Part 10

That relative advantage in Numbers expressed by the larger aggregate of Chess-pieces is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by additional geometric and sub-geometric symbols.

Excess or deficiency in Numbers determines the policy of Campaign. The policy of the inferior force is:

1. To preserve intact its Corps d’armee, and

2. To engage in battle only when victory can be assured by other advantages in Strategetic means, which nullify the adverse advantage in Numbers; and even then only when such victory is decisive of the Campaign.

Hence, the policy of Campaign of that army superior in Numbers, is:

Incessantly to proffer battles which:

(a) Accepted, constantly reduces the inferior army and increases its disproportion in numbers, or,

(b) Evaded, compels the inferior army to abandon important posts, for whose defence it cannot afford the resulting loss of troops; thus permitting to the numerically superior army a continually increasing advantage in Position.

PRINCIPLE

_All else being equal the advantage of Numbers is decisive of victory in battle and Campaign._

_Things being unequal, the advantage in Numbers may be nullified by adverse advantages in Organization, Topography, Mobility, Time and Position._

_Victory resulting from advantage in Numbers is achieved by simultaneously attacking two or more Tactical Keys from a Kindred Strategic Key and two or more Kindred Points of Command._

TO LOCATE THE AREA OF CONCENTRATION

That _relative advantage in Mobility_ expressed by the situation of the Strategic Front upon the Strategetic Center is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Kindred Chess-pieces posted upon that great central diagonal which extends towards the Objective Plane. Such advantage determines those points which should be occupied in the proper development of the front so posted; and consequently designates the direction and location of that battlefield upon which the kindred army may concentrate in overwhelming force, despite all possible resistance by the enemy.

MOST FAVORABLE BATTLEFIELD

That _relative advantage in Organization_ expressed by superior potential totality, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the geometric and sub-geometric symbols of those Chess-pieces possessed of the superior potential complement. Such symbols taken in combination, describe that field of battle most favorable for the execution of those Major Tactical evolutions which appertain to the Chess-pieces of superior organization.

POSTS OF MAXIMUM SECURITY

That _relative defensive advantage in Topography_ expressed by inaccessibility to hostile attack is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Corps of Position, posted upon points of different color to that occupied by the adverse Bishop; and this advantage designates those posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be occupied with the maximum of security.

That _relative offensive advantage in Topography_ expressed by accessibility to kindred attack is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Corps of Position posted upon points of the same color as that occupied by the kindred Bishop; and this advantage designates those posts situated on a projected field of battle which may be attacked with the maximum facility.

CHARACTER OF THE MOST FAVORABLE BATTLE

That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Attack_, expressed:

1. By superior location, direction and development of the Kindred Strategic Front of Operations; and

2. By the occupation of Points of Departure, of Manoeuvre, of Command and of the Strategic Key of a True Strategic Horizon, indicates that a Strategic Grand Battle in the first instance; and in the second case that a Tactical Grand Battle is most favorable in the existing situation.

That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Support_, expressed by superior facilities for occupying with the Kindred Promotable Factors their corresponding Points of Junction in the Kindred Logistic Horizon, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the larger number of Pawn Altitudes which either are open, or may be opened, despite all possible resistance by the enemy; and such advantage designates those adverse Points of Impenetrability and Points of Resistance to the march of the Kindred Promotable Factors, which it is necessary to nullify.

That _relative advantage in Position with the Column of Manoeuvre_, expressed by the security of the Kindred and the exposure of the adverse Strategetic Rear to attack by the Kindred Column of Support, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by the occupation by a Kindred Promotable Factor of the Point of Proximity; and such advantage indicates that the advance with all possible celerity of such Promotable Factor and Point of Proximity toward the corresponding Point of Junction is a dominating influence in the existing situation.

PROJECTED GRAND BATTLE

From the advantage in Position appertaining to the three Grand Columns is deduced the character of the Grand Battle properly in sequence.

_Advantage in Position with the Column of Attack_ indicates the opportunity, all else being equal, to engage in a victorious Strategic Grand Battle against the hostile Formation in Mass, or in a Tactical Grand Battle against the hostile Formation by Wings.

_Advantage in Position with the Column of Support_ indicates the opportunity to engage effectively in a series of minor battles, as though having the advantage in Numbers.

_Advantage in Position with the Column of Manoeuvre_ indicates the opportunity to engage in a victorious Logistic Grand Battle against the adverse Formation by Grand Columns.

LEAST FAVORABLE ADVERSE CONDITION

That _relative advantage in Time_ expressed by restrictions of the adversary’s choice of movements at his turn to play, is materially manifested upon the Chess-board by Feints operated by Kindred Chess-pieces against adverse vital points; and such advantage of the Initiative dictates the next move of the opposing army.

