Part 2

But there is more than the letter. The Senate has heard within a few days that this person has found his way to Memphis. Why is he at Memphis, when he should be at Washington?

Some time afterwards Mr. Sumner received from Missouri the very letter, in the undoubted autograph of Mr. Polk, and with the phrase which it was insisted he could not have written.

January 9, 1862, Mr. Ten Eyck, of New Jersey, reported the resolution from the Committee, with the unanimous recommendation that it pass.

January 10, the resolution was adopted without debate: Yeas, 36; Nays, 0.

EMANCIPATION AND THE PRESIDENT.

LETTER TO GOVERNOR ANDREW, OF MASSACHUSETTS, DECEMBER 27, 1861.

The following extract, copied from the letter-book of Governor Andrew, is a contemporary record of Mr. Sumner’s efforts with the Governor, and also of an important remark by President Lincoln.

WASHINGTON, December 27, 1861.

…

We hope that in your Message you will keep Massachusetts ahead, where she always has been, in the ideas of our movement. Let the doctrine of Emancipation be proclaimed as an essential and happy agency in subduing a wicked rebellion. In this way you will help a majority of the Cabinet, whose opinions on this subject are fixed, and precede the President himself by a few weeks. He tells me that I am ahead of him only a month or six weeks. God bless you!…

Ever yours,

CHARLES SUMNER.

THE TRENT CASE, AND MARITIME RIGHTS.

SPEECH IN THE SENATE, ON THE SURRENDER OF MASON AND SLIDELL, REBEL AGENTS, TAKEN FROM THE BRITISH MAIL STEAMER TRENT, JANUARY 9, 1862. WITH APPENDIX.

_Hamlet._ Come on, Sir.

_Laertes._ Come, my Lord. [_They play._]

…

_Osric._ A hit, a very palpable hit.

_Laertes._ Well,--again.

[LAERTES _wounds_ HAMLET; _then, in scuffling, they change rapiers, and_ HAMLET _wounds_ LAERTES.]

SHAKESPEARE, _Hamlet_, Act V. Scene 2.

It is, perhaps, well that you settled the matter by sending away the men at once. _Consistently with your own principles you could not have justified their detention._--RICHARD COBDEN, _MS. Letter to Mr. Sumner_, January 23, 1862.

This announcement is not made, my Lord, to revive useless recollections of the past, nor to stir the embers from fires which have been in a great degree smothered by many years of peace. Far otherwise. Its purpose is to extinguish those fires effectually, before new incidents arise to fan them into flame. The communication is in the spirit of peace and for the sake of peace, and springs from a deep and conscientious conviction that high interests of both nations require this so long contested and controverted subject now to be finally put to rest.--DANIEL WEBSTER, _Letter to Lord Ashburton_, August 8, 1842: Works, Vol. VI. p. 325.

The case of the Trent was an important incident of the war,--most interesting for a time to the people of the United States, attracting the attention of foreign nations, and exciting England to hostile demonstrations, even to the verge of practical coöperation with a Rebellion for the sake of Slavery. The facts are few, and are authenticated by official documents.

At an early stage of the Rebellion, the Slave-Masters of Richmond appointed James M. Mason, of Virginia, commissioner and envoy to England, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, in the same capacity to France, each with a secretary, and also with instructions and despatches. Their duty was to help the Rebellion, especially in its financial and military exigencies, to urge its recognition, to make treaties of commerce and alliance, to obtain European intervention, and generally to oppose the diplomacy of the United States. As the Rebel ports were already under strict blockade, and there were no Rebel vessels for their conveyance, they were driven to rely upon accommodation under a neutral flag. Some time in October, 1861, they succeeded in running the blockade and reaching Havana. Here their pretensions and objects were notorious. But this was only the first stage in the voyage. The next was conveyance to Europe; and for this they relied upon the English flag, taking passage in the Trent, bound from Havana to St. Thomas, from which latter place a regular line of steamers, connecting with the Trent, ran to England. Mr. Dana, in his excellent statement of the case, says: “Their character and destination were well known to the agent and master of the Trent, as well as the great interest felt by the Rebels that they should, and by the United States officials that they should not, reach their destination in safety.”[11] The regular mails for England from South America and Cuba were aboard, to be transferred at St. Thomas, with a large number of passengers bound to England.

On the high seas, within a few hours’ sail of Nassau, the Trent was stopped and searched by the national steamer San Jacinto, commanded by Captain Wilkes, afterwards Rear-Admiral, acting on his own responsibility, and without any instructions from the National Government. The two commissioners and their secretaries were found aboard, but the despatches were secreted or confided to some of the passengers. Here Mr. Dana remarks: “There was no evidence or charge that the commander of the Trent aided in the concealment or forwarding of these despatches. He did, however, deny the right of search, refused all facilities for it, and obstructed it by everything but actual force, and made it known to Captain Wilkes that he yielded only to superior power, and that, if made a prize, he and his crew would lend no aid in carrying the Trent into port.”[12] Under these circumstances, Captain Wilkes took the two commissioners with their suite, and carried them as prisoners to the United States, while the Trent proceeded on her voyage.

As this incident became known in the United States, there was a general expression of sympathy and approbation. The press was unanimous. Persons in authority gave their adhesion by public speech or writing, among whom were Mr. Everett, Governor Andrew, Chief-Justice Bigelow of Massachusetts, Professor Parsons of the Law School at Cambridge, Mr. Caleb Cushing, and Mr. George Sumner, all of whom were to a certain extent under the influence of British precedents.

The Secretary of the Navy, under date of November 30, 1861, addressed a communication to Captain Wilkes, containing the following significant words.

“Your conduct in seizing these public enemies was marked by intelligence, ability, decision, and firmness, and has the emphatic approval of this Department. It is not necessary that I should in this communication, which is intended to be one of congratulation to yourself, officers, and crew, express an opinion on the course pursued in omitting to capture the vessel which had these public enemies on board, further than to say that the forbearance exercised in this instance must not be permitted to constitute a precedent hereafter for infractions of neutral obligations.”[13]

The House of Representatives made haste, December 2, 1861, the first day of its session, to adopt a joint resolution tendering the thanks of Congress to Captain Wilkes, “for his brave, adroit, and patriotic conduct in the arrest and detention of the traitors James M. Mason and John Slidell.” This was on the motion of Hon. Owen Lovejoy, the faithful Abolitionist. The joint resolution, on reaching the Senate, was referred to the Committee on Naval Affairs, of which Mr. Hale was chairman. Mr. Sumner suggested its reference to the Committee on Foreign Relations; but Mr. Hale insisted, by way of objection, that “the attempt now to take it out of its ordinary course and refer it to the Committee on Foreign Relations would be taken as an intimation that there is some doubt in some minds as to the propriety of the course that Captain Wilkes took.” Unwilling to raise a debate at that moment, Mr. Sumner assented to the reference proposed.

* * * * *

In England there was a counter sentiment, breaking out into expressions of exasperation. The press was bitter and vindictive. Public report attested a crisis, which may be read in the newspapers of Richmond, throbbing sympathetically with the London organs.

The _Richmond Examiner_, of December 19, broke forth in notes of triumph.

“All other topics become trifles beside the tidings of England which occupy this journal, and all commentary that diverts public attention from that single point is impertinence. The effect of the outrage of the Trent on the public sentiment of Great Britain more than fulfils the prophecy that we made when the arrest of the Confederate ministers was a fresh event. All legal quibbling and selfish calculation has been consumed like straw in the burning sense of incredible insult.”

Then, speculating upon the position of the National Government, the same journal says:--

“The Abolition element of the Northern States would go straight to revolution at the least movement toward a surrender of the captives.… Spectators of these events, who can doubt that the Almighty fiat has gone forth against the American Union, or that the Southern Confederacy is decreed by Divine Wisdom?”

The _Richmond Enquirer_ of the same date likewise rejoiced.

“We have no need to invite attention to the extremely interesting foreign news which we publish to-day from England. The old British lion is giving an honest roar, in view of the indignity visited upon the Queen’s flag.… We will not disturb the eloquence of such facts by words of comment. We will only say, Well done, John Bull! France, too, echoes the British indignation, and will support her action. _Vive Napoléon!_ … After the brave talk and the congratulations to Wilkes by both Cabinet and Congress, it would be to the last degree pusillanimous to retreat. We think Lincoln will be afraid to prove so great a coward.”

Swiftly came the British demand, in a letter from Earl Russell to Lord Lyons at Washington, dated at London, November 30, and read to Mr. Seward December 19. It concluded in the following terms.

“Her Majesty’s Government, therefore, trust, that, when this matter shall have been brought under the consideration of the Government of the United States, that Government will, of its own accord, offer to the British Government such redress as alone could satisfy the British nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and their delivery to your Lordship, in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed. Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, you will propose them to him.”[14]

“The four gentlemen,” being the commissioners and their secretaries, all Rebels, were to be liberated forthwith, and “a suitable apology” was to be made by the National Government. Such was the mandate. But accompanying these instructions read to Mr. Seward was a private communication to Lord Lyons, directing him to break up his legation and to leave Washington, if the National Government did not submit to the terms required after “a delay not exceeding seven days.” Here are the words:--

“Should Mr. Seward ask for delay, in order that this grave and painful matter should be deliberately considered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven days. If at the end of that time no answer is given, or if any other answer is given except that of a compliance with the demands of Her Majesty’s Government, your Lordship is instructed to leave Washington, with all the members of your legation, bringing with you the archives of the legation, and to repair immediately to London.… You will communicate with Vice-Admiral Sir A. Milne immediately upon receiving the answer of the American Government, and you will send him a copy of that answer, together with such observations as you may think fit to make. You will also give all the information in your power to the Governors of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Jamaica, Bermuda, and such other of Her Majesty’s possessions as may be within your reach.”[15]

These latter instructions, contemplating war, were unknown in our country at the time of the settlement, and, when read in the calmness of a period removed from the event, seem incomprehensible in spirit. They are positive and peremptory, without recognizing any possibility of delay, even for a proposal of arbitration. Plainly they announce, as the British alternatives, instant surrender, with suitable apology, or war. This is the conclusion of Mr. Dana, in his admirable note, and nobody can doubt it.

In accord with this note was the conduct of the British Government, making preparations for war; and here is unimpeachable British testimony.

“Troops were despatched to Canada with all possible expedition; and that brave and loyal colony called out its militia and volunteers, so as to be ready to act at a moment’s notice. Our dock-yards here resounded with the din of workmen getting vessels fitted for sea; and there was but one feeling, which animated all classes and parties in the country, and that was a determination to vindicate our insulted honor and uphold the inviolability of the national flag.”[16]

At that moment the American Republic was straining every nerve to suppress a Rebellion whose single declared object was the foundation of a new government with Slavery as its corner-stone. War by England was practical recognition of the new government, with alliance and breaking of the blockade.

The difficulty in comprehending this attitude is increased, when it is known that the British Government did not regard the seizure as authorized by instructions. In his letter to Lord Lyons, Earl Russell says expressly: “Her Majesty’s Government are willing to believe that the United States naval officer who committed the aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his Government.”[17] Therefore the National Government had done nothing,--absolutely nothing.

On the same day that Earl Russell indited his remarkable despatch, Mr. Seward wrote from Washington to Mr. Adams, at London, on business of the legation, and in his letter mentions that Captain Wilkes “acted without any instructions from the Government.” He adds: “We have done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion.” The letter throughout is in the spirit of peace. After declaring his inference “that the British Government is now awake to the importance of averting possible conflict, and disposed to confer and act with earnestness to that end,” Mr. Seward says, “If so, we are disposed to meet them in the same spirit, as a nation chiefly of British lineage, sentiments, and sympathies, a civilized and humane nation, a Christian people,” and then adds, that the affair of the Trent “is to be met and disposed of by the two Governments, if possible, in the spirit to which I have adverted,”[18] that is, with a sense of “the importance of averting possible conflict,” and a disposition “to confer and act with earnestness to that end,” as a Christian people. It so happened that Mr. Adams read this letter to Earl Russell on the very day that Lord Lyons read the demand for surrender and apology to Mr. Seward; but the British Government did not allow its pacific contents to become known, and the war-fever went on. Here Mr. Dana aptly remarks: “The truth seems to be, that, so long as they were uncertain whether their menace of war might not lead to war, they could not afford to withdraw the chief motive for the war-spirit in the British people, and to admit that their warlike demonstration had been needless. Their popular support depended upon a general belief in a necessity for their having accompanied their demand with the preparations and menace of war.”[19]

