Part 8

Hence, at every moment of its existence, organized Society is face to face with the possibility of collision into the Under World; and because of the knowledge that such encounter is inevitable, unforeseeable and perhaps immediately impending, Civilization, so-called, ever is beset by an unspeakable and all-corroding fear.

_To deter a multitude, destitute of everything except the power to take, from despoiling by means of its irresistible physique, those few who are possessed of everything except ability to defend themselves, in all Ages has been the chiefest problem of mankind; and to the solution of this problem has been devoted every resource known to Education, Legislation, Ecclesiasticism and Jurisprudence._

This condition further is complicated by a peculiar outgrowth of necessary expedients, always more or less unstable, due to that falsity of premise in which words do not agree with acts.

Of these expedients the most incongruous is the arming and training of the children of the mob for the protection of the upper stratum; and that peculiar mental insufficiency of hoi polloi, whereby it ever is induced to accept as its leaders the sons of the Patrician class.

That a social structure founded upon such anomalies should endure, constitutes in itself the real Nine Wonders of the World; and is proof of that marvellous ingenuity with which the House of Have profits by the chronic predeliction of the House of Want to fritter away time and opportunity, feeding on vain hope.

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_The advantage in Numbers consists in having in the aggregate more Corps d’armee than has the adversary._

All benefit to be derived from the advantage in Numbers is limited to the active and scientific use of every corp d’armee; otherwise excess of Numbers, not only is of no avail, but easily may degenerate into fatal disadvantage by impeding the decisive action of other kindred corps. Says Napoleon: “It is only the troops brought into action, that avails in battles and campaigns--the rest does not count.”

A loss in Numbers at chess-play occurs only when two pieces are lost for one, or three for two, or one for none, and the like. No diminution in aggregate of force can take place on the Chess-board, so long as the number of the opposing pieces are equal.

This is true although all the pieces on one side are Queens and those of the other side all Pawns.

The reason for this is:

All the Chess-pieces are equal in strength, one to the other. The Pawn can overthrow and capture any piece--the Queen can do no more.

That is to say, at its turn to move, any piece can capture any adverse piece; and this is all that any piece can do.

It is true that the Queen, on its turn to move, has a maximum option of twenty-seven squares, while the Pawn’s maximum never is more than three. But as the power of the Queen can be exerted only upon one point, obviously, her observation of the remaining twenty-six points is merely a manifestation of mobility, and her display of force is limited to a single square. Hence, the result in each case is identical, and the display of force equal.

The relative advantage in Numbers possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following, viz.:

RULE

_That army which contains more Corps d’armee than an opposing army has the relative advantage in Numbers._

_“With the inferiority in Numbers, one must depend more upon conduct and contrivance than upon strength.”--Caesar._

MILITARY EXAMPLES

_“He who has the advantage in Numbers, if he be not a blockhead, incessantly will distract his enemy by detachments, against all of which it is impossible to provide a remedy.”--Frederic the Great._

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_“He that hath the advantage in Numbers usually should exchange pieces freely, because the fewer that remain the more readily are they oppressed by a superior force.”--Dal Rio._

At Thymbra, Cyrus the Great, king of the Medes and Persians, with 10,000 horse cuirassiers, 20,000 heavy infantry, 300 chariots and 166,000 light troops, conquered Croesus, King of Assyria whose army consisted of 360,000 infantry and 60,000 cavalry. This victory made Persia dominant in Asia.

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At Marathon, 10,000 Athenian and 1,000 Plataean heavy infantry, routed 110,000 Medes and Persians. This victory averted the overthrow of Grecian civilization by Asiatic barbarism.

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At Leuctra, Epaminondas, general of the Thebans, with 6000 heavy infantry and 400 heavy horse, routed the Lacedaemonean army, composed of 22,000 of the bravest and most skillful soldiers of the known world, and extinguished the military ascendency which for centuries Sparta had exercised over the Grecian commonwealths.

At Issus, Alexander the Great with 40,000 heavy infantry and 7,000 heavy cavalry destroyed the army of Darius Codomannus, King of Persia, which consisted of 1,000,000 infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 200 chariots and 15 elephants. This battle, in which white men encountered elephants for the first time, established the military supremacy of Europe over Asia.

