Part 4

“Even now Cronje was all right; he easily and brilliantly out-manoeuvred the British and gained the protection of the Modder River. But a second time he blundered. Instead of first executing Ferrera and then abandoning everything and devoting all his efforts to saving his men, he neglected an obvious and imperative military duty and clung to his slow-moving cannon and wagons.

“Finally he took position on the Modder and resolved to fight the whole British army. This was fatal.

“Then for the fourth time he blundered. Having made his decision to fight he should not have surrendered to the British on the anniversary of Majuba Hill. On the contrary, surrounded by the mightiest army the British empire ever put in the field and enveloped in the smoke of a hundred cannon, Cronje, upon a rampart formed by his dead army and with his last cartridge withstanding the destroyers of his country, would have presented to posterity a more spectacular and seemingly a more fitting termination of the career of the Lion of South Africa.”

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_“Mere hope of attaining their desires, coupled with ignorance of the processes necessary to their accomplishment, is the common delusion and the certain destruction of the inexperienced.”--Plato._

ORGANIZATION

_“To employ in warfare an uninstructed people is to destroy the nation.”--Chinese Saying._

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Antiochus, King of Syria, reviewing his immense but untrained and undisciplined army at Ephesus, asked of Hannibal, “if they were not enough for the Romans.”

“Yes,” replied the great Carthagenian, “enough to glut the bloodthirstiness, even of the Romans.”

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_“A man in the vigor of life and capable of sustaining the heaviest fatigues, but untrained in warfare, is fitted not to bear arms, but to bear baggage.”--Timoleon._

ORGANIZATION

_“The chief distinction between an army and a mob is the good order and discipline of the former and the disorderly behavior of the latter.”--Washington._

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“It is the duty of the commander-in-chief frequently to assemble the most prudent and experienced of his generals and to consult with them as to the state of his own and of the enemies’ troops.

“He must examine which army has the better weapons, which is the better trained and disciplined; superior in condition and most resolute in emergencies.

“He must note whether himself or the adversary has the superior infantry, cavalry or artillery, and particularly must he discern any marked lack in quantity and quality of men or horses, and any difference in equipment of those corps which necessarily will be or because of such reason, advantageously may be opposed to each other.

“Advantages in Organization determine the field of battle to be preferred, which latter should be selected with the view of profiting to the uttermost by the use of specially equipped corps, to whom the enemy is not able to oppose similar troops.

“If a general finds himself superior to his enemy he must use all means to bring on an engagement, but if he sees himself inferior, he must avoid battle and endeavor to succeed by surprises, stratagems and ambuscades; which last skillfully managed often have gained the victory over foemen superior in numbers and in strength.”--_Vergetius._

_Advantage in Organization consists in having one or more Corps d’armee which in equipment or in composition are so superior to the hostile corps to which they may become opposed, as entails to them exceptional facilities for the execution of those major tactical evolutions that appertain to any tactical area made up of corresponding geometric or sub-geometric symbols._

PRINCIPLE

_Advantage in Organization determines the choice of a prospective battlefield; and the latter always should be composed of those tactical areas which permit of the fullest exercise of the powers peculiar to kindred corps d’armee._

Every corps d’armee thus especially equipped should be constantly and energetically employed in the prospective battle; and usually it will eventuate as the Prime Tactical Factor in the decisive Major Tactical evolution.

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Notions most mistaken prevail in regard to the Pawns and Pieces of the Chessboard.

To suppose that the Chessmen _per se_ may be utilized to typify the different arms of the military service is a fallacy.

Many unfamiliar with the technicalities of Strategetic Science delude themselves that the Pawns, on account of their slow and limited movements properly are to be regarded as Infantry; that the Knights because topped by horses’ heads thereby qualify as light Cavalry; the Bishops, for reasons unknown, often are held to represent Artillery; the Rooks, because of their swift, direct and far-reaching movements are thought to duplicate heavy Cavalry; while the Queen, in most of these unsophisticated philosophies, is supposed to constitute a Reserve.

Nothing can be further from the truth than such assumptions.