The _advantage of the Initiative_ determines which of the adverse corps d’armee may and may not move.

The material expression of this advantage always is a Feint by a Kindred Corps against a vital point either occupied or unoccupied, which necessitates that upon his next move, the enemy either evacuate, support, cover or sustain the post so menaced.

Such feint, therefore, restricts the move of the enemy to those of his corps as are able to obviate the threatened loss and proportionately reduces the immediate activity of his army.

RELATIVE ADVANTAGES IN LOCATION

_“It is only the force brought into action that avails in battles and campaigns--the rest does not count.”--Napoleon._

_The distance which separates opposing Corps d’armee always modifies the values of the Prime Strategetic Means._

Hence in the making of Grand Reconnaissance, it is next in sequence to determine whether the Chess-pieces are:

I. In Contact.

II. In Presence.

III. At Distance.

Corps d’armee are _in Contact_ with each other whenever their logistic radii intersect; or, their radii offensive and the corresponding adverse radii defensive are opposed to each other.

Corps d’armee are _in Presence_ whenever the posts which they occupy are contained within the same Strategic front, the same Strategetic Horizon, or are in communication with their corresponding posts of mobilization, development, or manoeuvre.

Corps d’armee are _at Distance_ when the posts which they occupy are not in communication with Kindred Corps d’armee posted upon the strategic front adopted, or with posts of mobilization or development contained within the corresponding Primary Base of Operations, or, within the True Strategetic Horizon.

REQUISITES FOR SUCCESSFUL CAMPAIGNING

Every Campaign, whether upon the surface of the Earth or upon the Chess-board is decided and usually is terminated by a Grand Battle.

Those movements of opposing Grand Columns, whereby such decisive conflict is brought about under circumstances which ensure victory, by reason of superior advantages in Strategetic Means, are termed Grand Manoeuvres; and a proper series of Grand Manoeuvres, combined with their corresponding feints, strategems, ambuscades and minor battles, the whole terminated by a resulting Grand Battle, is termed a Grand Operation.

Those processes of Grand Manoeuvre, which produce an opportunity to victoriously engage in battle, are the most subtle and difficult known to the Strategetic Art.

_Successful application of these processes in practice depends wholly upon proper use of the MEANS at hand and the doing of the utmost that can be done in the TIME available._

Nothing can be more repugnant to high art in Strategetics than those crudities termed in the specious mouthings of pretentious mediocrity “waiting moves,” “delayed strokes,” “defensive-offensives,” “masterly inactivities,” and the like.

“Time past is gone and cannot be regained; time future is not and may never be; time present is” and with it Opportunity, which an instant later may be gone.

The gain of but “a foot of ground and a minute of time” would have saved the French army at Rosbach and have cost Frederic the Great one of his most lustrous victories and perhaps his army and his crown.

PRINCIPLE

_In Strategetics there is but a single method whereby Opportunity may be availed of, and that is by so augmenting kindred advantages and so depreciating adverse advantages as to acquire for the kindred army that particular advantage of Strategetic means which in the given situation is the proper basis of the Strategetic movement next in sequence._

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_At Distance._

_The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse army at Distance, is the advantage in MOBILITY._

The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army acting in the formation by Grand Columns, and the object of such Grand Manoeuvre always is, by superior celerity of movement, to occupy:

1. The Strategic Center by the Kindred Column of Attack, thus intersecting the Route of Communication between the adverse main body and its Base of Operation; or to occupy:

2. The Logistic Center with the Kindred Columns of Support and of Manoeuvre, thus intersecting the Route of Communication between the adverse main body and its Chief Supporting Column and clearing the way for the advance of the Kindred Column of Support against the flank and rear of the adverse Main Body.

Obviously, the united Kindred Columns of Attack and of Support always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in Numbers as compared with the adverse main body.

_In Presence._

_The chief requisite for success when acting against an adverse Grand Column in Presence, is the advantage in POSITION._

The primary process is that of a Grand Manoeuvre against an adverse army acting in the Formation by Wings, and the object of such Grand Manoeuvre always is, by availing to the uttermost of its situation upon the Tactical Center, _i.e._, upon the area midway between the adverse Wings thus isolated from each other; to act in overwhelming Numbers, first against one and then against the other hostile bodies.

_In Contact._

_The chief requisite for success when acting offensively against an adverse Grand Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee, in Contact, is the advantage in NUMBERS._

The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army has an overwhelming superiority in Numbers in contact, and at least the equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means.

In this circumstance, the object of such Grand Battle always is:

1. To attack the hostile Formation in Mass frontally at the center, and upon both wings obliquely; all three attacks being made simultaneously and the evolutions so executed that the hostile army never is able to penetrate between either kindred wing and the kindred center, nor to outflank that kindred wing which may be in the air.

