Part 3

There is much difference between the Art of Logic and mere conjecture.

The calculations of arithmeticians, though rigorous and exact, are never difficult; because they relate to known quantities and to the palpable objects of nature. But when it is required to argue from combining circumstances, the least ignorance of uncertain and obscure facts breaks the chain and we are deceived every moment.

This is no defect of the understanding, but error arising from plausible ideas, which wear the face of and are too quickly accepted for truth. A long chapter can be written on the different ways in which men lose themselves in their conjectures. Innumerable examples of this are not wanting, and all because they have suffered themselves to be hurried away and thus to be precipitate in drawing their conclusions.

The part that the General, whether in Chess-play or in Warfare, has to act, always is more difficult because he must not permit himself the least mistake, but is bound to behave with prudence and sagacity throughout a long series of intricate processes. A single false deduction, or a movement of the enemy unintelligible to a commander, may lead him to commit an irremediable error; and in cases wherein the situation is beyond comprehension, his ignorance is invincible.

For however extensive the human mind may be, it never is sufficiently so to penetrate those minute combinations necessary to be developed in order to foresee and regulate events, the sequence, utility and even existence of which, depend upon future contingencies.

Incidents which are past, can be explained clearly, because the reasons therefor are manifest. But men easily deceive themselves concerning the future, which, by a veil of innumerable and impenetrable secondary causes, is concealed from the most prying inspection.

In such situations, how puerile are the projects even of the greatest Strategist. To him, as much as to the tyro, is the future hidden; he knows not what shall happen, even on the next move. How then may he foresee those situations which secondary causes later may produce?

Circumstances most often oblige him to act contrary to his wishes; and in the flux and reflux of fortune, it is the part of prudence to conform to system and to act with consistency. It is impossible to foresee all events.

* * * * *

“It is not possible,” writes the Count de Saxe, “to establish a system without first being acquainted with the _principles_ that must necessarily support it.”

In corroboration of this is the opinion of Frederic the Great:

“Condemned by my unfortunate stars to philosophies on contingencies and on probabilities I employ my whole attention to examine the _principle_ on which my argument must rest and to procure all possible information on that point. Deprived of such precaution, the edifice I erect, wanting a base, would fall like a house of cards.”

Everyone who does not proceed on principle, is inconsistent in his conduct. Equally so, whenever the principle on which one acts is false, _i.e._, does not apply to the existing situation; all deductions based thereon, if applied to the existing situation, necessarily are false.

“Those principles which the Art of Warfare prescribes, never should be departed from,” writes Frederic the Great, “and generals rigidly should adhere to those circumspections and never swerve from implicit obedience to laws, upon whose exact observance depends the safety of their armies and the success of their projects.”

Thus the student will clearly see that all other calculations, though never so ingeniously imagined, are of small worth in comparison with comprehension of the use of Strategetic principles. By means of these latter, we are taught to control the raging forces which dominate in the competitive arts and to compel obedience from friend and foe alike.

“To the shame of humanity it must be confessed,” writes Frederic the Great, “that what often passes for authority and consequence is mere assumption, used as a cloak to conceal from the layman the extreme of official indolence and stupidity.

“To follow the routine of service, to be busied concerning food and clothing, and to eat when others eat, to fight when others fight, are the whole warlike deeds of the majority and constitute what is called having seen service and grown grey in arms.

“The reason why so many officers remain in a state of mediocrity, is because they neither know, nor trouble themselves to inquire into the causes either of their victories or defeats, although such causes are exceedingly real.”

In this connection, writes Polybius, the friend and biographer of Hannibal:

“Having made ourselves masters of the subject of Warfare, we shall no longer ascribe success to Fortune and blindly applaud mere conquerors, as the ignorant do; but we shall approve and condemn from Principle and Reason.”

To the Chess-student nothing can be more conclusive than the following:

“My success at Chess-play,” writes Paul Morphy, “is due to rigid adherence to fixed rules and Principles.”

* * * * *

_“Chess is best fought on Principles, free from all deception and trickery.”--Wilhelm Steinitz._

GRAND RECONNAISSANCE

_“Man can sway the future, only by foreseeing through a clear understanding of the present, to what far off end matters are tending.”--Caesar._

* * * * *

_“From the erroneous ideas they form in regard to good and evil, the ignorant, the mis-educated and the inexperienced always act without precisely knowing what they ought to desire, or what they ought to fear; and it is not in the end they propose, but in the choice of means, that most deceive themselves.”--Aristotle._

GRAND RECONNAISSANCE

_“In every situation the principal strategical requirements must clearly be defined and all other things must be subordinated to these considerations.”--Frederic the Great._

* * * * *

_“One should seek to obtain a knowledge of causes, rather than of effects; and should endeavor to reason from the known, to the unknown.”--Euclid._

_The province of Grand Reconnaissance is exactly to determine the relative advantages and disadvantages in time, numbers, organization, topography, mobility and position, which appertain to hostile armies contained in the same strategetic plane; and to designate those Corps d’armee by which such advantages are materially expressed._

Those processes which appertain to the making of Grand Reconnaissance, necessarily are argumentative; inasmuch as all the facts never are determinate.

