Part 4

It is a matter of the greatest importance for the conduct of the squadron in general whether it is acting in a friendly or hostile country. While in the first case troops may ride through towns, feed in villages, and count upon considerable support from the inhabitants, in the service both of security and information, in the second they must always be prepared against treachery or surprise, and behave as if they were surrounded by a network of spies. Townships are to be particularly avoided, and special precautions for safety must be taken, especially while at rest.

In other respects the advance itself must in both cases be carried out according to the same principles.

Squadrons will generally advance by successive stages, and upon those roads which appear to them to be the most important for reconnaissance. If they are provided with the light-signal apparatus, and can use it for communicating to the rear, they must keep in mind during the march itself the possibilities of being able to use it, try it on the ground, and make a mental note of points that are specially adapted for connection-stations. The whole plan of the day's march must then be made with an eye to the establishment of communication by this method. Halting-places for rest or feeding horses must be selected with regard either to good cover or to the view which may be had from them. In order to be independent of the hostile population, it is advisable for the squadron to have its ration and forage wagons with it. In case of an unsuccessful collision with the enemy these may indeed be lost. In any other case, however, they will always be at the disposal of the squadron. On the other hand, in hostile country, if they follow the squadron at too great a distance, they will often fall a prey to the enemy. Under such circumstances, if they are to be really protected, a sufficiently strong escort must be left with them, and this will react unfavourably upon the strength of the squadron.

The efforts of reconnoitring squadrons to diminish the distance between themselves and the enemy as quickly as possible by undertaking excessive marches, such as are frequently seen in peace, are misdirected and unreal, and only tend to wear out the horses. In peace manoeuvres, which only last two or three days, and which have not to be sustained by a number of lame and over-tired horses, such proceedings are indeed possible, but in war they are pernicious. A squadron should be able to remain up to strength throughout a campaign, and it must be remembered that horses that go lame and are left behind will, at all events in hostile country, be lost to the reconnoitring squadrons for good. The patrols, too, must be able to keep something in hand. But, if the squadrons tax their capacity for marching to the utmost, the patrols, which are required to go still farther in advance, must be completely exhausted. If the squadrons can cover daily 25 miles and the distant patrols 35 to 40 miles, this will, I hold, be quite sufficient. More than this, on an average, cannot be expected of them. This does not of course preclude special efforts to meet particular circumstances. It will only be possible, however, to demand these efforts when we learn how to calculate the average length of march during which men and horses can be kept fresh and efficient.

Although the choice of lines of advance and the combined action of the reconnoitring squadrons are often weighty factors of success, yet on the other hand, in order to obtain early and sufficient intelligence of the enemy, it is of the highest importance that the patrol system should be properly ordered according to the needs and probabilities of the situation. The "Field Service Manual" gives the necessary principles for their action. They must, it says, be sent forward along the roads that the enemy is most likely to use. By so doing, certain results must, under any circumstances, be obtained. On the other hand, it is a mistake to send forward single patrols against a wide front. Under such circumstances a patrol is always in doubt which way to go, will probably divide, and cannot, at all events, be everywhere. From such procedure, which is unfortunately only too common, reliable results cannot be expected, and it is never certain if observation is being carried out in any given direction. Such a faulty course of action usually originates from a certain confusion of thought on the part of the leader as to his own intentions and his suppositions as to the enemy. A clear appreciation of the situation ensures at the same time a clearly defined course of action. If, however, no sort of idea can be formed as to what the enemy is likely to do, the patrol system must be extended, not only in those directions from which the enemy may be expected, but in others where it is possible that he may be met with. Any turning movement on the part of the hostile forces must, in this manner, be continually guarded against.

The number of patrols sent out will, of course, depend on the importance of the task. If the strength of a squadron is insufficient to provide them, it must be supplemented by patrols detailed from other squadrons. The relief of such patrols, also, may have to be carried out by the same means. Cutting down the number of distant patrols is to be avoided as far as possible. Economy of force can be better obtained by careful husbanding of strength in the close reconnaissance and service of security.

The strength of distant patrols should never be arbitrarily laid down, as in this respect also the circumstances must be taken into account. Patrols which are far distant from the road upon which the squadron is advancing, and which can only be reached with difficulty, require a greater degree of independence than those in the immediate neighbourhood, which can be rapidly supported or strengthened. The probability, also, of meeting with superior hostile force demands a greater proportion of strength. Under certain circumstances a whole troop may be used as an independent patrol. At the same time a wise economy of force must be practised so that the fighting and marching efficiency of the squadron does not suffer too much. To this end, quite weak patrols must be made to suffice in directions of secondary importance. A second in command must be detailed to every patrol. There should also be a supply of trained lance-corporals ready to lead such patrols as may be required to carry information to the rear.

