Chapter 16

THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS

The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to the various fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditions of modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made upon the leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be an absolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be ready to enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations of the Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmony with them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methods of fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be able to intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must with swift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and in addition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possess inexhaustible activity of mind and body.

If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leaders of the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensified in similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mental qualifications, they will need, for the solution of the various problems with which they will be confronted, an immensely increased amount of military knowledge and executive ability.

The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalry engagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations of the Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above, and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the whole situation will enable the individual to act opportunely when such moments may arrive. It is not merely a general military education which will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness, and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of the great operations, and the power of judging a military situation with accuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader of an independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the results deduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed by Officers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on a large scale. Without such training only isolated facts will be reported--deductions will not be drawn. There will be no discrimination between important and unimportant details, and the Officer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as to the direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly what it is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform. They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deduce the strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, to divine the probable connection of his operations, and hence to determine the most important points and directions in which to follow up any available clue.

If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied position, he should be able from the indications on the spot and from his map to determine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what point to direct his further advance.

If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able to decide whether it is more important to follow or watch their subsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some other direction. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatest importance for the superior staff to know when his instructions in face of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty.

Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of all points to the same conclusion--viz., that a comprehensive military education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of the Higher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. The history of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerable examples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in the future.

Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only--the point was to determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress or were marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whose doings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence, seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which would have enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance for the Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the direction in which the troops they saw were moving--a matter of most vital importance--or estimated the strength of the several encampments, or reported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they were all moving in the immediate vicinity, and might easily have ascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus, because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations led to false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence--the actual position of the French right flank--could not be determined until hours after the battle had been begun under an entire misapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences have repeated themselves times without number.

When we now reflect upon the greatly increased importance of reliable information in Modern War, we cannot escape the conclusion that a proper training of our Cavalry Officers to meet their requirements is of vital importance. Their present-day education does not sufficiently guarantee their competence.

The knowledge of the military sciences acquired at the War schools is on a very modest scale, nor is it, indeed, the business of these schools to give higher education in such subjects. Hence it is all the more deplorable that the higher intellectual training of our Cavalry Officers practically ceases after the War School, because the practical day-to-day duties of their profession furnishes them with nothing which can replace the need for a higher theoretical training. Generally, their attention is absorbed by the smallest of details, which, though each is of immense importance to the efficiency of the whole Arm, are not calculated to widen their intellectual horizon, and in the few great manoeuvres in which an Officer might find an opportunity of enlarging his knowledge, he finds himself lacking in the foundation necessary to make full use of it.

The usual course of instruction, in fact, is not adapted to the needs of the Cavalry Officer, who already in early youth may find himself in situations requiring adequate strategical knowledge for their solution; hence there is urgent need for the supreme military authorities to concern themselves at once both with his theoretical and practical education.

The latter could best be provided for in connection with the development of the Field-Service training of the Troops already dealt with above. The former--_i.e._, the scientific side--could be most adequately met by the creation of a 'Cavalry School' on the lines of the special Artillery and Engineer Schools which already provide for the further education of the Officers of these Arms after they have spent a couple of years or more in responsible command of men in their own units.

If on the broader foundations of the military sciences--principally those relating to the conduct of operations, to Strategy and Tactics--thus supplied, the Regimental Commanders were to build up by practical instruction, as above indicated, and the whole spirit of the training were modified in conformity with the views therein already expressed, then I consider that, with the admirable material amongst our Officers which already exists, and which for the most part needs only opportunity to prove its value, most important results might be achieved.

Such a school would be most fittingly affiliated to the existing School of Equitation in Hanover. The bright, attractive side of Cavalry life, as we there find it, would be a useful counterpoise to the risk of too much theory, and the district lends itself admirably to practical exercises in reconnaissances and endurance rides.

So long as this most desirable reform remains only an ideal, we must strive to do the utmost we can within the limits of our existing educational system, for the need is urgent, and admits of no delay.

