CHAPTER XIII

THE PEACE CONFERENCE--A MONARCHY OR A REPUBLIC?

The Peace Conference met at Shanghai on December 18th.

Dr. Wu Ting Fang, who was the Chief Commissioner on the Revolutionist side, is well known. He was educated in Hongkong, and afterwards qualified for the Bar in England. He practised in Hongkong for a little time, and also acted as Police Magistrate. Later on he joined the Chinese Government service under the late Marquis Li Hung-chang. He became Minister to the United States, Spain, and Peru in 1896, and was appointed Vice-President of the Board of Commerce and then of the Waiwupu in Peking. In 1906 he became Vice-President of the Board of Punishments, and was engaged in revising the Chinese code of laws. He retired in that year, and in 1907 went to the United States a second time to represent China as Envoy. He is a firm believer in rational diet. He originated and was made President of the Rational Diet Society and anti-Tobacco Movement in Shanghai, which became very popular.

Of the Revolutionary delegates, Wen Tsung-yao also hailed from Hongkong, and was educated in the Government Central School in that colony over twenty years ago. After that he was engaged in the Peiyang University in Tientsin. From 1905 to 1908 he went to Canton as Secretary to ex-Viceroy Tsen Chuan-hsuan, and in June, 1908, he was appointed to Lhassa as {186} Assistant-Amban, and was removed from office after the ex-Dalai Lama was deposed by Edict. Wang Chung-hui is a Cantonese student who graduated from college in America. He also studied in Europe, and is versed in law. Wang Chao-ming is celebrated for his attempt to assassinate the ex-Prince Regent, for which offence he was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was released when the recent pardon was granted to all reformers and political offenders. Wang Cheng-ting, who is a returned student from the United States, and Hu Ying are delegates appointed by General Li Yuan Hung.

#Tang Wu Shao-yi Ting-Fang* +------------------------------+ #Er Kuan | o o | Wen Chan. | o o | Tseng Yao.* | | #Hsu | | Wang Ting Lin. | o o | Chou Wei.* | | #Chao | | Wang Chun Ni. | o o | Chow Ning* | | #Feng | | New Ih Tung. | o o | Yung Kee.* | o | +------------------------------+ Wang Chen Ting.*

* Republicans. #Imperialists.

Up to the time my manuscript went forward to the publishers I was unable to get any special information regarding the Imperial delegates. Of Tang Shao-yi, however, much is known. He had played many an important part on the political platform of his country, and was, undoubtedly, a man calculated safely to direct the affairs of the Imperial side into safe channels. At the time he was appointed to represent Yuan Shih K'ai he occupied an important position, and, because he had {187} had a career most successful as a diplomat, was chosen as the man of all the men the Imperial body were able to secure as most likely to commit no political errors. Tang Shao-yi is one of the ablest statesmen in China to-day.

The table at the Conference was arranged as on opposite page.

For more than four hours these two Cantonese--Wu and Tang--with their colleagues, held secret conference in the Town Hall of Shanghai, with the object of deciding on terms of peace which were expected to involve a decision as to the future form of government in China. At the end of the session the following statement, initialed by both commissioners, was handed out as a memorandum of the happenings of the day:--

"1. Exchange of credentials.

"2. Commissioner Tang agrees to wire Yuan Shih K'ai conveying the demand of the Republicans that the order to stop fighting and capturing of places by the Manchu Army should be carried out effectively in Hupei, Shansi, Shensi, Shantung, Anhui, Kiangsu, and Fengtien, and that no further conference should be held until a satisfactory reply from Yuan Shih K'ai has been received.

"3. Commissioner Wu agrees to wire to General Li Yuan Hung of Hupei and the Republican Generals of Shansi and Shensi ordering them to discontinue fighting and further attacks upon the Manchu troops."

