Chapter 5
The matter may be presented in still another view. The government establishes a mail between two cities, say Boston and New York, which is supported by the avails of postage on letters. Then it proceeds to establish a mail between New York and Philadelphia, which is supported by the postage between those places. Now, how much will it cost the government to carry in addition, all the letters that go from Boston to Philadelphia, and from Philadelphia to Boston? Nothing. The contracts will not vary a dollar. In this manner, you may extend your mails from any point, wherever you find a route which will support itself, until you reach New Orleans or Little Rock, and it is as plain as the multiplication table, that it will cost the government no more to take an individual letter from Boston to Little Rock than it would to take the same letter from Boston to New York. The government is quite indifferent to what place you mail your letter, provided it be to a place which has a mail regularly running to it.
This brings us to the unproductive routes. An act was passed by the last Congress to establish mail routes in Oregon territory. An agent is appointed to superintend the business, at a salary of $1000 a year and his travelling expenses; contracts are made or to be made, mails carried, postmasters appointed and paid. This is doubtless a very proper and necessary thing, one which the government could not have omitted without a plain dereliction of duty. The honor and interest of the nation required that as soon as the title to the country was settled, our citizens who were resident there, and those who shall go to settle there, should enjoy the benefits of the mail. And as it was the nation’s business to establish the mail, it was equally the nation’s business to pay the expense. No man can show how it is just or reasonable, that the letters passing between Boston and New York should be taxed 150 per cent. to pay the expense of a mail to Oregon, on the pretext that the post-office must support itself.
A mail is run at regular periods to Eagle River, Wisconsin, for the accommodation of the persons employed about the copper mines on Lake Superior. Without questioning the certainty of the great things that are to be done there hereafter, it is no presumption to express the belief that the expenses of that mail are hardly paid by the postage on the letters now carried to and from Lake Superior. Nor, after making all due allowances for the liberal distribution of copper stock at the East, is it rational to believe that all the people who write letters here, are so directly interested as to make a tax upon letters the most equitable mode of assessing the expense.
During the debates in Congress on the act of 1844, an incident was related by Senator Crittenden, of Kentucky, to this effect. He said he was travelling in the mail stage somewhere in the State of Tennessee. At a time of day when he was tired and hungry, the stage turned off from the road a number of miles, to carry the mail to a certain post-office; it was night when they reached the office, the postmaster was roused with difficulty, who went through the formality of taking the mail pouch into his hand, and returned it to the driver, saying there was not a letter in it, and had not been for a month. I will not inquire whose letters ought to be taxed to sustain that mail route, but only remark, that whatever consideration caused its establishment, ought to carry the cost to the public treasury, and not throw it as a burden upon our letters.
The Postmaster-General, in his late report, says that “the weight and bulk of the mails, which add so greatly to the cost of transportation, and impede the progress of the mail, are attributable to the mass of printed matter daily forwarded from the principal cities in the Union to every part of the country;” and “justice requires that the expense of their transportation should be paid by the postage.” I would add to this the qualifying phrase, “or by the government, out of the public treasury,” and then ask why the same principle of justice is not as applicable to long mail routes as to heavy mail bags. There is and can be no ground of apprehension, that mails will ever be overloaded or retarded by the weight of paid letters they contain. It was found by the parliamentary committee, that the number of letters, which was then nearly fifty per cent. greater than in all our mails, might be increased twenty-four fold, without overloading the mails, and without any material addition to the contracts for carrying the mails. They also found that the whole cost of receiving, transporting and delivering a letter was 76-100ths of a penny, of which the transit cost but 19-100ths, and the receipt and delivery 57-100ths. The cost of transit, per letter, is of course reduced by the increase of correspondence.
I have dwelt so long on this part of the subject, because I find that here is the great difficulty in the application of the principles and results of the British system to our own country—ours is such a “great country,” and we have so many “magnificent distances.” But disposing as I have of the unproductive mail routes, and showing as I have, the injustice of taxing letters with the expense of any public burthens, this whole difficulty is removed, and it is made to appear that two cents is the highest proper rate of postage which the government can justly exact for letters, on the score either of a just equivalent for the service rendered, or of a tax imposed for the purposes of the government itself.