2. In case the kindred army has the equality or inferiority in all other Prime Strategetic Means, then the object of a Grand Battle on the Offensive is to attack the hostile Formation in Mass obliquely with the whole kindred army, and preferably upon that wing which covers the route of communication of the adverse army with its Base of Operations, but always upon that wing which contains the Tactical Key of the actual Battlefield.

Obviously, the concentration of the entire kindred army against a single adverse wing always will constitute an overwhelming superiority in Numbers.

In making such attack obliquely against a single adverse wing, the center and remaining wing of the kindred army must not engage until the kindred Van and Corps of Position of the attacking wing first have formed the _center_ of three sides of an octagon; of which the Kindred Corps of Evolution will form the _farthest_ side and the Kindred Center and left wing Corps d’armee will form the _nearest_ and latest constructed side.

* * * * *

_The chief requisite for success when acting defensively against a Grand Column, or Wing, or Corps d’armee is the advantage in TOPOGRAPHY._

The primary process is that of a Grand Battle in which the kindred army, decidedly inferior in Numbers in the aggregate, has the advantage in Topography and equality in all other Prime Strategetic Means.

In this case the object is to support both flanks of the inferior army upon impassable natural barriers, strengthening both wings at the expense of the center, both in quantity and in quality of troops.

If the Tactical Defensive be selected, the center should retire before the oncoming of the hostile army in order to enclose it between the Kindred Wings, which will then overwhelm it by superior Numbers, while the natural barriers on the flanks being impassable will prevent the remaining hostile corps from participating in the battle otherwise than as spectators.

Should the Tactical Offensive be selected, that kindred wing best adapted for attack should engage supported by all kindred Corps of Evolution, while advancing the Kindred Center in reserve and holding the remaining wing refused and in observation.

All else being equal, relative advantage in either branch of Prime Strategetic Means is sufficient to ensure victory in battle, and the proper use of such advantage for securing victory is outlined thus:

PRINCIPLE

_Utilize advantage in Prime Strategetic Means to obtain the superiority in Numbers at the Point of Contact in an Offensive Battle; and to nullify the adverse superiority in Numbers at the point of contact in a Defensive Battle._

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Between War and Chess there is a seeming incongruity, which is the basis of that doubt of the utility of Chess-play, so commonly held by laymen, and which fallacy few, even among proficients, are competent to combat.

This doubt most frequently is voiced by the query:

If Chess and War are analagous, why was not Napoleon a Master Chess-player and Morphy a great military Commander?

This query readily is answered in the words of Frederic the Great, viz.:

“To be possessed of talent is not sufficient. Opportunity to display such talent and to its full extent is necessary. All depends on the time in which we live.”

The Strategetic talent possessed in common by Morphy and Napoleon, in both was brought to perfection by long and expert training.

But circumstances placed the twelve year old Napoleon in the midst of soldiers and in an era of war, while circumstances placed the twelve year old Morphy in the midst of Chess-players and in an era of Peace.

Napoleon was educated a General; Morphy was educated a lawyer.

To develop his self-evident and superlative Strategetic talent, Napoleon’s education was of the best; to develop his self-evident and superlative Strategetic talent, Morphy’s education was of the worst.

Napoleon succeeded as a General; Morphy failed as a lawyer.

The innate capability of Napoleon for Strategetics was developed in the direction of Warfare; the innate capability of Morphy for Strategetics was developed in the direction of Chess-play.

In War, Napoleon is superlative; in Chess, Morphy is superlative.

Educated in the law, Napoleon might have proved like Morphy a non-entity; educated in Chess, Napoleon might have proved like Morphy a phenomenon.

Educated in War, Morphy might have rivalled Napoleon.

For the Chess-play of Morphy displays that perfect comprehension of Strategetics, to which none but the great Captains in warfare have attained.

Perfection in Strategetics consists in exactly interpreting in battle and campaign, the System of Warfare invented by Epaminondas.

Those able to do this in War have achieved greatness, and the great at Chess-play are those who best have imitated that exactness with which Morphy employed this system on the Chess-board.

To those who imagine that Strategetic talent, as exemplified in Warfare, is different from Strategetic talent as exemplified in Chess-play, the following may afford matter for reflection.

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_“Frederic the Great was one of the finest Chess-players that Germany ever produced.”--Wilhelm Steinitz._

PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION

SECTION ONE

PRIME STRATEGETIC PROPOSITION

SECTION ONE

(FIRST PHASE.)

In the consideration of every Strategetic Situation possible in Warfare, or in Chess-play, the initial process always is a Grand Reconnaissance.

