Part 6

Thus, crowned with success, though won at terrible cost, closed the last campaign of General Rosecrans. It was matchless in its strategy, unequaled in the skill and energy with which his outnumbered army was concentrated for battle. Its stubborn, desperate, and heroic fighting throughout the two days' battle was not surpassed, and, judged by its returns of dead and wounded, not equaled in any one of the great battles of the war. It secured the city which it marched to capture. The loss was no greater than the country would have expected at any time in attaining that result. If Rosecrans had crossed the river in front of the city and captured it with even greater loss, the country would have gone wild with enthusiasm. Had he been properly supported from Washington he would have entered it without a battle, since, if there had been even a show of activity elsewhere, Bragg's army would not have been nearly doubled with re-enforcements and thus enabled to march back on Chattanooga after its retreat from the city. The reverse on the field on Sunday was not the disaster which at the time it was declared to be, and which it has ever since suited several writers of military fiction to persistently represent. The account herewith presented shows that after General Thomas consolidated his lines at 1 o'clock on Sunday not a single position was carried and held by the enemy. The withdrawal, which began soon after 5 o'clock, was not in any sense forced. There is not an officer or soldier who fought on those lines but knows that they could have been held throughout till dark.

The accepted version of Sunday's break on Rosecrans's right is that the two corps of Crittenden and McCook were swept off the field; but only five brigades of McCook's entire corps left the field, and the fragments which went from Crittenden would not exceed two brigades. Palmer's and Johnson's divisions, which fought splendidly to the end under Thomas on the left, were respectively from Crittenden's and McCook's corps. Wood belonged to Crittenden. Barnes's brigade, which fought on the extreme left, and part of Dick's and Samuel Beatty's were all of Van Cleve's division of Crittenden's corps. In other words, the large part of Crittenden's force fought to the last. Four regiments of Wilder's brigade of Reynolds's division were detached and cut off with the right, and a considerable part of Negley's division of Thomas went to the rear, chiefly through the bad conduct of its commander. We have seen, however, how persistently and effectively Stanley's and John Beatty's brigades of that division fought, and Beatty and General Charles Grosvenor and Sirwell and Stoughton, of these brigades, were all found fighting like private soldiers on the hill with Wood and Brannan to the last. The battle of Sunday was, then, not the fight of any one corps, but of the Army of the Cumberland. There was no disorderly retreat of the army on Chattanooga, and nothing approaching it. The greater portion of the right wing, which was cut off and certainly thrown into much confusion, was reorganized at Rossville, and occupied its place in line at that point throughout the next day and until the army moved on in the night to occupy Chattanooga. The battle was desperate from the moment it opened till its close. For the most part the lines fought at close range and, in the countless assaults, often hand to hand. On the first day there were no field works of any kind. On the second Thomas was protected by such rude log works as could be hastily thrown together. Brannan and Steedman were without a semblance of works. The battle in the main, on both sides, was dogged, stand-up fighting far within the limit of point blank range. For the second day, on the Confederate side, the contest was one continued series of brave and magnificent assaults.

General Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee with an effective force of all arms equipped for duty of a few hundred more than 60,000. Of this number Wagner's brigade, with 2,061 effectives, held Chattanooga, leaving the Union force in front of Bragg slightly less than 58,000. It was several thousand less at the battle, Post's brigade of Davis' division and three regiments of infantry and one battery being engaged in guarding supply trains.

In a letter from General Lee to President Davis, dated September 14, 1863, the following figures of Bragg's actual and prospective strength are thus stated:

"If the report sent to me by General Cooper since my return from Richmond is correct, General Bragg had, on the 20th of August last, 51,101 effective men; General Buckner, 16,118. He was to receive from General Johnson 9,000. His total force will, therefore, be 76,219, as large a number as I presume he can operate with. This is independent of the local troops, which, you may recollect, he reported as exceeding his expectations."

It will be well to remember, in connection with these official figures, that Bragg, after the battle, reported Longstreet's force, which was not included by Lee, at 5,000. This, according to the figures furnished General Lee, gave Bragg 81,219. According to General Johnson's correspondence, after he had sent 9,000 to Bragg, he subsequently dispatched him two small brigades, and these, later, reached him the day before the battle.

A reference to the losses on each side will show that there has been no exaggeration in the description of the fighting. Rosecrans's loss was 16,179. This included 4,774 missing, of which a large number were killed or wounded. Bragg's losses, as compiled and estimated at the War Records Office, were 17,804. Thus the entire loss for each army was over twenty-five per cent. of the entire force of each. Hill's corps of the Confederate right wing lost 2,990 out of a total 8,884. Of the 22,885 in Longstreet's left wing the loss was 7,856, with one brigade heavily engaged not reported. Longstreet's loss on Sunday afternoon was thirty-six per cent, of those engaged.