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Alexander the Great invaded Asia (May, 334 B.C.) whose armies aggregated 3,000,000 men trained to war; with 30,000 heavy infantry, 4000 heavy cavalry, $225,000 dollars in money and thirty days’ provisions.

At Arbela, Alexander the Great with 45,000 heavy infantry and 8,000 heavy horse, annihilated the last resources of Darius and reduced Persia to a Greek province. The Persian army consisted of about 600,000 infantry and cavalry, of whom 300,000 were killed.

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Hannibal began his march from Spain (218 B.C.) to invade the Roman commonwealth, with 90,000 heavy infantry and 12,000 heavy cavalry. He arrived at Aosta in October (218 B.C.) with only 20,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry to encounter a State that could put into the field 700,000 of the bravest and most skillful soldiers then alive.

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At Cannae, Hannibal destroyed the finest army Rome ever put in the field. Out of 90,000 of the flower of the commonwealth only about 3,000 escaped. The Carthagenian army consisted of 40,000 heavy infantry and 10,000 heavy cavalry.

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At Alesia, (51 B.C.) Caesar completed the subjugation of Gaul, by destroying in detail two hostile armies aggregating 470,000 men. The Roman army consisted of 43,000 heavy infantry, 10,000 heavy cavalry and 10,000 light cavalry.

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At Pharsaleus, (48 B.C.) Caesar with 22,000 Roman veterans routed 45,000 soldiers under Pompey and acquired the chief place in the Roman state.

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At Angora, (1402) Tamerlane, with 1,400,000 Asiatics, destroyed the Turkish army of 900,000 men, commanded by the Ottoman Sultan Bajazet, in the most stupendous battle of authentic record.

After giving his final instructions to his officers, Tamerlane, it is recorded, betook himself to his tent and played at Chess until the crisis of the battle arrived, whereupon he proceeded to the decisive point and in person directed those evolutions which resulted in the destruction of the Ottoman army.

The assumption that the great Asiatic warrior was playing at Chess during the earlier part of the battle of Angora, undoubtedly is erroneous. Most probably he followed the progress of the conflict by posting chess-pieces upon the Chessboard and moving these according to reports sent him momentarily by his lieutenants.

Obviously, in the days when the field telegraphy and telephone were unknown, such method was entirely feasible and satisfactory to the Master of Strategetics and far superior to any attempt to overlook such a confused and complicated concourse.

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At Bannockburne (June 24, 1314), Robert Bruce, King of Scotland, with 30,000 Scots annihilated the largest army that England ever put upon a battlefield.

This army was led by Edward II and consisted of over 100,000 of the flower of England’s nobility, gentry and yeomanry. The victory established the independence of Scotland and cost England 30,000 troops, which could not be replaced in that generation.

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Gustavus Adolphus invaded Germany with an army of 27,000 men, over one-half of whom were Scots and English. At that time the Catholic armies in the field aggregated several hundred thousand trained and hardened soldiers, led by brave and able generals.

At Leipsic, after 20,000 Saxon allies had fled from the battlefield, Gustavus Adolphus with 22,000 Swedes, Scots and English routed 44,000 of the best troops of the day, commanded by Gen. Tilly. This victory delivered the Protestant princes of Continental Europe from Catholic domination.

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At Zentha (Sept. 11, 1697), Prince Eugene with 60,000 Austrians routed 150,000 Turks, commanded by the Sultan Kara-Mustapha, with the loss of 38,000 killed, 4,000 prisoners and 160 cannon. This victory established the military reputation of this celebrated French General.

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At Turin (Sept. 7, 1706) Prince Eugene with 30,000 Austrians routed 80,000 French under the Duke of Orleans. Gen. Daun, whose brilliant evolutions decided the battle, afterward, as Field-Marshal of the Austrian armies, was routed by Frederic the Great at Leuthern.