We must devote increased attention to this portion of our officers' training from the very commencement of their career, and see that they are so far initiated into the nature both of tactical and strategical relations that they may be able, on the one hand, to reconnoitre an enemy in the spirit of the intentions of the Supreme Command; on the other, that they are capable of commanding their units in any given strategical situation.

All means must be strained towards the attainment of this purpose.

One of the first stepping-stones in our progress must be the actual horsemanship of the Officer himself. A man who under every circumstance feels himself firm in the saddle does not need to exert force to fight with or restrain his horse, and having learnt both how to think and command at a gallop, will lead Cavalry and reconnoitre before the enemy with far greater certainty and much better results than one to whom these things are hardly second nature.

Bold and determined horsemanship acts and reacts on all a man's other soldierly characteristics, and forms thus a basis for further progress of the highest order, apart from the fact that it impresses the men most favourably, and induces them to follow with greater confidence.

Hence, even from the standpoint of the higher education, the standard of horsemanship can never be raised too high. Given this, and the remainder can be acquired in the practical day-to-day work of the unit, in the training of the men themselves, and in the exercises in Field-Service duties, in manoeuvres and Cavalry exercises, always provided that these are all conducted in conformity with the spirit of modern operations. But since we have seen this practical duty, as at present carried on, nowhere meets the above conditions, we must find a supplement to it by recourse to systematic training in Field-Service rides, War Games, and Staff Tours, for which, of course, the necessary funds must be provided.

These exercises must be begun in the regiment, and continued through each successive grade up to the 'Inspection,' the sphere of each being enlarged with the increase in the importance of the Command.

But they will only then possess value and importance when based on connected military situations arising from the operations of modern Armies, and afford opportunities to the participants for the solution of problems far above their existing rank, for thus only can their mental horizon be extended. Within the radius of action of his own Command each Officer is already in daily contact with all that it is necessary for him to understand, and in minor tactical situations he has abundant opportunities for training his faculties. It seems to me, therefore, mere waste of time to give him further employment with these matters, and the attempt could only end in depriving them of all interest. On the other hand, the Regimental Officer is seldom if ever placed in positions which would enable him to form any adequate conception of the execution and connection of the greater operations, to realize the importance of the action of the unit within the framework of the whole, or to notice how faults in details, apparently trivial in themselves, can mount up in the mass until they may jeopardize the success of any given undertaking.

The higher the intellectual pinnacle on which he is placed, the wider becomes his horizon, and consequently his appreciation of the relative importance of each individual link in the chain.

CONCLUSION

If now, at the conclusion of my investigations, we summarize the chief results arrived at, we find the following sequence of thought:

The value of Cavalry in relation to the other Arms has risen materially; as a consequence of the whole range of changes introduced into the conduct of modern War--viz., those due to changes in the composition of Armies, to railways, telegraphs, supply, weapons, etc. Its strategical tasks have increased in importance, and on the battle-field new opportunities for successes have been disclosed.

Mounted and dismounted action have now become functions of equal importance. Great results--whether strategical or tactical--can only be obtained by the employment of 'Masses.'

The changing conditions of War demand increased mobility, both organic, strategic, and tactical.

The difficulties of leadership, in consequence of these conditions, have increased very materially. On the other hand, the Cavalry has remained in every respect relatively behind the other Arms, and hence we stand face to face with a whole list of new requirements which it must be the task of our peace-time preparation to satisfy, and of which the following are the most important items:

Increase in the price paid for our remounts.

Considerable increase in our numerical strength, if possible, on the lines of our existing and well-tried organization.

Rearmament of our Cavalry with a 6-millimetre carbine, ballistically equal in all respects to the rifle of the Infantry.

Considerable increase in the amount of ammunition carried both in peace and War.

Improvement in the whole equipment of man and horse.

Formation of the horse batteries of four guns, with corresponding increase in the number of batteries; introduction also of a true quick-firer.