This is the conclusion to which the parliamentary committee were most intelligently and satisfactorily drawn—that “the principle of a uniform postage is founded on the facts, that the cost of distributing letters in the United Kingdom consists chiefly in the expenses incurred with reference to their receipt at and delivery from the office, and that the cost of transit along the mail roads is comparatively unimportant, and determined rather by the number of letters carried than the distance;” that “as the cost of conveyance per letter depends more on the number of letters carried than on the distance which they are conveyed, (the cost being frequently greater for distances of a few miles, than for distances of hundreds of miles,) the charge, if varied in proportion to the cost, ought to increase in the inverse ratio of the number of letters conveyed,” but it would be impossible to carry such a rule into practice, and therefore the committee were of opinion, that “the easiest practicable approach to a fair system, would be to charge a medium rate of postage between one post-office and another, whatever may be their distance.” And the committee were further of opinion, “that such an arrangement is highly desirable, not only on account of its abstract fairness, but because it would tend in a great degree to simplify and economize the business of the post-office.”
Waterston’s Cyclopedia of Commerce says, “the fixing of _a low rate_ flowed almost necessarily from the adoption of a _uniform_ rate. It was besides essential to the stoppage of the private conveyance of letters. The post-office was thus to be restored to its ancient footing of an institution, whose primary object was public accommodation, not revenue.”
The adoption of this simple principle, of Uniform Cheap Postage, was a revolution in postal affairs. It may almost be called a revolution in the government, for it identified the policy of the government with the happiness of the people, more perfectly than any one measure that was ever adopted. It prepared the way for all other postal reforms, which are chiefly impracticable until this one is carried. We also can have franking abolished, as soon as cheap postage shall have given the franking privilege alike to all. We can have label stamps, and free delivery, and registry of letters, and reduced postage on newspapers, and whatever other improvement our national ingenuity may contrive, to the fullest extent of the people’s wants, and the government’s ability, just as soon as we can prevail upon the people to ask, and congress to grant, this one boon of Uniform Cheap Postage.
V. _Franking._
The unanimity and readiness with which the franking privilege was surrendered by the members of parliament—men of privilege in a land of privilege—is proof of the strong pressure of necessity under which the measure was carried. It is true, a few members seemed disposed to struggle for the preservation of this much-cherished prerogative. One member complained that the bill would be taxing him as much as £15 per annum. Another defended the franking privilege on account of its benefits to the poor. But the opposition melted away, like an unseasonable frost, as soon as its arguments were placed in the light of cheap postage. And the whole system of franking was swept away, and each department of the government was required to pay its own postage, and report the same among its expenditures. The debates in parliament show something of the reasons which prevailed.
_July 22, 1848._ The postage bill came up on the second reading:
Sir Robert H. Inglis, among other things, objected to the abolition of the franking privilege. He could not see why, because a tax was to be taken off others, a tax was to be imposed on members. It would be, to those who had much correspondence, at least £15 a year, at the reduced rate of a penny a letter. To the revenue the saving would be small, and he hoped the house would not consent to rescind that privilege.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer said the sacrifice of the franking privilege would be small in amount. But at the same time, be it small or great, he thought there would be not one feature of the new system which would be more palatable to the public, than this practical evidence of the willingness of members of this house, to sacrifice everything personal to themselves, for the advantage of the public revenue.
Sir Robert Peel did not think it desirable that members of this house should retain the franking privilege. He thought if this were continued after this bill came into operation, there _would be a degree of odium_ attached to it which would greatly diminish its value. He agreed that it would be well to restrict in some way the _right of sending by mail the heavy volumes of reports_. He said there were many members who would shrink from the exercise of such a privilege, to load the mail with books. He would also require that each department should specially pay the postage incurred for the public service in that department. If every office be called upon to pay its own postage, we shall introduce a useful principle into the public service. There is no habit connected with a public service so inveterate, as the privilege of official franking.
On a former day, July 5, the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said concerning the abolition of the franking privilege:
Undoubtedly, we may lose the opportunity now and then, of obliging a friend; but on other grounds, I believe there is no member of the house who will not be ready to abandon the privilege. As to any notion that honorable gentlemen should retain their privilege under a penny postage, they must have a more intense appreciation of the value of money, and a greater disregard for the value of time, than I can conceive, if they insist on it.