Consequently, talent of the highest order is required for the deducing of conclusions which never can be based upon exact knowledge, and which always must contemplate the presence of numerous unknown quantities.

The responsibilities inherent to Grand Reconnaissance never are to be delegated to, nor thrust upon subordinates. Scouts, spies, and informers of every kind, have their manifold and proper uses, but such uses never rise above furnishing necessary information in regard to topographical, tactical, and logistic details.

The Commander-in-chief alone is presumed to possess knowledge and skill requisite to discern what strategetically is fact and what is not fact; and to ascribe to each fact its proper place and sequence.

Lack of military talent and of Strategetic knowledge, never is more strikingly shown than by negligence or inability in this regard.

Incompetents, ignorant of this truth, and oblivious to its importance, devolve such vital responsibility upon subordinates; and later, these legalized murderers palliate the slaughter of their troops and the national shame by publicly reprimanding men serving at shillings per month, for failing in a service, which were the latter able to perform, would entitle them to the gold epaulets and general’s pay, of which their commander is the unfit recipient.

* * * * *

Knowledge of the number, organization, position and movements of the enemy’s troops is the basic element for correct calculation in campaign and battle.

Such things to be accurately estimated must be closely inspected. All speculation and all conjecture in regard to these matters is but frivolity.

It is by being precipitate and hasty in making such conclusions, that men are deceived, for to judge rightly of things before they become clearly shown is most difficult.

_To act on uncertainty is WRONG._

We do not know all the facts and a single iota of light later on may oblige us to condemn that which we previously have approved.

* * * * *

In the making of Grand Reconnaissance, one always must be wary of placing too much confidence in appearances and in first impressions. Especially must care be taken not to magnify the weaknesses of the hostile army, nor the efficacy of the kindred position.

Also, one never should underrate:

1. The talents of the opposing commander; nor

2. The advantages possessed by the opposing army:

(a) In numbers,

(b) In organization,

(c) In position,

(d) In topography,

(e) In time,

(f) In mobility.

It is a first essential, constantly to note the movements of the enemy, in order to detect his plans and the exact location of his corps.

These things are the only reliable guides for determining the true course of procedure. It must be left to the enemy to show by his movements and the posts which he occupies, the measures he projects for the future, and until these are known, it is not proper to _ACT_. Hence:

PRINCIPLE

_All movements of Corps Offensive should be governed by the POSITION of the hostile army, and all movements of Corps Defensive should be governed by the MOVEMENTS of the hostile army._

As soon as the enemy begins a movement, his intentions become clear. It is then possible to make precise calculations.

But be not hasty to build conclusions upon uncertain information and do not take any resolutions until certain what are the numbers, the position, the objectives, and the projects of the enemy.

However interesting an undertaking may appear, one should not be seduced by it while ill-informed of the obstacles to be met and the possibility of not having sufficient force in the theatre of action.

Chimerical schemes should be abandoned at their inception. Reason, instead of extravagancies of the fancy, always must be the guide. Men, most courageous, often undertake fearful difficulties, but impracticable things they leave to lunatics.

In all situations, one must beware of venturing beyond his depth. It is wiser to keep within the limits which the knowledge we possess shall prescribe.

Especially in crises, one must proceed most cautiously until sure information is acquired; for over-haste is exceedingly dangerous, when exact knowledge is lacking of the enemy’s numbers, position, and movements.

PRINCIPLE

_Situations always should be contemplated as they EXIST, never as they OUGHT to be, or, perhaps, MAY be._

In every important juncture, each step must be profoundly considered; as little as possible should be left to chance.

Particularly, must one never be inflated and rendered careless and negligent by success; nor made spiritless and fearful by reverses. At all times the General should see things only as they are and attempt what is dictated by that Strategetic Principle which dominates the given situation. Fortune often does the rest.

