Chapter 8

THE UNKNOWN GOD.

"As I passed by, and beheld your sacred objects, I found an altar with this inscription, _To the Unknown God_."--ST. PAUL.

"That which can be _known_ of God is manifested in their hearts, God himself having shown it to them" [the heathen nations].--ST. PAUL.

Having now reached our first landing-place, from whence we may survey the fields that we have traversed, it may be well to set down in definite propositions the results we have attained. We may then carry them forward, as torches, to illuminate the path of future and still profounder inquiries.

The principles we have assumed as the only adequate and legitimate interpretation of the facts of religious history, and which an extended study of the most fully-developed religious system of the ancient world confirms, may be thus announced:

I. A religious nature and destination appertain to man, so that the purposes of his existence and the perfection of his being can only be secured in and through religion.

II. The idea of God as the unconditioned Cause, the infinite Mind, the personal Lord and Lawgiver, and the consciousness of dependence upon and obligation to God, are the fundamental principles of all religion.

III. Inasmuch as man is a religious being, the instincts and emotions of his nature constraining him to worship, there must also be implanted in his rational nature some original _à priori_ ideas or laws of thought which furnish the necessary cognition of the object of worship; that is, some native, spontaneous cognition of God.

A mere blind impulse would not be adequate to guide man to the true end and perfection of his being without rational ideas; a tendency or appetency, without a revealed object, would be the mockery and misery of his nature--an "ignis fatuus" perpetually alluring and forever deceiving man.

That man has a native, spontaneous apperception of a God, in the true import of that sacred name, has been denied by men of totally opposite schools and tendencies of thought--by the Idealist and the Materialist; by the Theologian and the Atheist. Though differing essentially in their general principles and method, they are agreed in asserting that God is absolutely "_the unknown_;" and that, so far as reason and logic are concerned, man can not attain to any knowledge of the first principles and causes of the universe, and, consequently, can not determine whether the first principle or principles be intelligent or unintelligent, personal or impersonal, finite or infinite, one or many righteous or non-righteous, evil or good.

The various opponents of the doctrine that God can be cognized by human reason may be classified as follows: I. _Those who assert that all human knowledge is necessarily confined to the observation and classification of phenomena in their orders of co-existence, succession, and resemblance_. Man has no faculty for cognizing substances, causes, forces, reasons, first principles--no power by which he can _know_ God. This class may be again subdivided into--

1. Those who limit all knowledge to the observation and classification of _mental_ phenomena (_e. g_., Idealists like J. S. Mill).

2. Those who limit all knowledge to the observation and classification of _material_ phenomena (_e. g_., Materialists like Comte).

II. _The second class comprises all who admit that philosophic knowledge is the knowledge of effects as dependent on causes, and of qualities as inherent in substances; but at the same time assert that "all knowledge is of the phenomenal_." Philosophy can never attain to a positive knowledge of the First Cause. Of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing. The infinite can not by us be comprehended, conceived, or thought. _Faith_ is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond knowledge. We believe in the existence of God, but we can not _know_ God. This class, also, may be again subdivided into--

1. Those who affirm that our idea of the Infinite First Cause is grounded on an _intuitional_ or subjective faith, necessitated by an "impotence of thought"--that is, by a mental inability to conceive an absolute limitation or an infinite illimitation, an absolute commencement or an infinite non-commencement. Both contradictory opposites are equally incomprehensible and inconceivable to us; and yet, though unable to view either as possible, we are forced by a higher law--the "Law of Excluded Middle"--to admit that one, and only one, is necessary (_e. g_., Hamilton and Mansel).

2. Those who assert that our idea of God rests solely on an _historical_ or objective faith in testimony--the testimony of Scripture, which assures us that, in the course of history, God has manifested his existence in an objective manner to the senses, and given verbal communications of his character and will to men; human reason being utterly incapacitated by the fall, and the consequent depravity of man, to attain any knowledge of the unity, spirituality, and righteousness of God (_e. g_., Watson, and Dogmatic Theologians generally).

It will thus be manifest that the great question, the central and vital question which demands a thorough and searching consideration, is the following, to wit: _Is God cognizable by human reason_? Can man attain to a positive cognition of God--can he _know_ God; or is all our supposed knowledge "a learned ignorance,"[210] an unreasoning faith? We venture to answer this question in the affirmative. Human reason is now adequate to the cognition of God; it is able, with the fullest confidence, to affirm the being of a God, and, in some degree, to determine his character. The parties and schools above referred to answer this question in the negative form. Whether Theologians or Atheists, they are singularly agreed in denying to human reason all possibility of _knowing_ God.

[Footnote 210: Hamilton's "Philosophy," p. 512.]

Before entering upon the discussion of the negative positions enumerated in the above classification, it may be important we should state our own position explicitly, and exhibit what we regard as the true doctrine of the genesis of the idea of God in the human intelligence. The real question at issue will then stand out in clear relief, and precision will be given to the entire discussion.

(i.) _We hold that the idea of God is a common phenomenon of the universal human intelligence_. It is found in all minds where reason has had its normal and healthy development; and no race of men has ever been found utterly destitute of the idea of God. The proof of this position has already been furnished in chap, ii.,[211] and needs not be re-stated here. We have simply to remark that the appeal which is made by Locke and others of the sensational school to the experiences of infants, idiots, the deaf and dumb, or, indeed, any cases wherein the proper conditions for the normal development of reason are wanting, are utterly irrelevant to the question. The acorn contains within itself the rudimental germ of the future oak, but its mature and perfect development depends on the exterior conditions of moisture, light, and heat. By these exterior conditions it may be rendered luxuriant in its growth, or it may be stunted in its growth. It may barely exist under one class of conditions; it may be distorted and perverted, or it may perish utterly under another. And so in the idiotic mind the ideas of reason may be wanting, or they may be imprisoned by impervious walls of cerebral malformation. In the infant mind the development of reason is yet in an incipient stage. The idea of God is immanent to the infant thought, but the infant thought is not yet matured. The deaf and dumb are certainly not in that full and normal correlation to the world of sense which is a necessary condition of the development of reason. Language, the great vehiculum and instrument of thought, is wanting, and reason can not develop itself without words. "Words without thought are dead sounds, _thoughts without words are nothing_. The word is the thought incarnate."[212] Under proper and normal conditions, the idea of God is the natural and necessary form in which human thought must be developed. And, with these explanations, we repeat our affirmation that the idea of God is a common phenomenon of the universal human intelligence.