Grand Reconnaissance is that exact scrutiny of existing conditions, whereby is determined the relative advantages and disadvantages possessed by the opposing armies in:

1. Time.

2. Numbers.

3. Position.

4. Organization.

5. Mobility.

6. Topography.

The _First Phase_ in the demonstration of every Prime Strategetic Proposition consists:

1. _In determining by comparison of the relative advantages and disadvantages in Time, which of the opposing armies has the ability to MOVE, while the other must remain stationary._

2. _In deducing the MOTIF of such movement._

3. _In designating the DIRECTION of such movement._

The making of Grand Reconnaissance is a special privilege which exclusively appertains to the advantage in _Time_. It always should be made by the Commander-in-chief of that army which is able to put itself in motion, while the opposing army must remain stationary, and it never should be confounded with the advance of the Cavalry Corps, nor confused with the work of scouts and spies; all of which are matters entirely separate and distinct from Grand Reconnaissance.

In the Grand Reconnaissance of any given Strategetic Situation the element of Numbers _primarily_ is to be considered, for the reason that the basic fact of the Science of Strategetics is:

_“THE GREATER FORCE ALWAYS OVERCOMES THE LESSER.”--Napoleon._

Hence, unless more immediately vital considerations prevent, superiority in Numbers, of itself, is _decisive_ of victory; and thus it readily is to be deduced that all else being equal, the advantage in Time plus the advantage in Numbers constitutes the easiest and simplest winning combination known to Strategetic Art.

But it so happens that the advantage in Time may be combined not only with the greater force, but also with an equal, or even with the lesser force, and from this it is self-evident that Strategetic Situations are divided into three classes, viz.:

I. Numerical superiority, plus right to move.

II. Numerical equality, plus right to move.

III. Numerical inferiority, plus right to move.

There are _two primary methods_ for availing of superiority in Numbers to destroy the opposing lesser force, viz.:

1. _By the Process of Attrition, i.e., by maintaining an incessant tactical offensive and thus wearing down the opposing army by exchanging pieces at every opportunity._

2. _By Acting in Detachments, i.e., by means of the extra corps, simultaneously to attack more points of vital importance than the hostile army is able simultaneously to defend._

From the foregoing it is obvious that conversely there are two principal considerations, which all else being equal, must dominate the procedure of the Numerically inferior force, viz.:

I. To avoid further diminution of its aggregate.

II. To avoid creating indefensible vital points.

* * * * *

The _second consideration_ in the making of a Grand Reconnaissance by the commander-in-chief of an army having the advantage in Time, is the element of _Position_; for the reason that by unscientific posting of Corps d’armee, relative advantages in Time, or in Numbers or in both, may be rendered nugatory, on account of inability of the kindred Columns of Attack, of Support and of Manoeuvre to perform their functions.

In case the Corps are scientifically posted and are in positions to avail of advantage in Time and Numbers, those adverse vital points whose occupation may be effected by superior force, always will be the objectives of the movements of the latter.

Hence, the following:

PRINCIPLE

_As the advantage in Time gives the right to MOVE and the advantage in Numbers indicates the MOTIF of movement; so does the advantage in Position, as expressed by the Strategic Syllogism, specify the DIRECTION of that movement which normally appertains to the army having the advantage in Time._

The proper _direction_ of that movement which normally appertains to the advantage in Time always is indicated by the plus signs in the Strategic Syllogism, viz.:

+A. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in Time is along the Strategetic Center towards the Objective Plane.

+S. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in Time is along one or more pawn altitudes towards the Kindred Logistic Horizon.

+M. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in Time is along the shortest open pawn altitude towards the Kindred Point of Junction.

+A+S. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in Time is double, _i.e._,

+A. towards the Objective Plane.

+S. along one or more open Pawn altitudes toward the Kindred Logistic Horizon.

+A+M. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in Time, is double, _i.e._,

+A. towards the Objective Plane.

+M. Along the shortest open pawn altitude toward the Kindred Point of Junction.

+S+M. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement for the army having the advantage in Time is double, _i.e._,

+S. Along one or more open Pawn altitudes toward the Kindred Logistic Horizon.

+M. Along the shortest open Pawn Altitude toward the Kindred Point of Junction.

+A+S+M. Signifies that the Normal direction of movement is triple, _i.e._,

+A. Toward the Objective Plane.

+S. Along one or more open Pawn altitudes, toward the Kindred Logistic Horizon.

+M. Along the shortest open Pawn altitude, toward the Kindred Point of Junction.

The First Phase in the demonstration of every Strategetic Proposition is determined by the following:

THEOREM

_Given the Normal ability to move, to determine the Normal motif and direction of movement._

1. Designate that army having the advantage in Time and express such advantage by the symbol +T, express the corresponding disadvantage in Time which appertains to the opposing army, by the symbol -T, and such symbols will constitute the First Term of the First Phase of the demonstration of any Prime Strategetic Proposition.