Part 8

We must not conceal from ourselves the fact that in a future war it will by no means be always a matter of choice whether we will fight mounted or dismounted. Rather, by himself, seizing the rifle, will the opponent be able to compel us to adopt dismounted action. On our manoeuvre-grounds the charge on horseback is always the order of the day, even against artillery or machine-guns. The umpires continually allow such attacks to succeed, and the troops ride on as if nothing had happened. Equally fearless of consequences do they expose themselves to rifle-fire. But there are no bullets.

In real war it is different. Even then many a charge will naturally be successful, but victory will mean such sacrifices that the troops will often become too weak to carry out their further tactical and strategical duties. Such losses will not be incurred without necessity, and troops will give way, where possible, or themselves adopt dismounted action. The last will often indeed be necessary, as space and time will frequently be wanting for a turning movement, and even if such a movement were undertaken it would often lead to a fresh obligation to fight on foot in another place. This was repeatedly proved by the events of the campaign of 1870-71. Again and again was it necessary to detail infantry to the cavalry divisions in order to brush aside by offensive action resistance that hindered the advance of the cavalry, and which could not be broken down even by the horse artillery which accompanied it.

That the English in the South African war were finally repeatedly successful in forcing the mounted Boers back by turning movements without actual attacks proves nothing for European conditions. The explanation lies in the clumsiness of the Boers, who were hampered for rapid movement by their wagons and possessed no offensive strength of any kind, at least during the decisive portion of the campaign. Otherwise they could easily have anticipated the efforts of the English at a turning movement by the shortest line, or would have been able by taking the offensive to punish the dispersion that the turning movement entailed. We must not fall into any misconception of the fact that turning movements always contain an element of danger and can often bring about very unfavourable situations. They lay bare our own communications or lead to dangerous dispersion of force. It is necessary too, not only to _see_ behind the enemy, but also to _defeat_ him, in order to gain a _free hand_ for reconnaissance. To this end we will have to attack, and often on foot, as we may be quite sure that our possible opponent will use the rifle.

Circumstances have distinctly altered since 1870-71. If we had at that time no real cavalry opponent to face, we may yet be certain next time of having to deal with a numerous and determined cavalry who will quite conceivably endeavour to meet us in shock action with the _arme blanche_. There will always be dashing soldierly natures everywhere who will make a bid for success by risking all. Whether the hostile cavalry, once beaten, will return to the attack, is more than doubtful. I do not think so.

It lies deeply embedded in human nature that he who feels himself the weaker will act on the defensive. Both opponents will often endeavour to exploit the advantages of the defensive. It frequently happens during manoeuvres that the cavalry endeavours to seize some commanding position, and so force the enemy to attack it under the fire of artillery posted there. The other side, however, may make corresponding endeavours. An indecisive artillery duel is the usual result of such efforts. But if such action is frequent in peace, how much more frequent will it be under the pressure of responsibility which war brings with it, especially where one side is tactically the weaker?

It requires an enormous moral strength, personal influence over troops, and firmness of character to be able to maintain the offensive spirit, even after an unfavourable conflict, and continually to invoke the ultimate decision anew. In general, it may be relied upon that defence will be carried out according to tactical defensive principles, and that with the firearm. There can be no doubt upon that point to those who have studied human nature by the light of military history.

Our probable opponents, too, will certainly often advance dismounted. At all events they are endeavouring to strengthen cavalry divisions by cyclist battalions and infantry, and perhaps by mounted infantry, and thereby already show a remarkable inclination to conduct the fight, even of cavalry, with the firearm, and only to use their horses as a means of mobility, as was the custom of the Boers in Africa.

The rôle of cavalry in the fight will then apparently consist of a combination of the various methods of fighting. In explanation of this view I would cite a well-known example.

The task of the German army cavalry in the battle of Mars la Tour was to relieve the left flank of the German army by a determined attack against the right of the French, and thus to bring the apprehended advance of the enemy to a standstill. It did not accomplish this task, but was satisfied with trying conclusions with the French cavalry; but did not either win a decisive victory over the latter nor reap the necessary tactical benefit from the action. It certainly maintained its superiority over the enemy, but it made no attempt to interfere decisively in the course of the battle itself. This honour was left to the 1st Dragoons of the Guard.

But if we assume for a moment that this cavalry, after driving the French from the field, had made an attempt to operate further against the right flank of the French army, Cissey's Division, how would matters have stood?