As a fundamental of military organization applied to Chessplay, each Chesspiece typifies in itself a complete Corps d’armee. Each of these Chessic corps d’armee is equal to every other in strength, but all differ, more or less, in construction and in facilities, essential to the performance of diverse and particular duties.

Thus it is that while every Chesspiece represents a perfectly appointed and equally powerful body of troops, these corps d’armee in Chessplay as in scientific warfare are not duplicates, except to others of their own class. Each of these corps d’armee is made up of Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery in correct proportion to the service they are to perform and such proportions are determined not by simple arithmetic, but by those deployments, developments, evolutions, and manoeuvres, which such corps d’armee is constructed promptly and efficiently to execute.

The Chessmen, therefore, do not as individuals represent either infantry, cavalry or artillery.

But in the same manner as the movements of troops over the surface of the earth, exemplify the attributes of the three kindred grand columns in the greater logistics of a campaign; so do those peculiarities which appertain to the moves of the different Chesspieces exemplify the action of the three chief arms of the military service; either singly or in combination against given points in given times, in the evolutions of the battlefield, viz.:

CORPS D’ARMEE EN MARCH.

The march of:

(_a_) Infantry, alone, or of

(_b_) Cavalry, alone, or of

(_c_) Artillery, alone, or of

(_d_) Infantry and Cavalry, or of

(_e_) Infantry and Artillery, or of

(_f_) Cavalry and Artillery, or of

(_g_) Infantry, Cavalry and Artillery,

is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an unoccupied adjacent point.

The march of:

(_a_) Cavalry, alone, or of

(_b_) Artillery, alone, or of

(_c_) Cavalry and Artillery,

is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an unoccupied point, _not_ an adjacent point.

CORPS D’ARMEE EN ASSAULT.

The _Charge of Infantry_ is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an occupied adjacent point; posting itself thereon and capturing the adverse piece there located.

The _Charge of Cavalry_ is indicated by the movement of any Chesspiece from a given point to an occupied point _not_ an adjacent point; posting itself thereon and capturing the adverse piece there located.

CORPS D’ARMEE FIRE EFFECT.

_Infantry:_

_Offensive Fire Effect._ Compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its post upon an adjacent occupied point.

_Defensive Fire Effect._ Preventing an adverse piece from occupying an adjacent unoccupied point.

_Artillery:_

_Offensive Fire Effect._ Compelling an adverse piece to withdraw from its post upon an occupied point not an adjacent point.

_Defensive Fire Effect._ Preventing an adverse piece from occupying an unoccupied point not an adjacent point.

CHESSIC CORPS D’ARMEE.

The _Corps d’armee of the Chessboard_ are divided into two classes: viz.:

I. Corps of Position.

II. Corps of Evolution.

CORPS D’ARMEE OF POSITION.

_“The Pawns are the soul of Chess; upon their good or bad arrangement depends the gain or loss of the game.”--Philidor._

_The eight Pawns_, by reason of their limited movements, their inability to move backward and the peculiarity of their offensive and defensive powers, are best adapted of the Chesspieces to perform those functions which in the Military Art appertain to Corps of Position.

Each Corps of Position has its particular and designated Point of Mobilization and of Development, which differ with the various Strategic Fronts.

Upon each Corps of Position devolves the duties of maintaining itself as a consistent integer of the established, or projected kindred Pawn Integral; as a possible kindred Promotable Factor and as a Point of Impenetrability upon the altitude of an opposing Pawn.

Corps of Position take their individual appelation from their posts in a given formation, viz.:

1. Base Corps.

2. Pivotal Corps.

3. Minor Vertex Corps.

4. Minor Corps Aligned.

5. Major Vertex Corps.

6. Major Corps Aligned.

7. Corps Enpotence.

8. Minor Corps Enceinte.

9. Major Corps Enceinte.

10. Corps Echeloned.

11. Corps En Appui.

12. Base Corps Refused.

13. Pivotal Corps Refused.

14. Minor Vertex Corps Refused.

15. Minor Corps Aligned Refused.

16. Major Vertex Corps Refused.

17. Major Corps Aligned Refused.

18. Major Corps Refused Enpotence.

19. Corps en Major Crochet.

20. Corps en Minor Crochet.

21. Corps en Crochet Aligned.

22. Corps Doubly Aligned.

23. Grand Vertex Corps.

The above formations by Corps of Position are described and illustrated in detail in preceding text-books by the author, entitled:

The Minor Tactics of Chess.

