major penetration of the heart of his prepared positions in the center of the Motoyama Plateau and a subsequent reduction of the positions in the difficult terrain sloping to the shore on the flanks. The size and terrain of the island precluded any Force Beachhead Line. It was an operation of one phase and one tactic. From the time the engagement was joined until the mission was completed it was a matter of frontal assault maintained with relentless pressure by a superior mass of troops and supporting arms against a position fortified to the maximum practical extent.

We Americans of a subsequent generation in the profession of arms find it difficult to imagine a sustained amphibious assault under such conditions. In some respects the fighting on Iwo Jima took on the features of Marines fighting in France in 1918, described by one as “a war girt with horrors.” We sense the drama repeated every morning at Iwo, after the prep fires lifted, when the riflemen, engineers, corpsmen, flame tank crews, and armored bulldozer operators somehow found the fortitude to move out yet again into “Death Valley” or “The Meatgrinder.” Few of us today can study the defenses, analyze the action reports, or walk the broken ground without experiencing a sense of reverence for the men who won that epic battle.

Fleet Admiral Nimitz said these words while the fighting still raged: “Among the Americans who served on Iwo Jima, uncommon valor was a common virtue,” a sentiment now chiseled in granite at the base of Felix de Weldon’s gigantic bronze sculpture of the Suribachi flag-raising.

Twenty-two Marines, four Navy corpsmen, and one LCI skipper were awarded the Medal of Honor for utmost bravery during the battle of Iwo Jima. Half were posthumous awards.

General Erskine placed these sacrifices in perspective in remarks made during the dedication of the 3d Marine Division cemetery on the embattled island:

Victory was never in doubt. Its cost was. What was in doubt, in all our minds, was whether there would be any of us left to dedicate our cemetery at the end, or whether the last Marine would die knocking out the last Japanese gunner.

[Sidebar (page 50): Above and Beyond the Call of Duty

Twenty-seven men received the Congressional Medal of Honor for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity during the battle of Iwo Jima: 22 Marines, four Navy corpsmen, and one Navy landing craft commander. Exactly half of the awards issued to Marines and corpsmen of the V Amphibious Corps were posthumous. Within a larger institutional context, Iwo Jima represented more than one-fourth of the 80 Medals of Honor awarded Marines during the Second World War. This was Iwo Jima’s Roll of Honor:

Cpl Charles J. Berry, 1/26, 3 March 1945[A] PFC William R. Caddy, 3/26, 3 March[A] LtCol Justice M. Chambers, 3/25, 19-22 February Sgt Darrell S. Cole, 1/23, 19 February[A] Capt Robert Dunlap, 1/26, 20-21 February Sgt Ross F. Gray, 1/25, 21 February Sgt William G. Harrell, 1/28, 3 March Lt Rufus G. Herring, USNR, LCI 449, 17 February PFC Douglas T. Jacobson, 3/23, 26 February PltSgt Joseph J. Julian, 1/27, 9 March[A] PFC James D. LaBelle, 1/27, 8 March[A] 2dLt John H. Leims, 1/9, 7 March PFC Jacklyn H. Lucas, 1/26, 20 February 1stLt Jack Lummus, 2/27, 8 March[A] Capt Joseph J. McCarthy, 2/24, 21 February 1stLt Harry L. Martin, 5th Pioneer Battalion, 26 March[A] Pvt George Phillips, 2/28, 14 March[A] PhM 1/c Francis J. Pierce, USN, 2/24, 15-16 March PFC Donald J. Ruhl, 2/28, 19-21 February[A] Pvt Franklin E. Sigler, 2/26, 14 March Cpl Tony Stein, 1/28, 19 February[A] PhM 2/c George Wahlen, USN, 2/26, 3 March GySgt William G. Walsh, 3/27, 27 February[A] Pvt Wilson D. Watson, 2/9, 26-27 February Cpl Hershel W. Williams, 1/21, 23 February PhM 3/c Jack Williams, USN, 3/28, 3 March[A] PhM 1/c John H. Willis, USN, 3/27, 28 February[A]

[A] Posthumous

[Sidebar (page 52): Assault Divisions’ Command Structures

As the 3d, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions conducted their final preparations for Operation Detachment, these were the infantry commanders who would lead the way at the beginning of the battle:

3d Marine Division

3d Marines Col James A. Stewart 9th Marines Col Howard N. Kenyon 1/9 LtCol Carey A. Randall 2/9 LtCol Robert E. Cushman, Jr. 3/9 LtCol Harold C. Boehm 21st Marines Col Hartnoll J. Withers 1/21 LtCol Marlowe C. Williams 2/21 LtCol Lowell E. English 3/21 LtCol Wendell H. Duplantis

4th Marine Division

23d Marines Col Walter W. Wensinger 1/23 LtCol Ralph Haas 2/23 Maj Robert H. Davidson 3/23 Maj James S. Scales 24th Marines Col Walter I. Jordan 1/24 Maj Paul S. Treitel 2/24 LtCol Richard Rothwell 3/24 LtCol Alexander A. Vandegrift, Jr. 25th Marines Col John R. Lanigan 1/25 LtCol Hollis U. Mustain 2/25 LtCol Lewis C. Hudson, Jr. 3/25 LtCol Justice M. Chambers

5th Marine Division

26th Marines Col Chester B. Graham 1/26 LtCol Daniel C. Pollock 2/26 LtCol Joseph P. Sayers 3/26 LtCol Tom M. Trotti 27th Marines Col Thomas A. Wornham 1/27 LtCol John A. Butler 2/27 Maj John W. Antonelli 3/27 LtCol Donn J. Robertson 28th Marines Col Harry B. Liversedge 1/28 LtCol Jackson B. Butterfield 2/28 LtCol Chandler W. Johnson 3/28 LtCol Charles E. Shepard, Jr.

