Part 24

But I undertake to affirm that no usage, professional or social, can give any apology for joining the pack of the Slave-Hunter. Mr. Dunning, one of the persons in this predicament, showed that he acted against his better nature.[156] The first words in his argument were: "It is incumbent on me to justify the detainer of the negro." Pray, why incumbent on him? He was then careful to show that he did not maintain any absolute property in him; and he proceeded to say, among other things, that it was his misfortune to address an audience, the greater part of which, he feared, was prejudiced the other way,--that, for himself, he would not be understood to intimate a wish in favor of Slavery, but that he was bound in duty to maintain those arguments most useful to the claimant, so far as consistent with the truth; and he concluded with this conscience-stricken appeal: "I hope, therefore, I shall not suffer in the opinion of those whose honest passions are fired at the name of Slavery; I hope I have not transgressed my duty to Humanity."[157] Clearly the lawyer had transgressed his duty to Humanity. No man can rightfully enforce a principle which violates human nature; nor can any subtilty of dialectics, any extent of erudition, or any grandeur of intellect sustain him. Notwithstanding the character for liberal principles which John Dunning acquired, and which breathes in his sensitive excuses,--notwithstanding his double fame at once in Westminster Hall and Saint Stephen's Chapel,--notwithstanding the peerage which he won,--this odious service rendered to a Slave-Hunter, calling himself a Virginia gentleman, cries in judgment against him, and will continue to cry, as time advances. (Do not start, Mr. President,--I am narrating occurrences in another hemisphere and another century.) As well undertake a Slave-Hunt in the deserts of Africa as in the streets of London. As well pursue the fugitive with the hired whip of the overseer as with the hired argument of the lawyer. As well chase him with the baying of the blood-hound as with the tongue of the advocate. It is the lawyer's clear duty to uphold _human rights_, whether in the loftiest or the lowliest; and when he undertakes to uphold a wrong outrageous as Slavery, his proper function is so far reversed that he can be aptly described only in the phrase of the Roman Church, _Advocatus Diaboli_, the Devil's Advocate.

[156] A private letter from the claimant to James Murray, Esq., of Boston, dated London, June 15, 1772, carries us back to the times, and even to the court-room. "I am told," writes the claimant, "that some young counsel flourished away on the side of liberty, and acquired great honor. Dunning was dull and languid, and would have made a much better figure on that side also." Of course he would. After speaking of the "load of abuse thrown on L--d M----, for hesitating to pronounce judgment in favor of freedom," the claimant says, "Dunning has come in also for a pretty good share for taking the wrong side." (Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings for 1863-64, pp. 323, 324.) Abolitionists had begun to be critical.

[157] Howell's State Trials, XX. 71-76.

Passing from counsel to court, we find occasion for gratitude and sorrow. The three judges, Aston, Willes, and Ashhurst, who sat at the side of Lord Mansfield, were silent through the whole proceedings, overawed, perhaps, by his commanding authority, so that he alone seems to be present. Of large intellect, and extensive studies, running into all regions of learning,--with a silver-tongued voice, and an amenity of manner which gave constant charm to his presence,--with unsurpassed professional and political experience combined,--early companion of Pope, and early competitor of Pitt,--having already once refused the post of Prime Minister, and three times refused the post of Chancellor,--he stood forth, at the period when the poor slave was brought before him, an acknowledged master of jurisprudence, and, take him for all in all, the most finished magistrate England had then produced. But his character had one fatal defect, too common on the bench. He lacked _moral firmness_,--happily not lacking in Granville Sharp. Still more, he was not naturally on the side of Liberty, as becomes a great judge, but always, by blood and instinct, on the side of prerogative and power,--an offence for which he was arraigned by his contemporary, Junius, and for which posterity will hold him to strict account. But his luminous mind, prompt to perceive the force of principles, could not resist the array of argument now marshalled for Freedom. He saw clearly that a system like Slavery could not find home under the British Constitution, _which nowhere mentions the name Slave_; and yet he shrank from the sublime conclusion. More than once he coquetted with the merchants, who had the case so much at heart, and twice ignobly suggested that the claimant might avoid the decision of the great question, fraught with Freedom or Slavery to multitudes, simply by manumitting the individual. And when at last the case could not be arrested by any device, or be longer postponed,--when judgment was inevitable,--he came to the work, not warmly or generously, but in trembling obedience to the Truth, which waited to be declared.

