Charles Sumner: his complete works, volume 20 (of 20)
Part 2
In the same spirit with the last triviality, but in the anxiety to clutch at something, it is said that the Alabama Claims are endangered by this inquiry. Very well, Sir. On this point I am clear. If these historic claims, so interesting to the American people, are to be pressed at the cost of purity in our own Government, they are not worth the terrible price. Better give them up at once. Let them all go, every dollar. “First pure, then peaceable”;[4] above all things purity. Sir, I have from the beginning insisted that England should be held to just account for her violation of international duty toward us. Is that any reason why I should not also insist upon inquiry into the conduct of officials at home, to the end that the Government may be saved from reproach? Surely we shall be stronger, infinitely stronger, in demanding our own rights, if we show a determination to allow no wrong among ourselves. Our example must not be quoted against us at any time. Especially must it not be allowed to harden into precedent. But this can be prevented only by prompt correction, so that it shall be without authority. Therefore, because I would have my country irresistible in its demands, do I insist that it shall place itself above all suspicion.
The objection of Senators is too much like the old heathen cry, “Our country, right or wrong.” Unhappy words, which dethrone God and exalt the Devil! I am for our country with the aspiration that it may be always right; but I am for nothing wrong. When I hear of wrong, I insist at all hazards that it shall be made right, knowing that in this way I best serve my country and every just cause.
This same objection assumes another form, equally groundless, when it is said that I reflect upon our country and hurt its good name. Oh, no! They reflect upon our country and hurt its good name who at the first breath of suspicion fail to act. Our good name is not to be preserved by covering up anything. Not in secrecy, but in daylight, must we live. What sort of good name is that which has a cloud gathering about it? Our duty is to dispel the cloud. Especially is this the duty of the Senate. Here at least must be that honest independence which shall insist at all times upon purity in the Government, no matter what office-holders are exposed.
Again it is said that our good name cannot be compromised by these suspicions. This is a mistake. Any suspicion of wrong is a compromise, all the more serious when it concerns not only money, but the violation of neutral obligations. And the actual fact is precisely according to reason. Now while we debate, the national character is compromised at Paris, at London, at Berlin, at Geneva, where all these things are known as much as in this Chamber. But your indifference, especially after this debate, will not tend to elevate the national character either at home or abroad.
Such are some of the objections to which I reply. They are words only, as Hamlet says, “Words, words, words.” From words let us pass to things.
* * * * *
Mr. President, I come now to the simple question before the Senate, which I presented originally, whether there is not sufficient reason for inquiry into the sale of arms during the French and German War. I state the question thus broadly. The inquiry is into the sale of arms; and this opens two questions,--first, of international duty; and, secondly, of misfeasance in our officials, the latter involving what may be compendiously called the money question.
My object is simply to show grounds for inquiry; and I naturally begin with the rule of international duty.
In the discharge of neutral obligations a nation is bound to _good faith_. This is the supreme rule, to which all else is subordinate. This is the starting-point of all that is done. Without good faith neutral obligations must fail. In proportion to the character of this requirement must be the completeness of its observance. There can be no evasion, not a jot. Any evasion is a breach, without the bravery of open violation. But evasion may be sometimes by closing the eyes to existing facts, or even by acting without sufficient inquiry. These things are so plain and entirely reasonable as to be self-evident.
Now nothing can be more clear than that no neutral nation is permitted to furnish arms and war material to a belligerent power. Such is a simple statement of the law. I do not cite authorities, as I did it amply on a former occasion.[5]
But there is an excellent author whom I would add to the list as worthy of consideration, especially at this moment, in view of the loose pretensions put forth in the debate. I refer to Mr. Manning, who, in his Commentaries, thus teaches neutral duty:--
“It is no interference with the right of a third party to say that he shall not carry to my enemy instruments with which I am to be attacked. Such commerce is, on the other hand, a deviation from neutrality,--or rather would be so, _if it were the act of a State_ and not of individuals.”[6]
The distinction is obvious between what can be done by the individual and what can be done by the State. The individual may play the merchant and take the risk of capture; but the State cannot play the merchant in dealing with a belligerent. Of course, if the foreign power is at peace, there is no question; but when the power has become belligerent, then it is excluded from the market. So far as that power is concerned, all sales must be suspended. The interdict is peremptory and absolute. In such a case there can be no sale knowingly without mixing in the war,--precisely as France mixed in the war of our Revolution in those muskets sent by the witty Beaumarchais, which England resented by open war.