The Grand Tactics of Chess.

The normal use of Corps of Position is limited to Lines of Mobilization, of Development and to the Simple Line of Manoeuvre.

CORPS D’ARMEE OF EVOLUTION.

_“Every man in Alexander’s army is so well trained and obedient that at a single word of command, officers and soldiers make any movement and execute any evolution in the art of warfare._

_“Only such troops as themselves can check their career and oppose their bravery and expertness.”--Caridemus._

_The eight Pieces_, by reason of their ability to move in all directions, the scope of their movements and the peculiar exercises of their offensive and defensive powers, are best adapted of the Chesspieces to perform those functions which in the Military Art appertain to Corps of Evolution.

_Corps of Evolution_ acting offensively, take their individual appelations from the points which constitute their objective in the true Strategetic Horizon, viz.:

1. Corps of the Right.

2. Corps of the Centre.

3. Corps of the Left.

_Corps of Evolution_ acting defensively, take their individual appelations from the particular duties they are required to perform, viz.:

1. Supporting Corps.

2. Covering Corps.

3. Sustaining Corps.

4. Corps of Impenetrability.

5. Corps of Resistance.

The normal use of Corps of Evolution is limited to Lines of Manoeuvre. When acting on a Simple Line of Manoeuvre, a Corps of Evolution may deploy on the corresponding Line of Mobilization; but it has nothing in common with the Line of Development, which latter appertains exclusively to Corps of Position.

Any corps d’armee, whether of Position or of Evolution may be utilized upon a Line of Operations.

THE KING.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the King marches as infantry, cavalry and artillery; but it attacks as infantry exclusively and never as cavalry or artillery.

Although every situation upon the Chessboard contemplates the presence of both Kings, either, or neither, or both, may, or may not be present in any given Strategetic Horizon.

Whenever the King is present in a given Strategetic Horizon the effect of his co-operation is mathematically outlined, thus:

I. At his maximum of efficiency, the King occupies the centre of a circle of one point radius. His offensive power is equally valid against all eight points contained in his circumference, but his defensive power is valid for the support from a minimum of one point to a maximum of five points.

II. At his medium of efficiency the King occupies the centre of a semi-circle of one point radius.

His offensive power is valid against all five points contained in his semi-circumference, and his defensive power is valid for the support from a minimum of one, to a maximum of five points.

III. At his minimum of efficiency, the King occupies the centre of a quadrant of one point radius. Both his offensive and his defensive powers are valid against all three points contained in his segment.

THE QUEEN.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Queen marches and attacks as infantry, cavalry and artillery.

Either, neither, or both Queens may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of her co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.:

At her maximum of efficiency the Queen occupies the common vertex of one or more unequal triangles, whose aggregate area is from a minimum of 21 to a maximum of 27 points. Her offensive power is equally valid against all of these points; but her defensive power is valid for the support from a minimum of one point to a maximum of five points.

THE ROOK.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Rook marches and attacks as infantry, cavalry and artillery.

From one to four Rooks may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.:

At her maximum of efficiency, the Rook occupies the common angle of four quadrilaterals, whose aggregate area always is 14 points. The Offensive Power of the Rook is equally valid against all these points, but his defensive power is valid for the support of only two points.

THE BISHOP.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the Bishop marches and attacks as infantry, cavalry and artillery.

From one to four Bishops may be present in any Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.:

At its maximum of efficiency, the Bishop occupies the common vertex of four unequal triangles, having a maximum of 13 and a minimum of 9 points. His offensive power is valid against all of these points but his defensive power is valid only for the support of two points.

KNIGHT.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee the Knight marches and attacks as cavalry and artillery.