At the opening of the Conference Mr. Tang made a short address. He told of his appointment to come to Shanghai for the Conference, and expressed the hope that it would be successful. He then presented his credentials to Dr. Wu. The latter examined them, and then expressed a similar hope that the Conference would result in great good for China. His credentials were then given to Mr. Tang, and the Conference was begun. Although these assistants were admitted to the meeting they had no voice in its affairs, the two commissioners alone carrying on the discussion. No one of Dr. Wu's assistants was allowed to address Mr. Tang directly, nor were any of Mr. Tang's assistants allowed to {188} address Dr. Wu. Instead they could offer suggestions to their leaders, either by written note or by whispers. Tang Shao-yi expressed his personal readiness to accept Dr. Wu's demands for a Republic, but deferred a definite answer until he had communicated with Yuan Shih K'ai. With the exception of an agreement that the armistice should be extended for a week, ending December 31st, this was the result of the Conference, as told in the official statement given out at the end. The statement, headed "Authentic Account of To-day's Peace Conference," was as follows:--

"1. It is mutually agreed that the armistice should be extended for a period of seven days, i.e., from December 24, 8 a.m., to December 31, 8 a.m.

"2. Dr. Wu Ting Fang advocated the necessity of establishing a Republican form of government for China. He believed that China is fully prepared to welcome a new Republic. He said, in substance, as follows:

"The people of China will accept no other form of government than a Republic founded upon the will of the people. Since we can appoint delegates to represent us both in the various provincial assemblies and in the National Assembly at Peking, why are we not qualified to elect a President as the Chief Executive of the nation?

"The Manchus have shown their utter impossibility to govern the people for 267 years. They must go out. A government may be well likened to a trading company: if the manager through incapacity or dishonesty causes the failure of the concern, he has no business to continue in office. A new manager must be elected by the shareholders. The Republican Party does not intend to drive the Manchus out, nor to ill-treat them. On the contrary, they want to place them on perfect equality with the Chinese, enjoying together the blessings of liberty, equality, and fraternity."

The official statement of the day's proceedings, as handed out to the Chinese newspapers, was practically the same as that given to the foreign papers, except that it contained the following additional statement as being made by his Excellency Tang Shao-yi:--

"Personally, I am in favour of a Republic, which is the only solution of the present crisis. But we must not in the Conference overlook the integrity of Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and other dependencies."

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To which Dr. Wu replied:--

"The Republic does not denote the integrity and union of the eighteen provinces only."

Tang Shao-yi replied to this:--

"I will have to telegraph to Yuan Shih K'ai as regards the Republican question."

This Conference between the plenipotentiaries of the Peking Government and the Revolutionary groups was looked upon as a meeting of tremendous importance to the nation of China. Indeed, it was not too much to say that the fate of the Empire was to turn on the issue. The whole world would observe the proceedings and criticise the outcome with intense interest. Tang Shao-yi and Wuting-Fang, chief plenipotentiaries of the opposing parties, were to either earn the applause of civilisation or be condemned for having failed to rise to the opportunity of setting China firmly in the path of progress, which was to be presented by this extraordinary collocation of circumstances.

First may be considered what the situation probably would be if hostilities were resumed. At present the Yangtze River approximated a dividing line between territories controlled by the Government and Revolutionaries. Some localities north of the river had been in revolt, but a majority of these had returned to Imperial allegiance, being apparently satisfied with the concessions granted, and others showed a disposition to do the same. It seemed reasonable to assume that if the nation were to have civil war the country would divide north against the south, with the Yangtze River as a general line of demarcation.

The Peking Government had the advantage of being recognised by foreign nations, a condition which would continue while it remained in possession of the capital and any considerable region surrounding it. It had almost all of the modern drilled army, and a great {190} majority of the trained officers. It had better military equipment. The Government still controlled the Imperial railways of North China, the Peking-Hankow Railway, and the Tientsin-Pukou Railway over the greater part. Thus it would be able to concentrate troops at any given point along or north of the Yangtze more easily than the Revolutionists. Moreover, the Imperial troops were accustomed to and equipped to endure a cold climate, and winter had the northern part of the country in its grip. What forces the Revolutionaries could put in the field north of the Yangtze River was not definitely known. Except a few thousand trained troops, any army assembled for the purpose of advancing upon Peking or resisting an advance of the Imperial Army would be composed of raw recruits officered in the main by inexperienced men. Such an army would be ill provided to undertake a winter campaign in the north. Without further analysis the mooted march of a Revolutionary Army to Peking could be dismissed as visionary, unless it was assumed that the Imperial Army was disloyal and would desert the Government. There was now no very tangible basis for such an expectation. Yuan Shih K'ai, the creator of the new army which had always been loyal to him, still held the respect of the soldiers. It was one thing for the new army and its leaders to be dissatisfied with the old order of things at Peking: it was quite another to assume that it was dissatisfied with the form of government proposed by Yuan Shih K'ai, its former and present commander. The army knew Yuan, and what to expect from him. It did not know the Revolutionary leaders, except one here and there, and it did not know what treatment it would receive from a Revolutionary Government after what had happened. If it were assumed that the Northern Army would remain loyal to Yuan Shih K'ai, an early occupation of Peking by the Revolutionists was practically impossible. This was a task which would require a campaign of a year {191} or perhaps more--if it could ever be accomplished. The Imperialists might not have been able to penetrate south of the Yangtze, but they would have had no great difficulty in holding the territory under their control. And in the event of schisms and disintegration of the Republicans, the Government should have been able in time to recover its dominion in all the provinces. This was a phase which the Revolutionists had to consider. Hitherto the processes of disintegration and discontent had worked almost altogether in their favour.

