Part 2

I immediately read the message to Capt. Naylor, who ordered his battery to cease firing. I asked him if he could see the enemy and our troops plainly, and he said he could. I then asked him if he was firing into our men, and he replied he was not. I then ran with the message to the commanding officer of the other battery to the right, who immediately ordered his battery to cease firing, and asked him the same questions. He denied that he was firing into our men or that he was firing on the western side of the mountain. I had watched the firing of the batteries and did not believe that they were firing into our own troops or that any of the shells went on the western side of the mountain. I did not think that Gen. Thomas would believe it, and as my messages went through headquarters at Chattanooga, with the consent of Capt. Naylor, whom I considered the commanding officer on the Point at that time, at 1:18 p.m. I sent the following message to Gen. Hooker:--

CAPT. NAYLOR, MOCCASIN POINT, says he can see the enemy's flank plainly and requests permission to fire at them.

(Signed) WOOD, CAPT. AND A.S.O.

At 2:35 p.m. I received the following message from headquarters at Chattanooga.

WOOD:--Gen. Thomas directs that the batteries on Point open on the Summertown road immediately.

(Signed) MERRILL.

Capt. Jesse Merrill was chief signal officer of the army of the Cumberland on Gen. Thomas' staff. About this time the mists descended on the mountain and the troops were hidden from view and there was a little rain. It did not become clear again until nearly dark, so that the batteries did not begin firing again, but I read the message to the commanding officers of the batteries and we considered it a sufficient vindication that Gen. Thomas did not believe that they were firing into Gen. Hooker's men. The musketry firing continued in the fog and the enemy made a desperate stand behind a large rock to the left of the Craven house and in defending the Summertown road on the eastern side of the mountain. The heavy firing ceased about 2 p.m. Gen. Hooker's troops had exhausted their ammunition and no ammunition trains could now reach them. At 5 p.m. Gen. Carlin's brigade of the 1st division 14th corps crossed Chattanooga creek near its mouth and ascended the mountain to Gen. Hooker's right. The troops of this brigade carried on their persons ammunition for Hooker's skirmishers in addition to their ordinary supply for themselves. As night settled down the skirmishing continued very heavy, the flashes of the muskets on the side of the mountain presenting a brilliant sight to the spectators. Under cover of the skirmishing the mountain was evacuated and in the morning there were no troops to be seen on the northern slope. The weather was a little foggy, but as it gradually cleared, a line of troops without colors displayed could be seen in the valley through an opening in the trees, marching towards Missionary Ridge. Not being able to distinguish whether they were the enemy's or our own, at 9:30 a.m. Nov. 25 I sent the following message to Capt. Jesse Merrill at army headquarters:--

Can see a long line of infantry on ridge beyond Chattanooga creek a little east of South. Are they our troops?

Not receiving an answer very promptly, I left a man to watch the station on Cameron Hill with my marine glass, and unfastening my telescope from the stake to which it was attached, hastened to the guns on the point, and looking through it could see plainly by the gray and jean uniforms, the slouched hats and the furled colors, that the troops were Confederates, and asked Lt. Crosby to look at them and if he thought he could reach them, but he said that he could not train his guns upon them. At 10:10 a.m. I sent the following message to Capt. Leonard:--

Fifty degrees east of south and about two miles distant, a heavy column of rebels marching towards Mission Ridge.

Shortly after I received this answer to my message to Capt. Merrill:--

I do not know.

Some daring soldiers of the 8th Kentucky were the first to scale the palisades and unfurl the national flag on the summit of Lookout Mountain. As the fog lifted it soon became apparent that the left flank of the enemy had been turned and the forces which held the mountain had been transferred to Missionary Ridge. In this battle Gen. Hooker had two divisions and two brigades, seven brigades in all of 9680 men, and in the evening was reinforced by the brigade of Gen. Carlin, three regiments of which were engaged. Gen. Stevenson, the Confederate general, commanded two divisions of six brigades on the mountain, and another brigade was sent to reinforce him but too late to be of any value. He reports that only four of his brigades were in action. The casualties in a few of the regiments under Gen. Hooker were not reported until after the fighting at Ringgold and Graysville, when the total was given for the four days; but the loss at Lookout Mountain was about 75 killed and 375 wounded, a total of 450. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was about the same and Gen. Hooker captured between 2000 and 3000 prisoners, five stand of colors, two pieces of artillery and 5000 muskets, and 20,000 rations and camp and garrison equipage for three brigades were abandoned on the summit of the mountain.