The French infantry had occupied the Gréyère Farm as a support to their right flank. The Chasseurs d'Afrique, on the other hand, who initiated the cavalry fight, retired after they had been beaten by the 13th Dragoons in a northerly direction, and occupied with dismounted fire the southern edge of a small wood near Ville sur Yron, which the French call Bois de la Grange and the German official history Bois de Gréyère. It is bordered on the south by the plateau of Ville sur Yron. The dismounted Chasseurs here formed an échelon behind the right flank of the French infantry.

How should the German cavalry have acted under such circumstances in order to gain contact with the right flank of the French infantry so protected? The strongly occupied Gréyère Farm commanded the crossing of the Fond de la Cuve, which stretches in a northerly direction from Mars la Tour towards Château Moncel, while to the north the wood occupied by the Chasseurs limited freedom of movement. What else remained but a determined attack of both objectives and their capture, and that on foot? Artillery alone would not have sufficed against the Gréyère Farm, for this point would have had to be strongly occupied with riflemen, and nowadays also with machine guns, before the crossing of the Fond de la Cuve which the farm commanded, and which divided our cavalry from the French infantry, could be accomplished.

We can thus see that even in the action of cavalry in battle the combination of the several methods of fighting can scarcely, if ever, be avoided. In flank and rear, also, the opponent will endeavour to secure himself by occupying points of support as soon as he becomes aware of our intention to operate in these directions. Our cavalry must thus be continually prepared to pave the way by dismounted action for the mounted combat.

Our new Regulations mention quite incidentally (390)[12] that cavalry will often have to combine mounted and dismounted action, that "on occasions" also, in combination with shock action, dismounted cavalry must be ready to hold supporting points to cover deployment or to co-operate in the engagement (438).[13]

I do not think that this passing mention of the importance of combination of the two methods of fighting of the cavalry sufficiently emphasises the matter. After due reflection over all the circumstances appertaining to the question, I am, on the other hand, firmly convinced that the mutual relationship between the fight on foot and on horseback will give the modern cavalry combat its peculiar character. This relationship will _always_ have to be reckoned with, and all tactical considerations must be guided by it.

In my opinion all the principles of cavalry tactics should spring from this co-operation of the several methods of fighting and not from its attitude towards the various arms considered separately. The modern battle suffers no division of the action of one arm, or of one manner of fighting from another. As every kind of country has to be utilised for the fight, so also must the most varied kind of action of the arms be taken into account. It must, of course, be clearly established how these can best be applied against the various adversaries--cavalry, artillery, or infantry. Such reflections, however, can refer only to tactical formations. On the other hand, as soon as it becomes a question of tactical leading, such combination of all arms must, from the first, be taken into account as war may demand.

Military history affords us vivid examples of such co-operation of the arms in a cavalry fight, not, indeed, in a European theatre of war, but in the Civil War in America. They are woven, above all, round the heroic figure of General "Jeb" Stuart, and if weapons and other circumstances of the time and place were different from those obtaining in Europe to-day, the principle of action has still remained the same.

"Soon after the outbreak of the war Stuart distinguished himself as a cavalry leader, and his strategical work in blindfolding the enemy and in enlightening his own army has never been surpassed. As a cavalry tactician he is not only the first, but hitherto the only, leader of the arm who understood how to combine the effects of fire and shock, how to render effective service in fighting on foot without losing the power to strike on horseback when opportunity offered."[14]

There, indeed, was a man worthy of emulation.

We must, I think, be resolute in freeing ourselves from all old-fashioned conceptions of those knightly cavalry combats which have in reality become obsolete owing to the necessities of modern war. We do not in this need to break with our ancient and honoured traditions, for the spirit of tradition consists not in the retention of antiquated forms, but in acting in that spirit which in the past led to such glorious success. But this spirit points to the road of progress and bids us not allow ourselves to be urged by events, but, hurrying before them, to gain a start in development and therewith a decisive advantage over our enemies. To maintain in the troops, under modern conditions, the spirit of discipline and independence, and of the greatest effort and self-sacrifice, _that_ is the old Prussian tradition, and not the adherence to dead forms, which in our history has been bloodily enough avenged.

This principle has been embraced in all the other spheres of military development; it is only the cavalry that has remained behind the times.