The casualties in Jackson's brigade of Cleburne's division, which assaulted on Baird's front, was 35 per cent., while the Fifth Georgia, of that brigade, lost 55 per cent., and the First Confederate Regulars 43 per cent. Gregg's brigade, of Buckner's corps, lost 652 out of 1,425. Helm's Kentucky brigade, on the Union left, lost 75 per cent. of its strength. Bate's brigade lost 7 officers killed and 61 officers wounded, and the total casualties were 607 out of 1,316. All his field officers except three were killed or wounded. The losses in Govan's brigade, of Walker's corps, exceeded 50 per cent. Deas, who fought in front of Steedman's assault, lost 745 out of 1,942. Walthall, of Walker, lost 705 out of 1,727. On the Union side Steedman in four hours lost 1,787 out of 3,700, and all were killed and wounded but one. Brannan's division had 5,998 engaged. Its casualties were 2,174, or 38 per cent. The loss in Van Derveer's brigade, of this division, in four regiments and one battery, was 840 out of 1,788 engaged, or 49 per cent. Croxton's brigade, of the same division, made up of five regiments, lost 938. Of Van Derveer's regiments the Ninth Ohio lost 50 per cent.; the Thirty-fifth Ohio, a small fraction less than 50 per cent.; the Second Minnesota 192, or exactly 50 per cent., and the Eighty-seventh Indiana about half of its number. General Wood lost 1,070 in two brigades.

These figures become the more significant when compared with the statement of losses in the world's noted battles. General Wheeler, the distinguished Confederate cavalry commander, thus vividly presented this question at the gathering of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland and Confederates, at Chattanooga, in 1881:

"Waterloo was one of the most desperate and bloody fields chronicled in European history and yet Wellington's casualties were less than 12 per cent., his losses being 2,432 killed and 9,528 wounded out of 90,000 men, while at Shiloh, the first great battle in which General Grant was engaged, one side lost in killed and wounded 9,740 out of 34,000, while their opponents reported their killed and wounded at 9,616, making the casualties about 30 per cent. At the great battle of Wagram Napoleon lost but about 5 per cent. At Wurzburg the French lost but 3-1/2 per cent., and yet the army gave up the field and retreated to the Rhine. At Racour Marshal Saxe lost but 2-1/2 per cent. At Zurich Massena lost but 8 per cent. At Lagriz Frederick lost but 6-1/2 per cent. At Malplaquet Marlborough lost but 10 per cent., and at Ramillies the same intrepid commander lost but 6 per cent. At Contras Henry of Navarre was reported as cut to pieces, yet his loss was less than 10 per cent. At Lodi Napoleon lost 1-1/4 per cent. At Valmy Frederick lost but 3 per cent., and at the great battles of Marengo and Austerlitz, sanguinary as they were, Napoleon lost an average of less than 14-1/2 per cent. At Magenta and Solferino, in 1859, the average loss of both armies was less than 9 per cent. At Konigrattz, in 1866, it was 6 per cent. At Werth, Specheran, Mars la Tour, Gravelotte, and Sedan, in 1870, the average loss was 12 percent. At Linden General Moreau lost but 4 per cent., and the Archduke John lost but 7 per cent. in killed and wounded. Americans can scarcely call this a lively skirmish.

"At Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Atlanta, Gettysburg, Mission Ridge, the Wilderness, and Spottsylvania the loss frequently reached and sometimes exceeded forty per cent., and the average of killed and wounded on one side or the other was over thirty per cent."

Those who remained at Chickamauga and fought till the night of Sunday came, when, for many regiments, every other comrade was dead or wounded, were satisfied with the result, and have always maintained that Chickamauga was fought for Chattanooga, and have so regarded it as a great and notable victory. General D. H. Hill in a recent _Century_ article thus sums up the result for the Confederate side: "A breathing space was allowed him; the panic among his troops subsided, and Chattanooga--the objective point of the campaign--was held. There was no more splendid fighting in '61, when the flower of the Southern youth was in the field, than was displayed in those bloody days of September, '63. But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga--that brilliant dash which had distinguished him on a hundred fields was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay to strike was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope. That 'barren victory' sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy."

The authorities at Washington, to cover their own shortcomings and inexcusable neglect, chose to deepen the erroneous impression that the Army of the Cumberland had been routed and driven back to Chattanooga in confusion. The removal of General Rosecrans was determined upon. In fact, it had been only a question of opportunity since the campaign opened. There was only needed the misrepresentations about Chickamauga to furnish this.