Prolongation of hostilities, therefore, would seem to presage a temporary, perhaps a permanent, division of the Empire into two parts, and the subjection of the country and the people to the horrors and disasters which inevitably attend such internecine struggles. The calamities which would befall under these circumstances were obvious. Six months of such conditions would probably create a counter-revolution in the southern provinces. Conditions in the north would have been somewhat similar, but probably not so bad, as the Government had a firmer grip on affairs and would be able to keep outlawry within bounds. In this discussion it is assumed, of course, that Chinese would be left to fight it out among themselves, without foreign intervention. Foreign intervention, which it would be difficult to avoid if hostilities were to be prolonged indefinitely, would bring its own problems and dangers. Such aspects were presented by the alternative of war.

These were some of the chief considerations which were to weigh upon the plenipotentiaries. There seemed only one point of serious divergence--whether the new Government would follow the Monarchical or the Republican form. If the former were elected, it probably would mean that the present Dynasty would be retained, although perhaps reigning under a different name, for neither Revolutionists nor Monarchists had another emperor to propose. If a Republic were to be decided {192} upon, the Government which would be instituted would differ only in title from a Constitutional Monarchy; therefore, the argument was more about mere terms than about realities. Objections to the retention of the monarchy were based upon two principal theories. One was that with the Manchu Dynasty on the throne the liberty of the Chinese would not be secure--that the Dynasty must be overthrown and the capital removed from Peking in order to shake off for ever the atmosphere and associations of the old regime. Another objection was that, under the monarchical form, Yuan Shih K'ai would be virtual dictator, and then he would use his power to place himself on the throne. In certain quarters Yuan was certainly credited with having this ambition--as one Chinese put it, he wanted to be China's Napoleon, not her George Washington. But it seemed that if Yuan had this ambition, a Republic such as would of necessity exist in China would be exactly what he would want. Napoleon began his rise to power as a Republican. If Yuan desired to make himself emperor, he could adopt no more favourable course than to accept the presidency of a Republic now, biding his time, as Napoleon did, until the inevitable reaction set in, and the transition back to an Empire would be comparatively easy. On the other hand, continuation of the Dynasty and Imperial forms constituted a check on such ambition, if it existed, for it provided a focus for loyalty of the people without in any practical way hampering administration of the Government on constitutional lines. Should Yuan Shih K'ai concede the point at issue and assent to a Republic, what then? A Republic would have the same difficulties as a Constitutional Monarchy, difficulties which well might baffle the ablest statesmanship. If peace should be established, there still would remain all the great problems which make China an invalid among nations, accentuated by famine, and the strain of the Revolution. Could a Republic solve these offhand? Or would {193} a republic have a better prospect? If there were any difference in favour of either of the two forms of government a Constitutional Monarchy would have less difficulty. A Republic would be handicapped in its attempts to restore order, and put the administration of the Government back on a normal basis by expectations of the people which it could not fulfil. To do this it would be compelled to have money. It would be compelled, almost immediately, to make a foreign loan, a policy which Revolutionists had been denouncing in the Peking Government. It would be compelled to continue many forms, conditions, and processes which Revolutionists had criticised in the Manchu Government, and had led the people to expect would be abolished immediately. It would have to resume collection of taxes in localities where the Revolutionary Press had led the people to believe they would be reduced or abrogated altogether. It would, until a new code be devised and put into operation, have to administer the existing laws. In short, a Republican Government would be absolutely compelled to do many of the things which its leaders had been criticising the Manchu Government for permitting. It would have to reckon with a large number of upstart leaders and their henchmen brought forth by the Revolution, and who one and all looked forward to securing good positions in the new Government. What the immediate future of China would be under a Republic none could at the time of the Conference foresee.

