Part 21

Rejoicing in my independence, and claiming nothing from party ties, I throw myself upon the candor and magnanimity of the Senate. I ask your attention; I trust not to abuse it. I may speak strongly, for I shall speak openly and from the strength of my convictions. I may speak warmly, for I shall speak from the heart. But in no event can I forget the amenities which belong to debate, and which especially become this body. Slavery I must condemn with my whole soul; but here I need only borrow the language of slaveholders; nor would it accord with my habits or my sense of justice to exhibit them as the impersonation of the institution--Jefferson calls it the "enormity"[103]--which they cherish. Of them I do not speak; but without fear and without favor, as without impeachment of any person, I assail this wrong. Again, Sir, I may err; but it will be with the Fathers. I plant myself on the ancient ways of the Republic, with its grandest names, its surest landmarks, and all its original altar-fires about me.

[103] Letter to Dr. Price, August 7, 1785: Memoir, Correspondence, etc., ed. Randolph, Vol. I. p. 269; Writings, Vol. I. p. 377.

And now, on the very threshold, I encounter the objection, that there is a final settlement, in principle and substance, of the question of Slavery, and that all discussion of it is closed. Both the old political parties, by formal resolutions, in recent conventions at Baltimore, have united in this declaration. On a subject which for years has agitated the public mind, which yet palpitates in every heart and burns on every tongue, which in its immeasurable importance dwarfs all other subjects, which by its constant and gigantic presence throws a shadow across these halls, which at this very time calls for appropriations to meet extraordinary expenses it has caused, they impose the rule of silence. According to them, Sir, we may speak of everything except that alone which is most present in all our minds.

To this combined effort I might fitly reply, that, with flagrant inconsistency, it challenges the very discussion it pretends to forbid. Their very declaration, on the eve of an election, is, of course, submitted to the consideration and ratification of the people. Debate, inquiry, discussion, are the necessary consequence. Silence becomes impossible. Slavery, which you profess to banish from public attention, openly by your invitation enters every political meeting and every political convention. Nay, at this moment it stalks into this Senate, crying, like the daughters of the horseleech, "Give! give!"

But no unanimity of politicians can uphold the baseless assumption, that a law, or any conglomerate of laws, under the name of Compromise, or howsoever called, is final. Nothing can be plainer than this,--that by no parliamentary device or knot can any Legislature tie the hands of a succeeding Legislature, so as to prevent the full exercise of its constitutional powers. Each Legislature, under a just sense of its responsibility, must judge for itself; and if it think proper, it may revise, or amend, or absolutely undo the work of any predecessor. The laws of the Medes and Persians are said proverbially to have been unalterable; but they stand forth in history as a single example where the true principles of all law have been so irrationally defied.

To make a law final, so as not to be reached by Congress, is, by mere legislation, to fasten a new provision on the Constitution. Nay, more; it gives to the law a character which the very Constitution does not possess. The wise Fathers did not treat the country as a Chinese foot, never to grow after infancy; but, anticipating progress, they declared expressly that their great Act is not final. According to the Constitution itself, there is not one of its existing provisions--not even that with regard to fugitives from labor--which may not at all times be reached by amendment, and thus be drawn into debate. This is rational and just. Sir, nothing from man's hands, nor law nor constitution, can be final. Truth alone is final.

Inconsistent and absurd, this effort is tyrannical also. The responsibility for the recent Slave Act, and for Slavery everywhere within the jurisdiction of Congress, necessarily involves the right to discuss them. To separate these is impossible. Like the twenty-fifth rule[104] of the House of Representatives against petitions on Slavery,--now repealed and dishonored,--the Compromise, as explained and urged, is a curtailment of the actual powers of legislation, and a perpetual denial of the indisputable principle, that the right to deliberate is coextensive with the responsibility for an act. To sustain Slavery, it is now proposed to trample on _free speech_. In any country this would be grievous; but here, where the Constitution expressly provides against abridging freedom of speech, it is a special outrage. In vain do we condemn the despotisms of Europe, while we borrow the rigors with which they repress Liberty, and guard their own uncertain power. For myself, in no factious spirit, but solemnly and in loyalty to the Constitution, as a Senator of the United States, representing a free Commonwealth, I protest against this wrong. On Slavery, as on every other subject, I claim the right to be heard. That right I cannot, I will not abandon. "Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties":[105] these are glowing words, flashed from the soul of John Milton in his struggles with English tyranny. With equal fervor they should be echoed now by every American not already a slave.