And this undoubted principle of International Law was recognized by the Secretary of War, when he directed the Chief of Ordnance not to entertain any bids from E. Remington & Sons, who had stated that they were agents of the French Government. In giving these orders he only followed the rule of duty on which the country can stand without question or reproach; but it remains to be seen whether persons under him did not content themselves with obeying the order in letter only, breaking it in spirit. I assume that the order was given in good faith. Was it obeyed in good faith? Here we start with the admitted postulate that it was wrong to sell arms to France.
But if this cannot be done directly, it is idle to say that it can be done indirectly without a violation of good faith. If it cannot be done openly, it cannot be done privily. If it cannot be done above-board, it cannot be done clandestinely. It is idle to reject the bid of the open agent of a belligerent power and then at once accept the bid of another who may be a mere man-of-straw, unless after careful inquiry into his real character.
Nothing can be clearer than the duty of the proper officers to consider all bids in the sunlight of the conspicuous events then passing. A terrible war was convulsing the Old World. Two mighty nations were in conflict, one of which was already prostrate _and disarmed_. Meanwhile came bids for arms and war material on a gigantic scale, on a scale absolutely unprecedented. Plainly these powerful batteries, these muskets by the hundred thousand, and these cartridges by the million were for the disarmed belligerent and nobody else. It was impossible not to see it. It is insulting to common-sense to imagine it otherwise. Who else could need arms and war material to the amount of four million dollars at once? Now it appears by the dispatches of the French Consul-General at New York, which I find in an official document, that on the 22d October, 1870, he telegraphed to the Armament Commission at Tours:--
“The prices of adjudication have been 100,000 muskets at $9.30; 40,000 at $12.30; 100,000 at $12.25; 50,000,000 cartridges at $16.30 the thousand: altogether, with the commission to Remington and the incidental expenses, more than four million dollars.”
Such gigantic purchases, made at one time, or in the space of a few days, could have but one destination. It is weakness to imagine otherwise. Obviously, plainly, unquestionably, they were for the disarmed belligerent. The telegraph each morning proclaimed the constant fearful struggle, and we all became daily spectators. In the terrible blaze, filling the heavens with lurid flame, it was impossible not to see the exact condition of the two belligerents,--Germany always victorious, France still rallying for the desperate battle. But the officials of the Ordnance Bureau saw this as plainly as the people. Therefore were they warned, so that every applicant for arms and war material on a large scale was open to just suspicion. These officials were put on their guard as much as if a notice or _caveat_ had been filed at the War Department. In neglecting that commanding notice, in overruling that unprecedented _caveat_, so far as to allow these enormous supplies to be forwarded to the disarmed belligerent, they failed in that proper care required by the occasion. If I said that they failed in good faith, I should only give the conclusion of law on unquestionable facts.
In the case of the _Gran Para_, Chief-Justice Marshall, after exposing an attempt to evade our neutral obligations by an ingenious cover, exclaimed, in words which he borrowed from an earlier period of our history, but which have been often quoted since: “This would, indeed, be a fraudulent neutrality, disgraceful to our own Government, and of which no nation would be the dupe.”[7] I forbear at present to apply these memorable words, which show with what indignant language our great Chief-Justice blasted an attempt to evade our neutral obligations. In calling it fraudulent he was not deterred by the petty cry of a false patriotism, that his judgment might affect the good name of our country. Full well he knew that national character could suffer only where fraud is maintained.
I doubt much if the true rule can be laid down in better words than those I quoted on a former occasion from the Spanish minister at Stockholm, denouncing the sale of Swedish frigates.[8] He protested against “arms and munitions furnished through _intermediate speculators_, under pretence of not knowing the result,” which he exhibited as an “act of hostility” and a “political scandal.” According to this excellent protest, the sale is not protected from condemnation merely by “intermediate speculators” and the “pretence of not knowing the result.” And this is only according to undoubted reason. It is simply a question of good faith; and if, taking into view the circumstances of the case and the condition of the times, there is reasonable ground to believe that “intermediate speculators” are purchasing for a belligerent, then the sale cannot be made, nor will any “pretence of not knowing the result” be of avail.