Owing to bad weather and roads Gen. Sherman had been delayed in crossing the Tennessee. Gen. Howard's corps had been detached from Gen. Hooker and was formed in close column north and west of Fort Wood Nov. 23. The 4th and 14th corps extended from Citico creek north of Chattanooga around Forts Wood and Negley, and Academy and Cameron Hills. On the morning of the 24th Gen. Sherman was crossing the river above Chattanooga. The utmost efforts had been made by Gen. W. F. Smith to provide the pontoon bridges for Gen. Sherman's troops to cross the river near the mouth of Chickamauga creek to attack the enemy's right flank. The river at the point selected for the crossing was 1300 feet wide, and two bridges were proposed, and one also for the mouth of South Chickamauga 180 feet in length. As it was expected that the enemy would contest the passage every precaution had been taken to keep the projected bridges a profound secret. The pontoons had been hauled on by-roads on the north side of the Tennessee to the North Chickamauga creek, eight miles above Chattanooga, and there launched and concealed, in readiness to be floated down to the place of crossing. At midnight on Nov. 23d, 116 boats with a brigade left the North Chickamauga and floated quietly to the place of crossing. They were landed above and below the mouth of South Chickamauga and were first used to transport troops from the opposite shore. By daylight two divisions were over and the construction of the bridge was under vigorous prosecution. The steamer Dunbar from Chattanooga, which had been captured in a disabled condition and repaired by our soldiers, was also of great assistance in transporting the troops, especially as on account of the rise in the river from heavy rains, more pontoons were needed and but one bridge could be thrown. Just as the last boat was connected Gen. Howard with one brigade of infantry and a small cavalry escort arrived from Chattanooga without having met with any resistance. Leaving his brigade to skirmish on the right of Gen. Sherman's advance at his request, he returned to Chattanooga with his escort. The bridge was finished at 11 a.m., and at 1 p.m. Gen. Sherman moved forward with three divisions in echelon. He met with no serious resistance and at 4 p.m. occupied the two northern summits of Missionary Ridge. There was still one summit between Gen. Sherman and the tunnel. Gen. Grant had expected that he would carry the ridge to the tunnel before the enemy could concentrate against him; but the intervening hill was the one upon which Gen. Bragg's right flank rested. The crest of Missionary Ridge is divided into distinct summits throughout its whole length by numerous depressions. The deepest of these between the Tennessee river and Rossville separates the second summit, which Gen. Sherman had gained from the third, which was the strongest position for lateral defense within Gen. Bragg's lines. Here Gen. Cleburne's famous division was placed. Heavy barricades constructed of logs and earth, covered the troops on the first defensive line, while the higher ground to the south gave room for successive supporting columns. A somewhat thickly planted forest gave additional protection to the enemy. It was the strength of this position that induced Gen. Bragg to yield the first two hills to Gen. Sherman. Their abandonment shortened his line while the depression on his right and the slopes east and west placed his enemy under his guns on every practicable line of attack. Gen. Bragg now had his entire army on the ridge. Cleburne's and Gist's divisions were on the extreme right opposed to Gen. Sherman, his left was held by Stewart's division, his center by Breckenridge's division and portions of the commands of Buckner and Hindman under Gen. Anderson, and the divisions of Cheatham and Stevenson from Lookout Mountain were in motion toward the right. Gen. Sherman opened the battle of Nov. 25 soon after sunrise by the advance of Gen. Corse's brigade from the right center. Gen. Corse moved down the southern slope of the second hill gained the night before and under a destructive fire ascended towards Cleburne's fortified position. He gained a lateral elevation about eighty yards distant from the enemy's defenses and held it firmly. Advancing repeatedly from this position he was as often driven back and in turn repulsed every attack of the enemy. In the meantime Gen. Morgan L. Smith's division advanced along the eastern base of the hill and Loomis' brigade supporting Corse on the left was sustained by the two reserve brigades of Gen. John E. Smith's division. Gen. Morgan L. Smith pressed his attack to the enemy's works but gained no permanent lodgement. The character and issue of this contest was observed by Gen. Grant from Orchard Knob.