Supply of Maxim guns to the Cavalry. Organization of the whole of the supply columns and pioneer detachments required to give the necessary strategical mobility.

Improvement in the method of training horses and men, both individually and for the purpose of securing better conditions in the horses to stand the increased strain of modern operations.

Complete reform of our course of training, both tactical and for field service, to fit us for employment in 'Masses,' and to meet the new strategic requirements. The increased importance of fire-action must be taken into account.

Further development of our Cavalry Regulations, which require not only simplification in many details, but the addition of sections developing the principles of the employment by 'Wings' of the several units, an extension of the prescriptions for the use of fire-action, and more precise formulation of tactical principles.

Rearrangement of the instructions relating to reconnaissance, security, and the forwarding of reports, in the field-service regulations, with due regard to the employment of cyclists where practicable.

A more systematic, practical, and general education for our Officers; creation of a Cavalry School, in which War should be taught on scientific principles.

Distribution of the whole Arm into independent territorial districts, to be termed 'Inspections' (Corps) and 'Sub-inspections' (Divisions), which are to be entirely independent of the existing Army Corps.

Annual Cavalry Manoeuvres.

Improvement of discipline 'to meet the demands of modern Warfare.

This is a considerable list of extreme requirements put together in a few words, and I am well aware that they are not to be obtained by a single stroke of the pen--indeed, it needs a considerable degree of optimism to believe that they are to be obtained at all; but I am equally conscious that sound evolution is only possible when the extremest purpose of our endeavours is clearly placed before our minds, and if we have the courage to recognise openly how far we fall short of the standard the pitiless reality of War demands.

Do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that excellence is to be attained without exertion, or that the path of easy-going reforms, safeguarding always existing interests, will lead us to a certain victory.

Half-measures do more harm than good, and it will not be those races which will survive in the great 'world struggle for existence' which seek only for a harmonious development of all their living forces, but rather those which devote themselves with a single mind to the evolution of the utmost fighting power It is the triumph of force--fighting power--which conditions the development of all other social interests. If we possess the 'force,' the rest will follow. Whilst, however, we seek to develop by every means in our power the utmost strength of the nation, we must be quite clear in our own minds as to the limits of the attainable. In War, no more than in any other 'act of human intercourse,' is the 'best' ever reached by mortal executants. But the palm of success beckons across the field of destiny to the race which strives towards the highest, and has made the greatest sacrifices and dared the most to deserve it.

In this sense it is the duty of each individual unit amongst us, unconcerned about results or consequences, to work with whole heart and mind in the cause we serve; and the more resistance to be encountered, the greater the obstacle to be overcome, the less may we shun the struggle, for here also the old truth holds good: _Per aspera ad Astra_.

INDEX

Action, typical case of Cavalry, 225; example of Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)

Advance, time to be selected for, 32; rate of, 121; of enemy marks period for pushing forward, 27

Advantages, in War, must be fought for, 29

Ammunition, carbine, insufficiency of, 175, 179; increase in amount of, for practice, 250

Ammunition columns, special, required for Cavalry, 179

Armies, change of character of modern, 3

Art of War, new conditions in, 3; their effect on Cavalry, 9; result of first engagement of overwhelming importance, 12

Artillery, effect of modern, on defence of villages and woods, 15; power of, can be over-estimated, 54; support of dismounted Cavalry by, 60, 100; protection of, 95; Horse Artillery must adapt itself to Cavalry's action, 100; position for, 101; one battery per brigade recommended, 179; quick-firing guns wanted, 180; should be attacked from flank, 234; co-operation in Cavalry training, 263

Attack, stereotyped forms of, prohibited, 72; on flank when advisable, 78; simultaneous, on front and flank, 79; 'mobile' or 'immobile' horses during, 91; by dismounted troops, 99; change of direction of, when permissible, 116; importance of vehemence of onslaught, 232; formation for, against Infantry and Artillery, 234; distribution and duties of dismounted men in, 259