* * * * *

_“Napoleon bending over and sometimes lying at full length upon his map, with a pair of dividers opened to a distance on the scale of from 17 to 20 miles, equal to 22 to 25 miles over country, and marking the positions of his own and of the hostile armies by sticking into the map pins surmounted by little balls made of diverse colored sealing wax; in the twinkling of an eye calculated those wonderful concentrations of his Corps d’armee upon decisive points and dictated those instructions to his Marshals which in themselves are a title to glory.”--Baron de Jomini._

MILITARY EXAMPLES

_“Phillip, King of Macedonia, is the single confidant of his own secrets, the sole dispenser of his treasure, the most able general of all Greece, the bravest soldier in his army. He foresees and executes everything himself; anticipates events, derives all possible advantages from them and yields to them when to yield is necessary._

_His troops are extremely well disciplined, he exercises them incessantly. Always himself at their head, they perform with arms and baggage marches of three hundred stadia with alarming expedition and making no difference between summer or winter, between fatigue and rest._

_He takes no step without mature reflection, nor proceeds to a second until he is assured of the success of the first and his operations are always dominated by considerations of time and place.”--Apollodorus._

The facility with which one familiar with the Strategetic Art may make Grand Reconnaissance, even of an invisible theatre of action, and may evolve accurate deductions from a mass of inexact and contradictory reports is illustrated by the following practical examples, viz.:

FIRST EXAMPLE.

(From the _New York Journal_, Dec. 26, 1899 By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“The position of the British armies is deplorable.

“With the single exception of Gen. Buller’s force, the situation of these bodies of British troops, thus unfortunately circumstanced, is cause for the greatest anxiety.

“Strong indications point to a grand offensive movement on the part of the Boers, with the object of terminating the war in one campaign and by a single blow.

“True, this movement may be but a feint, but if it be a true movement, it is difficult to over-estimate the gravity of the situation of the British in South Africa.

“For if this movement is a true military movement, it shows as clearly as the sun in the sky to those who know the Strategetic Art, that the Boer armies are in transition from the defensive to an offensive plan of campaign, with the purpose of capturing DeArr and from thence advancing in force against the chief British depot, Capetown.”

* * * * *

The United States War Department, _Report on the British-Boer War_, published June 14, 1901, contains the following:

(By =Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, December 25, 1899. U. S. Military Attache with the British Army.)

“I consider the present situation to be the most critical for the English forces, since hostilities began. Should the Boers assume offensive operations, the English armies with their long and thinly guarded lines of communication, would be placed in great jeopardy.”

* * * * *

(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, war correspondent with Gen. Buller and Lord Roberts in the South African Campaign. MacMillan & Co., 1902.)

“Had the defence (of Cape Colony) been entrusted to less capable hands than those of Gen. French, who, with a mere handful of troops succeeded not only in checking the Boer advance, but in driving them back on Colesberg, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the enemy would have been able to push on south and west to Craddock and Hex River range and thus bring about a state of affairs which might have shaken British rule in South Africa to its foundation.”

SECOND EXAMPLE.

(_Boston Globe_, Jan. 12, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“Lord Roberts’ first object will be the rescue of Lord Methuen’s army now blockaded near Magersfontein by Gen. Conje.

“As the first step to effect this, the British commander-in-chief at once and with all his force, will occupy the line from Naauwpoort to De Arr. There, he will await the arrival of twenty-two transports now en route from England.

“With these reinforcements, he will advance directly to the Modder River by the route previously taken by Lord Methuen.”

* * * * *

(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, Sp. Cor. British Army.)

“Slow to recognize their opportunities, the enemy were still in the midst of preparation, when Gen. French reached De Arr. Meanwhile a detachment under Major McCracken occupied Naauwpoort, to which place thirty days’ supplies for 3000 men and 1100 animals had been ordered.

“In the ten weeks of fighting which ensued, prior to the arrival of the British main army, Gen. French by his skillful tactics held a powerful force of Boers at bay, checked their descent into the southern part of the colony, defeated their attempt to display the Vierkleur across the cape peninsular, and materially influenced, if not absolutely determined, the entire future of the campaign.”

* * * * *

(By =Chas. S. Goldmann=, Sp. Cor. with British Army.)

“Arriving at Capetown on Jan. 10, Lord Roberts decided that the line of march should lead by way of Bloemfontein to Pretoria, initiating the operation by the concentration of large forces on the Modder River, forming there an advanced base.”

THIRD EXAMPLE.

(_Boston Globe_, Jan. 21, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“It is plain that when the Boers took position at Colenso they prepared their plan for the protection of their flanks; to deny this would be to assume that men who had displayed superb military sagacity were ignorant of the simplest processes of warfare.

“What that plan is will be unfolded very rapidly should Gen. Buller attempt to pierce the line of Boer vedettes posted upon the Spion Kop and concealing as near as can be determined from the present meagre facts, either the Second, or the Fourth Ambuscade.

“In either case it signifies that the Boers are confident of annihilating Gen. Buller’s army if it should cross the Tugela.

“About this time the Boers are watching Gen. Warren and his command and watching him intently. Something may happen to him.”

* * * * *

(_London Times_, Jan. 22, 1900.)

“On Friday, Jan. 19, Gen. Warren began a long, circuitous march to the westward for the purpose of turning the right of the Boer position.