Pending Gen. Sherman's series of attacks there had been some activity on the right flank of the Union army. Early in the morning Gen. Thomas had directed Gen. Hooker to move with his forces except two regiments to hold the mountain on the road to Rossville. Later he had ordered him to advance upon the enemy's works in conjunction with the 14th corps under Gen. Palmer. Gen. Hooker advanced rapidly to Chattanooga creek, but was there delayed to restore a bridge which the enemy had destroyed in his retreat from the mountain. It was evident from the importance of the position that Gen. Bragg would maintain his right if possible. Gen. Sherman was threatening not only to turn that flank, but was also menacing his rear and his depot of supplies at Chickamauga station. In the mean time Gen. Hooker had attained position on the enemy's left flank which caused him to retreat to Rossville. Gen. Hooker then disposed his troops to sweep Missionary Ridge toward the north. He directed Gen. Osterhaus to cross to the east side, Gen. Cruft to advance on the summit and Gen. Geary on the western slope and edge of the valley. Gen. Grant had waited for Gen. Sherman's success in turning the enemy's right flank since early morning, and during the afternoon he had waited for Gen. Hooker to engage his left. The day was now nearly gone and some new measure was necessary or the sun would set with Gen. Bragg in possession of Missionary Ridge. Four divisions were in front of Gen. Bragg's center, now held by less than four divisions, as a portion of Stewart's on the extreme left, under the direction of Gen. Breckenridge, had been sent against Gen. Hooker. From 11 a.m. until after 3 p.m. Confederate troops were plainly seen on the crest of the ridge marching past Gen. Bragg's headquarters to reinforce his right. In order to relieve the pressure on Gen. Sherman, Gen. Grant ordered Gen. Thomas to advance with the army of the Cumberland and attack Gen. Bragg's center. The order required that the enemy should be dislodged from the rifle-pits and intrenchments at the base of Missionary Ridge. His four divisions from right to left were Johnson's, Sheridan's, Woods' and Baird's, consisting of eleven brigades of about 20,000 men. Two lines of skirmishers covered the battle front and such troops as were designated as reserves were massed in rear of their respective organizations. Gen. Thomas' line was more than a mile long. Most of the houses between the lines had been destroyed and the trees cut down and used for fuel. To the east and south of Fort Wood the plain was barren. At five minutes past 4 p.m. six successive cannon shots from the battery on Orchard Knob gave the signal for the advance. At the sixth discharge the line moved forward in splendid array with colors flying and bayonets fixed. The batteries of the enemy on the ridge immediately opened upon them with great activity. Gen. Brannan's heavy guns in Forts Wood, Negley, Sheridan and Rosseau and four light batteries on the intermediate hills gave emphatic response. Their fire was at first directed to the enemy's inferior intrenchments, and when that endangered the advancing lines, their missiles were thrown upon the summit of Missionary Ridge. The change of direction was soon necessary, as the troops in rapid movement first met the enemy's pickets and their reserves, and then his stronger line in his lower intrenchments, and drove all in confusion to the crest of the ridge. The advance of the Union troops had been so rapid that the forces which had so often repeated their furious assaults at Chickamauga lost courage and made no soldierly efforts to maintain their positions, though supported by at least fifty guns which at short range were fast decimating the assaulting columns. Having executed their orders holding the enemy's lower defenses, the four divisions stood under his batteries while the troops they had routed threw themselves behind the stronger intrenchments on the summit. To stand still was death, to fall back was not compassed by orders and was forbidden by every impulse of the brave men who with no stragglers had moved so boldly and so successfully upon the foe.