Baggage-train should be represented at manoeuvres, 279

Bapaume, Battle of, 57

Barley as forage, 206

Battle-field, place of Cavalry in, 81, 84; case of Mars la Tour, 82; best formation for, 85; decided by circumstances of case, 82, 85; simple formations alone applicable on, 225; Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)

Beans as a ration, 205

Bit and bridoon, merits of, 192, 197

Bivouac, disadvantages of, 122, 125

Breaking in. See 'Training'

Bridging material, sufficient, needed to be carried to deal with small streams, etc., 175

Bridoon. See 'Bit'

Brigade, highest unit for drill purposes, 238

Bugle calls, when allowable, 69; value of, 230; regimental calls, 230; movements to be practised without, 236

Cantonments, advantages of providing, 125

Carbine, method of attachment, 176; improved pattern needed, 177

Cartridges, method of carrying, 177

Cavalry must be trained to act in 'mass,' 7; during Wars of 1870 and 1877-1878, 7; experiences of the past insufficient, 8; proportion to other Arms, 10; importance of, greater than formerly, 11; new tasks for, 14; actual fighting value diminished, 16; best strategic value increased, 16; public opinion at fault, 16; exploits in 1870-1871 misjudged, 16; German organization of, requires reform, 17; clear conception of requirements during each phase needed, 17; advance during mobilization deprecated, 23; should not act till enemy's strategic concentration begins, 28; importance of superiority over enemy's Cavalry at commencement, 31; in what cases the principal Arm, 37; Divisional, 38; Independent, 38; fire action of, during battles, 55; greater tactical cohesion than Infantry, 58; scope of, enormously increased, 59; importance of good leadership, 63; place of, in line of battle, 81, 84; formation of, on battle-field, 85; factors determining strategic employment of, 126; difficulty of supplying reinforcements, 151; augmentation of German, necessary, 153; and not to be postponed till mobilization, 158; training of, requires reforming, 181 _et seq._; Regulations require amendment to meet dismounted needs, 257; tasks for, in future War not properly appreciated, 268

Change of formation during action, 69; from 'rendezvous' to 'attack,' 79

Charge, the, when preferable to fire action, 52; example of Waterloo, 52; position of Commander during, 65; choice of moment for, 87; cohesion during, 221; speed of, 221

Chargers. See 'Horses'

Chotusitz, Battle of, 83

Civilians, possible participation in future Wars by, 10; armed resistance by, to be suppressed, 33

Column, regimental, value of, for War, 227; squadron, disadvantages of, 228

Combined action, factors essential to success of, 68

Command of Cavalry masses exceeding six regiments, 45; must be under a single leader, 46; efficiency of, more important with Cavalry than Infantry, 63

Commander, qualities needed in a good, 64, 286; place of, before and during charges, 65; when working with other Arms, 66; choice of formation to be left to, 72, 76, 77; must be informed of progress of Infantry combat, 86; qualities required in covering a retreat, 86; in dismounted action, 93; must decide as to extension in strategy, 106; and concentration in combat, 106; to be kept informed of general situation, 111, 117; must organize his own reconnaissance, 120; personal supervision of front by, 121; forage reserve to be formed by, 131; to arrange times for drill, 215; but not to deviate from Regulations, 220; importance of handling 'masses,' 216. See also 'Leader'

Commencement of War, essence of all Cavalry action during, 26; obtaining intelligence during, 27

Communications, increased liability to interruption of, 13; greater opportunities for Cavalry to interfere with, 14; especially after victory, 14; to be maintained with Headquarters on field of battle, 67

Comparison between Cavalry and Infantry, 59

Concentration, question of disturbing enemy's communications during, 19; views of other Powers on this, 20; value of raids during, 20; premature commitment of Cavalry during, 24; reasons against sacrificing Cavalry during, 25; defensive duties during, 26; advantages of pushing forward during enemy's, 28; of force for raids, 35; of considerable masses, when essential, 44; for combat, 106, 108, 109

