Part 7

The sacrifice of precious life is beyond human compensation; but there may be an approximate estimate of the national loss in treasure. Everybody can make the calculation. I content myself with calling attention to the elements which enter into it. Besides the blockade, there was the prolongation of the war. The Rebellion was suppressed at a cost of more than four thousand million dollars, a considerable portion of which has been already paid, leaving twenty-five hundred millions as a national debt to burden the people. If, through British intervention, the war was doubled in duration, or in any way extended, as cannot be doubted, then is England justly responsible for the additional expenditure to which our country was doomed; and whatever may be the final settlement of these great accounts, such must be the judgment in any chancery which consults the simple equity of the case.

This plain statement, without one word of exaggeration or aggravation, is enough to exhibit the magnitude of the national losses, whether from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or the expense of the blockade. They stand before us mountain-high, with a base broad as the Nation, and a mass stupendous as the Rebellion itself. It will be for a wise statesmanship to determine how this fearful accumulation, like Ossa upon Pelion, shall be removed out of sight, so that it shall no longer overshadow the two countries.

THE RULE OF DAMAGES.

Perhaps I ought to anticipate an objection from the other side, to the effect that these national losses, whether from the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, or the expense of the blockade, are indirect and remote, so as not to be a just ground of claim. This is expressed at the Common Law by the rule that “damages must be for the natural and proximate consequence of an act.”[86] To this excuse the answer is explicit. The damages suffered by the United States are twofold, individual and national, being in each case direct and proximate, although in the one case individuals suffered, and in the other case the nation. It is easy to see that there may be occasions, where, overtopping all individual damages, are damages suffered by the nation, so that reparation to individuals would be insufficient. Nor can the claim of the nation be questioned simply because it is large, or because the evidence with regard to it is different from that in the case of an individual. In each case the damage must be proved by the best possible evidence, and this is all that law or reason can require. In the case of the nation the evidence is historic; and this is enough. Impartial history will record the national losses from British intervention, and it is only reasonable that the evidence of these losses should not be excluded from judgment. Because the case is without precedent, because no nation ever before received such injury from a friendly power, this can be no reason why the question should not be considered on the evidence.

Even the rule of the Common Law furnishes no impediment; for our damages are the natural consequence of what was done. But the rule of the Roman Law, which is the rule of International Law, is broader than that of the Common Law. The measure of damages, according to the Digest, is, “Whatever may have been lost or might have been gained,”--_Quantum mihi abest, quantumque lucrari potui_;[87] and this same rule seems to prevail in the French Law, borrowed from the Roman Law.[88] This rule opens the door to ample reparation for all damages, whether individual or national.

There is another rule of the Common Law, in harmony with strict justice, which is applicable in the case. I find it in the law relating to _Nuisances_, which provides that there may be two distinct proceedings,--first, in behalf of individuals, and, secondly, in behalf of the community. Obviously, reparation to individuals does not supersede reparation to the community. The proceeding in the one case is by action at law, and in the other by indictment. The reason assigned by Blackstone for the latter is, “Because, the damage being common to all the king’s subjects, no one can assign his particular proportion of it.”[89] But this is the very case with regard to damages sustained by the nation.

A familiar authority furnishes an additional illustration, which is precisely in point:--

“No person, natural or corporate, can have an action for a _public nuisance_, or punish it,--but only the king, in his public capacity of supreme governor and _paterfamilias_ of the kingdom. Yet this rule admits of one exception: where a private person suffers some extraordinary damage beyond the rest of the king’s subjects.”[90]

Applying this rule to the present case, the way is clear. Every British pirate was _a public nuisance_, involving the British Government, which must respond in damages, not only to the individuals who have suffered, but also to the National Government, acting as _paterfamilias_ for the common good of all the people.

Thus by an analogy of the Common Law in the case of a Public Nuisance, also by the strict rule of the Roman Law, which enters so largely into International Law, and even by the rule of the Common Law relating to Damages, all losses, whether individual or national, are the just subject of claim. It is not I who say this; it is the Law. The colossal sum-total may be seen not only in the losses of individuals, but in those national losses caused by the destruction of our commerce, the prolongation of the war, and the expense of the blockade, all of which may be charged directly to England:--

“illud ab uno Corpore, et ex una pendebat origine bellum.”[91]

Three times is this liability fixed: first, by the concession of ocean belligerency, opening to the Rebels ship-yards, foundries, and manufactories, and giving to them a flag on the ocean; secondly, by the organization of hostile expeditions, which, by admissions in Parliament, were nothing less than piratical war on the United States with England as the naval base; and, thirdly, by welcome, hospitality, and supplies extended to these pirate ships in ports of the British empire. Show either of these, and the liability of England is complete; show the three, and this power is bound by a triple cord.