Missionary Ridge rises to a height of between 400 and 500 feet. The trees had been cut down and the slope was rough and uneven, in places rocky and covered with trunks and stumps of trees. There were rifle-pits half way up and just below the crest a strong line of intrenchments. While looking through my telescope at the lower line almost directly in front of Gen. Bragg's headquarters, in less than a minute after they had been taken and before the enemy who were driven out had reached the crest, I saw a few of our men start up the hill in pursuit. The movement extended first to the left and afterwards to the right. I exclaimed, "They are going up the hill, may God help them," and some one standing near by said, "Amen." We did not expect it and it looked like a forlorn hope. The cannonade was terrific. Sometimes our men would halt for a few seconds until others came up, but none went back. The enthusiasm spread and our men kept advancing, inclining a little to the right, taking advantage of what cover there was or stopping to reload, though there was not much firing on their part. During the assault a caisson on the crest a little to the north of Gen. Bragg's headquarters was struck by a shell, probably from Fort Wood, and exploded with great effect, a column of smoke rising high in the air; and not long after another exploded further to the north in a similar manner. Just before our line of troops appeared on the crest I saw a group of men run a gun from the intrenchment to the top of the ridge, fire it to the south along the line of intrenchments and then turn it around and fire it at the fleeing enemy on the other side of the ridge. Capt. McMahon of the 41st Ohio writes: "His regiment was on the right of the first line of Gen. Hazen's brigade. The right company of the regiment captured a section of artillery on the crest, turned the guns, enfiladed the crest and drove the enemy in Gen. Sheridan's front into a precipitate retreat." In a few moments more the crest of the ridge was occupied all along the front of the army of the Cumberland and Gen. Bragg's center was routed. Gen. Hooker soon after swept the ridge northward from Rossville connecting with Gen. Johnson's right. Gen. Hardee's forces opposite Gen. Sherman alone maintained their position. From Gen. Bragg's own declaration and from the observation of those occupying elevated positions, there is no room to doubt that Gen. Thomas J. Wood's division first reached the summit.[1] Gen. Sheridan's and Gen. Baird's, on the right and left, very soon after gained the crest. Gen. Wood's troops enfiladed the enemy's line to the right and left as soon as they broke through it. Many isolated contests were conducted with spirit by the enemy but the fragments of his line were speedily brushed away.

[1] According to Confederate testimony, which in this case is impartial, the right of Willich's and left of Hazen's brigades, Wood's Division, were the first Union troops to reach the crest of the ridge. (See Obituary of Gen. Thos. J. Wood, Thirty-Fourth Reunion, Society of the Army of the Cumberland, October, 1906, page 98.)

About 6 p.m. I saw a signal flag on a hill in Chattanooga valley near the ridge calling my station, and answering the call received the following message which I forwarded to the Cameron Hill station.

GEN. THOMAS:--I think we have got them, but I want a battery.

(Signed) GEN. GRANGER.

The impulse to carry the summit of the ridge was seemingly spontaneous and from different points several brigades passed beyond the limit fixed by Gen. Grant's order before there was any concerted action toward a general assault. Gens. Bragg, Hardee, Breckenridge and others of inferior rank exerted themselves to prevent defeat, and Gen. Bragg was nearly surrounded before he entirely despaired and abandoned the field. Gen. Breckenridge resisted Gen. Hooker as he ascended the ridge at Rossville, availing himself of the intrenchments which had been constructed by the Union army after the battle of Chickamauga. His first resistance was quickly overcome by Grose's brigade. Gen. Cruft's division was then formed in four lines on the summit, and with the lateral division abreast moved rapidly forward, driving the enemy in turn from several positions. Many of his troops that fled east or west were captured by Osterhaus or Geary, and those who tried to escape northward fell into Johnson's hands. As soon as Gen. Hardee heard the noise of battle to his left he hastened to join his troops under Gen. Anderson on the right of their central line, but before he could cross the chasm corresponding to the interval between Gen. Sherman's right and Gen. Thomas' left, Anderson's command was thrown into a confused retreat. He then hurried Cheatham's division from the vicinity of the tunnel and formed it across the summit to resist Baird's division which had advanced northward after carrying its entire front in the assault. In a severe contest in which Col. Phelps, a brigade commander, fell, Gen. Baird pressed this fresh division northward from several knolls, but was finally compelled to abandon the conflict by the peculiar strength of a new position and the approach of darkness. The victory was gained too late in the day for a general pursuit. Gen. Sheridan's division and Willich's brigade of Wood's division pursued the enemy for a short distance down the eastern slope. Later Gen. Sheridan advanced and drove the enemy from a strong position, captured two pieces of artillery, numerous small arms and several wagons from a supply train. Darkness was now fast coming on and the pursuit could no longer be continued, so the troops bivouacked on the ridge for the night. Gen. Cleburne on Gen. Bragg's right had been able to hold the bridge over the Chickamauga on his right and when night fell Gen. Hardee withdrew his troops from the position which was so persistently held against Gen. Sherman, saving his arms and material.