From one to four Knights may be present in any given Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined, viz.:

At its maximum of efficiency, the Knight occupies the centre of an octagon of two points radius, having a minimum of two points and a maximum of eight points area. His offensive power is equally valid against all of these eight points, but his defensive power is valid for the support of only one point.

THE PAWN.

Regarded as a Chessic Corps d’armee, the Pawn at its normal post marches as infantry and cavalry. Should an adverse corps, however, take post within the kindred side of the Chessboard; that Pawn upon whose altitude the adverse Piece appears, at once loses its equestrian attributes and marches and attacks exclusively as infantry.

Located at any other point than at its normal post, the Pawn is composed exclusively of infantry and never acts either as cavalry or artillery.

From one to eight Pawns may be present in any Strategetic Horizon; and whenever present the effect of its co-operation mathematically is outlined as follows:

At its maximum of efficiency the Pawn occupies the vertex of a triangle of two points. Its offensive power is equally valid against both of these points; but its defensive power is valid for the support of only one point.

POTENTIAL COMPLEMENTS.

Subjoined is a table of the potential complements of the Chesspieces.

The King 6⁹⁄₁₆ units. The Queen 22¼ ” The Rook 14 ” The Bishop 8¾ ” The Knight 5¼ ” The Pawn 1½ ”

The student clearly should understand that this table does not indicate prowess, but relates exclusively to normal facilities for bringing force into action.

* * * * *

The relative advantage in Organization possessed by one army over an opposing army always can be determined by the following, viz.:

_RULE._

1. Above a line, set down in order those abbreviations which properly designate the White corps d’armee present in a given Strategetic Situation; and below the line, set down those abbreviations which in like manner designate the Black corps d’armee, viz.:

K+Q+R+R+P+P+P+P ---------------- K+Q+R+B+P+P+P+P+P

2. Cancel all like symbols and resolve the unlike symbols remaining, into their respective Potential complements, viz.:

R 14 --- = ------- = --- B+P 8¾ + 1½ 10¼

3. Subtract the lesser Potential total from the greater and the difference will be the relative advantage in Organization.

4. To utilize the relative advantage in Organization select a battlefield in which the Strategic Key, the Tactical Keys and the Points of Command of the True Strategetic Horizon are situated upon the perimeters of those geometric and sub-geometric symbols which appertain to the corps d’armee whose superior potentiality is established by Section 2.

5. To neutralize the relative disadvantage in Organization, occupy the necessary posts upon the battlefield selected in such a manner that the kindred decisive points are situated _not_ upon the perimeters of the geometric and sub-geometric symbols appertaining to the adverse corps d’armee of superior potentiality; while the adverse decisive points _are_ situated upon the perimeters of the geometric and sub-geometric symbols which appertain to the kindred corps d’armee of inferior potentiality.

MILITARY EXAMPLES

_“Men habituated to luxury cannot contend with an army accustomed to fatigue and inured to want.”--Caesar._

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_“That wing with which you propose to engage the enemy should be composed of your best troops.”--Epaminondas._

The _Sacred Band_ of the Thebans was composed of men selected for valor and character. Epaminondas called them _Comrades_ and by honorable rewards and distinctions induced them to bear without murmur the hardest fatigues and to confront with intrepidity the greatest dangers.

At Leuctra (371 B.C.) and again at Mantinea (362 B.C.) the right wing of the Lacedaemonian Army, composed exclusively of Spartans and for six hundred years invincible, was overthrown and destroyed by the Sacred Band led by Epaminondas.

This formidable body of Theban warriors was massacred by Alexander the Great at the Battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.)

* * * * *

The _Macedonian Phalanx_ was devised by Philip, King of Macedon. It was made up of heavy infantry accoutred with cuirass, helmet, greaves, and shield. The principal weapon was a pike twenty-four feet long.

The Phalanx had a front of two hundred and fifty-six files and a depth of sixteen ranks. A file of sixteen men was termed Lochos; two files were called Dilochie; four files made a Tetrarchie; eight files a Taxiarchie and thirty-two of the last constituted a simple Phalanx of 4096 men. A grand Phalanx had a front of one thousand and twenty-four files and a depth of sixteen ranks. It was made up of four simple Phalanxes and contained 16,384 men.