And although the issue of the Revolution remains still in doubt, one was at the start of the Conference in a better position to realise the nature and strength of its motive forces. Clearly this Revolutionary movement in China was not inspired solely or even mainly by the desire to press through a reform, too long delayed, of the corrupt Chinese Government. Nor was the general cry that the Manchus must be eliminated due solely or even mainly to a well-grounded disbelief in {194} the will or the power of the Tartar Dynasty to break with its tradition of misrule. The movement, which had spread like wildfire throughout the length of China, from the province of Chihli in the extreme north to that of Kwangtung in the extreme south, was clearly a national uprising of the Chinese against what was regarded as a degrading foreign domination. It had borrowed the political cries of the Liberal West; it had clothed itself, in those centres where it was victoriously established, with the forms of republican government; but its dynamic force was derived, at least among the ignorant masses, for whom constitutional government was a meaningless phrase, from the traditional feelings of a people which had for three hundred years past been restive under the Tartar yoke. Nothing could show this more clearly than what had everywhere been the first act of emancipation--the cutting of the queue, for the shaven head and queue were imposed in the seventeenth century upon the Chinese as a symbol of subjection by the conquering Manchus. Everywhere people had, from the start of the Revolution, been taking off their queues, and, although an Imperial edict had made it optional for the people to discard or retain them, the Imperialists had killed hundreds of peaceable folk merely because they were found without their queues. The rebellion thus took its place in a series of national uprisings against the Tartar rulers, and it was, as will be seen in the later portion of this volume, not without significance that it gained its most conspicuous initial successes precisely in those maritime provinces in which the appearance of the dispossessed Chinese Ming Dynasty held out longest against the Manchu usurpers. If the movement had taken on fresh forms, said a writer in a London journal, this was due to the exigencies of changed conditions. The Kwangsi rebels in 1850 set up as Emperor, with the name of Tien-te ("heavenly virtue") a youth said to be the representative of the {195} last Ming Dynasty. The movement languished until the redoubtable Hung Siu-tsuan swept the Pretender aside, courted foreign favours by declaring himself a Christian, and, after capturing Wuchang and Nanking, proclaimed himself the first Emperor of the Taiping Dynasty as Tien Wang ("heavenly king"). His hideous atrocities, continued the writer quoted, and a too fantastic description of the physical attributes of the deity--the outcome of a "vision" intended to impress the missionaries--alienated all foreign sympathy, and on the eve of his complete success his power was shattered by the Government troops, organised and led by "Chinese Gordon." The secret of his power lay in the absence of the legitimate "Son of Heaven" of the old Dynasty, in his claim to a new commission from Heaven itself.

Now, General Li Yuan Hung and those associated closely with him made no such claim. The younger Revolutionists were, for the most part, trained in the schools of the West, and their appeal for Western sympathy took a new form. At the time it was impossible to foresee how, in the long run, the idea of a democratic Republic would appeal to a people steeped in the political philosophies of Confucius, with its conception of parental rights and filial duties as the fundamental basis of government.

So far, indeed, the claim that from Chihli to Kwang-tung, and from Shantung to Szechuen, the provinces had approved the Republic seems to have been justified. It would seem, then, that, no scion of the old Imperial house being available, the Chinese would have been able to reconcile themselves to the creation of a United States of China, under an elected President, in which case it was at the time interesting to speculate whether a too patent breach with the past might be avoided by retaining a ceremonial "Son of Heaven," who, like the King Archon at Athens or the Rex Sacrificulus of Rome, would continue to offer the traditional sacrifices to the Fountain of Authority.

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It was to decide this and much more that the Peace Conference of last December was convened, but nothing but disappointment followed.

The plenipotentiaries, themselves actually agreeable to the main issue at stake, were overruled by Yuan Shih K'ai. Day after day wires were passing frequently between Yuan and Tang, and all looked anxiously towards Shanghai for the final word of the war. The Republic seemed already to have been born, and the five-coloured flag in Shanghai's streets heralded its dawn. But Yuan was obstinate, obdurate as a mule. In the end, after endless discussions on the situation, he repudiated Tang Shao-yi's power, declared that Tang could not finally negotiate upon any question, although his credentials showed that in him full power had been invested, and in the end the Conference merely "fizzled out."