Corn, amount of, to be carried by Cavalry, 130; author's experiment, 203

Coulmiers, Battle of, 86

'Critique' after field days, 243

Cyclists, value of, in conjunction with Cavalry, 22, 147; circulation of intelligence by, 39; should enable Divisional Cavalry to be economized, 42; further Regulations required, 146; limitations of, 148; to be attached to Cavalry, 178

Deception of enemy, means towards, 119

Defects in horses, correction of, 199

Defence of villages, 97

Defensive duties at commencement of War, 26; combat, 92; 'immobile' detachments during, 92; action, breaking off a, 94; action, duties of dismounted men during, 259

Despatch riders, 138, 145

Detachments, economy in use of, 38; reports from, to Headquarters, 111; outflanking, during attack, 232

Direction, change of, during action, 117

Dismounted action, increased importance of, 49; when desirable in attack, 49; when inevitable, 50; Sheridan's Cavalry in, 51; during rearguard actions, 52; during general engagements, 55; examples of Fredericksburg and Five Forks, 55; in South African War, 56; Franco-German War, 57; 'mobile' and 'immobile' horses, 91; in defensive combat, 92, 93; tactical distribution of men in, 96; 'Wing' or 'Line' systems, 96; in defence of villages, 97 _et seq._; in attack, 99; training for, 247; importance of, not sufficiently appreciated, 248 _et seq._; not to be confined to the defensive, 249; recruits' course, 250; Regulations as to, require expansion, 257 _et seq._; as important as fighting in the saddle, 262

Dispersion of troops for raids, 35; for screening and security, 106, 109

Divisional Cavalry defined, 38; duties of, 39; apportionment of, 41; as little as possible should be retained for Infantry Divisions, 42; reconnaissance duties of, 141; security duties of, 144

Divisions of Cavalry, maintenance of, during peace, 161; present strength insufficient, 165; permanent creation of, not advisable, 167

'Double-column' formation, when recommended, 80, 229

'Drei Treffen Taktik,' 73

'Dressur' detachment, 190

Drill, shortening of season for, 198; importance of Squadron and Regimental, 214 _et seq._; merits of Brigade and Divisional, 215 _et seq._; ceremonial to be separated from practical, 237; Brigade, the highest unit for formal, 238

Education, military, for man and horse, 186; tactical, for troops generally, 213 _et seq._; of recruits, 272; of non-commissioned ranks, 275; higher, of officers, 286 _et seq._

Efficiency of troops essential to good leadership, 126

Enemy, advance of, marks period for pushing forward Cavalry, 27; Cavalry of, must be beaten off field to obtain information, 30; outposts of, to be broken through, 33; communications, of, to be attacked, 33

Equipment for bridging and telegraphs, 174

Equitation, Staff for, 193; proposed new procedure, 200; school of, in Hanover, 290

Exercises to develop 'tactical principles,' 236; of larger formations than Brigades, 239; 'field-service' exercises, 240 _et seq._

Expediency, the highest ideal of strategy, 47

Extension of front when advisable, 107; in action when favourable, 240 _et seq._

Field-firing, increased importance of, 251; scheme for, 252

'Field-service' exercises, 218; nature of, 240; ground for, 239;

Cavalry acting independently, 240; Cavalry in combination with other Arms, 241; existing deficiencies in, 266

Fire action often imperative nowadays, 47; occasions when it will decide the day, 50; General Lee's capitulation, 51; South African War, 56; Franco-German War, 57

Firearms, increased range of, 36; better class of, needed by Cavalry, 58

Flank attack, when advisable, 78, 79; after victory, 83; during charge, 233

Flanks of enemy to be worked round to obtain information, 29

Forage, reserve of, 131; amount to be carried on horses, 169; author's experiment, 203

Force necessary to be employed in various circumstances, 36

Formation for attack, 36; change of, during action, 69; latitude to be allowed to Commander, 76, 77; merits of 'double column,' 80; 'mass' when suitable, 81; on battle-field, 85; of dismounted men in action, 96; in defence of villages, 96; in dismounted attack, 100; best, suitable for War, 226; to be avoided, 226; regimental column, 227