In harmony with this Spanish protest is the calm statement of a Joint Committee of Congress, where this question of international duty is treated wisely. I read from the report of Mr. Jenckes on the sale of certain ironclads:--
“Perhaps the international feature of this transaction is the most grave one for the consideration of Congress. It is a matter of notorious public history that war was being carried on in the years 1865 and 1866 between the Government of Spain, on the one hand, and the Governments of Peru and Chili, on the other. During the pendency of hostilities, applications were made to obtain possession of these vessels for one of the belligerents. If the Government of the United States had been _privy_ to any arrangement by which these vessels of war should be delivered to the agents of a belligerent, either in our own ports or upon the high seas, it would certainly have violated its international obligations. Of course, when Congress authorized the sale of these vessels, it was known that individuals had no use for them; yet it might have assumed, as in the case of the Dunderberg and the Onondaga,”--
Now mark the words, if you please,--
“that the Executive Department would take care that any individual who should purchase with a view to a resale to some foreign power would not be permitted to violate the obligations of the United States as a neutral nation.”[9]
Observe, if you please, the language employed. If the Government of the United States had been “privy” to any arrangement for the delivery of these vessels to the agents of a belligerent, it would certainly have violated its international obligations. This is undoubtedly correct. Then comes the assumption “that the Executive Department would _take care_ that any individual who should purchase _with a view to a resale_ to some foreign power would not be permitted to violate the obligations of the United States as a neutral nation.” Here again is the true rule. The Executive is bound to take care that there shall be no sale with a view to a resale in violation of neutral duties.
All this is so entirely reasonable, indeed so absolutely essential to the simplest performance of international duty, that I feel humbled even in stating it. The case is too clear. It is like arguing the Ten Commandments or the Multiplication Table. International Law is nothing but international morality for the guidance of nations. And be assured, Sir, that interpretation is the truest which subjects the nation most completely to the Moral Law. “Thou shalt not sell arms to a belligerent,” is a commandment addressed to nations, and to be obeyed precisely as that other commandment, “Thou shalt not steal.” No temptation of money, no proffer of cash, no chink of “the almighty dollar,” can excuse any departure from this supreme law; nor can any intervening man-of-straw have any other effect than to augment the offence by the shame of a trick.
Here, Sir, I am sensitive for my country. I can imagine no pecuniary profits, no millions poured into the Treasury, that can compensate for a departure from that international honesty which is at once the best policy and the highest duty. The dishonesty of a nation is illimitable in its operation. How true are the words,--
“’Twill be recorded for a precedent; And many an error, by the same example, Will rush into the State: it cannot be.”[10]
The demoralization is felt not at home only. Whatever any nation does is an example for other nations; whatever the Great Republic does is a testimony. I would have that testimony pure, lofty, just, so that we may welcome it when commended to ourselves; so that, indeed, it may be a glorious landmark in the history of civilization.
Therefore do I insist that international obligations, especially when war is raging, cannot be evaded, cannot be slighted, cannot be trifled with. They are not only sacred, they are sacrosanct; and whoso lays hands on them, whoso neglects them, whoso closes his eyes to their violation, is guilty of a dishonesty which, to the extent of its influence, must weaken public morals at home, while it impairs the safeguards of peace with other nations and sets ajar the very gates of War.
This question cannot be treated with levity, and waved out of sight by a doubtful story. Even if Count Bismarck, adapting himself to the situation, and anxious to avoid additional controversy, had declared in conversation that he would take these arms on the banks of the Loire,[11] this is no excuse for us. Our rule of duty is not found in the courageous gayety of any foreign statesman, but in the Law of Nations, which we are bound to obey, not only for the sake of others, but for the sake of ourselves. All other nations may be silent; Count Bismarck may be taciturn; but we cannot afford to cry, “Hush!” The evil example must be corrected, and the more swiftly the better.
On this simple statement of International Law, it is evident that there must be inquiry to see if through the misfeasance of officials our Government has not in some way failed to comply with its neutral duties. Subordinates in England are charged with allowing the escape of the Alabama. Have any subordinates among us played a similar part? It is of subordinates that I speak. Has the Government suffered through them? Has their misfeasance, their jobbery, their illicit dealing, compromised our country? Is there any ring about the Ordnance Bureau through which our neutral duties have been set at nought? Here I might stop without proceeding further. The question is too grave to be blinked out of sight; it must be met on the law and the facts.