On other occasions, of purely commercial character, his judgments are more learned and elaborate, besides being reported with more completeness and care; but no judgment of equal significance ever fell from the great Oracle. From various sources I have sought its precise import.[158] It is remarkable for several rules, which it clearly enunciates, and which, though often assaulted, still stand as reason and as law. Of these, the first is expressed in these simple words: "If the parties will have judgment, _fiat justitia, ruat coelum_: let justice be done, whatever be the consequence." The Latin phrase which here plays such a prominent part, though of classical stamp, cannot be traced to any classical origin, and it has even been asserted that it was freshly coined by Lord Mansfield on this occasion, worthy of such commanding truth in such commanding phrase. But it is of older date, and from another mint,--though it is not too much to say, that it took its currency and authority from him. Coming from such a conservative magistrate, it is of peculiar importance. With little expansion, it says openly: To every man his natural rights; justice to all, without distinction of person, without abridgment, and without compromise. Let justice be done, though it drags down the pillars of the sky. Thus spoke the Chief Justice of England.[159]

[158] It is strange that there should be no single satisfactory report of this memorable judgment. That usually quoted from Howell's State Trials, Vol. XX. coll. 80-82, was copied from Lofft, a reporter generally avoided as authority. There is another report in Hoare's Memoirs of Sharp, pp. 89-91; also another in Campbell's Lives of the Chief Justices, Vol. II. p. 419; and still another, and in some respects the best, in the Appendix (No. 8) to a tract published by Sharp in 1776, entitled "The Just Limitation of Slavery in the Laws of God, compared with the Unbounded Claims of the African Traders and British American Slaveholders." It is considered and quoted in other contemporary tracts.

[159] A British writer, giving an account of the Somerset case, says of this maxim, that "it has found its way into use as a classical expression, and, as no one has been able to find it in any Latin author, it is supposed to have been of Lord Mansfield's own coining." (Chambers's Edinburgh Journal, July 31, 1852, N. S. Vol. XVIII. p. 71: _Slaves in Britain_.) This is a mistake. The precise phrase will be found in Ward's "Simple Cobler of Aggawamm in America," written in 1615, and first printed in 1647,--"It is lesse to say, _Statuatur veritas, ruat Regnum_, than _Fiat justitia, ruat Coelum_" (p. 14); but its origin, in substance, if not in form, is earlier. There is little doubt that it does not occur in any Latin author. Its Latinity is good, and might belong to the classical period. The latter clause, _ruat coelum_, has classical authority, as in the passage of Terence, showing that it was a common saying in his time, "Quid si redeo ad illos _qui aiunt_, Quid si nunc _coelum ruat_?" (Heauton., Act. IV. sc. 3.) The idea is also Roman. On the European continent, and especially in Germany, the maxim has another form, which is common,--_Fiat justitia, pereat mundus_. Binder, in his _Novus Thesaurus Adagiorum Latinorum_, (Stuttgart, 1861,) cites it in this form as _Regula Juris_, explained as "a designation for the maxims, taken from the _Corpus Juris_ and the works of the different ancient civilians, which have become proverbial." In the same authority is the hexameter verse, _Fiat justitia, pereat licet integer orbis_, from Johannis Leibi _Studentica_ (Coburg, 1627). In England the maxim was current in other forms. As early as February 26, 1624-5, in a letter to the English ambassador at Holland, alluding to "the business of Amboyne," we meet _Fiat justitia et ruat mundus_. (Birch's Court and Times of James I., Vol. II. p. 500.) In a speech in the House of Commons, December 22, 1640, against the judges who pronounced in favor of ship-money, an orator says: "If ever any nation might justifiably, we certainly may now, now most properly, most seasonably, cry out, and cry aloud, _Vel sacra regnet justitia vel ruat coelum_." And he concludes with a motion, "That a special committee may be appointed to examine the whole carriage of that extrajudicial judgment, ... and, upon report thereof, to draw up a charge against the guilty; and then _Lex currat, fiat justitia_. (Parl. Hist., 2d ed., London, 1763, Vol. IX. p. 192.) In the answer of the Duke of Richmond (January 31, 1641-2) to the charge of the Commons, it is said: "_Magna est veritas et prevalebit_. I wish it may do so in what concerns me. _Regnet justitia et ruat coelum._" (Parl. Hist., Vol. X. p. 254. Also, Howell's State Trials, Vol. IV. col. 116.) The first clause of the maxim is an old law phrase, found in Law Dictionaries, and often repeated. A letter, dated London, May 4, 1621, relating the fine and degradation of Lord Bacon, concludes, _Fiat justitia_. (Birch's James I., Vol. II. p. 252.) Charles I., in a letter to the Lords, dated May 11, 1641, interceding for Strafford, said: "But if no less than his life can satisfy my people, I must say, _Fiat justitia_." (Parl. Hist. Vol. IX. p. 316. Howell's State Trials, Vol. III. col. 1520.) If not classical in authority, the maxim is not without interest from association with great events of English history, while it is a perpetual injunction to justice. Shakespeare gives expression to similar truth, when he says, "Be just and fear not."