[Note: Of those infantry battalion commanders who landed on Iwo Jima on D-Day, only seven remained unwounded and still retained command at the battle’s end.] ]

_Sources_

The official records of the V Amphibious Corps at Iwo Jima occupy 27 boxes in the USMC archives. Within this maze, the most useful information can be found in the “comments and recommendations” sections of the After Action Reports filed by the major units. The best published official account of the battle is contained in George W. Garand and Truman R. Strobridge, _Western Pacific Operations_, vol IV, _History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II_ (Washington: Historical Division, HQMC, 1971). Three other official accounts are recommended: LtCol Whitman S. Bartley, _Iwo Jima: Amphibious Epic_ (Washington: Historical Division, 1954); Capt Clifford P. Morehouse, _The Iwo Jima Operation_, and Bernard C. Nalty, _The U.S. Marines on Iwo Jima: The Battle and the Flag Raising_ (Washington: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1960). Chapter 10 of Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, _The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War_ (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951), combines exhaustive research and keen analysis of the assault on Iwo. Three of the many postwar published accounts are particularly recommended: Richard F. Newcomb, _Iwo Jima_ (New York: Bantam, 1982); Richard Wheeler, _Iwo Jima_ (New York: Crowell, 1980); and Bill D. Ross, _Iwo Jima: Legacy of Valor_ (New York: Vanguard Press, 1985).

The most comprehensive Japanese account is contained in Part II (“Ogasawara Islands Defense Operations”) in _Chubu Taiheyo rikugen sakusen (2)_ [Army Operations in the Central Pacific, vol II], part of the _Senshi Sosho_ War History Series. Of Japanese accounts in English, the best is Major Yoshitaka Horie’s “Explanation of Japanese Defense Plan and Battle of Iwo Jima,” written in 1946 and available at the Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC).

The MCHC maintains an abundance of personal accounts related to Iwo Jima. Among the most valuable of these are the Iwo Jima comments in the Princeton Papers Collection in the Personal Papers Section. The Marine Corps Oral History Collection contains 36 well-indexed memoirs of Iwo Jima participants. The research library contains a limited edition of _Dear Progeny_, the autobiography of Dr. Michael F. Keleher, the battalion surgeon credited with saving the life of “Jumping Joe” Chambers on D+3. The Personal Papers Section also holds the papers of TSgt Frederick K. Dashiell, Lt John K. McLean, and Lt Eugene T. Petersen. For an increased insight, the author also conducted personal interviews with 41 Iwo veterans.

The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Marvin Taylor of the Marine Rocket Troops Association; Helen McDonald of the Admiral Nimitz Museum: Frederick and Thomas Dashiell; LtCol Joseph McNamara, USMCR; BGen James D. Hittle, USMC (Ret); Mr. Bunichi Ohtsuka; and the entire staff of the Marine Corps Historical Center, whose collective “can-do” spirit was personified by the late Regina Strother, photograph archivist.

_About the Author_

Colonel Joseph H. Alexander, USMC (Ret), served 29 years on active duty in the Marine Corps as an assault amphibian officer, including two tours in Vietnam. He is a distinguished graduate of the Naval War College and holds degrees in history from North Carolina, Georgetown, and Jacksonville. He is a life member of both the Marine Corps Historical Foundation and the Naval Institute, a member of the Society for Military History, the Military Order of the World Wars, and the North Carolina Writers’ Workshop.

Colonel Alexander, an independent historian, wrote _Across the Reef: The Marine Assault on Tarawa_ in this series. He is co-author (with Lieutenant Colonel Merrill L. Bartlett) of _Sea Soldiers in the Cold War_ (Naval Institute Press, 1994) and the author of “Utmost Savagery: the Amphibious Seizure of Tarawa” (Naval Institute Press, pending). He has also written numerous feature essays published in _Marine Corps Gazette_, _Naval Institute Proceedings_, _Naval History_, _Leatherneck_, _Amphibious Warfare Review_, _World War Two_, and _Florida Historical Quarterly_.

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in the World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines by the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., as a part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance of the 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part by a grant from the Marine Corps Historical Foundation.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES

_DIRECTOR OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS_ =Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)=

_GENERAL EDITOR, WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIES_ =Benis M. Frank=

_CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANT_ =George C. MacGillivray=

_EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION_ =Robert E. Struder=, Senior Editor; =W. Stephen Hill=, Visual Information Specialist =Catherine A. Kerns=, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical Center Building 58, Washington Navy Yard Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

1994

PCN 190 003131 00

Transcriber’s Notes

Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not changed.

Simple typographical errors and unbalanced quotation marks were corrected.

To make this eBook easier to read, particularly on handheld devices, some images have been made relatively larger than in the original pamphlet, and centered, rather than offset to one side or the other; and some were placed a little earlier or later than in the original. Sidebars in the original have been repositioned between chapters and identified as “[Sidebar (page nn):”, where the page reference is to the original location in the source book. In the Plain Text version, the matching closing right bracket follows the last line of the Sidebar’s text and is on a separate line to make it more noticeable. In the HTML versions, that bracket follows the colon, and each Sidebar is displayed within a box.

Sidebar “The Marines’ Zippo Tanks” (originally on page 37) used both “Mark I” and “Mark 1”. Here, all of them are “Mark I”.

Page 47: “D-4” may be a misprint for “G-4”.