Now that Gen. Bragg had been defeated, Gen. Grant, who had been very anxious about Gen. Burnside, gave attention equally to the pursuit of the routed enemy and the relief of Knoxville; and during the evening of the 25th gave orders to Gen. Thomas to recall the 4th corps to prepare for forced marches to Knoxville, and in conjunction with Gen. Sherman to pursue the enemy with his available troops. Accordingly Gen. Thomas ordered Wood's and Sheridan's divisions to return to Chattanooga and Gens. Hooker and Palmer, the latter with two divisions, to move in pursuit of the enemy. The generals moved on the morning of the 26th, Hooker leading. The troops were delayed at West Chickamauga and Peavine creek, where bridges had to be constructed. At 9 p.m. the enemy was overtaken near Graysville, and on being attacked by Stoughton's brigade fled in all directions. At 11 p.m. the enemy was again attacked and one gun and a number of prisoners taken.

On the following day the columns advanced to Ringgold, where a stand was made. Gen. Hooker was without artillery, but he determined to feel the enemy at once. The skirmish line was driven back upon the main line and the exact position of a battery was ascertained. The endeavor to pick off the gunners provoked the enemy to advance against Gen. C. R. Woods' line. His skirmishers fell back and the main line repulsed the enemy handsomely and followed them into a gorge. Cleburne's division was engaged and its dead and wounded were abandoned as it gave ground. The enemy having been developed in force in a strong position, troops were moved to support those who had been engaged and the action was arrested in waiting for the artillery. Between 12 and 1 p.m. the guns came upon the field and were put in position and the dispositions were made to renew the attack; but the enemy having succeeded in delaying pursuit withdrew, attempting to burn the bridges beyond the town. He was so closely followed, however, that the bridges were saved. Gen. Grant having reached the field gave orders to discontinue the pursuit, but in the afternoon Col. Grose was sent forward with his brigade to Tunnel Hill. Grose soon encountered the enemy's cavalry and drove them upon the infantry. Ascertaining that there was a strong column in a strong position, he returned to Ringgold. Gen. Hooker lost according to his report 65 killed and 377 wounded. Col. Creighton and several officers fell. The enemy left 130 dead on the field and 230 as prisoners; his wounded was not known.

Very early in the morning of Nov. 26 Gen. Davis was ordered by Gen. Sherman to cross his division on the pontoon bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga and pursue the enemy, and Gen. Howard was ordered to repair a bridge two miles up the creek and follow. Davis in advance reached Chickamauga Station at 11 a.m., in time to witness the burning of the depot building and the greater portion of the supplies. A short distance beyond, the enemy was found partially intrenched, but was speedily forced to retreat. He was pursued and overtaken at dark, when a sharp conflict ensued, but the darkness covered his escape. In the morning Davis reached Graysville and found himself in the rear of Hooker's command. Gen. Howard advanced through Parker's Gap further east and detached a column to destroy railroad communication between Bragg and Longstreet. These movements terminated the pursuit of the enemy.