And still another rule, hardly less important or less commanding, was clearly proclaimed in these penetrating words: "I care not for the supposed _dicta_ of judges, however eminent, _if they be contrary to all principle_"; or, in other language, In vain do you invoke great names in the law, even the names of Hardwicke and Talbot, and my own learned associate, Blackstone, in behalf of an institution which defies reason and outrages justice. Human precedent is powerless against immutable principle. Thus again spoke the Chief Justice of England.

Braced by these rules, the next stages were logically easy. And here he uttered words which are like a buttress to Freedom. He declared, that, tracing Slavery to _natural principles_, it can never be supported: that is to say, Slavery is a violation of the great law of Nature, established by God himself, coextensive in space and time with the Universe. Again he proclaimed, Slavery cannot stand on any reason, moral or political, but only by virtue of _positive law_; and he clinched his conclusion by the unquestionable truth, that, in a matter so _odious_, the evidence and authority of this law must be taken strictly: in other words, a wrong like Slavery, which finds no support in natural law or in reason, can be maintained, if at all, only by some dread mandate, from some sovereign authority, irresistibly clear and incapable of a double sense, which declares in precise and unequivocal terms, that men guilty of no crime may be held as _slaves_, and be submitted to the bargains of the market-place, the hammer of the auctioneer, and the hunt of the blood-hound. Clearly no such mandate could be shown in England. After asserting the obvious truth, that rights cannot depend on any discrimination of color, and thus discarding the profane assumptions of race, while he quoted apt Roman authority,--

"Quamvis ille niger, quamvis tu candidus esses,"

the Chief Justice concluded, "And therefore let the negro be discharged." Such was this immortal judgment. I catch its last words, already resounding through the ages, with the voice of deliverance to an enslaved people.

From Westminster Hall, where he had been held so long in painful suspense, the happy freedman, with glad tidings of deliverance, hurried to his angel protector, Granville Sharp, who, though organizing and sustaining these proceedings, was restrained by unobtrusive modesty from all attendance in court, that he might in no wise irritate the Chief Justice, unfortunately prepossessed against his endeavor. And thus closed the most remarkable constitutional battle in English history, fought by a simple clerk, once apprentice to a linen-draper, against the merchants of London, backed by great names in law, and by the most exalted magistrate of the age. Like the stripling David, he went forth to the contest with only a sling and a few smooth stones from the brook; and Goliath fell prostrate. Not merely the individual slave, but upwards of fourteen thousand human beings,--four times as many slaves as could be counted throughout New England at the adoption of the National Constitution,--rejoiced in emancipation; a slave-hunt was made impossible in the streets of London; and a great principle was set up which will stand forever as a Landmark of Freedom.

This triumph, hailed at the time by the friends of human happiness with exultation and delight, was commemorated by poetry and eloquence. It prompted Cowper, in his "Task," to these touching verses:--

"Slaves cannot breathe in England; if their lungs Receive our air, that moment they are free: They touch our country, and their shackles fall. That's noble, and bespeaks a nation proud And jealous of the blessing. Spread it, then, And let it circulate through every vein Of all your Empire, that, where Britain's power Is felt, mankind may feel her mercy too."

It inspired Curran to a burst of eloquence, grand, and familiar to all who hear me.

"I speak in the spirit of the British law, which makes Liberty commensurate with and inseparable from British soil,--which proclaims even to the stranger and sojourner, the moment he sets his foot upon British earth, that the ground on which he treads is holy and consecrated by the genius of Universal Emancipation. No matter in what language his doom may have been pronounced,--no matter what complexion, incompatible with Freedom, an Indian or an African sun may have burnt upon him,--no matter in what disastrous battle his liberty may have been cloven down,--no matter with what solemnities he may have been devoted upon the altar of Slavery: the first moment he touches the sacred soil of Britain, the altar and the god sink together in the dust, his soul walks abroad in her own majesty, his body swells beyond the measure of his chains that burst from around him, and he stands redeemed, regenerated, and disenthralled by the irresistible genius of Universal Emancipation."[160]

[160] Defence of Archibald Hamilton Rowan, January 29, 1794: Speeches, ed. Davis, (London, 1847,) p. 182.

It was this triumph which lifted Brougham, in our own day, to one of those vivid utterances by which truth is flashed upon unwilling souls.

"Tell me not of rights,--talk not of the property of the planter in his slaves. I deny the right,--I acknowledge not the property. The principles, the feelings of our common nature rise in rebellion against it. Be the appeal made to the understanding or to the heart, the sentence is the same that rejects it. In vain you tell me of laws that sanction such a claim. There is a law above all the enactments of human codes,--the same throughout the world, the same in all times: ... it is the law written on the heart of man by the finger of his Maker; and by that law, unchangeable and eternal, while men despise fraud and loathe rapine and abhor blood, they will reject with indignation the wild and guilty fantasy that man can hold property in man."[161]

[161] Speech on Negro Slavery, July 13, 1830: Works, Vol. X. p. 216.