[Footnote 211: Pp. 89,90.]

[Footnote 212: Müller, "Science of Language," p. 384.]

(ii.) _We do not hold that the idea of God, in its completeness, is a simple, direct, and immediate intuition of the reason alone, independent of all experience, and all knowledge of the external world_. The idea of God is a complex idea, and not a simple idea. The affirmation, "God exists," is a _synthetic_ and _primitive_ judgment spontaneously developed in the mind, and developed, too, independent of all reflective reasoning. It is a necessary deduction from the facts of the outer world of nature and the primary intuitions of the inner world of reason--a logical deduction from the self-evident truths given in sense, consciousness, and reason. "We do not _perceive_ God, but we _conceive_ Him upon the faith of this admirable world exposed to view, and upon the other world, more admirable still, which we bear in ourselves."[213] Therefore we do not say that man is born with an "innate idea" of God, nor with the definite proposition, "there is a God," written upon his soul; but we do say that the mind is pregnant with certain natural principles, and governed, in its development, by certain necessary laws of thought, which determine it, by a _spontaneous logic_, to affirm the being of a God; and, furthermore, that this judgment may be called _innate_ in the sense, that it is the primitive, universal, and necessary development of the human understanding which "is innate to itself and equal to itself in all men."[214]

[Footnote 213: Cousin, "True, Beautiful and Good," p.102.]

[Footnote 214: Leibnitz.]

As the vital and rudimentary germ of the oak is contained in the acorn; as it is quickened and excited to activity by the external conditions of moisture, light, and heat, and is fully de developed under the fixed and determinative laws of vegetable life--so the germs of the idea of God are present in the human mind as the intuitions of pure reason (_Rational Psychology_); these intuitions are excited to energy by our experiential and historical knowledge of the facts and laws of the universe (_Phenomenology_); and these facts and intuitions are developed into form by the necessary laws of the intellect (_Nomology_, or _Primordial Logic_).

The _logical demonstration_ of the being of God commences with the analysis of thought. It asks, What are the ideas which exist in the human intelligence? What are their actual characteristics, and what their primitive characteristics? What is their origin, and what their validity? Having, by this process, found that some of our ideas are subjective, and some objective that some are derived from experience, and that some can not be derived from experience, but are inherent in the very constitution of the mind itself, as _à priori_ ideas of reason; that these are characterized as self-evident, universal, and necessary and that, as laws of thought, they govern the mind in all its conceptions of the universe; it has formulated these necessary judgments, and presented them as distinct and articulate propositions. These _à priori_, necessary judgments constitute the major premise of the Theistic syllogism, and, in view of the facts of the universe, necessitate the affirmation of the existence of a God as the only valid explanation of the facts.

The _natural_ or _chronological order_ in which the idea of God is developed in the human intelligence, is the reverse process of the scientific or logical order, in which the demonstration of the being of God is presented by philosophy; the latter is _reflective_ and _analytic_, the former is _spontaneous_ and _synthetic._ The natural order commences with the knowledge of the facts of the universe, material and mental, as revealed by sensation and experience. In presence of these facts of the universe, the _à priori_ ideas of power, cause, reason, and end are evoked into consciousness with greater or less distinctness; and the judgment, by a natural and spontaneous logic, free from all reflection, and consequently from all possibility of error, affirms a necessary relation between the facts of experience and the _à priori_ ideas of the reason. The result of this involuntary and almost unconscious process of thought is that natural cognition of a God found, with greater or less clearness and definiteness, in all rational minds. The _à posteriori_, or empirical knowledge of the phenomena of the universe, in their relations to time and space, constitute the minor premise of the Theistic syllogism.

The Theistic argument is, therefore, necessarily composed of both experiential and _à priori_ elements. An _à posteriori_ element exists as a condition of the logical demonstration The rational _à priori_ element is, however, the logical basis, the only valid foundation of the Theistic demonstration. The facts of the universe alone would never lead man to the recognition of a God, if the reason, in presence of these facts, did not enounce certain necessary and universal principles which are the logical antecedents, and adequate explanation of the facts. Of what use would it be to point to the events and changes of the material universe as proofs of the existence of a _First Cause,_ unless we take account of the universal and necessary truth that "every change must have an efficient cause;" that all phenomena are an indication of _power_; and that "there is an ultimate and sufficient reason why all things exist, and are as they are, and not otherwise." There would be no logical force in enumerating the facts of order and special adaptation which literally crowd the universe, as proofs of the existence of an _Intelligent Creator_, if the mind did not affirm the necessary principle that "facts of order, having a commencement in time, suppose mind as their source and exponent." There is no logical conclusiveness in the assertion of Paley, "that _experience_ teaches us that a designer must be a person," because, as Hume justly remarks, our "experience" is narrowed down to a mere point, "and can not be a rule for a universe;" but there is an infinitude of force in that dictum of reason, that "intelligence, self-consciousness, and self-determination necessarily constitute personality." A multiplicity of different effects, of which experience does not always reveal the connection, would not conduct to a single cause and to _one_ God, but rather to a plurality of causes and a plurality of gods, did not reason teach us that "all plurality implies an ultimate indivisible unity," and therefore there must be a _First Cause_ of all causes, a _First Principle_ of all principles, _the Substance_ of all substances, _the Being_ of all beings--_a God_ "of whom, in whom, and to whom are all things" (panta ek tou Theou, en tô Theô eis ton Theon).