CONCLUSION.

MR. PRESIDENT, in concluding these remarks, I desire to say that I am no volunteer. For several years I have carefully avoided saying anything on this most irritating question, being anxious that negotiations should be left undisturbed to secure a settlement which could be accepted by a deeply injured nation. The submission of the pending treaty to the judgment of the Senate left me no alternative. It became my duty to consider it carefully in committee, and to review the whole subject. If I failed to find what we had a right to expect, and if the just claims of our country assumed unexpected proportions, it was not because I would bear hard on England, but because I wish most sincerely to remove all possibility of strife between our two countries; and it is evident that this can be done only by first ascertaining the nature and extent of difference. In this spirit I have spoken to-day. If the case against England is strong, and if our claims are unprecedented in magnitude, it is only because the conduct of this power at a trying period was most unfriendly, and the injurious consequences of this conduct were on a scale corresponding to the theatre of action. Life and property were both swallowed up, leaving behind a deep-seated sense of enormous wrong, as yet unatoned and even unacknowledged, which is one of the chief factors in the problem now presented to the statesmen of both countries. The attempt to close this great international debate without a complete settlement is little short of puerile.

With the lapse of time and with minuter consideration the case against England becomes more grave, not only from the questions of international responsibility which it involves, but from better comprehension of the damages, which are seen now in their true proportions. During the war, and for some time thereafter, it was impossible to state them. The mass of a mountain cannot be measured at its base; the observer must occupy a certain distance; and this rule of perspective is justly applicable to damages which are vast beyond precedent.

A few dates will show the progress of the controversy, and how the case enlarged. Going as far back as 20th November, 1862, we find our Minister in London, Mr. Adams, calling for redress from the British Government on account of the Alabama.[92] This was the mild beginning. On the 23d October, 1863, in another communication, the same Minister suggested to the British Government any “fair and equitable form of conventional arbitrament or reference.”[93] This proposition slumbered in the British Foreign Office for nearly two years, during which the Alabama was pursuing her piratical career, when, on the 30th August, 1865, it was awakened by Lord Russell only to be knocked down in these words:--

“In your letter of the 23d of October, 1863, you were pleased to say that the Government of the United States is ready to agree to any form of arbitration.… Her Majesty’s Government must, therefore, decline either to make reparation and compensation for the captures made by the Alabama, or to refer the question to any foreign state.”[94]

Such was our repulse from England, having at least the merit of frankness, if nothing else. On the 17th October, 1865, our Minister informed Lord Russell that the United States had finally resolved to make no effort for arbitration.[95] Again the whole question slumbered until 27th August, 1866, when Mr. Seward presented a list of individual claims on account of the pirate Alabama and other Rebel cruisers.[96] From that time negotiation has continued, with ups and downs, until at last the pending treaty was signed. Had the early overtures of our Government been promptly accepted, or had there been at any time a just recognition of the wrong done, I doubt not that this great question would have been settled; but the rejection of our very moderate propositions, and the protracted delay, which afforded an opportunity to review the case in its different bearings, have awakened the people to the magnitude of the interests involved. If our demands are larger now than at our first call, it is not the only time in history when such a rise has occurred. The story of the Sibyl is repeated, and England is the Roman king.

Shall these claims be liquidated and cancelled promptly, or allowed to slumber until called into activity by some future exigency? There are many among us, who, taking counsel of a sense of national wrong, would leave them to rest without settlement, so as to furnish a precedent for retaliation in kind, should England find herself at war. There are many in England, who, taking counsel of a perverse political bigotry, have spurned them absolutely; and there are others, who, invoking the point of honor, assert that England cannot entertain them without compromising her honor. Thus there is peril from both sides. It is not difficult to imagine one of our countrymen saying, with Shakespeare’s Jew, “The villany you teach me I will execute, and it shall go hard but I will better the instruction”; nor is it difficult to imagine an Englishman firm in his conceit that no apology can be made and nothing paid. I cannot sympathize with either side. Be the claims more or less, they are honestly presented, with the conviction that they are just; and they should be considered candidly, so that they shall no longer lower, like a cloud ready to burst, upon two nations, which, according to their inclinations, can do each other such infinite injury or such infinite good. I know it is sometimes said that war between us must come sooner or later. I do not believe it. But if it must come, let it be later, and then I am sure it will never come. Meanwhile good men must unite to make it impossible.