In the mean time General Rosecrans thoroughly fortified Chattanooga and was actually engaged in preparations to open the river for supplies, exactly as it was afterwards done, when he was removed. In fact, his plan was partially perfected before he crossed the river, as is shown by the fact that he made written contracts with Northern firms to have bridges completed by October 1 for the Tennessee at Bridgeport, and the Running Water at Wauhatchie. He had ordered the thorough reconnoitering of the river bank opposite the north end of Missionary Ridge--where Sherman afterward crossed with a view of a flank attack there. It was, therefore, altogether fitting and proper that the order for his relief should arrive while he was absent making a personal examination of the vicinity of Brown's Ferry, where he intended to throw a bridge to unite with Hooker from Bridgeport and open the river exactly as was afterward done. He had even notified Harker of the plan three days before and ordered him to be ready to execute his part of it. General Thomas, at first, insisted that he would resign rather than appear to acquiesce in Rosecrans's removal by accepting the command. It was at Rosecrans's earnest solicitation that he reconsidered this determination. But he did not hesitate to say that the order was cruelly unjust. When General Garfield left for Washington soon after the battle he immediately charged him to do all he could to have Rosecrans righted. These will be new statements to most, but they are true.

The survivors of the Army of the Cumberland should awake to great pride in this notable field of Chickamauga. Why should it not, as well as Eastern fields, be marked by monuments, and its lines accurately preserved for history? There was no more magnificent fighting during the war than both armies did there. Both sides might well unite in preserving the field where both, in a military sense, won such renown.

H. V. B.

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Transcriber's note

Minor punctuation errors have been changed without notice. Printer errors have been changed and are listed below. All other inconsistencies are as in the original.

Characters that could not be displayed directly in Latin-1 are transcribed as follows:

_ - Italics

Page 5: "Chicamauga" changed to "Chickamauga".

Page 5: "vordict" changed to "verdict".

Page 6: "maneuvred" changed to "maneuvered".

Page 12: "Wilder swan" changed to "Wilder swam".

Page 13: "precipitious" changed to "precipitous".

Page 13: "resit" changed to "resist".

Page 13: "Raccoon Mountains" changed to "Raccoon Mountain".

Page 13: "similar" changed to "similar".

Page 13: "Lookoot" changed to "Lookout".

Page 15: "basis" changed to "bases".

Page 16: "culimnated" changed to "culminated".

Page 16: "through" changed to "though".

Page 16: "Lookout Mountains" changed to "Lookout Mountain".

Page 16: "Pigeon Mountains" changed to "Pigeon Mountain".

Page 17: "fortanate" changed to "fortunate".

Page 17: "Rosecran's" changed to "Rosecrans'".

Page 19: "re enforcing" changed to "re-enforcing".

Page 19: "Chicamauga" changed to "Chickamauga".

Page 20: "Tenessee" changed to "Tennessee".

Page 20: "struggte" changed to "struggle".

Page 20: "Johston" changed to "Johnston".

Page 22: "Chicamauga" changed to "Chickamauga".

Page 22: "Infantry" changed to "infantry".

Page 22: "Braggs's plan" changed to "Bragg's plan".

Page 26: "Telford's" changed to "Tedford's".

Page 26: "reconnoissance" changed to "reconnaissance".

Page 29: "presentoed" changed to "presented".

Page 30: "Layfayette" changed to "Lafayette".

Page 30: "earrying" changed to "carrying".

Page 31: "David was" changed to "Davis was".

Page 32: "Starkweathar" changed to "Starkweather".

Page 34: "Breckrinridge, to" changed to "Breckinridge, to".

Page 35: "Layfayette" changed to "Lafayette".

Page 35: "plainful quiet" changed to "painful quiet".

Page 36: "Breckenridge" changed to "Breckinridge".

Page 37: "Breckenridge" changed to "Breckinridge".

Page 37: "Breckenridge's" changed to "Breckinridge's".

Page 38: "Stoval" changed to "Stovall".

Page 38: "noth" changed to "north".

Page 40: "Brechinridge" changed to "Breckinrdige".

Page 40: "unexpectly" changed to "unexpectedly".

Page 40: "detrimeat" changed to "detriment".

Page 40: "occurred" changed to "occurred".

Page 41: "through a considerable" changed to "though a considerable".

Page 41: "Laibolt's" changed to "Laiboldt's".

Page 41: "Longstreets'" changed to "Longstreet's".

Page 43: "final assanlt" changed to "final assault".

Page 44: "Breckenridge" changed to "Breckinridge".

Page 45: "direet fire" changed to "direct fire".

Page 47: "assauit was made" changed to "assault was made".

Page 50: "begun soon" changed to "began soon".

Page 53: "Navarra" changed to "Navarre".

Page 53: "enthusiam" changed to "enthusiasm".

End of Project Gutenberg's Chattanooga and Chickamauga, by Henry V. Boynton