The conclusion, therefore, is, that, as the idea of God is a complex idea, so there are necessarily a number of simple _à priori_ principles, and a variety of experiential facts conspiring to its development in the human intelligence.

(iii.) _The universe presents to the human mind an aggregation and history of phenomena which demands the idea of a God--a self-existent, intelligent, personal, righteous First Cause--as its adequate explanation._

The attempt of Positivism to confine all human knowledge to the observation and classification of phenomena, and arrest and foreclose all inquiry as to causes, efficient, final, and ultimate, is simply futile and absurd. It were just as easy to arrest the course of the sun in mid-heaven as to prevent the human mind from seeking to pass beyond phenomena, and ascertain the ground, and reason, and cause of all phenomena. The history of speculative thought clearly attests that, in all ages, the inquiry after the Ultimate Cause and Reason of all existence--the archê, or First Principle of all things--has been the inevitable and necessary tendency of the human mind; to resist which, skepticism and positivism have been utterly impotent. The first philosophers, of the Ionian school, had just as strong a faith in the existence of a Supreme Reality--an Ultimate Cause--as Leibnitz and Cousin. But when, by reflective thought, they attempted to render an account to themselves of this instinctive faith, they imagined that its object must be in some way appreciable to sense, and they sought it in some physical element, or under some visible and tangible shrine. Still, however imperfect and inadequate the method, and however unsatisfactory the results, humanity has never lost its positive and ineradicable confidence that the problem of existence could be solved. The resistless tide of spontaneous and necessary thought has always borne the race onward towards the recognition of a great First Cause; and though philosophy may have erred, again and again, in tracing the logical order of this inevitable thought, and exhibiting the necessary nexus between the premises and conclusion, yet the human mind has never wavered in the confidence which it has reposed in the natural logic of thought, and man has never ceased to believe in a God.

We readily grant that all our empirical knowledge is confined to phenomena in their orders of co-existence, succession, and resemblance. "To our objective perception and comparison nothing is given but qualities and changes; to our inductive generalization nothing but the shifting and grouping of these in time and space." Were it, however, our immediate concern to discuss the question, we could easily show that sensationalism has never succeeded in tracing the genetic origin of our ideas of space and time to observation and experience; and, without the _à priori_ idea of _space_, as the place of bodies, and of _time_, as the condition of succession, we can not conceive of phenomena at all. If, therefore, we know any thing beyond phenomena and their mutual relations; if we have any cognition of realities underlying phenomena, and of the relations of phenomena to their objective ground, it must be given by some faculty distinct from sense-perception, and in some process distinct from inductive generalization. The knowledge of real Being and real Power, of an ultimate Reason and a personal Will, is derived from the apperception of pure reason, which affirms the necessary existence of a Supreme Reality--an Uncreated Being beyond all phenomena, which is the ground and reason of the existence--the contemporaneousness and succession--the likeness and unlikeness, of all phenomena.

The immediate presentation of phenomena to sensation is the _occasion_ of the development in consciousness of these _à priori_ ideas of reason: the possession of these ideas or the immanence of these ideas, in the human intellect, constitutes the original _power_ to know external phenomena. The ideas of space, time, power, law, reason, and end, are the logical antecedents of the ideas of body, succession, event, consecution, order, and adaptation. The latter can not be conceived as distinct notions without the former. The former will not be revealed in thought without the presentation to sense, of resistance, movement, change, uniformity, etc. All actual knowledge must, therefore, be impure; that is, it must involve both _à priori_ and _à posteriori_ elements; and between these elements there must be a necessary relation.

This necessary relation between the _à priori_ and _à posteriori_ elements of knowledge is not a mere subjective law of thought. It is both a law of thought and a law of things. Between the _à posteriori_ facts of the universe and the _à priori_ ideas of the reason there is an absolute nexus, a universal and necessary correlation; so that the cognition of the latter is possible only on the cognition of the former; and the objective existence of the realities, represented by the ideas of reason, is the condition, _sine qua non_, of the existence of the phenomena presented to sense. If, in one indivisible act of consciousness, we immediately perceive extended matter exterior to our percipient mind, then Extension exists objectively; and if Extension exists objectively, then Space, its _conditio sine qua non_, also exists objectively. And if a definite body reveals to us the _Space_ in which it is contained, if a succession of pulsations or movements exhibit the uniform _Time_ beneath, so do the changeful phenomena of the universe demand a living _Power_ behind, and the existing order and regular evolution of the universe presuppose _Thought_--prevision, and predetermination, by an intelligent mind.

If, then, the universe is a created effect, it must furnish some indications of the character of its cause. If, as Plato taught, the world is a "created image" of the eternal archetypes which dwell in the uncreated Mind, and if the subjective ideas which dwell in the human reason, as the offspring of God, are "copies" of the ideas of the Infinite Reason--if the universe be "the autobiography of the Infinite Spirit which has also repeated itself in miniature within our finite spirit," then may we decipher its symbols, and read its lessons straight off. Then every approach towards a scientific comprehension and generalization of the facts of the universe must carry us upward towards the higher realities of reason. The more we can understand of Nature--of her comprehensive laws, of her archetypal forms, of her far-reaching plan spread through the almost infinite ages, and stretching through illimitable space--the more do we comprehend the divine Thought. The inductive generalization of science gradually _ascends_ towards the universal; the pure, essential, _à priori_ reason, with its universal and necessary ideas, _descends_ from above to meet it. The general conceptions of science are thus a kind of _ideoe umbratiles_--shadowy assimilations to those immutable ideas which dwell in essential reason, as possessed by the Supreme Intelligence, and which are participated in by rational man as the offspring and image of God.