Four-squadron regiments, 154

Frederick the Great on length of marches, 122

Front, extension and concentration of, 107

Frontal attack against Infantry and Artillery, 235

Galloping, exercises in, 209

German Cavalry, numerically inadequate, 151; expedients for augmenting, 153; proposed territorial organization, 167

Gravelotte, example of faulty reconnaissance reports, 288

Ground, value of tactical advantage of, 78; acquisition of, for field-training, 239

Halts on march, 128

Headquarters, reports to be sent to, from detachments, 111

Horsemanship, 184

Horses, demands on, 87; 'mobile' or 'immobile,' 91; position for led, 93 _et seq._; protection of, 95; rest for, 122; security of, during rest, 122, 124; bivouac on march, 122; on outpost, 123; importance of care bestowed on, 123, 127; excessive demands on, 128; shortage of, in Germany, 152; 'augmentation,' 155; 'untrained,' of small use, 158; increased demands on, 181; training of, 185 _et seq._; English thoroughbreds, 187; Prussian, 187; old, 194; food for, increase of, 203; endurance of, 202; feeding, author's experiment in, 203; galloping powers, 209; weight to be put on, 212

Increase of German Cavalry needed, 158

Independence, when to be given to subordinates, 68

'Independent Cavalry' defined, 38; conditions which determine allotment of, 42; in what cases it should be concentrated on decisive lines, 43; security duties of, 144

Individual superiority essential for patrols, 31

Infantry, effect on Cavalry of extended zone of fire of, 9; difficult for Cavalry to encounter in close bodies, 10; when once broken offer great opportunity to Cavalry, 15; defence of villages and woods by, more difficult now, 15; compared with Cavalry, 59

Initial success, great importance of, 12

Initiative, value of, 115

Inspections, new scheme of, for recruits and schools, 200; importance of thorough, 246

Inspector-General of Cavalry, position of, 282 and footnote

Intelligence indispensable at commencement of War, 27; spaces between enemy's columns to be penetrated to obtain, 27; when more important than security, 28; circulation of, 39; during progress of action, 40; experience of 1870, 40; to be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through usual channel, 45

Lance-exercises, 254; better attachment of, necessary, 255

Leader, importance of-independence of, in combined action, 68, 76; more initiative to be given to, 73; to be careful about his horses, 87; duty when covering a retreat, 88; modern requirements in a good, 89, 90; to be kept informed of the general situation, 111, 117; clearness of intention, 116; must organize his own intelligence, 117; capacity of, 126; of great Cavalry masses, 286

Led horses, 91; place for, 93, 94; in dismounted practice, 259

Lines--three-line system, 73

Locality, faculty of finding way in unknown, 274

Lunging rein, 188

Manoeuvres, Brigade and Divisional, little criterion of work in War, 42; trotting and galloping at, 210; weight to be carried at, 210; movements which are of use for War, 226; theatrical display in great Cavalry, 263; deficiencies in existing, 266; Imperial, 267; baggage train to be represented at, 279; limitations of telegraphs at, 279; of Brigades to be abolished in favour of Divisional and Corps, 283; limitation of demands on Cavalry at, 284

Maps, misuse of, 274

Marches, flanking detachments to, 121; length of, 122; endurance of horses on, 127; excessive lengths of, 128; average lengths of, 128; trotting and halts on, 128

Mars la Tour, 82, 83, 86, 225 (footnote)

'Mass' when suitable, 81, 82

Masses, training of Cavalry in large, 214, 215; necessity for bringing Cavalry together frequently in, 245

Maxim guns with Cavalry, 178

Messengers, employment of, to be limited, 129

Mobility, essential in surprise actions, 118; German Cavalry deficient in, 169; of supply waggons, 173