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At Peterwaradin (Aug. 5, 1716) Prince Eugene with 60,000 Austrians destroyed 150,000 Turks. This victory delivered Europe for all time from the menace of Mahometan dominion.

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At Belgrade (Aug. 26, 1717) Prince Eugene with 55,000 Austrians destroyed a Turkish army of 200,000 men.

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At Rosbach (Nov. 5, 1757) Frederic the Great with 22,000 Prussians, in open field, destroyed a French army of 70,000 regulars commanded by the Prince de Soubisse.

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At Leuthern (Dec. 5, 1757) Frederic the Great with 33,000 Prussians destroyed in open field, an Austrian army of 93,000 regulars, commanded by Field-Marshal Daun. The Austrians lost 54,000 men and 200 cannon.

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At Zorndorf (Aug. 25, 1758) Frederic the Great with 45,000 Prussians destroyed a Russian army of 60,000 men commanded by Field-Marshal Fermor. The Russians left 18,000 men dead on the field.

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At Leignitz (Aug. 15, 1760) Frederic the Great with 30,000 men out-manoeuvred, defeated with the loss of 10,000 men and escaped from the combined Austrian and Russian armies aggregating 130,000 men.

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At Torgau (Nov. 5, 1760) Frederic the Great with 45,000 Prussians destroyed an Austrian army of 90,000 men, commanded by Field-Marshal Daun.

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Washington, with 7,000 Americans, while pursued by 20,000 British and Hessians under Lord Cornwallis, captured a Hessian advance column at Trenton (Dec. 25, 1776) and destroyed a British detachment at Princeton, (Jan. 3, 1777).

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Bonaparte, with 30,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry and 40 cannon, invaded Italy, (March 26, 1796) which was defended by 100,000 Piedmontese and Austrian regulars under Generals Colli and Beaulieu. In fifteen days he had captured the former, driven the latter to his own country and compelled Piedmont to sign a treaty of peace and alliance with France.

At Castiglione, Arcole, Bassano and Rivoli, with an army not exceeding 40,000 men Bonaparte destroyed four Austrian armies, each aggregating about 100,000 men.

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At Wagram, Napoleon, with less than 100,000 men, overthrew the main Austrian army of 150,000 men, foiled the attempts at succor of the secondary Austrian army of 40,000 men, and compelled Austria to accept peace with France.

In the campaign of 1814, Napoleon, with never more than 70,000 men, twice repulsed from the walls of Paris and drove backward nearly to the Rhine River an allied army of nearly 300,000 Austrians, Prussians and Russians.

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In the year 480 B.C., Xerxes, King of Persia, invaded Greece with an army, which by Herodotus, Plutarch and Isocrates, is estimated at 2,641,610 men at arms and exclusive of servants, butlers, women and camp followers.

Arriving at the Pass of Thermopolae, the march of the invaders was arrested by Leonidas, King of Sparta, with an army made up of 300 Spartans, 400 Thebans, 700 Thespians, 1,000 Phocians and 3,000 from various Grecian States, posted behind a barricade built across the entrance.

This celebrated defile is about a mile in length. It runs between Mount Oeta and an impassible morass, which forms the edge of the Gulf of Malia and at each end is so narrow that a wagon can barely pass.

Xerxes at once sent a herald who demanded of the Grecians the surrender of their arms, to which Leonidas replied:

“_Come and take them._”

On the fifth day the Persian army attacked, but was unable to force an entrance into the pass. On the sixth day the Persian Immortals likewise were repulsed, and on the seventh day these troops again failed.

That night Ephialtes, a Malian, informed Xerxes of a foot path around the mountains to the westward, and a Persian detachment was sent by a night march en surprise against the Grecian rear. On the approach of this hostile body, the Phocians, who had been detailed by Leonidas to guard this path, abandoned their post without fighting and fled to the summit of the mountains, leaving the way open to the enemy, who, wasting no time in pursuit, at once marched against the rear of the Grecian position.

At the command of Leonidas, all his allies, with the exception of the 700 Thespians, who refused to leave him, abandoned Thermopolae in haste and returned safely to their own countries.