The strength of patrols will depend largely on the number of messages that they are expected to send in. As a general rule, in large operations, not more than two messages will be required from each patrol during the day. It is only when the opposing armies approach each other, and the distant patrols gradually become close patrols, that it will be necessary to report frequently on tactical events. The distances, however, will then have so far diminished, that a reinforcement of the patrols from the squadrons would probably be possible if they have become over-weak through transmission duties.

Like the reconnoitring squadrons, the patrols require relief from time to time, as the same patrol leader cannot be expected to remain in continuous touch with the enemy.

The strength of patrols, therefore, will generally have to be calculated according to the number of messages and the number of days during which the same men are required to be in contact with the enemy. It is only when a special fighting strength appears necessary that these numbers should be exceeded. On the other hand, the patrols in friendly country may be made weaker than when in the enemy's territory, as, in the latter case, it will scarcely be possible to send in messages by single orderlies.

Careful preparation must be made for the relief of patrols. Every patrol that is sent out must know when, and approximately where, it can rejoin the squadron. The relieving patrol should arrive on the field of exploration before the original patrol returns. The two patrol leaders should meet where possible. All the patrols should never be relieved at one time, as such a procedure would tend to weaken the squadron too much.

The reconnoitring squadron must continually endeavour to maintain communication with the distant patrols which send in reports to it. As the main body must always be careful to render communication with the reconnoitring squadron possible and to facilitate it, so is communication with the patrols one of the most important duties of the latter. It will often be necessary, when the distances become great or the ground difficult, to push forward relay posts to facilitate and accelerate the service of transmission. These posts must have a sufficiency of force assigned to them. The squadron leader, further, must most minutely instruct the patrols in anything that can serve to assist the carrying out of their task, and as to all arrangements for the transmission of reports.

A patrol's instructions must be short and clear, and must leave no room for doubt in the patrol leader's mind as to what is expected of him.

The instructions must contain: all that is known of the enemy; a statement of the general situation, and of the system of reconnaissance, as far as it may concern the patrol in question; an indication of the proposed march and the objective of the squadron; points where messages as to the position of the squadron may be deposited, in case it should be found necessary to depart from the preconceived plan; exact data as to when and where the relieving patrol will be sent and also when the patrol is to rejoin the squadron.

Although such arrangements may not always have the desired results, as all such dispositions are liable to be disturbed by the action of the enemy, they yet form a good groundwork on which to build further, according to circumstances, and which can be suited to any alteration of the situation. Such arrangements should therefore never be neglected.

In manoeuvres, the leaving of such information--for instance, under stones--in prearranged places or localities that are easy to find, and which must be determined by the map according to the expected situation, will be found a valuable exercise.

Communication will, as a rule, be best secured if the reconnoitring squadron can succeed in beating the hostile organs of reconnaissance and security. We must not, of course, assume that a squadron that has been thrown back and pursued for a space will be rendered incapable of carrying out its rôle. It will still try to support its patrols as before. If, however, such successful combats become numerous, a superiority will at length be obtained, particularly on the main avenues of communication, that will considerably facilitate the task of obtaining and transmitting information.

It must therefore be the ceaseless endeavour of the cavalry to attack the enemy wherever found. The reconnoitring squadrons in particular must undertake the duty, not only of driving the corresponding hostile squadrons from the field, but of endeavouring to intervene and assist wherever the hostile reconnoitring patrols offer an obstinate resistance. They must take every opportunity of fighting with the _arme blanche_, or of attacking the enemy in some unfavourable situation, perhaps by night. Dismounted action for single squadrons advancing in hostile country is generally dangerous, and, on account of the weakness of the force, usually leads to failure. It should never be forgotten that for a successful action on foot great numerical superiority is indispensable.