Granville Sharp did not rest from labor. The Humanities are not solitary. Where one is found, there will others be also. The advocate of the slave in London was naturally the advocate of liberty for all everywhere. In this spirit he signalized himself against that scandal of the English law, the hateful system of Impressment, while he encountered no less a person than Dr. Johnson, whom he did not hesitate to charge with "plausible sophistry and important self-sufficiency, as if he supposed that the mere sound of words was capable of altering the nature of things";[162] also, against the claims of England in the controversy with her American colonies, zealously maintaining our cause in a publication, of which it is said seven thousand copies were printed in Boston[163]; also, in establishing a colony of liberated slaves at Sierra Leone, on the coast of Africa, predecessor of our more successful Liberia; and, finally, as leader, not only against the Slave-Trade, but also against Slavery itself, so that he was hailed "Father of the cause in England," and was placed at the head of the illustrious committee by which it was conducted, though his rare modesty prevented him from taking the chair to which he was unanimously elected. But no modesty could check his valiant soul in conflict with wrong. Not content with his warfare in court, he addressed Lord North, the Prime Minister, warning him in the most earnest manner to take measures for the immediate abolition of Slavery in all the British dominions, as utterly irreconcilable with the principles of the British Constitution and the established religion of the land, and solemnly declaring that "it were better for the nation that their American dominions had never existed, or even that they had sunk in the sea, than that the kingdom of Great Britain should be loaded with the horrid guilt of tolerating such abominable wickedness."[164] With similar boldness, in an elaborate work, he arraigned the doctrine of _Passive Obedience_, advanced now in favor of judicial tribunals, as once in favor of kings, and he openly affirmed, as unquestionable truth, that every public ordinance contrary to reason, justice, natural equity, or the written word of God, must be promptly rejected.[165] Other things, too, I might mention; but I am admonished that I must draw to a close. Pardon me, if I touch yet one other shining point in his career.

[162] Memoirs, p. 169.

[163] A Declaration of the People's Natural Right to a Share in the Legislature (London, 1774). Memoirs, pp. 172, 173.

[164] Memoirs, pp. 78-80.

[165] The Law of Passive Obedience, p. 82, note.

The news of the Battle of Bunker Hill, which reached London at the end of July, 1775, found him at his desk, still a clerk in the Ordnance Office, and by position obliged to participate in the military preparations now required. He was unwilling to be concerned, even thus distantly, in what he regarded as "that unnatural business"; and though a close attendance on his office for seventeen years, to the neglect of all other worldly opportunities, made it important to him as a livelihood, yet he resolved to sacrifice it. Out of regard to his great worth and the respect he had won, he was indulged at first with leave of absence; but when hostilities in the Colonies advanced beyond any prospect of speedy accommodation, then he vacated his office. This man of charity, who lived for others, was now left without support. But he was happy in the testimony he had borne to his principles: nor was he alone. Lord Effingham, and also the eldest son of Lord Chatham, threw up commissions in the army rather than serve on the side of injustice. They were all clearly right. It is vain to suppose that any human ordinance, whether from King, Parliament, or Judicial Tribunal, can vary our moral responsibilities, or release us from obedience to God. And since no man can stand between us and God, it belongs to each conscience for itself to determine its final obligations, and where pressed to an unrighteous act,--as if to slay, or, what is equally bad, to enslave, a fellow-man charged with no crime,--then at every peril to disobey the mandate. The example of Granville Sharp on this occasion is not the least among the large legacies of wisdom and fidelity which he has left to mankind.

All these are especially commended to us, as citizens of the United States, by the early and constant interest which he manifested in our country. By pen and personal intercession he vindicated our political rights,--and when independence was secured, his sympathies did not abate, as witness his correspondence with Adams, Jay, Franklin, and America's earliest Abolitionist, Anthony Benezet. His name became an authority here,--at the South as well as the North,--and the colleges, including Brown University, Harvard University, and William and Mary, of slaveholding Virginia, vied with each other in conferring upon him their highest academic honors. But the growing numbers of the Episcopal Church had occasion for special gratitude, only to be repaid by loyal regard for his character and life. On separation from the mother country, they were left without Episcopal head. To repair this deprivation, Granville Sharp, in published writings extensively circulated, proposed the election of bishops by the churches, and their subsequent consecration in England, as congenial to the usage of early Christians, and, after much correspondence and many impediments, enjoyed the satisfaction of presenting two bishops elect from America--one of whom was the exemplary Bishop White, of Philadelphia--to the Archbishop of Canterbury, by whom the Christian rite of laying on of hands was performed; and thus was the English Episcopacy communicated to this continent. I know not that the powerful religious denomination befriended by him in its infancy has ever sympathized with the great effort by which his name is exalted; but they should at least repel the weak imputation, so often levelled against all who are steadfast against Slavery, that their benefactor was "a man of one idea."

* * * * *