All the peculiarities which distinguish British institutions from our own, might naturally be expected to make public men in that country more tenacious of privilege than our own statesmen. In a land of privilege, we should expect mere privilege to be coveted, because it is privilege. This practical and harmonious decision of British statesmen, of all parties, in favor of abolishing the franking privilege, in order to give strength and consistency to the system of cheap postage, shows in a striking light the sense which they entertained of the greatness of the object of cheap postage. The arguments which convinced them, we should naturally suppose would have tenfold greater force here than there; while the arguments in favor of the privilege would have tenfold greater influence there than here. Can there be a doubt that, when the subject is fairly understood, there will be found as much magnanimity among American as among British legislators?
The moral evils of the franking system are far more serious than the pecuniary expense, although that is by no means undeserving of regard. It is not only an ensnaring prerogative to those who enjoy it, and an anomaly and incongruity in our republican institutions, but it is an oppressive burden upon the post-office, which ought to be removed.
The parliamentary committee ascertained, by three distinct calculations, (of which all the results so nearly agreed as to strengthen each other,) that, reckoning by numbers, one-ninth of the letters passing through the post-office in a year, were franked. And, reckoning by weight, the proportion was 30 per cent. of the whole. Of seven millions of franked letters and documents, nearly five millions were by members of parliament. If all the franks had been subject to postage, they would have yielded upwards of a million sterling yearly. This was after the parliamentary franks had been restricted to a certain number (ten) daily for each member, and limited in weight to two ounces. The amount of postage on parliamentary franks would be yearly £350,000, averaging about £310 to each member. But there were a number of official persons, whose franks were not limited, either in number or weight. These franks were obtained and used, by those who could get them, without stint or scruple.
The celebrated Dr. Dionysius Lardner, who then occupied a prominent place among men of letters in Great Britain, testified before the parliamentary committee in 1838, that he was in the practice of sending and receiving about five thousand letters a year, of which he got four-fifths without postage—chiefly by franks. While he lived in Ireland, his correspondence was so heavy, not only as to the number of letters, but their bulk and weight, that he was obliged to apply to the Postmaster-General of Ireland, Lord Rosse, who allowed them to go under his franks. From the year 1823, or soon after he quitted the university, until the year 1828, his letters went and came under the frank of Lord Rosse, who had the power of franking to any weight. Since he came to England, his facilities of getting franks were very great. Without such means, he would have found it very difficult indeed to send his letters by post. His heavy correspondence was chiefly sent through official persons, who had the power of franking to any weight; and his correspondents knew that they could send their letters under care to these friends; so that he received communications from them in the same way. He endeavored to save as much trouble as he could, by dividing the annoyance among them, and by enclosing a bundle of letters for the same neighborhood under one cover. He said that, to obtain these privileges a man must be connected or known to the aristocratic classes, and that it was certainly unfair, as it gave unfair advantages to those who happened to have friends or connections having that power. His foreign correspondence was carried on through the embassies; and in this way the letters came free. He got his letters from the United States free in that way. Any man who was a Fellow of the Royal Society, or who lived among that class, could avail himself of these means of obtaining scientific communications.
The number of franked letters posted, throughout the kingdom, in two weeks in January, 1838, is stated in the following table.
Week ending Country to London to Country to Total London. country. country. 15 January, 41,196 43,345 36,361 122,902 29 January, 46,371 51,046 37,894 135,311 ——— ——— ——— ——— Total, 87,567 96,391 74,255 258,213 Proportion, .339 .373 .287 1.
It was stated in the debates, that before the franking privilege was limited, it had been worth, to some great commercial houses, who had a seat in parliament, from £300 to £800 a year; and that after the limitation it was worth to some houses as much as £300 a year. The committee spoke of the use of franks for scientific and business correspondence, as “an exemplification of the irregular means by which a scale of postage, too high for the interests and proper management of the affairs of the country, is forced to give way in particular instances. And like all irregular means, it is of most unfair and partial application; the relief depends, not on any general regulation, known to the public, and according to which relief can be obtained, but upon favor and opportunity; and the consequence is, that while the more pressing suitor obtains the benefit he asks, those of a more forbearing disposition pay the penalty of high postage.” It also keeps out of view of the public, “how much the cost of distribution is exceeded by the charge, and to what extent therefore the postage of letters is taxed” to sustain this official privilege. The committee therefore concluded in their report, that “taking into the account the serious loss to the public revenue, which is caused by the privilege of franking, and the inevitable abuse of that privilege in numerous cases where no public business is concerned, it would be politic in a financial point of view, and agreeable to the public sense of justice, if, on effecting the proposed reduction of the postage rates, the privilege of franking were to be abolished.” Only the post-office department now franks its own official correspondence; petitions to parliament are sent free; and parliamentary documents are charged at one-eighth the rate of letters. Letters _to_ the Queen also go free.