In order to be able to deal with the functions of the mounted arm in accordance with the old Prussian principles, we must try to get a clear and unprejudiced conception of the spirit of the modern cavalry combat. We must look forward and pierce the veil of the future uninfluenced by the ghosts of the past. The probable events and conditions of the modern battle must be our guiding star, and when we have realised how the spirit of cavalry may be adapted to them, how the results of modern technical improvements in arms influence and strengthen the action of the cavalry masses, then alone can we lay down principles for the conduct and tactics of cavalry in the fight.

II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE

Mobility is that prominent characteristic of the cavalry on which the justification of its existence is chiefly based. That it is able to come into action rapidly at distant points, and to observe the enemy while still afar off, makes it indispensable in the composition of an army. Anything that hinders its free mobility militates against its purpose and its characteristics. Nothing, therefore, is more justifiable or more in accordance with its spirit than that it should endeavour to preserve its mobility in the fight, and that mounted shock action, therefore, should be regarded as its proper rôle in battle. In this rôle, cavalry is able not only to force a decision quickly, but to continue its movement mounted, even from the fight itself.

These advantages, inherent in the nature of the arm, must not be expected in dismounted action. Such action always entails delay and hampers the movements of the troops, not only by the method of operation, but also by the separation of the men from their horses. It is therefore natural that cavalry should only undertake an attack on foot when there is no prospect of obtaining their object by shock action, or when the latter would entail such sacrifice that it might imperil the further successful action of the troops.

The more, however, the disadvantageous factors of dismounted action are realised and appreciated, the more, in my opinion, will endeavours be made to give it an offensive character, in order to remove as quickly as possible obstacles which hinder the free movement of the cavalry. All delay and hesitation are in opposition to the very spirit of the arm. To preserve its peculiar element of mobility a rapid decision is imperative in every situation.

Mounted, the cavalry knows only the charge and has no defensive power, a circumstance which strengthens its action considerably in carrying out its offensive principles, by relieving the leader of the onus of choice. On foot it is a different matter. The application of the firearm, under all tactical and topographical conditions, particularly facilitates defence and enables it to appear, to a certain extent, the stronger form of action. Herein lies the reason why defensive action is continually sought. All the more, therefore, must it be kept in view that it is the _offensive_ on foot that the cavalry will require. To operate in combination with shock tactics to assist the offensive, and pave the way for free movement is, however, the real object of dismounted action.

It would perhaps have been better if the new Regulations had upheld this principle a little more definitely. In them, however, it is the defensive strength which cavalry has gained in dismounted action which is chiefly emphasised (390),[15] and the attack is only dealt with as a method of fighting from which the troops "need not shrink." Attention is certainly drawn (455)[16] to various cases in which an attack upon foot may be undertaken. That, however, does not alter the fundamental utterance that the dismounted fight will chiefly be undertaken on the defensive. This interpretation is strengthened on reading in the directions for the action of the army cavalry during operations that "Especial additions to the force (cyclist detachments, infantry in wagons, etc.) are mainly intended for the duty of strengthening local resistance, or of overcoming such resistance on the part of the enemy." The thought involuntarily occurs to the reader that in the spirit of the Regulations such additions to the force will be just as necessary in face of a serious hostile resistance, in order to free the way for the cavalry. We would, then, again find ourselves in just the same state which the war of 1870-71 proved to be so undesirable, and the cavalry would again find the wings of its mobility clipped.

The Regulations of course only intend to convey on this point that, _if_ such special additions to the cavalry were forthcoming, the task mentioned would be their principal duty. It is, however, a matter of significance that it is here presupposed that infantry in wagons may be detailed to accompany the strategic army cavalry. If it were but a matter of cyclists, that would be a quite different matter. But there cannot at present be any question of this, as there is no sufficient number of them in the army.

If the Regulations discuss these kind of possibilities I fear that the demand for infantry will very soon be heard from the army cavalry when there is any question of a serious attack on foot, and herewith the free action of the cavalry will be limited once and for all.

Military history and theoretical reflection teach us equally that the great masses of the army cavalry must under all circumstances be independent, at least for their offensive undertakings--that they cannot rely, in any case for these, on the "_occasional_" support of infantry. For they would thus find their mobility hampered, and themselves tied to the very troops from which they expect support, and would then be unable to carry out those important duties which fall to their share. The army cavalry, then, can only preserve its necessary independence if it can rely upon its own strength even in an attack on foot. It must at any moment be prepared to throw all its force into the conduct of a decisive attack. This is a method of fighting from which not only should it not "shrink," but in which its dismounted rôle essentially consists. When an attack on foot has been determined on, it must, however, be first perfectly clear that the results will justify the sacrifice which such an attack, under any circumstances, must mean--that is to say, the expenditure not only in lives, but also in time, which must both be regarded as lost in estimating the further operative value of the force.