[104] Originally the twenty-first, adopted January 28, 1840 (26th Cong. 1st Sess.), by Yeas 114, Nays 108; rescinded, on motion of John Quincy Adams, December 3, 1844 (28th Cong. 2d Sess.), by Yeas 108, Nays 80. It will be observed that the vote of the opponents of the rule was precisely the same (108) on its adoption as on its abrogation. Obviously many of the original supporters or their successors withheld their votes on the latter occasion. The rule in question was in these words: "No petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper, praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or any State or Territory, or the slave-trade between the States or Territories of the United States in which it now exists, shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way whatever."

[105] Milton, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing: Prose Works, ed. Symmons, Vol. I. p. 325.

But, Sir, this effort is impotent as tyrannical. Convictions of the heart cannot be repressed. Utterances of conscience must be heard. They break forth with irrepressible might. As well attempt to check the tides of Ocean, the currents of the Mississippi, or the rushing waters of Niagara. The discussion of Slavery will proceed, wherever two or three are gathered together,--by the fireside, on the highway, at the public meeting, in the church. The movement against Slavery is from the Everlasting Arm. Even now it is gathering its forces, soon to be confessed everywhere. It may not be felt yet in the high places of office and power, but all who can put their ears humbly to the ground will hear and comprehend its incessant and advancing tread.

The relations of the National Government to Slavery, though plain and obvious, are constantly misunderstood. A popular belief at this moment makes Slavery a national institution, and of course renders its support a national duty. The extravagance of this error can hardly be surpassed. An institution which our fathers most carefully omitted to name in the Constitution, which, according to the debates in the Convention, they refused to cover with any "sanction," and which, at the original organization of the Government, was merely _sectional_, existing nowhere on the _national_ territory, is now, above all other things, blazoned as national. Its supporters pride themselves as national. The old political parties, while upholding it, claim to be national. A National Whig is simply a Slavery Whig, and a National Democrat is simply a Slavery Democrat, in contradistinction to all who regard Slavery as a sectional institution, within the exclusive control of the States, and with which the nation has nothing to do.

As Slavery assumes to be national, so, by an equally strange perversion, Freedom is degraded to be sectional, and all who uphold it, under the National Constitution, are made to share this same epithet. Honest efforts to secure its blessings everywhere within the jurisdiction of Congress are scouted as sectional; and this cause, which the founders of our National Government had so much at heart, is called _Sectionalism_. These terms, now belonging to the commonplaces of political speech, are adopted and misapplied by most persons without reflection. But here is the power of Slavery. According to a curious tradition of the French language, Louis the Fourteenth, the Grand Monarch, by an accidental error of speech, among supple courtiers, changed the gender of a noun. But Slavery does more. It changes word for word. It teaches men to say _national_ instead of _sectional_, and _sectional_ instead of _national_.

Slavery national! Sir, this is a mistake and absurdity, fit to have a place in some new collection of Vulgar Errors, by some other Sir Thomas Browne, with the ancient, but exploded stories, that the toad has a gem in its head, and that ostriches digest iron. According to the true spirit of the Constitution, and the sentiments of the Fathers, _Slavery_, and not Freedom, is _sectional_, while _Freedom_, and not Slavery, is _national_. On this unanswerable proposition I take my stand, and here commences my argument.

The subject presents itself under two principal heads: first, _the true relations of the National Government to Slavery_, wherein it will appear that there is no national fountain from which Slavery can be derived, and no national power, under the Constitution, by which it can be supported. Enlightened by this general survey, we shall be prepared to consider, secondly, _the true nature of the provision for the rendition of fugitives from service_, and herein especially the unconstitutional and offensive legislation of Congress in pursuance thereof.

I.

And now for THE TRUE RELATIONS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT TO SLAVERY. These are readily apparent, if we do not neglect well-established principles.