Mounted Reserve, duties of, 95; strength of, 96

Movements most suitable for battle-field, 226; to be avoided, 226; to be practised on simple warnings, 236

Musketry, importance of knowledge of, by officers, 253; judging distances, 253

Napoleon on length of Cavalry marches, 122

Narbonne, General von Pelet, proposals of, 155

Numbers alone can prevail in victory or in covering retreat, 36; give opportunities of dismounted action, 57

Oats, 205

Observation of masses of enemy's army by officers patrol, 31; during combat, 40

Offensive against Infantry, Cavalry capable of taking the, 60

Officers of Cavalry have better knowledge of their men than in Infantry, 59; importance of training of, 64; increased importance of knowledge of musketry, 253; to be attached to Infantry for instruction, 256; higher education of, 286 _et seq._; training in horsemanship of, 291

Officers patrols, when necessary, 31

Orderlies to be limited, 128

Orders, simplicity essential in, 68; how to be transmitted in the field, 69; by bugle call, 69; verbal, 69; to be circulated simultaneously to all subordinates, 112; importance of clearness in, 116

Organization of German Cavalry unchanged, 17; requires reform, 17; must be elastic, 47; example of 1870, 47; also of Napoleon, 48; of German Cavalry to be by territorial districts, 167

'Outer lines,' advantages of, 78

Outflanking tactics, when undesirable, 53; detachments, work of, during charge, 232

Outposts, necessity for breaking through enemy's, 33; fixed rules for, impossible, 126

Patrols, causes of possible danger in the future, 10; breaking up of enemy's communications by officers, 22; must ascertain changes in enemy's initial dispositions, 25; must protect frontier districts from raids, 25; must avoid becoming desperately involved, 26; superiority in individual patroller essential, 31; defeat of enemy's, necessary, 31; 'reconnoitring' distinct from 'security' patrols, 133; strength of, 136; duties of commander, 136; transmission of despatches by, 138; must report to Headquarters as well as through ordinary channel, 140; 'tactical,' 143; 'security,' 143; screening by, 144; Regulations need amendment, 145; training for scouting basis of all reconnaissance instruction, 269; suggestion as to instruction, 270

Place on battle-field of Cavalry, 84, 85

Prague, Battle of, 83

'Principles,' tactical, of Cavalry opposed to Cavalry, 231; of Cavalry opposed to Infantry and Artillery, 234

Prisoners, value of capturing, during enemy's mobilization, 24

Protection of main force, steps required differ from those for obtaining information, 29; opposite views held, 29

Pursuit of beaten enemy imperative, 84; methods of, 51; dismounted action during, 51; Waterloo, 52; wars of 1866 and 1870, 84; duties during, 88; to be practised on a grand scale, 283

Quick-firing guns, employment of 180

Raids, value of, on outbreak of War, 20; to exploit enemy's resources, 34; indispensable element in future, 34; depend on rapidity and surprise, 34; and on concentration of force at night-time, 35; dispersion during, 35

Rapidity essential in raids, 34; and in dismounted attack, 99

Rations, emergency, for horses, 174; author's experiment with forage, 203 _et seq._

Rearguard actions, to be practised on a grand scale, 283

Reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry necessary, 7; rendered more difficult by range of modern firearms, 10; and by smokeless powder, 10; value of intensified, 12; must be a separate service from screening, 31; an exception to this, 41; advantage of defeating enemy's reconnoitrers, 31; under fire very difficult to effect, 39; on the battle-field, 66; cavalry leader must organize his own, 120; training for scouting the basis of instruction in, 269; knowledge of principles of 'higher strategy' essential, 288

Reconnoitring patrols, 134 _et seq._

Recruits, training of, 188 _et seq._, 273. See also 'Training'

Regiment, the fundamental tactical unit, 228

Regimental call, value of, 230 _et seq._

'Regimental column' formation, 227; merits of double, 229

Regulations should not lay down fixed evolutions, 70; but only essential principles of action, 70; existing edition of, requires revision, 70, 79; importance of Section 346, 76; rearrangement recommended, 244; as to training of dismounted squadrons, 253