The new Regulations take this point of view also into consideration, but in a manner that gives cause for serious reflection. They would limit the time expended in an attack on foot, and during which the arm is deprived of its free mobility, and therefore demand (456)[17] that, if such an attack be found necessary, endeavour must be made to carry it out _with the utmost rapidity_. Here is expressed a desire easy to understand. But I do not think that the object will thus be attained of limiting the time that a dismounted fight demands. To carry an attack rapidly through under modern conditions demands the employment of overwhelming fire power and numerical superiority.

In so far as the Regulations express the idea that an attack should only be undertaken when this superiority is assured, there is great justification for the definition laid down in paragraph 456. But the cavalry must then generally confine itself to the attack of quite weak hostile posts, for even the division contains but an insignificant number of rifles. But such limitations, on the other hand, in no way take into account the necessities of grave situations. The army cavalry will often find itself in a situation where a difficult attack _must_ be carried through without any overwhelming superiority, unless it means to renounce the accomplishment of the duties entrusted to it.

I do not think that we should interpret the wording of the Regulations in this sense. Taken literally, great danger lies in them--the danger, that is, of seeing in the wording of paragraph 456, a demand for the hastening of the conduct of the attack. We should thus see ourselves prevailed upon to carry out a necessary attack in a precipitate manner without the necessary fire preparation in order to fulfil the demand for haste. In peace manoeuvres such conduct is but too often seen. In war it must inevitably lead to defeat. Under modern conditions of weapons an attack does not allow of being accelerated by force. It must take its own time. We must not therefore deceive ourselves into thinking that voluntary acceleration of the offensive fight is possible, but quite clear that every decision to attack on foot signifies considerable loss in time as well as men.

After considering these circumstances it would almost seem advisable to alter the wording of paragraph 456, to make it somewhat more precise, and to eliminate the idea of acceleration of the attack. Every trooper must be conscious that from the moment he dismounts for fire action he is no longer a cavalryman, but a foot soldier. He must follow the laws of fighting on foot, and can only reach his horse again by successful action according to these laws. Then, certainly, the dismounted troops must strive with all means in their power to reassume their mounted rôle with the utmost celerity.

The same holds good for the defence.

Cavalry will only undertake this when absolutely obliged. It may be that the conditions of force do not allow of the attack, or that the maintenance of some locality is the chief object of the fight. In the consciousness, however, that any hampering of initiative and free movement is opposed to the spirit of cavalry action, so must the defence--if circumstances in any way permit--be carried out with the idea of emerging as soon as possible from the defensive rôle imposed, to regain freedom of movement, and then to lay down the law to the enemy. This can only be attained by conducting the defence in an offensive spirit, that compels the opponent to a decision in accordance with our will.

This point of view does not, according to my thinking, receive sufficient attention in the new Regulations. Daring and initiative carry in them the seeds of great success. The cavalry should continually remember this, even in defence. On the other hand, however, it must also be ready when occasion demands to defend itself with the utmost obstinacy to the last man. The resolute defence of Sandepu by a Japanese cavalry brigade against heavy odds gives us a good example to follow. This action made the timely arrival of the Japanese reinforcements possible.

III. CAVALRY IN COMBAT AGAINST THE VARIOUS ARMS, MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED

In the mounted combat against cavalry, every effort must be directed towards falling upon the enemy at full gallop in a serried mass, and thus to overthrow him. It is not sufficient to succeed in coming to blows with the enemy. His tactical formation must be destroyed, and he must be rendered incapable either of evolution or battle. And this must be done without losing cohesion or power of command. The material damage done to the enemy is a matter for the mounted pursuit, which need only be carried out by part of the troops, or, in default of this, by shrapnel.

For the conduct of the purely cavalry fight we should, in my opinion, rely upon men like Frederick the Great, Seydlitz, and the prominent Napoleonic cavalry leaders. In the relations of cavalry to cavalry, nothing has altered since their day, and the experiences of these men are, in their lessons, just as applicable to-day as at the time in which they lived. And what do they teach us?