If Slavery be national, if there be any power in the National Government to uphold this institution,--as in the recent Slave Act,--it must be by virtue of the Constitution. Nor can it be by mere inference, implication, or conjecture. According to the uniform admission of courts and jurists in Europe, again and again promulgated in our country, Slavery can be derived only from clear and special recognition. "The state of Slavery," said Lord Mansfield, pronouncing judgment in the great case of Sommersett, "is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, _but only by positive law_.... It is so odious, that _nothing can be suffered to support it_ but POSITIVE LAW."[106] And a slaveholding tribunal,--the Supreme Court of Mississippi,--adopting the same principle, has said:--

"Slavery is condemned by reason and the Laws of Nature. It exists, and can _only_ exist, through municipal regulations."[107]

And another slaveholding tribunal--the Court of Appeals of Kentucky--has said:--

"We view this as a right existing by _positive law_ of a municipal character, without foundation in the Law of Nature or the unwritten and Common Law."[108]

Of course every power to uphold Slavery must have an origin as distinct as that of Slavery itself. Every presumption must be as strong against such a power as against Slavery. A power so peculiar and offensive, so hostile to reason, so repugnant to the Law of Nature and the inborn Rights of Man,--which despoils its victim of the fruits of labor,--which substitutes concubinage for marriage,--which abrogates the relation of parent and child,--which, by denial of education, abases the intellect, prevents a true knowledge of God, and murders the very soul,--which, amidst a plausible physical comfort, degrades man, created in the divine image, to the state of a beast,--such a power, so eminent, so transcendent, so tyrannical, so unjust, can find no place in any system of Government, unless by virtue of _positive sanction_. It can spring from no doubtful phrase. It must be declared by unambiguous words, incapable of a double sense.

[106] Howell's State Trials, Vol. XX. col. 82.

[107] Harry et al. _v._ Decker et al., Walker, 42.

[108] Rankin _v._ Lydia, 2 Marshall, 470.

Slavery, I repeat, is not mentioned in the Constitution. The name Slave does not pollute this Charter of our Liberties. No "positive" language gives to Congress any _power_ to make a slave or to hunt a slave. To find even any seeming sanction for either, we must travel, with doubtful footstep, beyond express letter, into the region of interpretation. But here are rules which cannot be disobeyed. With electric might for Freedom, they send a pervasive influence through every provision, clause, and word of the Constitution. Each and all make Slavery impossible as a national institution. They shut off from the Constitution every fountain out of which it can be derived.

_First_, and foremost, is the _Preamble_. This discloses the prevailing objects and principles of the Constitution. This is the vestibule through which all must pass who would enter the sacred temple. Here are the inscriptions by which they are earliest impressed. Here is first seen the genius of the place. Here the proclamation of Liberty is soonest heard. "We, the People of the United States," says the Preamble, "in order to form a more perfect Union, _establish justice_, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, _promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of Liberty_ to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America." Thus, according to undeniable words, the Constitution was ordained, not to establish, secure, or sanction Slavery,--not to promote the special interests of Slaveholders,--not to make Slavery national, in any way, form, or manner,--but to "establish justice," "promote the general welfare," and "secure the blessings of Liberty." Here, surely, Liberty is national.

_Secondly._ Next to the Preamble in importance are the explicit _contemporaneous declarations_ in the Convention which framed the Constitution, and elsewhere, expressed in different forms of language, but all tending to the same conclusion. By the Preamble the Constitution speaks for Freedom. By these declarations the Fathers speak as the Constitution speaks. Early in the Convention, Gouverneur Morris, of Pennsylvania, broke forth in the language of an Abolitionist: "_He never would concur in upholding domestic slavery._ It was a nefarious institution. It was the curse of Heaven on the States where it prevailed."[109] These positive words, in harmony with other things from the same quarter, show a vehement determination that Slavery should not be national.

[109] Madison's Debates, August 8, 1787.

At a later day a discussion ensued on the clause touching the African slave-trade, which reveals the definitive purposes of the Convention. From the report of Mr. Madison we learn what was said. Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut, said: "The morality or wisdom of Slavery are considerations belonging to the States themselves."[110] According to him, Slavery was sectional. Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, "thought we had nothing to do with the conduct of the States as to slaves, _but ought to be careful not to give any sanction to it_."[111] According to him, Slavery is sectional, and he would not make it national. Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, "was opposed to a tax on slaves imported, as making the matter worse, _because it implied they were property_."[112] He would not have Slavery national. After debate, the subject was referred to a committee of eleven, who reported a substitute, authorizing "a tax or duty on such migration or importation, at a rate _not exceeding the average of the duties laid on imports_."[113] This language, classifying _persons_ with merchandise, seemed to imply a recognition that they were _property_. Mr. Sherman at once declared himself "against this part, _as acknowledging men to be property_, by taxing them as such under the character of slaves."[114] Mr. Gorham "thought that Mr. Sherman should consider the duty, _not as implying that slaves are property_, but as a discouragement to the importation of them."[115] Mr. Madison, in mild juridical phrase, "_thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men_."[116] After discussion it was finally agreed to make the clause read:--

"But a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars _for each person_."[117]

[110] Madison's Debates, Aug. 21, 1787.

