Part 4

Such instances, so recent, show how little the injunction of International Law has been regarded by Great Britain, whether before or after the Crimean War; and yet British censors have not hesitated to arraign the United States in brutal terms. I do not admit their competency to sit in judgment on us; I plead to the jurisdiction. If they would teach correct principles, they must begin by a correct example. Meanwhile the abuses for which Great Britain is responsible cannot be forgotten by those who sincerely desire a new era in International Law. I say this in no spirit of reproach or controversy, but simply to serve the cause of my country and of truth.

AMERICANUS.

RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN: THE ST. ALBANS RAID.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON A BILL FOR FORTIFICATIONS AND BATTERIES ON THE LAKES, DECEMBER 19, 1864.

December 19th, Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, introduced a bill to enable the President to expend the sum of ten million dollars, or so much thereof as might be necessary, in his opinion, in building fortifications and floating-batteries to defend our northern frontier and the commerce of the Lakes against the attacks of piratical and hostile expeditions organized in the British provinces by the enemies of the United States; and he moved the reference of the bill to the Committee on Finance, which, at the suggestion of Mr. Sumner, he changed to the Committee on Foreign Relations. A debate ensued, involving what were called the troubles on the border, and especially the “St. Albans Raid,” when a hostile expedition crossed from Canada into Vermont, and committed acts of violence in that town. Mr. Sumner said:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--The question before the Senate is simply on the reference of this bill. It is a question of the order of business.

Looking at its character, it is plain that it concerns primarily and essentially our foreign relations. This circumstance gives it a peculiar interest. If it concerned only an additional levy of troops, or the building of new forts, or a change in our commercial policy, there would be no question with regard to its reference, nor would the Senator from Maryland [Mr. REVERDY JOHNSON] have followed it by remarks on the outrage at St. Albans. I assume, then, that it concerns our foreign relations, and therefore, according to the usages of the Senate, should be referred to the committee having that subject in charge.

This is all I have to say on the question of reference; but the Senate will pardon me, if I glance for one moment at the outrage to which the Senator referred. Only a few weeks ago, the village of St. Albans, in Vermont, was disturbed by a band of murderers, highwaymen, house-breakers, horse-thieves, and bank-robbers, from Canada. After breaking open the banks and obtaining a certain amount of spoil, attended by the murder of a citizen, they succeeded in making their way back to Canada, where they declared themselves agents of the Rebel Government. Such are the main facts. Now, Mr. President, does any one suppose that these agents of the Rebel Government were moved to this criminal enterprise merely by considerations of plunder?--that they risked life and everything merely to rob a bank? No such thing. Their object was much higher and more comprehensive. It was to embroil the Government of the United States with the Government of Great Britain. I cannot doubt that such was their object. To my mind it is plain as noonday.

These agents, or rather the men behind who set them on, knew the sensitiveness of our people, and how naturally they would be aroused against the foreign country where the enterprise had its origin. They saw that excitement, passion, anger on our part were inevitable, that out of these some complication or collision might ensue, and that any such complication or collision must necessarily help the Rebellion more than a victory on the field of battle. All this they saw, and acted accordingly. The whole proceeding was a trap in which to catch the Government of our country. It was hoped that in this way the Rebellion might gain that powerful British intervention which would restore its failing fortunes.

For myself, Sir, I am determined not to be caught in any such trap. There are many things Great Britain has done, since the outbreak of our Rebellion, which to my mind are most unfriendly; but I am unwilling that there should be anything on our side to furnish seeming apology for that foreign intervention so constantly menaced, and originally foreshadowed in the most hasty and utterly unjustifiable concession of ocean belligerence to Rebel Slavemongers who had not a single port or prize court. Nobody sees the wrongs we have suffered more clearly than I do; but I see other wrongs also. While never ceasing to claim all our just rights, and reminding this power always of duties plainly neglected, I cannot forget that we are engaged in a war for the suppression of a long-continued and most virulent Rebellion, which has thus far tasked our best energies. To this work let us dedicate ourselves, without arousing another enemy, through whose alliance the Rebellion may be encouraged and strengthened. Let us put down the Rebellion. Do this, and we shall do everything.

Meanwhile I trust the Senate will not be moved by passion into hasty action on any of the measures before it, but that each will be considered carefully and calmly on its merits, according to the usage of this body. This surely is the dictate of prudence, and I cannot doubt that it is the dictate of patriotism also.

Washington, in his Farewell Address, warns against “the insidious wiles of foreign influence”; but the “insidious wiles” of our Rebels, seeking to embroil us with foreign powers, are as deadly as any influence brought against us. Forewarned is forearmed. Let us be steadfast against them.