Again I say, this debate is not of my seeking. It is not tempting; for it compels criticism of a foreign power with which I would have more than peace, more even than concord. But it cannot be avoided. The truth must be told,--not in anger, but in sadness. England has done to the United States an injury most difficult to measure. Considering when it was done and in what complicity, it is truly unaccountable. At a great epoch of history, not less momentous than that of the French Revolution or that of the Reformation, when Civilization was fighting a last battle with Slavery, England gave her name, her influence, her material resources to the wicked cause, and flung a sword into the scale with Slavery. Here was a portentous mistake. Strange that the land of Wilberforce, after spending millions for Emancipation, after proclaiming everywhere the truths of Liberty, and ascending to glorious primacy in the sublime movement for the Universal Abolition of Slavery, could do this thing! Like every departure from the rule of justice and good neighborhood, her conduct was pernicious in proportion to the scale of operations, affecting individuals, corporations, communities, and the nation itself. And yet down to this day there is no acknowledgment of this wrong,--not a single word. Such a generous expression would be the beginning of a just settlement, and the best assurance of that harmony between two great and kindred nations which all must desire.

LOCALITY IN APPOINTMENT TO OFFICE.

REMARKS IN THE SENATE, APRIL 21, 1869.

The Senate having under consideration a resolution requesting from the heads of Departments “information of the names, age, and compensation of all inferior officers, clerks, and employés in their respective Departments at Washington, showing from what States they were respectively appointed,” &c., Mr. Abbott, of North Carolina, moved the following addition:--

“_Resolved further_, That in the opinion of the Senate the distribution of the official patronage of the Government not embraced in local offices in the States should be made as nearly equal among all the States, according to their representation and population, as may be practicable; and that to confine such patronage to particular States or sections, either wholly or partially, is both unjust and injudicious.”

On the latter resolution Mr. Sumner spoke as follows:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--If I have rightly read the history of my country, there was before Vicksburg an army commanded by three generals from Ohio,--General Grant, General Sherman, and General McPherson. Now, if I rightly understand the proposition of the Senator from North Carolina, he would require that the generals in command of our Army should be taken geographically,--not according to their merits, not according to their capacity to defend this Republic and to maintain with honor its flag, but simply according to the place of their residence,--and no three generals should be in command from one State. Do I understand the Senator aright?

MR. ABBOTT. My amendment reads, “as far as practicable.”

MR. SUMNER. Very well,--“as far as practicable.” I would inquire of my friend whether fitness for office or service in other departments of the Government does not depend upon capacity, talent, preparation, as much as in the Army? I ask the Senator if it is not so?

MR. ABBOTT. The purpose of this amendment was not to override all such considerations; it was to give an expression of the sense of the Senate that States should not be ignored in the distribution of this sort of patronage. Nothing in it prevents three generals from Ohio being in the command of one army, or the appointment of three Cabinet officers from Ohio; but it is simply to express the sense of the Senate that these things ought to be done with something like fairness and justice, as between the different States.

MR. SUMNER. I take it there is no Senator who does not accept the general idea of the Senator from North Carolina, that all things should be done in fairness, and that all parts of the country, every portion of this great Republic, should be treated with equal respect and honor. That is clear. But first and foremost above all is the public service: that must be maintained; it must not be sacrificed; and how can it be maintained, unless you advance to prominent posts in this service those who are the most meritorious, and who can best discharge the duties of the post?

I merely throw out this remark, and call attention to this point, that Senators may see to what this proposition tends. If it were fully carried out, it would reduce the public service of this country to one dead level. Men would go into it merely because they lived in certain places, not because they had a fitness for the posts to which they were advanced. Perhaps I am mistaken, but I see no reason why there should be three Ohio generals in command before Vicksburg, and not three Ohio citizens in eminent civil service. To my mind the attainments and the talents required in civil service are as well worthy to be recognized as those that are required in military service, and I see no reason for a rule that shall allow talent to be taken without any reference to geographical limit in the military service which is not equally applicable to the civil service.

Now, as to our friends who have recently come into this Chamber, I beg them to understand, that, so far as I am concerned, there is no disposition to deny or to begrudge them anything to which, according to geographical proportions, they may be entitled; but I beg them to consider that time is an essential element of this transition through which we are passing.

MR. FESSENDEN. Will my friend allow me to make a suggestion to him?