Without making any pretension to profound scientific accuracy, we offer the following tentative classification of the facts of the universe, material and mental, which may be regarded as hints and adumbrations of the ultimate ground, and reason, and cause, of the universe. We shall venture to classify these facts as indicative of some fundamental relation; (i.) to Permanent Being or Reality; (ii.) to Reason and Thought; (iii.) to Moral Ideas and Ends.

(i.) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation to Permanent Being or Reality_.

1. _Qualitative_ Phenomena (properties, attributes, qualities)--the predicates of a _subject_; which phenomena, being characterized by likeness and unlikeness, are capable of comparison and classification, and thus of revealing something as to the nature of the _subject_.

2. _Dynamical_ Phenomena (protension, movement, succession)--events transpiring in _time_, having beginning, succession, and end, which present themselves to us as the expression of _power_, and throw back their distinctive characteristics on their _dynamic_ source.

3. _Quantitative_ Phenomena (totality, multiplicity, relative unity)--a multiplicity of objects having relative and composite unity, which suggests some relation to an absolute and indivisible _unity_.

4. _Statical_ Phenomena (extension, magnitude, divisibility)--bodies co-existing in _space_ which are limited, conditioned, relative, dependent, and indicate some relation to that which is self-existent, unconditioned, and absolute.

(ii.) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation to Reason or Thought_.

1. _Numerical and Geometrical Proportion_.--Definite proportion of elements (Chemistry), symmetrical arrangement of parts (Crystallography), numerical and geometrical relation of the forms and movements of the heavenly bodies (Spherical Astronomy), all of which are capable of exact mathematical expression.

2. _Archetypal Forms_.--The uniform succession of new existences, and the progressive evolution of new orders and species, conformable to fixed and definite ideal archetypes, the indication of a comprehensive _plan_(Morphological Botany, Comparative Anatomy).

3. _Teleology of Organs_.--The adaptation of organs to the fulfillment of special functions, indicating _design_(Comparative Physiology).

4. _Combination of Homotypes and Analogues_.--Diversified homologous forms made to fulfill analogous functions, or special purposes fulfilled whilst maintaining a general plan, indicating _choice_ and _alternativity_.

(iii.) _Facts of the universe which indicate some fundamental relation to Moral Ideas and Ends_.

1. _Ethical Distinctions_.--The universal tendency to discriminate between voluntary acts as right or wrong, indicating some relation to an _immutable moral standard of right_.

2. _Sense of Obligation_.--The universal consciousness of dependence and obligation, indicating some relation to Supreme _Power_, an Absolute _Authority_.

3. _Feeling of Responsibility_.--The universal consciousness of liability to be required to give account for, and endure the consequences of our action, indicating some relation to a Supreme _Judge_.

4. _Retributive Issues_.--The pleasure and pain resulting from moral action in this life, and the universal anticipation of pleasure or pain in the future, as the consequence of present conduct, indicate an _absolute Justice_ ruling the world and man.

Now, if the universe be a _created effect_, it must, in some degree at least, reveal the character of its Author and cause. We are entitled to regard it as a created symbol and image of the Deity; it must bear the impress of his _power_; it must reveal his infinite _presence_; it must express his _thoughts_; it must embody and realize his _ideals_, so far, at least, as material symbols will permit. Just as we see the power and thought of man revealed in his works, his energy and skill, his ideal and his taste expressed in his mechanical, artistic, and literary creations, so we may see the mind and character of God displayed in his works. The skill and contrivance of Watts, and Fulton, and Stephenson were exhibited in their mechanical productions. The pure, the intense, the visionary impersonation of the soul which the artist had conjured in his own imagination was wrought out in Psyché. The colossal grandeur of Michael Angelo's ideals, the ethereal and saintly elegance of Raphael's were realized upon the canvas. So he who is familiar with the ideal of the sculptor or the painter can identify his creations even when the author's name is not affixed. And so the "eternal Power" of God is "clearly seen" in the mighty orbs which float in the illimitable space. The vastness of the universe shadows forth the infinity of God. The indivisible unity of space and the ideal unity of the universe reflect the unity of God. The material forms around us are symbols of divine ideas, and the successive history of the universe is an expression of the divine thought; whilst the ethical ideas and sentiments inherent in the human mind are a reflection of the moral character of God.

The reader can not have failed to observe the form in which the Theistic argument is stated; "_if_ the finite universe is a created effect, it must reveal something as to the nature of its cause: _if_ the existing order and arrangement of the universe had a commencement in time, it must have an ultimate and adequate cause." The question, therefore, presents itself in a definite form: "_Is the universe finite or infinite; had the order of the universe a beginning, or is it eternal_?"

It will be seen at a glance that this is the central and vital question in the Theistic argument. If the order and arrangement of the universe is _eternal_, then that order is an inherent law of nature, and, as eternal, does not imply a cause _ab extra:_ if it is not eternal, then the ultimate cause of that order must be a power above and beyond nature. In the former case the minor premise of the Theistic syllogism is utterly invalidated; in the latter case it is abundantly sustained.

Some Theistic writers--as Descartes, Pascal, Leibnitz, and Saisset--have made the fatal admission that the universe is, in some sense, _infinite_ and _eternal_. In making this admission they have unwittingly surrendered the citadel of strength, and deprived the argument by which they would prove the being of a God of all its logical force. That argument is thus presented by Saisset: "The finite supposes the infinite. Extension supposes first space, then immensity: duration supposes first time, then eternity. A sudden and irresistible judgment refers this to the necessary, infinite, perfect being."[215] But if "the world is infinite and eternal,"[216] may not nature, or the totality of all existence (to pan), be the necessary, infinite, and perfect Being? An infinite and eternal universe has the reason of its existence in itself, and the existence of such a universe can never prove to us the existence of an infinite and eternal God.