Reinforcements, difficulty of supplying Cavalry, 151

Remounts, supply of, in War, 159; English blood in, 187; training of, 187

Reports in the field to be made to Headquarters and to adjacent columns, 11; transmission of, 138 _et seq._

Reserve forage, 131

Reserve squadrons, position for, during attack, 232

Reserve troops an easy prey to Cavalry when once beaten, 15

Rest, importance of, to horses, 124, 125

Retreat, advantages of 'outer lines' in, 78; duty of Cavalry covering a, 88

Riding, cross-country, 186; individual, 189

Riding School, 193 _et seq._

Roszbach, Battle of, 83

Rushes, advancing by, 113

Rye as forage, 206

Schlichting, General von, writings of, 81; criticism of, 83; on application of drill-book principles, 237

School, Riding, 192; War (see 'War School'); of Cavalry, 290

Screening, importance of, 12; during absence of troops, 27; must give way to obtaining intelligence, 28; distinct from reconnoitring, 32; must be fought for, 33

Security when secondary to obtaining intelligence, 28; during rest, 122; general advantages of, 124

Sedan, Battle of, 87

Seidlitz, Von, at Zorndorf, 87

Simplicity essential to successful tactics, 68

Single combat exercises, 195 _et seq._

Skeleton enemy, 244

Soor, action of, 83

Squadron School, the basis of tactical training, 214; drill, 217; tactical training of dismounted, 258; general education of, 272, 276; practical exercises for, 275

'Squadron column,' merits of, 228

Staff required for Cavalry corps, 228

Strategical handling of Cavalry, importance of, 37; fixed regulations inapplicable to, 105; general principles, 105

Subdivision of force, 107

Summary of opinions on Cavalry generally, 294

Supply trains must march as fast as Cavalry, 171; length of, 172; mobility of, 173

Supreme Commander, presence of Cavalry essential to success of, 37

Surprise the essence of Cavalry actions, 16; indispensable in raids, 34; requirements for success in, 118

System, the 'three-line,' 74

Tactical action by Divisional Cavalry precluded, 40; of Cavalry changed by new conditions, 49; 'Drei Treffen,' 73; training for, too elementary, 223

Tactical education for troops generally, 213 _et seq._

Tactical principles, Cavalry _v._ Cavalry, 231 _et seq._; Cavalry _v._ Infantry and Artillery, 232 _et seq._; exercises to develop the, 236

Tactical and strategical principles of the future, 83

Telegraph, control of, 140; limitations as to the use of, in Manoeuvres, 279

'Three-line' system, 73

Training, true purpose of, 161 of Cavalry Staff, 166; Von Moltke's proposals, 166; changes must be met by new methods, 181; of horses and men, 184 _et seq._; length of period of, 188, 194; proposed programme for, 200; preparation for endurance, 207; War conditions essential to, 208; tactical, too elementary at present, 223; for dismounted fighting, 247 _et seq._; some deficiencies in present, 217; of squadrons a stepping-stone to field service, 276

Training grounds ('Truppenuebungs Plaetze'), 239

Transmission of orders during action, 69

'Treffen,' definition of, 74

Trotting on march, 128

Turning movements, when imperative, 115

Verbal orders, 69

Villages, dismounted defence of, 97 _et seq._; withdrawal from, 99

Vionville, Battle of, 107

Von-Rosenberg at Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)

Waggons, supply, pace of, 171

War conditions essential to training, 208

War School, extent of teaching at, 289; creation of school for Cavalry desirable, 290

Weight to be carried by horses, 212

Wheat as forage, 206

'Wing attack,' 76; best formation for requirements of combat, 227; in action against Infantry and Artillery, 234; freedom as to use of, 244

Woerth, Battle of, 87

Zone of fire, results of extension of, 9

Zorndorf, Battle of, 87

THE END

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