MR. SUMNER. Certainly.

MR. FESSENDEN. I merely wish to allude to the notorious fact that for half a century before the Rebellion the proportion of persons in civil office in the Departments in Washington from the Southern States was very nearly, if not quite, two to one to those from all the other States. They had the control, and had pretty much all the offices, for years and years.

MR. SUMNER. We are now in a process of transition, and I was observing that time is an essential element in that process. What the Senator from North Carolina aims at cannot be accomplished at once. The change cannot be made instantly. The men are not presented from the States lately in rebellion in sufficient numbers, in sufficient proportion, with competency for these posts. I know that there are gentlemen there fit to grace many of these posts, but I know also that there is not relatively the same proportion of persons fit for the civil service as there is in the other parts of the country; and our friends from the South, it seems to me, must take this into consideration kindly, and wait yet a little longer.

NATIONAL AFFAIRS AT HOME AND ABROAD.

SPEECH AT THE REPUBLICAN STATE CONVENTION IN WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS, SEPTEMBER 22, 1869.

Mr. Sumner was selected as President of the Convention. On taking the chair he spoke as follows:--

FELLOW-CITIZENS OF MASSACHUSETTS:--

While thanking you for the honor conferred upon me, I make haste to say that in my judgment Massachusetts has one duty, at the coming election, to which all local interests and local questions must be postponed, as on its just performance all else depends; and this commanding duty is, to keep the Commonwealth, now as aforetime, an example to our country and a bulwark of Human Rights. Such was Massachusetts in those earlier days, when, on the continent of Europe, the name of “Bostonians” was given to our countrymen in arms against the mother country,[97] making this designation embrace all,--and when, in the British Parliament, the great orator, Edmund Burke, exclaimed, “The cause of Boston is become the cause of all America; every part of America is united in support of Boston; … you have made Boston the Lord Mayor of America.”[98] I quote these words from the Parliamentary Debates. But Boston was at that time Massachusetts, and it was her stand for Liberty that made her name the synonym for all. And permit me to add, that, in choosing a presiding officer entirely removed from local issues, I find assurance of your readiness to unite with me in that _National Cause_ which concerns not Massachusetts only, but every part of America, and concerns also our place and name as a nation.

The enemy here in Massachusetts would be glad to divert attention from the unassailable principles of the Republican Party; they would be glad to make you forget that support we owe to a Republican Administration,--also that support we owe to the measures of Reconstruction, and our constant abiding persistence for all essential safeguards not yet completely established. These they would hand over to oblivion, hoping on some local appeal to disorganize our forces, or, perhaps, obtain power to be wielded against the National Cause. Massachusetts cannot afford to occupy an uncertain position. Therefore I begin by asking you to think of our country, our whole country,--in other words, of _National Affairs at Home and Abroad_.

* * * * *

It is now four years since I had the honor of presiding at our annual Convention, and I do not forget how at that time I endeavored to remind you of this same National Cause, then in fearful peril.[99] The war of armies was ended; no longer was fellow-citizen arrayed against fellow-citizen; on each side the trumpet was hushed, the banner furled. But the defection of Andrew Johnson had then begun, and out of that defection the Rebellion assumed new life, with new purposes and new hopes. If it did not spring forth once more fully armed, it did spring forth filled with hate and diabolism towards all who loved the Union, whether white or black. There were exceptions, I know; but they were not enough to change the rule. And straightway the new apparition, acting in conjunction with the Northern Democracy, aboriginal allies of the Rebellion, planned the capture of the National Government. Its representatives came up to Washington. Then was the time for a few decisive words in the name of the Republic, on which for four years they had waged bloody war. The great dramatist, who has words for every occasion, anticipated this, when he said,--

“Return thee, therefore, with a flood of tears, And wash away thy country’s stained spots.”

Such a mood would have been the beginning of peace. How easy to see that these men should have been admonished frankly and kindly to return home, there to plant, plough, sow, reap, buy, sell, and be prosperous, but not to expect any place in the copartnership of government until there was completest security for all! Instead of this, they were sent back plotting how to obtain ascendency at home as the stepping-stone to ascendency in the nation. Such was the condition of things in the autumn of 1865, when, sounding the alarm from this very platform, I insisted upon irreversible guaranties against the Rebellion, and especially on security to the national freedman and the national creditor. It was upon security that I then insisted,--believing, that, though the war of armies was ended, this was a just object of national care, all contained in the famous time-honored postulate of war, _Security for the Future_, without which peace is no better than armistice.