[Footnote 215: "Modern Pantheism," vol. ii. p. 205.]

[Footnote 216: Ibid, p. 123.]

A closer examination of the statements and reasonings of Descartes, Pascal, and Leibnitz, as furnished by Saisset, will show that these distinguished mathematicans were misled by the false notion of "_mathematical_ infinitude." Their infinite universe, after all, is not an "absolute," but a "relative" infinite; that is, the indefinite. "The universe must extend _indefinitely_ in time and space, in the infinite greatness, and in the infinite littleness of its parts--in the infinite variety of its species, of its forms, and of its degrees of existence. The finite can not express the infinite but by being _multiplied_ infinitely. The finite, so far as it is finite, is not in any reasonable relation, or in any intelligible proportion to the infinite. But the finite, as _multiplied_ infinitely,[217] ages upon ages, spaces upon spaces, stars beyond stars, worlds beyond worlds, is a true expression of the Infinite Being. Does it follow, because the universe has no limits,--that it must therefore be eternal, immense, infinite as God himself? No; that is but a vain scruple, which springs from the imagination, and not from the reason. The imagination is always confounding what reason should ever distinguish, eternity and time, immensity and space, _relative_ infinity and _absolute_ infinity. The Creator alone is eternal, immense, absolutely infinite."[218]

[Footnote 217: "The infinite is distinct from the finite, and consequently from the multiplication of the finite by itself; that is, from the _indefinite_. That which is not infinite, added as many times as you please to itself, will not become infinite."--Cousin, "Hist, of Philos.," vol. ii. p. 231.]

[Footnote 218: Saisset, "Modern Pantheism," vol. ii. pp. 127, 128.]

The introduction of the idea of "the mathematical infinite" into metaphysical speculation, especially by Kant and Hamilton, with the design, it would seem, of transforming the idea of infinity into a sensuous conception, has generated innumerable paralogisms which disfigure the pages of their philosophical writings. This procedure is grounded in the common fallacy of supposing that _infinity_ and _quantity_ are compatible attributes, and susceptible of mathematical synthesis. This insidious and plausible error is ably refuted by a writer in the "North American Review."[219] We can not do better than transfer his argument to our pages in an abridged form.

[Footnote 219: "The Conditioned and the Unconditioned," No. CCV. art. iii. (1864).]

Mathematics is conversant with quantities and quantitative relations. The conception of quantity, therefore, if rigorously analyzed, will indicate _à priori_ the natural and impassable boundaries of the science; while a subsequent examination of the quantities called infinite in the mathematical sense, and of the algebraic symbol of infinity, will be seen to verify the results of this _à priori_ analysis.

Quantity is that attribute of things in virtue of which they are susceptible of exact mensuration. The question _how much_, or _how many_ (_quantus_), implies the answer, _so much_, or _so many_ (_tantus_); but the answer is possible only through reference to some standard of magnitude or multitude arbitrarily assumed. Every object, therefore, of which quantity, in the mathematical sense, is predicable, must be by its essential nature _mensurable._ Now mensurability implies the existence of actual, definite limits, since without them there could be no fixed relation between the given object and the standard of measurement, and, consequently, no possibility of exact mensuration. In fact, since quantification is the object of all mathematical operations, mathematics may be not inaptly defined as _the science of the determinations of limits_. It is evident, therefore, that the terms _quantity_ and _finitude_ express the same attribute, namely, _limitation_--the former relatively, the latter absolutely; for quantity is limitation considered with relation to some standard of measurement, and finitude is limitation considered simply in itself. The sphere of quantity, therefore, is absolutely identical with the sphere of the finite; and the phrase _infinite quantity_, if strictly construed, is a contradiction in terms.

The result thus attained by considering abstract quantity is corroborated by considering concrete and discrete quantities. Such expressions as _infinite sphere, radius, parallelogram, line,_ and so forth, are self-contradictory. A sphere is limited by its own periphery, and a radius by the centre and circumference of its circle. A parallelogram of infinite altitude is impossible, because the limit of its altitude is assigned in the side which must be parallel to its base in order to constitute it a parallelogram. In brief, all figuration is limitation. The contradiction in the term _infinite line_ is not quite so obvious, but can readily be made apparent. Objectively, a line is only the termination of a surface, and a surface the termination of a solid; hence a line can not exist apart from an extended quantity, nor an infinite line apart from an infinite quantity. But as this term has just been shown to be self-contradictory, an infinite line can not exist objectively at all. Again, every line is extension in one dimension; hence a mathematical quantity, hence mensurable, hence finite; you must therefore, deny that a line is a quantity, or else affirm that it is finite.

The same conclusion is forced upon us, if from geometry we turn to arithmetic. The phrases _infinite number, infinite series, infinite process_, and so forth, are all contradictory when literally construed. Number is a relation among separate unities or integers, which, considered objectively as independent of our cognitive powers, must constitute an exact sum; and this exactitude, or synthetic totality, is limitation. If considered subjectively in the mode of its cognition, a number is infinite only in the sense that it is beyond the power of our imagination or conception, which is an abuse of the term. In either case the totality is fixed; that is, finite. So, too, of _series_ and _process_. Since every series involves a succession of terms or numbers, and every process a succession of steps or stages, the notion of series and process plainly involves that of _number_, and must be rigorously dissociated from the idea of infinity. At any one step, at any one term, the number attained is determinate, hence finite. The fact that, by the law of the series or of the process, _we_ may continue the operation _as long as we please_, does not justify the application of the term infinite to the operation itself; if any thing is infinite, it is the will which continues the operation, which is absurd if said of human wills.