“This attempt was abandoned on account of the long ridge running from Spion Kop being occupied by the Boers in such strength as to command the entire route.

“Saturday, Jan. 20, Gen. Warren, having crossed the Tugela River with the bulk of his troops, ordered a frontal attack. Our men behaved splendidly under a heavy cross-fire for seven hours. Our casualties were slight. Three lines of rifle fire[1] were visible along the Boer main position.”

[1] The Second Ambuscade. Vide “Secret Instructions” of Frederic the Great.

* * * * *

(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 22, 1900.)

“Gen. Warren has been engaged all day chiefly on his left, which he has swung forward a couple of miles.”

(Signed) _Buller._

* * * * *

(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 24, 1900.)

“Gen. Warren holds the position he gained two days ago. The Boer position is on higher ground than ours and can be approached only over bare and open slopes. An attempt will be made tonight to seize Spion Kop.”

(Signed) _Buller._

* * * * *

(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 25, 1900.)

“Gen. Warren’s troops last night occupied Spion Kop, surprising the small[2] garrison which fled.”

(Signed) _Buller._

[2] Merely the outposts and vedettes of the Second Ambuscade.

* * * * *

(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 26, 1900.)

“Gen. Warren’s garrison, I am sorry to say, I find this morning had in the night abandoned Spion Kop.”

(Signed) _Buller._

* * * * *

(_British War Office Bulletin_, Jan. 28, 1900.)

“I decided that a second attack on Spion Kop was useless[3] and that the enemy’s right was too strong to allow me to force it. Accordingly I decided to withdraw the troops to the south side of the Tugela River.”

(Signed) _Buller._

[3] The proffer of an untenable post always is the bait of the Second Ambuscade.

* * * * *

(_London Daily Mail_, Jan. 29, 1900.)

“The richest and what was hitherto considered the most powerful nation in the world is today in the humiliating position of seeing its armies beaten back with heavy losses by two small states.”

FOURTH EXAMPLE.

(_Boston Globe_, Feb. 16, 1900, by =Franklin K. Young=.)

“Lord Roberts’ communications for nearly two hundred miles are exposed to the attack of an enemy, who at any moment is liable to capture and destroy his supply and ammunition trains and to reduce the British army to a condition wherein it will be obliged to fight a battle under most disadvantageous circumstances.”

* * * * *

(From United States War Department _Report on the British Boer War_. By =Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, U. S. Attache with British Army.)

“Feb. 15, 1900. The main supply park of the army was attacked by the enemy near Watervale Drift.

“This park consisted of one hundred ox-wagons containing rations and one hundred more wagons filled with ammunition. One hundred and fifty of these wagons and three thousand oxen were captured by the Boers.

“The loss of these rations and munitions was a most serious blow. Lord Roberts was here confronted by a crisis which would have staggered and been the undoing of many commanders-in-chief placed as he was.

“He was in the enemy’s country, cut off from his base of supplies on the railroad and with an unknown number of the enemy in his rear and upon his line of communication. His transport was nearly all captured and his army was suddenly reduced to three days full rations on the eve of a great movement and the country afforded no food whatever. The crisis still further developed when a courier brought the report that the Boers were in position at Watervale Drift and commanding the ford with artillery.”

FIFTH EXAMPLE.

(_Boston Globe_, Feb. 25, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“There is reason to believe that should worse come to worse, the Boer Army, should it be compelled to abandon its position, will be able to save its personnel by a rapid flight across the Modder. Of course, in this case, the Boers would lose their supplies and cannon.”

* * * * *

(From United States War Department, _Report on the British Boer War_. By =Capt. S. L’H. Slocum=, U. S. Attache, with British Army.)

“The enemy, under Cronje, with all his transport was in all practical effect surrounded, although by abandoning his wagons and supplies, a large number of the Boers undoubtedly could have escaped.”

* * * * *

(_Boston Sunday Times_, March, 1900. By =Franklin K. Young=.)

“Cronje’s conduct was heroic and imbecile in the extreme. As the commander on the ground he is entitled to all the glory and must assume all the blame. One of the ablest of the Boer generals, he is the only one in the whole war to make a mistake.

“Cronje’s first duty was to decide whether he should stand or run; he decided to run, which was proper, but having so decided he should have run at once and not have stopped running until safe on the north bank of the Vaal River.

“Properly he sent his siege guns and trains off to the north across the Vaal and improperly held his position in force on the British front, instead of withdrawing his personnel after his material.

“This blunder, like all blunders of a commander-in-chief, quickly produced blunders by his subordinates. Commander Ferrera permitted French to get around Cronje’s left flank without a battle. The presence of this force on his rear cut Cronje off from his natural line of retreat across the Vaal and compelled him to flee toward Bloemfontein.