After further debate, in which Mr. Sumner considered the order of General Dix, authorizing our troops to pursue a hostile expedition into Canada, according to writers on International Law, the bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, where, with other similar measures, it was allowed to sleep.

TERMINATION OF THE CANADIAN RECIPROCITY TREATY.

SPEECHES IN THE SENATE, ON THE JOINT RESOLUTION GIVING NOTICE FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE CANADIAN RECIPROCITY TREATY, DECEMBER 21, 1864, JANUARY 11 AND 12, 1865.

A joint resolution passed the House of Representatives, December 13, 1864, which, after an argumentative preamble, authorized and requested the President of the United States to give the British Government the notice required by the fifth article of the Reciprocity Treaty of the 5th June, 1854, for the termination of the same; and in the Senate the same was duly referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.

December 20, 1864, Mr. Sumner reported from the Committee the House resolution, with the following substitute as an amendment.

“JOINT RESOLUTION providing for the termination of the Reciprocity Treaty of fifth June, eighteen hundred and fifty-four, between the United States and Great Britain.

“Whereas it is provided in the Reciprocity Treaty concluded at Washington the 5th of June, 1854, between the United States, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, of the other part, that this treaty ‘shall remain in force for ten years from the date at which it may come into operation, and further until the expiration of twelve months after either of the high contracting parties shall give notice to the other of its wish to terminate the same’; and whereas it appears, by a proclamation of the President of the United States, bearing date 16th March, 1855, that the treaty came into operation on that day; and whereas, further, it is no longer for the interests of the United States to continue the same in force: Therefore

“_Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled_, That notice be given of the termination of the Reciprocity Treaty, according to the provision therein contained for the termination of the same; and the President of the United States is hereby charged with the communication of such notice to the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.”

December 21st, the joint resolution was, on motion of Mr. Sumner, taken up for consideration, when the substitute was adopted as an amendment. The question occurring on the passage of the joint resolution as amended, Mr. Sumner said:--

MR. PRESIDENT,--I had originally intended, when this joint resolution came up, to review the whole subject, and to exhibit at length the history of the Reciprocity Treaty, and existing reasons for its termination. But, after the debate of a few days ago, and considering the apparent unanimity in the Senate, I feel unwilling to occupy time by any protracted remarks. They are not needed.

The people of the United States have been uneasy under the Reciprocity Treaty for several years,--I may almost say from its date. A feeling early showed itself that the treaty was more advantageous to Canada than to the United States,--that, in short, it was unilateral. This feeling has of late ripened into something like conviction. At the same time the exigencies of the present war, requiring so large an expenditure, make it unreasonable for us to continue a treaty by which the revenues of the country suffer. Such considerations have brought the public mind to its present position. The unamiable feelings manifested toward us by the people of Canada have had little influence on the question, unless, perhaps, they may conspire to make us look at it in the light of reason rather than of sentiment.

The subject of the fisheries is included in this treaty. But it is not doubted that before the termination of the treaty some arrangement can be made in regard to it, either by reciprocal legislation or by further negotiation.

The Committee, after careful consideration at a full meeting, was unanimous in its report. And as the Committee represents all parts of the country and all sentiments of the Senate, I have thought that perhaps there might be a similar unanimity among Senators. Therefore I forbear all further remarks, and ask for a vote.

On motion of Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, the further consideration of the question was postponed.

January 11, 1865, it was resumed, when Mr. Hale spoke against the notice. He was followed by Mr. Sumner.

MR. PRESIDENT,--The Reciprocity Treaty has a beautiful name. It suggests at once exchange, equality, equity; and it is because it was supposed to advance these ideas practically that this treaty was originally accepted by the people of the United States. If, however, it shall appear, that, while organizing an exchange, it forgets equality and equity in any essential respect, then must a modification be made in conformity with just principles.

I mean to be brief, but I hope, though brief, to make the proper conclusion apparent. It is a question for reason, and not for passion or sentiment, and in this spirit I enter upon the discussion.

The treaty may be seen under four different heads, as it concerns, first, the fisheries,--secondly, the navigation of the St. Lawrence,--thirdly, the commerce between the United States and the British provinces,--and, fourthly, the revenue of the United States.