In our own country, the congressional franking privilege has long been a subject of complaint, both by the post-office authorities and the public press. There are many discrepancies in the several returns from which the extent of franking is to be gathered.
From a return made by the Postmaster General to the Senate, Jan. 16, 1844, the whole number of letters passing through the mails in a year is set at 27,073,144, of which the number franked is 2,815,692, which is a small fraction over 10 per cent.
The annual report of the Postmaster-General in 1837, estimates the whole number of letters at 32,360,992, of which 2,100,000, or a little over 6 per cent, were franked.
In February, 1844, the Postmaster-General communicated to Congress a statement of an account kept of the free letters and documents mailed at Washington, during three weeks of the sitting of Congress in 1840, of which the results appear in the following table.
Week ending Letters. Public Doc. Weight of Doc. May 2, 13,674 96,588 8,042 lbs. June 2, 13,955 108,912 9,076 July 7, 14,766 186,768 15,564 ——— ——— ——— Total, 42,395 392,268 32,689 Average, 14,132 140,756 10,896 Session 33 466,345 4,314,948 359,579 weeks,
Whole number of Letters and Documents in a session of thirty-three weeks, 4,781,293.
Average weight of Public Documents, 1-⅓ oz.
Of the 42,375 free letters, 20,362 were congressional, and 22,032, or 52 per cent. were from the Departments.
In the month of October, 1843, an account was kept at all the offices in the United States, of the number of letters franked and received in that month by members of Congress. The number was 18,558, which would give 81,370 for 19 weeks of vacation. To these add 223,992 mailed in 33 weeks of session, and four-fifths as many, 179,193, for letters received, and it gives a total of 484,555 letters received and sent free of postage by members of Congress in a year, besides the Public Documents. The postage on the letters, at the old rates, would have been $100,000.
From the same return of October, 1843, it appears that the number of letters franked and received by national and state officers, was 1,024,068; and by postmasters, 1,568,928; total, 2,592,998, the postage on which, at 14-½ cents, would amount to $376,073.
These calculations would give the loss on free letters, at that time, $476,073. This is besides the postage on the public documents, 359,578 pounds, the postage on which, at 2-½ cents per ounce, would come to $147,581.
Total postage lost by franking, $623,654.
Document No. 118, printed by the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, 1848, gives $312,500 as the amount of postage on franked letters, and $200,000 for franked documents, making a total of $512,500.
The report of the Post-office Committee of the House of Representatives, May 15, 1844, contains a return of the number of free letters mailed and received at the Washington post-office, during the week ending February 20, 1844, with the corresponding annual number, and the amount of postage, at the old rates—allowing the average length of a session of Congress to be six months. From this I have constructed the following table.
Departments Letters Letters Total No. Postage. received sent Annually. House of 1,882 1,505 Representatives Senate 7,510 10,271 —— —— Total of 9,392 11,776 550,368 $114,697 Congress President U. S. 304 174 24,856 4,895 Post Office 6,041 3,615 502,112 102,474 State 1,989 2,253 220,584 41,600 Department Treasury 6,800 2,405 478,660 100,949 Department War Department 2,592 2,626 271,336 61,475 Navy Department 1,709 2,082 197,132 39,809 Attorney-General 52 816 45,136 10,678 —— —— —— —— Total 2,290,184 $476,577
Whole number of letters franked at Washington: 2,290,184 Add, franked by members at home: 111,348 Franked by postmasters: 1,568,928 Total of free letters: 3,970,450 Add, franked documents: 4,314,948 General total number: 8,285,398 The postage on all which, at the old rates, would be at least: $1,000,000
The annual report of the Postmaster-General, December, 1847, estimates the number of free letters at five millions, the postage on which, at present rates, would be at least $375,000, to which the postage on the documents should be added.
The conclusion of the whole matter is, that the postage due on the free letters and documents, if reckoned according to the old rates, would be at least one million, and under the present rates above half a million of dollars annually; equal to 12 per cent of the whole gross income of the department.
When our present postage law was under consideration, the committees of both Houses recommended the abolition of the franking privilege, for reasons of justice, as well as to satisfy the public mind. The report of the House Committee has this passage: