Part 6

In this statement, I rely upon personal recollection of conversations with him. More than twenty years ago--as also more recently--I was in the habit of meeting the great writer in the society of London; and I remember well how, on one of these occasions, when told that an American bookseller proposed to publish a collection of his articles, he very positively protested against it, and refused to furnish a list. Nor is it out of place to add here, that, while his wonderful conversation left on the mind an ineffaceable impression of eloquence and fulness, perhaps without parallel, it also showed a character of singular integrity.

This article is not alone in attesting his sympathy with the Antislavery cause. The first public appearance of Macaulay, while yet a very young man, was at an Antislavery meeting; and one of his most stinging speeches, at the maturity of his powers, in the House of Commons, bore testimony to the depth and constancy of this sentiment.[14] This was natural; for he was son of Zachary Macaulay, one of the devoted Abolitionists who helped to carry, first, the abolition of the slave-trade, and then, at a later day, the abolition of Slavery itself, in the British dominions.

The services of the father, as friend of the slave, have been aptly commemorated by a cenotaph in Westminster Abbey, situated in the nave, on the left side of the great door as you enter, and close to the imposing monument of Fox. The son now lies in the same historic burial-place and beneath the same mighty roof,[15] but in Poets’ Corner, distant by more than the whole length of the nave from the tablet erected in honor of his father. In all that multitude of monuments to the illustrious dead, if we except the line of kings, there is but one other instance of father and son enshrined in the Abbey, and that is Lord Chatham and William Pitt, whose monuments are also distant from each other by more than the whole length of the nave.

Such is the conspicuous fellowship of the two Pitts and the Macaulays, father and son, although most unlike in circumstances of life and the services which have secured this common foothold of immortality. In each case, the father, even with the fame of Lord Chatham, has new glory from the son. The resting-places of the two Pitts are known at once on entering the Abbey. Hereafter, the stranger, who has stood with grateful admiration before the grave of the younger Macaulay, will seek with reverent step the simple tribute to his father, the Abolitionist,--mindful that the love of Human Freedom in which the son was cradled and schooled gave to his character some of its best features, and to his career of authorship its earliest triumph.

My purpose is simply to introduce this new-found testimony against Slavery, and not to dwell on the life or character of the author. If I followed a hint from him, the way would be open. Nobody can forget that in one of his most magnificent essays he has availed himself of the interest, transient it may have been, created by a newly discovered prose work of Milton, and has reminded his readers that the dexterous Capuchins never choose to preach on the life and miracles of a Saint till they have awakened the devotional feelings of their auditors by exhibiting some relic of him,--a thread of his garment, a lock of his hair, or a drop of his blood. Here, indeed, is a relic of Macaulay; but I venture no further.

CHARLES SUMNER.

STATUE OF HORACE MANN.

LETTER TO DR. SAMUEL G. HOWE, MARCH 5, 1860.

From the public papers of the time.

SENATE CHAMBER, March 5, 1860.

MY DEAR HOWE,--I am glad to know that you are moving in earnest for a public statue to Horace Mann.

Absence, and not indifference, is my excuse for not associating myself at first with this purpose. Though tardily, I do it now most sincerely, and with my whole heart. I send you for it one hundred dollars; but you will please not to measure my interest in this tribute to a public benefactor by the sum which I contribute. Were I able, it would be ten times as large. If each person in Massachusetts who has been benefited by the vast and generous labors of Horace Mann,--each person who hates Intemperance, and who hates Slavery,--each person who loves Education, and who loves humane efforts for the prisoner, the poor, and the insane,--should contribute a mite only, then his statue would be of gold. Why not at once appeal to good men, and insist upon organization throughout the Commonwealth, reaching into every School District, so that all may have an opportunity to contribute? Pray do this, and if I can serve you any way about it, command me, and believe me,

Always yours,

CHARLES SUMNER.

P. S.--Mr. Seward, who is not a Massachusetts man, asks me to put his name down for fifty dollars. I enclose his subscription.

USURPATION OF THE SENATE IN IMPRISONING A CITIZEN.

TWO SPEECHES, ON THE IMPRISONMENT OF THADDEUS HYATT FOR REFUSING TO TESTIFY IN THE HARPER’S FERRY INVESTIGATION, IN THE SENATE, MARCH 12 AND JUNE 15, 1860.

On his return to the Senate, at the opening of Congress, December 5, 1859, Mr. Sumner encountered the agitation arising from the famous attempt of John Brown at Harper’s Ferry. Though warned to enter slowly into the full responsibilities of his position, he was constantly moved by incidents arising from this agitation.

* * * * *

On the first day of the session, Mr. Mason, of Virginia, moved the appointment of a committee “to inquire into the facts attending the late invasion and seizure of the armory and arsenal of the United States at Harper’s Ferry, in Virginia, by a band of armed men,” and the long resolution concluded with “power to send for persons and papers.” The Committee was appointed, with Mr. Mason as chairman, and, in the course of its duties, summoned John Brown, Jr., of Kansas, and F. B. Sanborn and James Redpath, of Massachusetts, who severally failed to appear. Thaddeus Hyatt, of New York, appeared, but refused to testify. Thereupon Mr. Mason reported from his committee the following resolution.

“Whereas Thaddeus Hyatt, appearing at the bar of the Senate, in custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms, pursuant to the resolution of the Senate of the 6th of March, instant, was required, by order of the Senate then made, to answer the following questions, under oath and in writing: ‘1st, What excuse have you for not appearing before the select committee of the Senate, in pursuance of the summons served on you on the 24th day of January, 1860? 2d, Are you now ready to appear before said committee, and answer such proper questions as shall be put to you by said committee?’--time to answer the same being given until the 9th day of March following: And whereas, on the said last-named day, the said Thaddeus Hyatt, again appearing, in like custody, at the bar of the Senate, presented a paper, accompanied by an affidavit, which he stated was his answer to said questions; and it appearing, upon examination thereof, that said Thaddeus Hyatt has assigned no sufficient excuse in answer to the question first aforesaid, and in answer to said second question has not declared himself ready to appear and answer before said committee of the Senate, as set forth in said question, and has not purged himself of the contempt with which he stands charged: Therefore,

“_Be it resolved_, That the said Thaddeus Hyatt be committed by the Sergeant-at-Arms to the common jail of the District of Columbia, to be kept in close custody until he shall signify his willingness to answer the questions propounded to him by the Senate; and for the commitment and detention of the said Thaddeus Hyatt this resolution shall be a sufficient warrant.

“_Resolved_, That, whenever the officer having the said Thaddeus Hyatt in custody shall be informed by said Hyatt that he is ready and willing to answer the questions aforesaid, it shall be the duty of such officer to deliver the said Thaddeus Hyatt over to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the Senate, whose duty it shall be again to bring him before the bar of the Senate, when so directed by the Senate.”

On the question upon its passage, March 12, 1860, Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

MR. PRESIDENT,--It is related in English parliamentary history, that, on a certain occasion, when the House of Commons was about ordering the commitment of a somewhat too famous witness to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms, the Speaker interfered by volunteering to say, that “the House ought to pause before they came to a decision upon a point in which the liberty of the subject was so materially concerned.”[16] That same question is now before us. We are to pass on the liberty of a citizen.

Pardon me, if I say that such a question cannot at any time be trivial. But it has an unaccustomed magnitude on this occasion, because the case is novel in this body; so that what you now do, besides involving the liberty of the gentleman at the bar, will establish a precedent, which, in itself, will be a law for other cases hereafter.

Now, if it be conceded that the Senate is invested with all the large powers claimed by the Houses of Parliament, then I cannot doubt its power in the present case, although I might well question the expediency of exercising it. But this is notoriously untrue. It is well known that Parliament is above the constraint of a written Constitution; and it has been more than once declared--much to the indignation of our Revolutionary fathers--that it is “omnipotent” to such extent that it can do anything it pleases, except make a man of a woman, or a woman of a man. The Senate has no such large powers; it is not “omnipotent,” but under the constraint of a written Constitution. Instead of authority in all possible cases, it has authority only in certain specific cases.

If the Senate can summon witnesses to its bar, and compel them to testify, under pains and penalties, it must be by virtue of powers delegated in the Constitution,--I do not say by express grant, but at least by positive intendment. I say positive intendment; for nothing is to be presumed against liberty.

There are certain cases in which the power is clear: first, and most conspicuously, in the trial of impeachments; secondly, in determining the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members; and, thirdly, in punishing its members for disorderly behavior. All these proceedings are judicial, as well as political, in character, and carry with them, as a natural incident, the power to compel witnesses to testify.

Beyond these three cases, which stand on the express words of the Constitution, there are two other cases, quasi-judicial in character, which, though not supported by express words of the Constitution, have grown out of necessity and reason, amounting to positive intendment, and are sanctioned by precedents. I refer, first, to the inquiry into an alleged violation of the privileges of this body, as where a copy of a treaty was furtively obtained and published; and, secondly, to the inquiry into conduct of servants of the Senate, like that now proceeding with regard to the Printer, on the motion of the Senator from New York [Mr. KING]. If I were asked to indicate the principle on which these two cases stood, I should say it was that just and universal right of _self-defence_ inherent in every parliamentary body, as in every court, and also in every individual, but which is limited closely by the simple necessities of the case.

Such are the five cases in which this extraordinary power has been heretofore exercised: the first three standing on the text of the Constitution, and the other two on the right of self-defence necessarily inherent in the Senate; all five sanctioned by precedents of this body; all five judicial in character; all five judicial also in purpose and intent; and all five agreeing in this final particular, that they have no legislative purpose or intent. Beyond these cases there is no precedent for the exercise by the Senate of the power in question.

It is now proposed to add a new case, most clearly without any support in the Constitution, without any support in the right of _self-defence_ inherent in the Senate, and without any support in the precedents of the Senate.

A committee has been appointed to inquire into the facts attending the late invasion and seizure of the armory and arsenal at Harper’s Ferry by a band of armed men, and report whether the same was attended by armed resistance to the authorities and public force of the United States, and by the murder of any citizens of Virginia, or of any troops sent there to protect public property; whether such invasion was made under color of any organization intended to subvert the government of any of the States of the Union; the character and extent of such organization; _whether any citizens of the United States, not present, were implicated therein or accessory thereto, by contributions of money, arms, munitions, or otherwise_; the character and extent of the military equipment in the hands or under the control of such armed band; where, how, and when the same was obtained and transported to the place invaded; also, to report what legislation, if any, is necessary by the Government for the future preservation of the peace of the country and the safety of public property; with power to send for persons and papers.

And this committee, after several weeks of session, now invokes the power of the Senate to compel the witness to testify. The chairman of the committee, the Senator from Virginia [Mr. MASON], who calls for the imprisonment of an American citizen, has shown no authority for such an exercise of power in the Constitution, or in the admitted right of self-defence, or in the precedents of the Senate. He cannot show any such authority. It does not exist.

Surely, where the Constitution, and reason, and precedent, all three, are silent, we might well hesitate to exercise a power so transcendent. But I shall not stop here. I go further, and point out two specific defects in the resolution of the Senate.

_First._ The inquiry which it institutes is clearly judicial in character,--without, however, any judicial purpose, or looking to any judicial end. The committee is essentially a Tribunal, with power of denunciation, but without power of punishment,--sitting with closed doors, having the secrecy of the Inquisition or the Star Chamber, or, if you please, the Grand Jury,--with power to investigate facts involving the guilt of absent persons, and to denounce fellow-citizens as felons and traitors. If such a power is lodged anywhere outside of judicial tribunals, it must be in the House of Representatives, as the Grand Inquest of the Nation, with its power to impeach all civil officers, from the President down; but it cannot be in the Senate. Let me cite an illustration. The Constitution of Maryland provides expressly that “the House of Delegates may inquire, on the oath of witnesses, into all complaints, grievances, and offences, as the Grand Inquest of the State, and may commit any person for any crime to the public jail, there to remain until discharged by due course of law.” But I deny that the Senate of that neighbor State can erect itself into a Grand Inquest.

If the Senate of the United States have power to make the present inquiry, then, on any occasion of alleged crime, of whatever nature, whether of treason or murder or riot, it may rush to the assistance of the grand juries of the District, or, still further, it may rush to the assistance of the grand juries of Virginia; in short, it will be an inquest of commanding character, and with far-reaching, all-pervading process, supplementary and ancillary to the local inquest,--or, rather, so transcendent in powers, that by its side the local inquest will be dwarfed into insignificance. This cannot be proper or constitutional. But perhaps I am especially sensitive on this point; for, as a citizen of Massachusetts, I cannot forget that her Bill of Rights, originally the work of John Adams, provides expressly that the legislative department shall never exercise judicial powers, and the judicial department shall never exercise legislative powers,--“to the end,” as is solemnly declared, “it may be a government of laws, and not of men.”

But, assuming that the resolution is defective so far as it constitutes an inquest into crime, it may be said that the witness should be compelled to answer the other parts. Surely, the Senate will not resort to any such refinement in order to imprison a citizen.

_Secondly._ But there is a broader objection still: that, whatever may be the power of the Senate in judicial cases, it cannot compel the testimony of a witness in a proceeding of which the declared purpose is merely legislative. Officers of the Government communicate with Congress and its committees simply by letter. They are not summoned from distant posts, or even from their offices here. And I know not why a distant citizen, charged with no offence, and in every right the peer of any office-holder, should be treated with less consideration. If information be desired from him for any legislative purpose, let him communicate it in the way most convenient to himself, and most consistent with those rights of the citizen which all are bound to respect.

At all events, if this power is to be exercised, let it not be under a simple resolution of the Senate, but by virtue of a general law, passed by both Houses, and approved by the President, so that the citizen shall be surrounded with certain safeguards.

Mr. President, I confidently submit that a power so entirely without support, and also so obnoxious to criticism, at the same time that it is so vast, is not to be carelessly exercised. You cannot send the witness to prison without establishing a new precedent and commencing a new class of cases. You will declare that the Senate, at any time,--not merely in the performance of admitted judicial duties, but also in the performance of mere legislative duties,--may drag a citizen from the most distant village of the most distant State, and compel his testimony, involving the guilt or innocence of absent persons, or, it may be, of the witness himself. This is a fearful prerogative, and permit me to say, that, in assuming it, you liken yourselves to the Jesuits, at the period of their most hateful supremacy, when it was said that their power was a sword whose handle was at Rome and whose point was in the most distant places. You take into your hands a sword whose handle will be in this Chamber, to be clutched by a mere partisan majority, and whose point will be in every corner of the Republic.

If the present case were doubtful, which I do not admit, I feel that I cannot go wrong, when I lean to the side of Liberty. But, even admitting that you have the power, is this the occasion to use it? Is it, upon the whole, expedient? Is the object to be accomplished worth the sacrifice? It is well to have a giant’s strength, but it is tyrannous to use it like a giant.

For myself, Sir, I confess a feeling of gratitude to the witness, who, knowing nothing which he desires to conceal, and chiefly anxious that the liberties of all may not suffer through him, feeble in body and broken in health, hardly able to endure the fatigue of appearing at your bar, now braves the prison which you menace, and thrusts his arm as a bolt to arrest an unauthorized and arbitrary proceeding.

The resolutions were adopted March 12, 1860, and on the same day Mr. Hyatt was committed to the common jail of Washington.

* * * * *

On the 15th of June, 1860, Mr. Mason, of Virginia, Chairman of the Harper’s Ferry Investigating Committee, in submitting his final report, further submitted the following order.

“_Ordered_, That Thaddeus Hyatt, a witness confined in the jail of this city for refusal to appear and testify before said committee, be discharged from custody, and that a copy of this order be delivered to the jailer by the Sergeant-at-Arms, as his warrant for discharging said prisoner.”

On the question upon its passage, Mr. Sumner spoke as follows.

MR. PRESIDENT,--I welcome with pleasure the proposition for the discharge of Mr. Hyatt from his long incarceration in the filthy jail where he has been detained by the order of the Senate. But I am unwilling that this act of justice should be done to a much injured citizen, without for one moment exposing the injustice which he has received at your hands.

The case, it seems to me, can be made as plain as a diagram.

We must not forget a fundamental difference between the powers of the House of Representatives and the powers of the Senate. It is from the former that the Senator from Virginia has drawn his precedents, and here is his mistake.

To the House of Representatives expressly are given by the Constitution _inquisitorial_ powers, while no such powers are given to the Senate. This is contained in the words, “The House of Representatives shall have the _sole_ power of impeachment.” Here, then, obviously, is something delegated to the House, and not delegated to the Senate,--namely, those inquiries in their nature preliminary to impeachment, which may or may not end in impeachment; and since, by the Constitution, every “civil officer” of the national government may be impeached, the _inquisitorial_ powers of the House may be directed against every “civil officer,” from the President down to the lowest on the list.

This is an extensive power, but it is confined solely to the House. Strictly speaking, the Senate has no general _inquisitorial_ powers. It has, we know, _judicial powers_ in three cases under the Constitution:--

1. To try impeachments;

2. To judge the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members;

3. To punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two thirds, to expel a member.

In the execution of these powers, the Senate has the attributes of a court, and, according to established precedents, it may summon witnesses and compel their testimony, although it may well be doubted if a law be not necessary even to the execution of this power.

Besides these three cases, expressly named in the Constitution, there are two others, where it has already undertaken to exercise _judicial powers_, not by virtue of express words, but in _self-defence_:--

1. With regard to the conduct of its servants, as of its Printer;

2. When its privileges have been violated, as in the case of William Duane,[17] by a libel, or in the case of Nugent,[18] by obtaining and divulging a treaty while still under seal of secrecy.

It will be observed that these two classes of cases are not sustained by any text of the Constitution. If sustained at all, it must be by that principle of universal jurisprudence, and also of natural law, which gives to every body, whether natural or artificial, the right to protect its own existence,--in other words, the great right of self-defence. And I submit that no principle less solid can sustain this exercise of power. It is not enough to say that such a power would be _convenient_, highly convenient, or important. _It must be absolutely essential to the self-preservation of the body_; and even then, in the absence of any law, it must be open in our country to the gravest doubts.