* * * * *

1. The fisheries have been a source of anxiety throughout our history, even from the beginning, and for several years previous to the Reciprocity Treaty they had been the occasion of mutual irritation, verging at times on positive outbreak. The treaty was followed by entire tranquillity, which has not been for a moment disturbed. This is a plain advantage not to be denied. But, so far as I have been able to examine official returns, I do not find any further evidence showing the value of the treaty in this connection, while opinions, even among those most interested in the fisheries, are divided. There are partisans for it in Gloucester, and partisans against it in Maine.

If the treaty related exclusively to the fisheries, I should not be willing to touch it,--although the circumstance that representatives of these interests differ with regard to its value may leave it open to debate. But the practical question remains, whether any seeming advantage in this respect is sufficient to counterbalance the disadvantage in other respects.

* * * * *

2. Next comes the navigation of the St. Lawrence. This plausible concession has proved to be little more than a name. It appears that during the first six years of the treaty only forty American vessels, containing 12,550 tons, passed seaward through the St. Lawrence, and during the same time only nineteen vessels, containing 5,446 tons, returned by the same open highway.[39] These are very petty amounts, when we consider the commerce on the Lakes, which in 1856 was estimated at $587,197,320,[40] or when we, consider the carrying trade between the United States and the British provinces. Take the years 1857-62, and we find that during this period the shipping of the United States clearing for the British provinces was 10,707,329 tons, and the foreign shipping clearing during this same period was 7,391,399 tons, while the shipping of the United States entering at our custom-houses from the British provinces was 10,056,183 tons, and the foreign shipping entering was 6,453,520 tons.[41] I mention these things by way of contrast. In comparison with these grand movements of value, the business we have been able to do on the St. Lawrence is trivial. It need not be considered an element in the present discussion.

* * * * *

3. The treaty may be seen next in its bearing on the commerce between the two countries. This has increased immensely; but it is difficult to say how much of this increase is due to the treaty, and how much to the natural growth of population, and the facilities of transportation in both countries. If it could be traced exclusively or in any large measure to the treaty, it would be an element not to be disregarded. But it does not follow from the occurrence of this increase _after_ the treaty that it was _on account_ of the treaty. _Post hoc, ergo propter hoc_, is too loose a rule for our Government on the present occasion.

The census of the United States and of the British provinces shows an increase of population which must not be disregarded in determining the origin of this increase of commerce.

There are also the railroads, with prompt and constant means of intercommunication, which have come into successful operation only since the treaty. It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence they have exercised in quickening and extending commerce. I cannot doubt that the railroad system of the two countries has been in itself a Reciprocity Treaty more comprehensive and equal than any written on parchment.

The extent of trade before and after the treaty is seen in a few figures.

In the three years immediately preceding the treaty the total exports to Canada and the other British provinces were $48,216,518, and the total imports were $22,588,577,--being of exports to imports in the proportion of one hundred to forty-six.

In the ten years of the treaty the total exports to Canada and the other British provinces were $256,350,931, and the total imports were $200,399,786. According to these amounts the exports were to the imports in the proportion of one hundred to seventy-eight. Taking Canada alone, we find the change in this proportion greater still. The total exports to Canada in the three years immediately preceding the treaty were $31,846,865, and the total imports were $16,589,624, being in the proportion of one hundred to fifty-two,--while the total exports to Canada alone during the ten years of the treaty were $170,371,911, and the total imports were $161,474,349, being in the proportion of one hundred to ninety-four.

I present these tables simply to lay before you the extent and nature of the change in the commerce between the two countries. I forbear embarking on the much debated inquiry as to the effect of a difference between the amount of exports and of imports, involving, as it does, the most delicate question of the balance of trade. In the comparison I am making, it is not necessary to consider it. The Reciprocity Treaty cannot be maintained or overturned on any contested principle of political economy.

* * * * *

4. I come, in the last place, to the influence of the treaty on the revenue of our country; and here the custom-house is our principal witness. The means of determining this question are found in the authentic tables published from time to time in Reports of the Treasury, and especially in the report to Congress at this session, which I have in my hand.

Looking at these tables, we find certain unanswerable points. I begin with an estimate founded on the trade before the treaty. From this it appears, that, if no treaty had been made, and the trade had increased in the same ratio as before the treaty, Canada would have paid to the United States in the ten years of the treaty at least $16,373,880, from which she has been relieved. This sum is actually lost to the revenue of the United States. In return, Canada has given up $2,650,890, being the amount it would have collected, if no treaty had been made. This vast disproportion is to the detriment of the national revenue.

Here is another illustration, derived from the tables. During the ten years of the treaty the United States have actually paid in duties to Canada alone $16,802,962, while during this same period Canada has paid in duties to the United States the very moderate sum of $930,447. Here again is vast disproportion, to the detriment of the national revenue.