Should the reconnoitring squadron come in contact with the enemy's cavalry in strength, it must be decided whether to fall back, or avoid it by a détour in order to maintain under all circumstances communication with the distant patrols. In the latter case, communication to the rear becomes naturally considerably more difficult, and it can only be hoped that the hostile cavalry will be beaten by our own. Whatever decision is made will depend upon the circumstances of the case: the terrain, the distance from our own cavalry and from the enemy's main body, as well as on what is already known of the enemy, and on what it is of particular importance to learn. It will generally be most important, as well as desirable, to maintain at all costs communication with the distant patrols, as news must first be procured before it can be sent back, and it will be possible under certain circumstances to communicate over the enemy's head with the light-signal.

In order to maintain the necessary fighting strength of the squadrons under all circumstances, as few men as possible should be detached. This does not of course refer to the distant patrols.

The melting away of the squadron's numbers, so often seen in peace, is generally a result of the manner in which the close reconnaissance is conducted. The close patrols are sent out 6 or 7 miles, often still farther, and, having general instructions to remain in touch with the enemy, seldom rejoin the squadron. Thus they become lost to the squadron, and as the squadron leader is not fully aware of their position he is soon under the obligation of having to send out a fresh patrol. This patrol is a less useful one than the first, and if it brings in news of the enemy the latter will often arrive simultaneously with the news. The report often enough goes first to the enemy about whom it is being made. No reproach can be attached to any one concerned. It lies in the nature of things and in the method of apportioning duties.

In contradistinction to such procedure, it is, in my opinion, in most cases quite superfluous to arrange a close reconnaissance in addition to the distant patrols. Close patrols weaken the squadron, and can only, it appears, rejoin it with difficulty, nor do they effect the necessary reconnaissance. Every squadron must, on the other hand, be continually surrounded by local patrols for its own safety, closely connected with it, and which, being in constant communication with the squadron, secure it immediately from surprise and, as far as their strength allows, attack and break up hostile patrols. This measure will not have the effect of weakening the squadron too much. These patrols will require relief from time to time, and accompany the march of the squadron in its rayon in such a manner that a second patrol can be sent out before the first rejoins. They must, however, never be drawn so far away from the squadron that they cannot secure its immediate safety and beat off hostile patrols.

If, in exceptional circumstances, patrols are sent out in close reconnaissance, it is desirable that they should work from one locality to another a few miles in advance, so that it will always be possible to get them back. Especial attention must be given to this matter when operating in the enemy's country.

Patrols to connect with neighbouring squadrons are quite superfluous. They have little prospect of carrying out their task in a practical way, and must therefore be regarded as a useless expenditure of force. The regulation of the movements of the various reconnoitring squadrons as a whole, and the dissemination of information regarding them to each other, is a matter for the Head Quarters of the main body.

Economy in patrols should never go so far as to allow of cyclists, or indeed a single cyclist or motor-car, being used for reconnaissance, as unfortunately repeatedly happens in manoeuvres. Cyclists may be used for the purpose of maintaining communication and bringing back reports. It will not be possible to use them singly for these duties, especially in the enemy's country, but several will have to be sent together. Bound as they are to the roads, they are quite unsuited to patrol work. It is also inadmissible, at all events in hostile country, to send bicycles or motor-cars with patrols. They only become a burden to the patrol as soon as it wishes to leave the road. For the motor cyclist the question of petrol is also an important one. Where will he replenish his supply in hostile country? Certainly not in villages with a hostile population, unless a sufficient show of force can be made.

The accommodation of reconnoitring squadrons for the night also demands close attention. Such accommodation must be chosen from quite different considerations, according as the squadron is operating in a friendly or hostile country.

In any case, endeavour must be made so to dispose the squadron that the chief avenues of communication, at least, will be under observation, and thus closed to the enemy's despatch-riders. The horses also must be rested, that they may be ready for the next day's work, for a tired squadron cannot reconnoitre properly. In order that the horses may really rest, they must be off-saddled, and, to do this, the squadron must be secure from surprise. This will not always be possible, but endeavours must be made towards that end. Should hostile detachments be in the neighbourhood, which is unavoidable during critical days, it will be necessary to be always ready for possible surprise, and to so arrange that the squadron can speedily withdraw from its bivouac on the approach of the enemy. The measures taken for safety must be directed to this end. It is also sometimes desirable, in order to deceive the enemy, to change the halting-place already occupied, after darkness sets in. In friendly country, if an attack is expected, it is often better to spend the night in larger villages, where the inhabitants themselves will co-operate in the service of security. In the enemy's country, on the other hand--where the hostility of the inhabitants is to be reckoned with--the larger villages must always be avoided, and accommodation must be sought in single isolated farms, which, by their position, are in a measure secure from surprise, where the fighting force can be kept together, where there is nothing to fear from the inhabitants, and which can be quickly abandoned, if possible, unobserved.