Xerxes waited until day was well advanced and his detachment had taken post upon the Grecian rear. Then both Persian columns attacked simultaneously. The first part of this final conflict was fought outside and to the north of the barricade. Leonidas being slain and their numbers reduced over half, the remaining Greeks retired behind the barricade and took post upon a slight elevation, where one after another they were killed by arrows and javelins. The four days of fighting cost the Persians over 20,000 of their best troops.

Upon the summit of the hill where the Spartans perished a marble lion was erected, bearing the inscription:

“Go tell the Lacedymonians, O, Stranger, That we died here in obedience to the law.”

A second inscription engraved upon a stone column erected upon the scene of conflict read:

“Upon this spot four thousand Pelleponesians contended against three hundred myriads.”

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The largest army commanded by Epaminondas was about 70,000 men. Alexander the Great, after Arbela, had 135,000 trained troops. Hannibal never led more than 60,000 men in action, nor Caesar more than 80,000. Gustavus Adolphus, just before Lutzen, marshalled 75,000 of the best soldiers in the world under the banners of Protestantism. Turenne never fought with more than 40,000 troops; Prince Eugene often had 150,000 in hand, and Frederic the Great several times commanded 200,000 men. At Yorktown, Washington had 16,000 Continentals, 6,000 French regulars and 18,000 Provincial volunteers: Napoleon’s largest army, that of the Austerlitz campaign, consisted of 180,000 men, while von Moltke personally directed at Sadowa, 250,000 men; at Gravelotte, 211,000 men and at Sedan, 200,000 men.

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_Perfection in Numbers is attained whenever the kindred army has the most troops in the theatre of decisive action._

TIME

_“You lose the time for action in frivolous deliberations. Your generals instead of appearing at the head of your armies, parade in processions and add splendor to public ceremonies. Your armies are composed of mercenaries, the dregs of foreign nations, vile robbers, a terror only to yourselves and your allies. Indecision and confusion prevail in your counsels; your projects have neither plan nor foresight. You are the slaves of circumstance and opportunities continually escape you. You hurry aimlessly hither and thither and arrive only in time to witness the success of your enemy.”--Demosthenes._

TIME

_“That greatest of all advantages--TIME!”--Frederic the Great._

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_“Ask me for anything except--TIME.”--Napoleon._

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_“Time is the cradle of hope, the grave of ambition, the solitary counsel of the wise and the stern corrector of fools. Wisdom walks before it, opportunities with it and repentance behind it. He that hath made it his friend hath nothing to fear from his enemies, but he that hath made it his enemy hath little to hope even from his friends.”--Anon._

_The absolute advantage of Time consists in being able to move while the adversary must remain stationary._

_The conditioned advantage in Time i.e., the Initiative, consists in artificially restricting the adverse ability to move._

Advantage in Time is divided into two classes:

I. The Initiative.

II. Absolute.

The Initiative treats of restrictions to the movements of an army, due to the necessity of supporting, covering or sustaining Points or corps d’armee, menaced with capture by adverse corps offensive.

The absolute advantage in Time is the ability to move, while the adverse army must remain immovable.

Whenever the right to move is unrestricted, any desired Piece may be moved to any desired Point.

But whenever the right to move is restricted it follows that the Piece desired cannot be moved; or, that if moved it cannot be moved to the desired Point; or, that a piece not desired, must be moved and usually to a Point not desired.

Such restrictions of the right to move, quickly produce fatal defects in the kindred Formation; and from the fact that such fatal defects in Formation can be produced by restricting the right to move, arises the inestimable value of the advantage in Time.

Perfection in Time is attained whenever the kindred army is able to move while the hostile army must remain stationary.

The object of the active or absolute advantage in Time always is to remain with the Initiative, or Passive Advantage in Time; which consists in operating by the movement made, such menaces, as compel the enemy:

1. To move corps d’armee which he otherwise would not move and

2. Prevents him from moving corps d’armee which he otherwise would move.

PRINCIPLE

_Given superior brute strength and no matter how blunderingly and clumsily it be directed, it always will end by accomplishing its purpose, unless it is opposed by Skill._

Skill is best manifested by the proper use of Time. Such ability is acquired only through study and experience, guided by reflection, and it can be retained only by systematic and unremitting practice.