The same inequality is seen in another way. During the ten years of the treaty _dutiable_ products of the United States have entered Canada and the other provinces to the amount of $84,347,019, while during this same period _dutiable_ products of Canada and the other provinces have entered the United States only to the amount of $7,750,482. During this same period _free products_ of the United States have entered Canada and the other provinces to the amount of $118,853,972, while _free products_ of Canada and the other provinces have entered the United States to the amount of $178,500,184. Here, again, is vast disproportion to the detriment of the national revenue.

Add to these various results the statement of the Secretary of the Treasury, just laid on our tables, in the following words:--

“The treaty [during the eight fiscal years 1855-63] has released from duty a total sum of $42,333,257 in value of goods of Canada more than of goods the produce of the United States.”[42]

This conclusion is in substantial harmony with that reached from an independent examination of the tables.

These various illustrations show that the revenue of the United States has suffered by the treaty, and that in this important particular its advantages are not shared equally by the two countries. Here, at least, it loses title to its name.

But its onerous character has become manifest in other forms since the adoption of our system of internal revenue. I need not remind the Senate of the extent to which we have gone in seeking out objects of excise,--and there are pending propositions in the same direction, seeking new objects; but it is notorious that such taxation is always graduated with reference to the tariff on the same objects, when imported from abroad. But here the Reciprocity Treaty steps forward with imperative veto. Thus, for instance, the lumber of our country is left free from excise, though I am assured it might well bear it, simply because no countervailing tax can be imposed upon lumber from the British provinces. Had a tax of five per cent been imposed upon the lumber of our country, I am assured, by those familiar with the subject, that we should have received at least $5,000,000,--all of which is lost to our annual revenue. This is only a single illustration.

There are other ways in which the treaty and our excise system come into conflict. Practical difficulties, I am assured, have already occurred in the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This conflict is seen in the extent to which the business of the country, and even its agriculture, is taxed now. Everything is taxed. Even the farmer works now with taxed tools. These considerations, with the increased value of labor among us, must give new advantages to the productive interests of Canada as compared with ours, and tend still further to the unequal operation of the treaty. Even admitting its original equality, you cannot deny that the vicissitudes of war, in these latter days, have worked changes requiring new arrangements and adaptations.

* * * * *

Mr. President, such is the result of a candid inquiry into the operation of this treaty, as it concerns the fisheries, the navigation of the St. Lawrence, the commerce of the two countries, and the revenue of the United States. I have kept back nothing favorable to the treaty that could be adequately stated in the brief space I have allowed myself, nor have I exaggerated its unequal operation.

And now the question is, Shall this condition of things be readjusted? The treaty itself, as if anticipating this exigency, furnishes the opportunity, by expressly providing for its termination at the expiration of ten years, on notice of one year from either party. Great Britain is free to give this notice; so are the United States. Considering the present state of the country, it would seem improvident not to give the notice. We must husband our resources; nor can a foreign Government justly expect us to continue a treaty which is a drain upon our revenue. We are turning in all directions for subjects of taxation. Our own people are contributing largely in every way. Commerce, manufactures in every form, come to the assistance of the country. I know no reason why the large amounts enfranchised by this treaty should enjoy the immunity thus far conceded. An inequality which in ordinary times might escape observation becomes too apparent in the blaze of present responsibilities.

Something has been said about accompanying the proposed notice with instructions to negotiate a new treaty. This is unnecessary. A new treaty may not be advisable. It is possible that the whole matter may be settled by Congress under general laws. At all events, there is a full year from the 16th of March next in which to provide a substitute, either by diplomacy or by legislation. And this remark is applicable to the fisheries, as well as to every other interest touched by the treaty. I cannot doubt that the two contracting parties will approach the whole business in the determination to settle it on the permanent foundations of justice and equity; but the first step in this direction is the notice to terminate the existing treaty.

In the debate which ensued, Mr. Sherman, of Ohio, Mr. Collamer, of Vermont, Mr. Morrill, of Maine, Mr. Chandler, of Michigan, Mr. Foot, of Vermont, Mr. Doolittle, of Wisconsin, Mr. Farwell, of Maine, Mr. Conness, of California, Mr. Wilson, of Massachusetts, Mr. Cowan, of Pennsylvania, Mr. Riddle, of Delaware, and Mr. Richardson, of Illinois, spoke in favor of the notice; Mr. Ramsey, of Minnesota, Mr. Howe, of Wisconsin, Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, and Mr. Hendricks, of Indiana, spoke against it.

January 12th, Mr. Sumner spoke again.