Consequently, the attribute of infinity is not predicable either of 'diminution without limit,' 'augmentation without limit,' or 'endless approximation to a fixed limit,' for these mathematical processes continue only as we continue them, consist of steps successively accomplished, and are limited by the very fact of this serial incompletion.

"We can not forbear pointing out an important application of these results to the Critical Philosophy. Kant bases each of his famous four antinomies on the demand of pure reason for unconditioned totality in a regressive series of conditions. This, he says, must be realized either in an absolute first of the series, conditioning all the other members, but itself unconditioned, or else in the absolute infinity of the series without a first; but reason is utterly unable, on account of mutual contradiction, to decide in which of the two alternatives the unconditioned is found. By the principles we have laid down, however, the problem is solved. The absolute infinity of a series is a contradiction _in adjecto_. As every number, although immeasurably and inconceivably great, is impossible unless _unity_ is given as its basis, so every series, being itself a number, is impossible unless a _first term_ is given as a commencement. Through a first term alone is the unconditioned possible; that is, if it does not exist in a first term, it can not exist at all; of the two alternatives, therefore, one altogether disappears, and reason is freed from the dilemma of a compulsory yet impossible decision. Even if it should be allowed that the series has no first term, but has originated _ab æterno_, it must always at each instant have a _last term_; the series, as a whole, can not be infinite, and hence can not, as Kant claims it can, realize in its wholeness unconditioned totality. Since countless terms forever remain unreached, the series is forever limited by them. Kant himself admits that it _can never be completed_, and is only potentially infinite; actually, therefore, by his own admission, it is finite. But a last term implies a first, as absolutely as one end of a string implies the other; the only possibility of an unconditioned lies in Kant's first alternative, and if, as he maintains Reason must demand it, she can not hesitate in her decisions. That _number is a limitation_ is no new truth, and that every series involves number is self-evident; and it is surprising that so radical a criticism on Kant's system should never have suggested itself to his opponents. Even the so-called _moments_ of time can not be regarded as constituting a real series, for a series can not be real except through its divisibility into members whereas time is indivisible, and its partition into moments is a conventional fiction. Exterior limitability and interior divisibility result equally from the possibility of discontinuity. Exterior illimitability and interior indivisibility are simple phases of the same attribute of _necessary continuity_ contemplated under different aspects. From this principle flows another upon which it is impossible to lay too much stress, namely; _illimitability and indivisibility, infinity and unity, reciprocally necessitate each other_. Hence the Quantitative Infinites must be also Units, and the division of space and time, implying absolute contradiction, is not even cogitable as an hypothesis.[220]

"The word _infinite_, therefore, in mathematical usage, as applied to _process_ and to _quantity_, has a two-fold signification. An infinite process is one which we can continue _as long as we please_, but which exists solely in our continuance of it.[221] An infinite quantity is one which exceeds our powers of mensuration or of conception, but which, nevertheless, has bounds and limits in itself.[222] Hence the possibility of relation among infinite quantities, and of different orders of infinities. If the words _infinite, infinity, infinitesimal_, should be banished from mathematical treatises and replaced by the words _indefinite, indefinity,_ and _indefinitesimal_, mathematics would suffer no loss, while, by removing a perpetual source of confusion, metaphysics would get great gain."

[Footnote 220: By the application of these principles the writer in the "North American Review" completely dissolves the antinomies by which Hamilton seeks to sustain his "Philosophy of the Conditioned." See "North American Review," 1864, pp. 432-437.]

[Footnote 221: De Morgan, "Diff. and Integ. Calc." p. 9.]

[Footnote 222: Id., ib., p. 25.]

The above must be regarded as a complete refutation of the position taken by _Hume_, to wit, that the idea of nature eternally existing in a state of order, without a cause other than the eternally inherent laws of nature, is no more self-contradictory than the idea of an eternally-existing and infinite mind, who originated this order--a God existing without a cause. The eternal and infinite Mind is indivisible and illimitable; nature, in its totality, as well as in its individual parts, has interior divisibility, and exterior limitability. The infinity of God is not a _quantitative_, but a _qualitative_ infinity. The miscalled eternity and infinity of nature is an _indefinite_ extension and protension in time and space, and, as _quantitative_, must necessarily be limited and measurable, therefore _finite_.

The universe of sense-perception and sensuous imagination is a phenomenal universe, a genesis, a perpetual becoming, an entrance into existence, and an exit thence; the Theist is, therefore, perfectly justified in regarding it as disqualified for _self-existence_, and in passing behind it for the Supreme Entity that needs no cause. Phenomena demand causation, entities dispense with it. No one asks for a cause of the _space_ which contains the universe, or of the Eternity on the bosom of which it floats. Everywhere the line is necessarily drawn upon the same principle; that entities _may_ have self-existence, phenomena _must_ have a cause.[223]

[Footnote 223: "Science, Nescience, and Faith," in Martineau's "Essays," p. 206.]

IV. _Psychological analysis clearly attests that in the phenomena of consciousness there are found elements or principles which, in their regular and normal development, transcend the limits of consciousness, and attain to the knowledge of Absolute Being, Absolute Reason, Absolute Good_, i.e., GOD.

The analysis of thought clearly reveals that the mind of man is in possession of ideas, notions, beliefs, principles (as _e.g._, the idea of space, duration, cause, substance, unity, infinity), which are not derived from sensation and experience, and which can not be drawn out of sensation and experience by any process of generalization. These ideas have this incontestable peculiarity, as distinguished from all the phenomena of sensation, that, whilst the latter are particular, contingent, and relative, the former are _universal_, _necessary_, and _absolute_. As an example, and a proof of the reality and validity of this distinction, take the ideas of _body_ and of _space_, the former unquestionably derived from experience, the latter supplied by reason alone. "I ask you, can not you conceive this book to be destroyed? Without doubt you can. And can not you conceive the whole world to be destroyed, and no matter whatever in existence? You can. For you, constituted as you are, the supposition of the non-existence of bodies implies no contradiction. And what do we call the idea of a thing which we can conceive of as non-existing? We call it a _contingent_ and _relative_ idea. But if you can conceive this book to be destroyed, all bodies destroyed, can you suppose space to be destroyed? You can not. It is in the power of man's thought to conceive the non-existence of bodies; it is not in the power of man's thought to conceive the non-existence of space. The idea of space is thus a _necessary_ and _absolute_ idea."[224]

[Footnote 224: Cousin's "Hist. of Philos.," vol. ii. p. 214.]