With this formation of his infantry, Alexander the Great, when eighteen years of age, destroyed the Allied Athenian--Theban--Boeotian army at Chaeronea, the hosts of Persia at the river Grancius (334 B.C.) at Issus (333 B.C.) and Arbela (331 B.C.) and conquered Porus, King of India at the Hydaspes (326 B.C.).

* * * * *

The _Spanish Heavy Cavalry_ and _Nubian Infantry_ of Hannibal was a reproduction of that Macedonian organization whereby Alexander the Great had conquered the world.

With this formation Hannibal maintained himself for fifteen years in the richest provinces of Italy and destroyed seven Roman armies, at the Trebia (218 B.C.) at Lake Trasymenus (217 B.C.) at Cannae (216 B.C.) and at Herdonea (212 B.C.) at Herdonea (210 B.C.) at Locri (208 B.C.) and at Apulia (208 B.C.).

At Zama (202 B.C.) Hannibal’s effacement as a military factor was directly due to his lack of that organization which had been the instrument of his previous successes; a circumstance thus commented on by the victorious Roman commander, Scipio Africanus;

“Hitherto I have been opposed by an army without a general; now they send against me a General without an army.”

* * * * *

The _Tenth Legion_ of Caesar was the quintessence of that perfection in elementary tactics devised by the Romans to accord with the use of artillery.

The fundamentals of minor tactics as elucidated by Epaminondas and exploited by Alexander the Great and Hannibal are unchanged in the Legion, but by subdivision of the simple Phalanx into ten Cohorts, a necessary and maximum gain in mobility was effected.

The Roman Legion consisted of 6100 infantry and 726 cavalry, divided into the Militarain Cohort of 1105 heavy foot, 132 Cuirassiers and nine ordinary Cohorts, each containing 555 heavy foot and 66 Cuirassiers. The Legion was drawn up in three lines; the first of which was termed Principes, the second Hastati, and the third Triarii. The infantry were protected by helmet, cuirass, greaves and shield; their arms were a long sword, a short sword, five javelins and two large spears.

With this formation Caesar over-run Spain, Gaul, Germany, Britain, Africa, Greece, and Italy. The Scots alone withstood him and the ruins of a triple line of Roman entrenchments extending from the North to the Irish Seas to this day mark the southern boundary of the Scottish Highlands and the northern limit of Roman dominion.

At Pharseleus, Pompey made the inexplicable blunder of placing his best troops in his right wing, which was covered by the river Enipeus and inferior troops on his left wing which was in the air. By its first charge, the Tenth Legion destroyed the latter, outflanked the entire Pompeian army, drove it backward into the river and single handed won for Caesar undisputed dominion of the Earth.

* * * * *

The _Scots Volunteers_ of Gustavus Adolphus consisted of two brigades aggregating about 12,000 foot, made up of Scottish gentlemen who for various reasons were attracted to the Continental Wars.

At Leipsic, (Sept. 7, 1631) 20,000 Saxons, constituting one-half of the allied Protestant army, were routed at the first charge, put to flight and never seen again. Tilly’s victorious right wing then turned upon the flank of the King’s army. Three regiments of the Scots Volunteers on foot held in check in open field 12,000 of the best infantry and cavalry in Europe, until Gustavus had destroyed the Austrian main body and hastened to their aid with the Swedish heavy cavalry.

The Castle of Oppenheim was garrisoned by 800 Spanish infantry. Gustavus drew up 2,000 Swedes to escalade the place. Thirty Scots Volunteers, looking on observed that the Spaniards, intently watching the King had neglected to guard the opposite side of the fortress. Beckoning to their aid about a hundred of their comrades, they scaled the wall, captured the garrison and opened the gates to the king. Gustavus entered on foot, hat in hand. “My brave Scots,” said he, “you carry in your scabbards, the key to every castle in Europe.”

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