The extraordinary character of this demand was recognized at the time in Europe. The Count de Gasparin, after describing it as “a question of declaring war,” and an “ultimatum,” said: “Between great nations, between sister nations, it was a strange opening. The usage is hardly to commence with an _ultimatum_,--that is, to commence with the end. Ordinarily, when there has been a misunderstanding or regrettable act, especially when that act comes within a portion of the Law of Nations which is yet full of obscurity, the natural opening is to ask for explanations as to the intentions, and for reparation for what has been done, without mixing therewith an immediate menace of rupture.”[20] After expressing astonishment that a demand of apology “figured in the original programme,” which he pronounced entirely out of place, the impartial Frenchman proceeds: “Seeing such haste and proclamation so lofty of an exigence above debate, seeing the idea of an impious war accepted with so much ease by some and with such joy so little dissembled by others, Europe declared, without ambiguity or reserve, that, if England were not miraculously saved from her own undertaking, that, if she went so far as to fire a cannon at the North as an ally of the South, she would tear with her own hands her principal titles to the respect of the civilized world.”[21] Rejecting the pretension that the maintenance of peace was due to the “warlike measures of England,” the eloquent moralist exclaims, “America has just rendered to England the most signal service which ever a people rendered to another people,” and this by refusing the war which was menaced,--a war, as painted by him, where, in addition to untold calamity, would be the wretchedness of striking at the liberty of the world in alliance with slave-traders. How naturally he adds: “From the moment that she is only the ally of slave-traders, she has abdicated.”[22]

The summary tone of the British Government and the contemporaneous preparations for war enhanced the difficulties peculiar to such a question; but it was easy to see, on examination, that the demand was in substantial conformity with American precedents, and accordingly the Rebels, who had been confined at Fort Warren, in Boston Harbor, were handed over to the British Government.

* * * * *

While the question was under consideration by the Cabinet of President Lincoln, and before any conclusion had been communicated to the British Government, an incident occurred in the Senate which showed the feeling that sought expression. December 26th, Mr. Hale, of New Hampshire, who had already avowed his sympathy with the act of Captain Wilkes, found occasion to discuss it at some length, and to denounce the idea of surrendering the Rebels. A few passages will show the tone he adopted.

“I believe that the Cabinet to-day and yesterday, and for some days past, have had under consideration a measure which involves more of good or evil to this country than anything that has ever occurred before: I mean the surrender, on the demand of Great Britain, of the persons of Messrs. Slidell and Mason. To my mind, a more fatal act could not mark the history of this country,--an act that would surrender at once to the arbitrary demand of Great Britain all that was won in the Revolution, reduce us to the position of a second-rate power, and make us the vassal of Great Britain.…

“I have seen many gentlemen, and I have seen none, not a man can be found, who is in favor of this surrender; for it would humiliate us in the eyes of the world, irritate our own people, and subject us to their indignant scorn. If we are to have war with Great Britain, it will not be because we refuse to surrender Messrs. Mason and Slidell: that is a mere pretence. If war shall come, it will be because Great Britain has determined to force war upon us. They would humiliate us first and fight us afterwards. If we are to be humiliated, I prefer to take it after a war, and not before.… I pray that this Administration will not surrender our national honor. I tell them that hundreds and thousands and hundreds of thousands will rush to the battle-field, and bare their breasts to its perils, rather than submit to degradation.”[23]

Mr. Sumner at that time had not seen the demand, and was without any precise information on the subject, but felt it his duty to say something by way of breakwater against the rising tide. He spoke briefly.

MR. PRESIDENT,--The Senator has made his speech, and then withdrawn his motion; he has accomplished his object. For myself, Sir, I would rather meet this question, truly important, when presented in a practical form. The Senator treats it on an hypothesis; he assumes that Great Britain has made an arrogant demand, and then proceeds to denounce it. How does he know that any such demand has been made? Who in the Senate knows it? Who in the country knows it? I do not believe it,--will not believe it, except on evidence.

The Senator says that he is not against arbitration. How does he know that this is not the policy of the Administration? But I know nobody here who can speak for the Administration on this point.

I submit to the Senator that on both points he has spoken too swiftly. There is no evidence to justify him in belief that any arrogant demand has been made; there is no evidence that can lead him to distrust the fidelity of the Administration. Speaking for myself and nobody else, I declare my conviction that the question will be peaceably and honorably adjusted. I do not believe that it is a question for war; and I hail with gratitude the declaration of the honorable Senator in favor of arbitration. This at least is pacific in what must be called a war speech. But do not understand me as intimating that such mode is under consideration. I content myself with repeating, that the question is in safe hands, and that it will be better for us to reserve ourselves until it is presented in some practical form, or at least on evidence, and not on mere hypothesis.