Take, again, the ideas of _event_ and _cause_. The idea of an event is a _contingent_ idea; it is the idea of something which might or might not have happened. There is no impossibility or contradiction in either supposition. The idea of cause is a _necessary_ idea. An event being given, the idea of cause is necessarily implied. An uncaused event is an impossible conception. The idea of cause is also a _universal_ idea extending to all events, actual or conceivable, and affirmed by all minds. It is a rational fact, attested by universal consciousness, that we can not think of an event transpiring without a cause; of a thing being the author of its own existence; of something generated by and out of nothing. _Ex nihilo nihil_ is a universal law of thought and of things. This universal "law of causality" is clearly distinguishable from a _general_ truth reached by induction. For example, it is a very general truth that, during twenty-four hours, day is succeeded by night. But this is not a necessary truth, neither is it a universal truth. It does not extend to all known lands, as, for example, to Nova Zembla. It does not hold true of the other planets. Nor does it extend to all possible lands. We can easily conceive of lands plunged in eternal night, or rolling in eternal day. With another system of worlds, one can conceive other physics, but one can not conceive other metaphysics. It is impossible to imagine a world in which the law of causality does not reign. Here, then, we have one absolute principle (among others which may be enumerated), the existence and reality of which is revealed, not by sensation, but by reason--a principle which transcends the limits of experience, and which, in its regular and logical development, attains the knowledge of the Absolute Cause--the First Cause of all causes--God.

Thus it is evident that the human mind is in possession of two distinct orders of primitive cognitions,--one, contingent, relative, and phenomenal; the other universal, necessary, and absolute. These two distinct orders of cognition presuppose the existence in man of two distinct faculties or organs of knowledge--_sensation_, external and internal, which perceives the contingent, relative, and phenomenal, and _reason_, which apprehends the universal, necessary, and absolute. The knowledge which is derived from sensation and experience is called _empirical_ knowledge, or knowledge _à posteriori_, because subsequent to, and consequent upon, the exercise of the faculties of observation. The knowledge derived from reason is called _transcendental_ knowledge, or knowledge _à priori_, because it furnishes laws to, and governs the exercise of the faculties of observation and thought, and is not the result of their exercise. The sensibility brings the mind into relation with the _physical_ world, the reason puts mind in communication with the _intelligible_ world--the sphere of _à priori_ principles, of necessary and absolute truths, which depend upon neither the world nor the conscious self, and which reveal to man the existence of the soul, nature, and God. Every distinct fact of consciousness is thus at once _psychological_ and _ontological_, and contains these three fundamental ideas, which we can not go beyond, or cancel by any possible analysis--the _soul_, with its faculties; _matter_, with its qualities; _God_, with his perfections.

We do not profess to be able to give a clear explication and complete enumeration of all the ideas of reason, and of the necessary and universal principles or axioms which are grounded on these ideas. This is still the grand desideratum of metaphysical science. Its achievement will give us a primordial logic, which shall be as exact in its procedure and as certain in its conclusions as the mathematical sciences. Meantime, it may be affirmed that philosophic analysis, in the person of Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Cousin, has succeeded in disengaging such _à priori_ ideas, and formulating such principles and laws of thought, as lead infallibly to the cognition of the _Absolute Being_, the _Absolute Reason_, the _Absolute Good_, that is, GOD.

It would carry us too far beyond our present design were we to exhibit, in each instance, the process of _immediate abstraction_ by which the contingent and relative element of knowledge is eliminated, and the necessary and absolute principle is disengaged. We shall simply state the method, and show its application by a single illustration.

There are unquestionably _two_ sorts of abstraction: 1. "_Comparative_ abstraction, operating upon several real objects, and seizing their resemblances in order to form an abstract idea, which is collective and mediate; collective, because different individuals concur in its formation; mediate, because it requires several intermediate operations." This is the method of the physical sciences, which comprises comparison, abstraction, and generalization. The result in this process is the attainment of a _general_ truth. 2. "_Immediate_ abstraction, not comparative; operating not upon several concretes, but upon a single one, eliminating and neglecting its individual and variable part, and disengaging the absolute part, which it raises at once to its pure form." The parts to be eliminated in a concrete cognition are, first, the quality of the object, and the circumstances under which the absolute unfolds itself; and secondly, the quality of the subject, which perceives but does not constitute it. The phenomena of the me and the not-me being eliminated, the absolute remains. This is the process of rational psychology, and the result obtained is a _universal_ and _necessary_ truth.