The next scene presents Dr. Sun Yat Sen on the Republican platform. The civilised world then looked to him to solve this political conundrum--and he was voting plump for the Republic. He had now arrived in Shanghai, and his presence totally altered the situation.[1]

[1] The following article, from the pen of Charles Spurgeon Medhurst, setting forth the claims of a Republic and a Monarchy, and printed in the _China Press_ of Shanghai, on December 13, 1911, will be of interest to the reader at this juncture:--

"Representative government with a scion of the Dynasty, not necessarily the infant Emperor, as its head, or representative government without any link with the past, is the problem on which hangs the issue of peace or war in China, and yet, so far as the freedom of the country is concerned, the difference between these two ideals is as the distinction between the good old English russet grown in the West of England, and a bellflower cultivated on the western slopes of the Pacific. Both are good eating apples. The preference for one before the other is a matter of taste. One may, indeed, almost say that the Imperialists are Republicans, and that the Republicans are Imperialists, for the Republican insists as strongly as his brother Imperialist that there must be a strong central authority, and the Imperialist {197} clasps hands with his Republican comrade in his anxiety that the control of national affairs shall be in the hands of the people. To borrow an expressive simile recently used by Dr. Wu in reference to something else, the bottle is different but the brand is the same. Each side is pledged to give the nation freedom from all authority, excepting such as the nation itself imposes upon itself. Between Imperialist and Republican the difference is, in reality, one of form and not of substance. A general recognition of this fact will clear the atmosphere, and make it easier to perceive the imperative needs of the moment. There is the more urgent demand that this should be brought about because in their enthusiasm over the prospects of the new dawning day many of our Chinese friends have mistakenly persuaded themselves that Democracy is the greatest gift the Occident has for the Orient. But the last mail brought us a message from Dr. Inge, the Dean of St. Paul's in London, that Democracy is perhaps one of the silliest of modern fetishes. It is incumbent, therefore, on those of us in China who agree with the Dean to speak out plainly at this critical juncture, lest our Chinese hosts blindly step on to a devious and a dangerous path. The duty becomes still plainer when we recall a recent speech by Dr. Sun Yat Sen, in which he hinted that universal suffrage for men and women would be the note to which the tune of the new Republic would be keyed.

"For any good result to come from a universal suffrage there must have been many previous years of universal education, but even with this advantage Democracy becomes for the most part little more than a dream, a good catchword but impossible politics. Constitutional government has nowhere as yet been perfected. The best we have is an adaptation of realities still unrealised. Like everything else at this stage of our progress, it is a compromise. Its methods give no sign of finality; in all countries it is what must take place in China, an adaptation to existing circumstances. None know better than the Chinese that co-operative compromise with the ideas of others is the foundation of all order. What else are the mutations of the Yin and the Yang? If these do not harmonise disorder ensues. In the same way there can be no peace in China until Republicans and Imperialists work together. That autocracy has been abused is no reason why Republicans should seek to replace it by a system which many residents of democratic countries, as witness the observations of the London dean, are beginning to regard as false in its premise. Because a revolution has shown it to be the will of the country that there should be a change in the administration of Chinese affairs there is no reason why Imperialists should not unite with Republicans in friendly conference, and see if between them it be not possible to evolve an administration better than any now existing, and thus magnify their proud position of being the oldest nation in the world. Both sides are Chinese. Why not meet and set younger civilisations an example in civics?

"If democracy be a dream, self-government is an illusion. There never has been and never will be any society, or any body, which is self-governed. We are not even free to wear the clothes our inclination suggests. Madame Fashion cuts the cloth and purchases the material. Government (to quote a French expression) is always an 'affair of two.' Like love-making, it is a matter of one yielding to the other. In the same way self-respect is not self-respect but the approbation of my lower to my Higher, the God within me. Self-control is not self-control, but the obedience of my passional nature to the Divine enshrined within. Self-government is not self-government, but the government of one part by another part, of the unfit by the fit, of the masses by the classes, of the uneducated by the educated. Anything else would be incompetence, injustice, not liberty. There cannot be equality and fraternity in government. There is much truth in Lao Tzu's paradox, 'When the people are difficult to control it is because they possess too much worldly wisdom.' Democracy is an idol many of its worshippers are ceasing to respect, and facts should be known before a temple to its honour is erected in China. What is wanted is an Autocracy in its proper place, not an autocracy of birth, of money, or of clamour, but an autocracy of character, of self-sacrifice, and ability. This is China's hour, a challenge to her strong men to devise something characteristic of herself, and not merely to imitate Western Constitutions.