The service of security in such situations must be carefully organised and must not consist merely of guarding the immediate environs. It will rather be advisable to push forward posts on the chief lines of approach of the enemy, which will be able to bring in timely news of his advance. What degree of readiness for movement is maintained in such situations the circumstances of the moment must dictate.

In this question of accommodation, attention must also be paid to the service of communication. It must be possible from the position selected for the night to pick up communication with our own troops and to receive the orders and instructions which will naturally be expected at the end of the day.

If the squadron is provided with the light-signal apparatus it should remain in the neighbourhood of high ground, from which it is thought possible that communication may be picked up. If instructions have been received to establish communication by mounted orderlies or cyclists, care must be taken that there are roads easily found, even in the dark, by which they can reach the main body, the reporting centre, or the relay posts, as the case may be. The squadron's own reports, too, will often not be sent off before evening, in order that all the events of the day may be collated. This must be done in clear, concise form, more especially where the means of transmission is the telegraph or light-signal.

The sifting and collating of information received is therefore an important and very responsible task, requiring continual practice. The squadron leader must be able properly to judge which of the reports received must be sent to the army Head Quarters or to the cavalry commander, and all superfluous matter must be eliminated. All reports received should by no means be transmitted. This would overburden the service of transmission to no useful purpose.

3. _Distant Patrols_

The duties of the distant patrols are just as difficult as those of the reconnoitring squadrons, as they are continually brought face to face with the necessity of forming independent decisions, and, in order to act and report efficiently, require a high degree of strategic insight. Apart from the personal capacity of the officer commanding the patrol, a thorough training emphasising the essential points in its conduct is necessary for the men.

I have already shown the lines on which such instruction should be conducted. I would here, however, like to add that the patrol leader, if he is in any doubt, can clear up the situation in his mind by cross-questioning himself. It should never suffice to him that the authority who set him the task veiled his responsibility by general verbiage. The task must be definitely determined; whether negative reports are required or not, and when and where reports are to be sent, more especially when touch has been lost with the squadron. The complete instructions must of course be confided to the second in command of the patrol, and the general task to be fulfilled to each member of it.

For the conduct of the patrol it is a matter of still greater importance than for the squadron, which has a certain fighting strength, whether it is acting in its own or in hostile country. It will have the same points to consider as in the case of a squadron, but in hostile country its conduct must be still more circumspect, while in friendly country, where concealment is more easy, its action can be correspondingly bolder.

If long distances are to be covered, the patrol should remain on the road until it reaches country where an encounter with the enemy is likely. The passage through large villages peopled by hostile inhabitants is to be avoided.

Horses should not be fed, at least in hostile country, in the neighbourhood of villages or on the main road, but always in a safe place, and a proportion of them only at a time. In friendly country they may best be fed in the larger villages, which the hostile patrols will avoid, but should not halt on the main road.

When the locality is reached where a meeting with hostile detachments may be expected, the patrol should advance in _bonds successifs_. It must, unfortunately, be admitted that such methods appear to be quite foreign to most patrol leaders; at all events, they are seldom applied in manoeuvres. Most of them ride forward with praiseworthy speed along the road until they collide with the enemy; then, indeed, they begin to observe him, without asking themselves whether in war the result of such tactics would not have already compromised their chances of success. For if they are once discovered by the enemy they may count on being relentlessly hunted and pursued, so that there will no longer be, in most cases, any further possibility of deliberate observation.

Very different indeed are the circumstances when, from a well-chosen point of view, a patrol is successful in detecting the enemy before coming into immediate collision with him. The patrol can then order the whole of its conduct according to its knowledge of the enemy before it is discovered, and has a very much greater prospect of attaining good results.

We must lay down here, once and for all, that the distant observation with the glass is by far the most important; it affords the best survey over the general conditions, and a better possibility of sending back a report safely and quickly. It is just in this method of observation that, in consequence of our peace conditions, patrols are generally so badly trained. Again and again they fall into the error of approaching too close to the enemy and, in order to see as much of him as possible, let him march past them. They are then compelled to send in their reports from places which lie behind the belt of the hostile service of security. The despatch-riders have then to ride from the rear through the hostile advance-guard, outposts, and patrol system.