"Let us take, as an example, the principle of cause. To be able to say that the event I see must have a cause, it is not indispensable to have seen several events succeed each other. The principle which compels me to pronounce this judgment is already complete in the first as in the last event; it can not change in respect to its object, it can not change in itself; it neither increases nor decreases with the greater or less number of applications. The only difference that it is subject to in regard to us is that we apply it, whether we remark it or not, whether we disengage it or not from its particular application. The question is not to eliminate the particularity of the phenomenon wherein it appears to us, whether it be the fall of a leaf or the murder of a man, in order immediately to conceive, in a general and abstract manner, the necessity of a cause for every event that begins to exist. Here it is not because I am the same, or have been affected in the same manner in several different cases, that I have come to this general and abstract conception. A leaf falls; at the same moment I think, I believe, I declare that this falling of the leaf must have a cause. A man has been killed; at the same instant I believe, I proclaim that this death must have a cause. Each one of these facts contains particular and variable circumstances, and something universal and necessary, to wit, both of them can not but have a cause. Now I am perfectly able to disengage the universal from the particular in regard to the first fact as well as in regard to the second fact, for the universal is in the first quite as well as in the second. In fact, if the principle of causality is not universal in the first fact, neither will it be in the second, nor in the third, nor in the thousandth; for a thousandth is not nearer than the first to the infinite--to absolute universality. It is the same, and still more evidently, with _necessity_. Pay particular attention to this point; if necessity is not in the first fact, it can not be in any; for necessity can not be formed little by little, and by successive increments. If, on the first murder I see, I do not exclaim that this murder had necessarily a cause, at the thousandth murder, although it shall be proved that all the others had causes, I shall have the right to think that this murder has, very probably, also a cause, but I shall never have the right to say that it _necessarily_ had a cause. But when universality and necessity are already in a single case, that case is sufficient to entitle me to deduce them from it,"[225] and we may add, also, to affirm them of every other event that may transpire.

[Footnote 225: Cousin, "True, Beautiful, and Good," pp. 57, 58.]

The following _schema_ will exhibit the generally accepted results of this method of analysis applied to the phenomena of thought:

(i.) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments from whence is derived the cognition of Absolute Being_.

1. _The principle of Substance_; thus enounced--"every quality supposes a _subject_ or real being."

2. _The principle of Causality_; "every thing that begins to be supposes a _power_ adequate to its production, _i.e._, an efficient cause."

3. _The principle of Unity_; "all differentiation and plurality supposes an incomposite unity; all diversity, an ultimate and indivisible identity."

4. _The principle of the Unconditioned_; "the finite supposes the infinite, the dependent supposes the self-existent, the temporal supposes the eternal."

(ii.) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments, from which is derived the cognition of the Absolute Reason_.

1. _The principle of Ideality_; thus enounced, "facts of order--definite proportion, symmetrical arrangement, numerical relation, geometrical form--having a commencement in time, present themselves to us as the expression of _Ideas_, and refer us to _Mind_ as their analogon, and exponent, and source."

2. _The principle of Consecution_; "the uniform succession and progressive evolution of new existences, according to fixed definite archetypes, suppose a unity of _thought_--a comprehensive _plan_ embracing all existence."

3. _The principle of Intentionality or Final Cause_; "every means supposes an _end_ contemplated, and a choice and adaptation of means to secure the _end_."

4. _The principle of Personality_; "intelligent purpose and voluntary choice imply a personal agent."

(iii.) _Universal and necessary principles, or primitive judgments, from whence is derived the cognition of the Absolute Good_.

1. _The principle of Moral Law_; thus enounced, "the action of a voluntary agent necessarily characterized as _right_ or _wrong_, supposes an immutable and universal standard of right--an absolute moral Law."

2. _The principle of Moral Obligation_; "the feeling of obligation to obey a law of duty supposes a _Lawgiver_ by whose authority we are obliged."

3. _The principle of Moral Desert_; "the feeling of personal accountability and of moral desert supposes a _judge_ to whom we must give account, and who shall determine our award."

4. _The pnnciple of Retribution_; "retributive issues in this life, and the existence in all minds of an impersonal justice which demands that, in the final issue, every being shall receive his just deserts, suppose a being of _absolute justice_ who shall render to every man according to his works."

A more profound and exhaustive analysis may perhaps resolve all these primitive judgments into one universal principle or law, which Leibnitz has designated "_The principle or law of sufficient reason_," and which is thus enounced--there must be an ultimate and sufficient reason why any thing exists, and why it is, rather than otherwise; that is, if any thing begins to be, something else must be supposed as the adequate ground, and reason, and cause of its existence; or again, to state the law in view of our present discussion, "_if the finite universe, with its existing order and arrangement, had a beginning, there must be an ultimate and sufficient reason why it exists, and why it is as it is, rather than otherwise_." In view of one particular class of phenomena, or special order of facts, this "principle of sufficient reason" may be varied in the form of its statement, and denominated "the principle of substance," "the principle of causality," "the principle of intentionality," etc.; and, it may be, these are but specific judgments under the one fundamental and generic law of thought which constitutes the _major_ premise of every Theistic syllogism.

These fundamental principles, primitive judgments, axioms, or necessary and determinate forms of thought, exist potentially or germinally in all human minds; they are spontaneously developed in presence of the phenomena of the universe, material and mental; they govern the original movement of the mind, even when not appearing in consciousness in their pure and abstract form; and they compel us to affirm _a permanent being_ or _reality_ behind all phenomena--a _power_ adequate to the production of change, back of all events; a _personal Mind_, as the explanation of all the facts of order, and uniform succession, and regular evolution; and a _personal Lawgiver_ and _Righteous Judge_ as the ultimate ground and reason of all the phenomena of the moral world; in short, to affirm _an Unconditioned Cause of all finite and secondary causes; a First Principle of all principles; an Ultimate Reason of all reasons; an immutable Uncreated Justice, the living light of conscience; a King immortal, eternal, invisible, the only wise God, the ruler of the world and man_.

Our position, then, is, that the idea of God is revealed to man in the natural and spontaneous development of his intelligence, and that the existence of a Supreme Reality corresponding to, and represented by this idea, is rationally and logically demonstrable, and therefore justly entitled to take rank as part of our legitimate, valid, and positive _knowledge_.

And now from this position, which we regard as impregnable, we shall be prepared more deliberately and intelligibly to contemplate the various assaults which are openly or covertly made upon the doctrine that _God is cognizable by human reason_.