In this presentation I do not argue. The case requires a statement only. Beyond this I point to the honorable example which our country has set in times past. The equity with which we have discharged our neutral obligations has been the occasion of constant applause. Mr. Ward, the accomplished historian of the Law of Nations, and also of a treatise on the “Rights and Duties of Belligerent and Neutral Powers,” which Chancellor Kent says “exhausted all the law and learning applicable to the question,”[12] wrote in 1801, four years after Washington’s retirement:--
“Of the great trading nations, America is almost the only one that has shown consistency of principle. The firmness and thorough understanding of the Laws of Nations, which during this war [the French Revolution] she has displayed, must forever rank her high in the scale of enlightened communities.”[13]
Another English writer, Sir Robert Phillimore, author of the comprehensive work on International Law, speaks of the conduct of the United States as, “under the most trying circumstances, marked not only by a perfect consistency, but by _preference for duty and right_ over interest and the expediency of the moment.”[14] Then again, in another place, the same English authority, after a summary of our practice and jurisprudence in seizing and condemning vessels captured in violation of neutrality, declares:--
“In these doctrines a severe, _but a just_, conception of the duties and rights of neutrality appears to be embodied.”[15]
An excellent French writer on International Law, Baron de Cussy, remarks, on mentioning our course with reference to a steamer purchased by Prussia in its war with Denmark in 1849,--
“It affords a genuine proof of respect for the obligations of neutrality.”[16]
American loyalty to neutral duties received the homage of the eminent orator and statesman Mr. Canning, who, from his place in Parliament, said:--
“If I wished for a guide in a system of neutrality, I should take that laid down by America in the days of the Presidency of Washington and the Secretaryship of Jefferson.”[17]
These testimonies may be fitly concluded by the words of Mr. Rush, so long our Minister in England, who records with just pride the honor accorded to our doctrines on neutral duties:--
“They are doctrines that will probably receive more and more approbation from all nations as time goes on, and continues to bring with it, as we may reasonably hope, further meliorations to the code of war. They are as replete with international wisdom as with American dignity and spirit.…
“Come what may in the future, we can never be deprived of this inheritance. It is a proud and splendid inheritance.”[18]
Such is the great and honest fame already achieved by our Republic in upholding neutral duties. No victory in our history has conferred equal renown. Surely you are not ready to forget the precious inheritance. No, Sir, let us guard it as one of the best possessions of our common country,--guard it loyally, so that it shall continue without diminution or spot. Here there must be no backward step. Not _Backward_, but _Forward_, must be our watchword in the march of civilization.
* * * * *
I am now brought to that other branch of the subject which concerns directly the conduct of our officials; and here my purpose is to simplify the question. Therefore I shall avoid details, which have occupied the Senate for days; and I put aside the apparent discrepancy between the Annual Report of the War Department and the Annual Report of the Treasurer, which has been satisfactorily explained on this floor, so that this ground of inquiry is removed. I bring the case to certain heads, which, taken together in their mass, make it impossible for us to avoid inquiry, without leaving the Government or some of its officials exposed to serious suspicion. Now, as at the beginning, I make no accusation against any officer of our Government,--none against the President, none against the Secretary of War; but I exhibit reasons for the present proceeding.
The case naturally opens with the resolution of the Committee of the French Assembly, asking the United States “to furnish the result of the inquiry into the conduct of American officials who were suspected of participating in the purchase of arms for the French Government during the war.” This seems to have been adopted as late as February 9th last past. At least it appears in the cable dispatch of that date.[19] From this resolution three things are manifest: first, that the sale of arms by our Government is occupying the attention of the French Legislature; secondly, that American officials are suspected of participating in the purchase for the French Government; and, thirdly, that it is supposed that our Government has instituted an inquiry into the case.
This resolution is, I believe, without precedent. I recall no other instance where a foreign legislative assembly has made any inquiry into the conduct of the officials of another country. If this were done in an inimical or even a critical spirit, it might, perhaps, be dismissed with indifference. But France, once in our history an all-powerful ally, is now a friendly power, with which we are in the best relations. Any movement on her part with regard to the conduct of our officials must be received according to the rules of comity and good-will. It cannot be disregarded. It ought to be anticipated. This resolution alone would justify inquiry on our part.
Passing to evidence, I come to the telegraphic dispatch of Squire, son-in-law and agent of Remington, actually addressed in French cipher to the latter in France, under date of October 8, 1870. Though brief, it is most important:--
“We have _the strongest influences_ working for us, which will use all their efforts to succeed.”
Considering the writer of this dispatch, his family and business relations with Remington, to whom it was addressed, it is difficult to regard it except as a plain revelation of actual facts. It was important that Remington should know the precise condition of things. His son-in-law and agent telegraphs that “the strongest influences” are at work for them. What can this mean? Surely here is no broker or arms-merchant, engaged in the course of business. It is something else,--plainly something else. What? That is the point for inquiry. Mr. Squire is an American citizen. Let him be examined and cross-examined, under oath. Let him disclose what he meant by “the strongest influences.” He could not have intended to deceive his father-in-law, and puff himself. He was doubtless in earnest. Did he deceive himself? On this he is a witness. But until those words are so far explained as to show that they do not point to officials, the natural inference is that it was on them that he relied,--that they were “the strongest influences” by which the job was to be carried through; for, of course, it was a job which he announced.
It cannot be doubted that this dispatch of Mr. Squire by itself alone is enough to justify inquiry. Without the resolution of the French Assembly, and without the supplementary testimony to be adduced, it throws a painful suspicion upon our officials, which should compel them to explain.