"If this is to be successfully accomplished, preconceived ideas must be kept fluid when the peacemakers meet in the coming Conference. Republicans must remember that to imagine a Democracy without an oppression is idle. Imperialists must consider that to interfere with the rights of another is wrong. Republicans must not forget that every democratic government rules by majorities, and that when the wishes of the minority are overridden an Autocracy in its wrong place has been substituted for Democracy. Imperialists must not lose sight of the truth that the yoke laid on the defeated party is no easier to bear because the coercion comes from an opposing political body and not from one or two accredited officials, and that coercion of any sort invites rebellion. Let both sides consider that wisdom does not always dwell with majorities. History supplies many instances where the minority of one was right and all the rest wrong. Being right, he might perhaps efface himself and yield to the general wish, but he cannot properly be coerced. If Democracy be right, then coercion is necessarily wrong, whether the pressure be exercised by individuals or majorities.

"The proper basis for an orderly arrangement of men's common interests is that all concerned shall discuss in a friendly way with a

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view to agreement. If this prove impossible, then as a general rule (subject to the elastic dictates of common sense) the question should, if possible, be shelved as being unripe for decision. If government by party, such as exists under all Constitutional Governments be right, if it be right for one party because stronger to compel the other party because weaker to submit to its ruling, then might becomes right. In that case Imperialists and Republicans should continue their fight until one has crushed the other; in that case the Powers whose interests are jeopardised by the continuance of the conflict should step in and apply their might also, that right may be enthroned. If, however, Force be always evil, if the universal practice of Constitutional Governments in regard to minorities be wrong, it follows that whichever side refuses to compromise in the present struggle is also wrong, because by such refusal reliance is placed on the strength of the arm, instead of on the might of TRUTH.

"In any event it is ironical inconsistency to employ the harsh arbitrament of war to decide such a question as the supremacy of the will of the people until, at least, a vote has been taken and the consent of those who have lived within the area of the fight has been obtained to the unavoidable destruction of their property. As there is no conscription in China the position of the soldier need not be taken into account. At present the few have spoken for the many, the leaders on both sides have imposed their will on their followers, and the masses are afraid to speak. I cannot guess what the verdict on the Revolution would be were every one heard from individually, nor does it affect the point at issue. The simple fact remains that grave wrongs have been inflicted on thousands who have had no chance to assent or to protest, and that for the rest of their lives they will be worse off than they would have been under the most tyrannical government. If it be argued that this 'evil' was unavoidable, that the Revolution was a cruel necessity, the answer is that it should be concluded as speedily as possible and recompense given to those who have suffered. Every unrequited wrong committed in its name, or on its account, will be a weak spot in the new Government's armour.

"If these paragraphs are felt to be mere counsels of perfection, they at least emphasise the terrible hurt that will be inflicted on Righteousness should the fighting be resumed. Conciliation, submission, compromise are the foundations of Truth and of Liberty, the binding forces of society everywhere. It is not strength but weakness which refuses to swerve from an assumed position. The bravest men are not afraid of inconsistency. As Michael Wood says: 'Humility is the strength of God: the power of everything worth having. It does not grovel: it is strong. It is seeing true: it is having your values right. It is knowing what matters and what is rubbish to be flung away.' Or as Jacob Boehme put it: 'He to whom Eternity is as Time and Time as Eternity is free from all strife.' In a word, Democracy can only succeed where all the people are aristocrats, and now is the time for the leaders on both sides to prove their aristocracy and their fitness to rule, by gracefully yielding each to the other. China has always set the world an example in this particular. She will surely not fail on the eve of what will doubtless be the most glorious chapter of her memorable history."

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[Transcriber's note: this page was entirely taken up by part of footnote 1, which is now on page 196 in its entirety.]

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