Most people imagine that Skill is to be attained merely from study; many believe it but the natural and necessary offshoot of long experience; and there are some of the opinion that dilettante dabbling in book lore is an all-sufficient substitute for that sustained and laborious mental and physical effort, which alone can make perfect in the competitive arts.

Only by employing his leisure in reflection upon the events of the Past can one get to understand those things which make for success in Warfare and in Chessplay, and develop that all-essential ability to detect equivalents in any situation.

For in action there is no time for such reflection, much less for development.

Then, moments of value inestimable for the achieving of results are not to be wasted in the weighing and comparison of things, whose relative importance should be discerned in the twinkling of an eye, by reason of prior familiarity with similar conditions.

The relative advantage in time possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following, viz.:

RULE

1. _That army which is in motion while the opposing army must remain stationary has the absolute advantage in Time._

2. _That army which although at rest can dictate the movement of an opposing army in motion has the conditioned advantage in Time, i.e., the Initiative._

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_“One may lose more by letting slip a decisive opportunity than afterwards can be gained by ten battles.”--Gustavus Adolphus._

_“It is the exact moment that must be seized; one minute too soon or too late and the movement is utterly futile.”--Napoleon._

MILITARY EXAMPLES

_“The movements of an army should be characterized by decision and rapidity.”--Hannibal._

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_“In order to escape from a dilemma it first of all is necessary to gain Time.”--Napoleon._

Thebes having revolted, Alexander the Great marched 400 miles in fourteen days; attacked and captured the city and razed it to the ground (335 B.C.) sparing only the house and family of Pindar, the poet; massacred all males capable of bearing arms and sold 30,000 women and children into slavery.

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To gain time to occupy the Strategic center and to cut the communications with Rome of the army of the Consul Flaminius, Hannibal marched his army for three days and nights through the marshes of the Po.

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Caesar marched from Rome to Sierra-Modena in Spain, a distance of 1350 miles in twenty-three days.

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Frederic the Great in order to gain time usually marched at midnight.

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Bonaparte finished his first Italian campaign by winning the battles of St. Michaels, Rivoli and Mantua, marching 200 miles and taking 20,000 prisoners, all in less than four days. In 1805, the French infantry in the manoeuvres which captured 60,000 Austrians, marched from 25 to 30 miles a day. In 1806 the French infantry pursued the Prussians at the same speed. In 1814, Napoleon’s army marched at the rate of 30 miles per day, besides fighting a battle every 24 hours. Retrograding for the succor of Paris, Napoleon marched 75 miles in thirty-six hours. On the return from Elba, 1815, the Imperial Guard marched 50 miles the first day, 200 miles in six days and reached Paris, a distance of 600 miles, in twenty days.

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_“The fate of a battle always is decided by the lack of the few minutes required to bring separated bodies of troops into co-operation.”--Napoleon._

POSITION

POSITION

_“War is a business of position.”--Napoleon._

By the term Position is signified those relative advantages and disadvantages in location, which appertain to the aggregate posts occupied by the kindred army, as compared with the aggregate posts occupied by the adverse army.

Advantages and disadvantages in Position are of three classes, viz.:

(a) Those which appertain to the Column of Attack

(b) Those which appertain to the Column of Support.

(c) Those which appertain to the Column of Manoeuvre.

STRATEGETIC SITUATIONS

A Strategic Situation, and whether in warfare or in Chess-play, is produced by the presence, in any Strategetic Plane, _i.e._, theatre of conflict, of two or more opposing Strategetic Entireties, _i.e._, contending armies.

These latter are of four classifications and are denominated as follows:

(a) The Kindred Determinate Force.

(b) The Adverse Determinate Force.

(c) The Kindred Hypothetical Force.

(d) The Adverse Hypothetical Force.

RULE I

_Given the Strategetic Entireties present in a given Strategetic Situation, designate the opposing Prime Strategetic Factors and express the relative values of each in the terms of the Strategic Syllogism._