[111] Ibid., Aug. 22.

[112] Ibid.

[113] Ibid., Aug. 24.

[114] Ibid., Aug. 25.

[115] Ibid.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Madison's Debates, Aug. 25.

The difficulty seemed then to be removed, and the whole clause was adopted. This record demonstrates that the word "persons" was employed to show that slaves, everywhere under the Constitution, are always to be regarded as _persons_, and not as _property_, and thus to exclude from the Constitution all idea that there can be property in man. Remember well, that Mr. Sherman was opposed to the clause in its original form, "as acknowledging men to be _property_,"--that Mr. Madison was also opposed to it, because he "thought it _wrong_ to admit in the Constitution the idea that there could be property in men,"--and that, after these objections, the clause was so amended as to exclude the idea. But Slavery cannot be national, unless this idea is distinctly and unequivocally admitted into the Constitution.

The evidence still accumulates. At a later day in the proceedings of the Convention, as if to set the seal upon the solemn determination to have no sanction of Slavery in the Constitution, the word "servitude," which appeared in the clause on the apportionment of representatives and taxes was struck out, and the word "service" inserted. This was done by unanimous vote, on the motion of Mr. Randolph, of Virginia; and the reason assigned for this substitution, according to Mr. Madison, in his authentic report of the debate, was, that "the former was thought to express the condition of slaves, and the latter _the obligations of free persons_."[118] With such care was Slavery excluded from the Constitution.

[118] Ibid., Sept. 13.

Nor is this all. In the Massachusetts Convention, to which the Constitution, when completed, was submitted for ratification, a veteran of the Revolution, General Heath, openly declared, that, according to his view, Slavery was sectional, and not national. His language was pointed. "I apprehend," he said, "that it is not in our power _to do anything for or against those who are in slavery in the Southern States_. No gentleman within these walls detests every idea of Slavery more than I do; it is generally detested by the people of this Commonwealth; and I ardently hope that the time will soon come when our brethren in the Southern States will view it as we do, and put a stop to it; but to this we have no right to compel them. Two questions naturally arise: _If we ratify the Constitution, shall we do anything by our act to hold the blacks in slavery? or shall we become partakers of other men's sins? I think neither of them._"[119]

Afterwards, in the first Congress under the Constitution, on a motion, much debated, for a duty on the importation of slaves, the same Roger Sherman, who in the National Convention opposed the idea of property in man, authoritatively exposed the true relations of the Constitution to Slavery. His language was, that "the Constitution does not consider these persons as a species of property; it speaks of them as persons."[120]

[119] Debates, Resolutions, etc., of the Convention of Massachusetts, January 30, 1788.

[120] Annals of Congress, 1st Cong. 1st Sess., col. 342.

Thus distinctly and constantly, from the very lips of the framers of the Constitution, we learn the falsehood of recent assumptions in favor of Slavery and in derogation of Freedom.

_Thirdly._ According to a familiar rule of interpretation, all laws concerning the same matter, _in pari materia_, are to be construed together. By the same reason, _the grand political acts of the Nation are to be construed together_, giving and receiving light from each other. Earlier than the Constitution was the Declaration of Independence, embodying, in immortal words, those primal truths to which our country pledged itself with baptismal vows as a Nation. "We hold these truths to be self-evident," says the Nation: "that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, _liberty_, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed." But this does not stand alone. There is another national act of similar import. On the successful close of the Revolution, the Continental Congress, in an Address to the States, repeated the same lofty truth. "Let it be remembered," said the Nation again, "that it has ever been the pride and boast of America, _that the rights for which she contended were the rights of human nature_. By the blessing of the Author of _these rights_ on the means exerted for their defence, they have prevailed against all opposition, and FORM THE BASIS of thirteen independent States."[121] Such were the acts of the Nation in its united capacity. Whatever may be the privileges of States in their individual capacities, within their several local jurisdictions, no power can be attributed to the Nation, in the absence of positive, unequivocal grant, inconsistent with these two national declarations. Here, Sir, is the national heart, the national soul, the national will, the national voice, which must inspire our interpretation of the Constitution, entering into all the national legislation and spreading through all its parts. Thus again is Freedom national.

[121] Journal of Congress, April 26, 1783, Vol. VIII. p. 201.