Part 2

The great changes which have taken place in military science since the year 1866 have forced all arms to adopt new methods of fighting. It was, first and foremost, the improvement in the firearm which wrought the transformation of the battlefield and called forth an increased demand for cover against the murderous effect of fire. The infantry sought safety in sparser formations and in utilising the smallest accidents of the ground for cover, while the artillery adopted armoured shields, covered positions, and indirect methods of fire. It was only the cavalry that could not keep pace with these developments. Forming a conspicuous target, capable of being concealed only behind considerable inequalities of the ground, it could indeed seldom find cover within the range of the enemy's fire. As, at the same time, its strength in comparison to that of the great armies of the present day has sensibly diminished, it might be concluded that its particular value in battle had decreased considerably in possibility and importance.

This conclusion is thoroughly justified, but not altogether in the way that one is inclined to assume. For one reason, the cavalry is now supplied with an excellent firearm, which its mobility enables it to employ against the most sensitive parts of an enemy's line of battle. For another, the composition of modern armies offers, as I have frequently said, many new possibilities of success. Newly raised levies, such as will often have to take their place in the great armies of the day, cannot possess the same steadiness as standing permanent troops. They are, according to experience, very sensitive to moral impressions, and will often enough, when shaken in battle, offer a tempting and suitable object of attack to the cavalry. At the same time, the fact remains that, by reason of its relative numerical weakness, cavalry can no longer retain its former importance in the battle, and that the manner of its intervention in the fight must often be of a very different nature from what it has been in the past.

On the other hand, the duty of cavalry in the sphere of reconnaissance has increased in importance. For all strategical movements the main body of the modern army demands considerably more time and, generally also, comprehensive preparatory measures. If, therefore, intelligence as to the disposition of the enemy is to be of use in operations, it follows that it must be procured at the earliest possible moment. Whoever gets the earliest and best information possesses nowadays a far greater advantage than formerly, when, with the small armies of the day, movements and combinations of force could often be successfully carried out in the immediate presence of the enemy's army. These are indeed still possible in occasional cases and where sufficient depth of formation is maintained, and it is this circumstance that has made early and full intelligence, combined with successful screening of one's own movements, one of the most important factors of success.

There are people who, in fancy, already see cavalry replaced in this rôle by an air fleet. Such prophets cannot, however, be treated seriously. The air cruisers will not be designed for all the possibilities of war. In the period of concentration and in fortress warfare they would doubtless be able, even in their present condition, to render excellent service. Whether they can be adapted for use in a war of movement remains to be seen; but, even if they can in time be of more service for war than at present appears to be the case, their capabilities in this direction will always be limited. They can only observe at night under favourable conditions--such things, for example, as large detrainments of troops or bivouacs with fires burning. They are under all circumstances dependent upon the weather. By day the air fleet of the enemy will seek battle with them in order to hinder their reconnaissance. Hostile artillery will be particularly dangerous to them, and will be able, thanks to the developments in modern ordnance, to wage successful war against them. All detachments cannot possibly be supplied with airships, owing to the great cost and enormous apparatus entailed, and their usefulness will therefore only be realised with the larger formations. Finally, one or the other of the air fleets will be driven from the field, or rather from the air, and that side which meets with defeat will be deprived of all means of reconnoitring unless it can rely on its cavalry. So in the most modern war the cavalry remains the principal means of reconnaissance. Its activity may indeed be supplemented by airships, but will never be replaced by them.[1]

These circumstances, however, necessitate a new rôle for cavalry. It must drive the hostile cavalry from the field, a cavalry which will do all in its power to secure its own army against intrusion. It will find this cavalry reinforced not only by horse artillery and machine-guns, but also by cyclist battalions, mounted and other infantry, and will therefore have to be prepared, in order to properly carry out its service of exploration, to fight against detachments of all arms. But the same thing will also happen when it seeks to veil the movements of its own army, or to undertake some enterprise against the enemy's communications, or to defend its own against similar hostile raids. Our cavalry thus finds itself face to face with totally new duties of a most real kind, towards the carrying out of which it has no previous experience to help it.

In the wars of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, as well as in the German war of Unification, there is a total absence of analogy from which to draw conclusions that can be practically applied. The wars in South Africa and Manchuria, on the other hand, reveal conditions which have very little in common with those of a European war such as the German cavalry will have to fight. Nowhere can the few experiences of cavalry action gained in these wars be immediately applied, and there are but few bases for the formation of judgment as to what is practical and possible under modern conditions. The same may be said to hold good of the Russo-Turkish war. The most interesting and instructive campaigns for the service of modern cavalry appear to be those of the American War of Secession, which are, however, almost unknown in Germany, where there is a lack of opportunities to study them.[2]

There is, therefore, for our cavalry a want of any sort of tradition for that rôle which it will be expected to carry out in the next war, and this want will be the more felt as it will in the future be expected to deal with a number of technical methods of communication which are, as a whole, still almost unknown, and as to the actual war value of which no judgment can yet be formed. Up to now, also, cavalry training as carried out since the war of 1870-71 has been unable to create a sound foundation for preparation for war. Left far behind in the march of military progress, in tactics as well as reconnaissance, it has been led so far from the right way that it would have been unable to stand the test of serious war. Nor have we yet fully extricated ourselves from these trammels of the past.

For the moment, therefore, our cavalry finds itself in a state of transition. The demands which modern war will make upon it have not yet penetrated into its flesh and blood, that is to say, their extent and range have not yet been clearly grasped by the arm, nor have we yet by any means succeeded in breaking loose from the fetters of the past. Views based on antiquated assumptions are often apt to survive and to influence training as well as leading.

This is particularly the case as regards reconnaissance. In tactics, too, the cut-and-dried methods of bygone days are clearly not yet forgotten, while for enterprises against the enemy's communications there is a want both of practical training and theoretical instruction.

This state of affairs must be regarded as a great evil, as at the outbreak of a war there will no longer be time to collect experiences. From the very first day onward the greatest demands will be made upon the cavalry, not only as regards intentions, but performances. On the achievements of the cavalry in the early days of the war will depend to a considerable extent the success of the first great decisive encounter.

We must therefore be prepared to meet these great demands when war breaks out. Only a clear recognition of the necessities and the possibilities of manoeuvre and training can secure us this preparation. There remains, then, nothing for us--with no practical war experience to go on--but to create the groundwork of our methods of training from theoretical and speculative reflection. With all the means of intellect and foresight, we must endeavour to discern the probable course of the war of the future and regulate the methods of training accordingly.

Peace exercises based upon such clearly defined principles must serve as a further guide to what is possible and practical. They cannot, it is true, afford realistic results, as they lack the effect of weapons, the hostile country, the thousand causes of friction, and the moral factors of serious war. They can, however, be regarded as practical guides in many directions and will help us to evolve methods unattainable by pure theory: for instance, in increasing the capabilities of the troops, improving the practical arrangements for communication, the transmission service, the patrol system, and the like. Only these peace experiences must not be overrated, but subjected to continual criticism by the light of what would be practical in war.

It thus remains our chief duty to get a clear and just idea of the rôle that cavalry will play in a future war, in order to clear the mind fully on this point, and so be able further to build upon the foundations of sound reasoning.

The new Cavalry Drill Regulations,[3] in which I had the honour and pleasure of collaborating, have undertaken the creation of these fundamental principles of the independent rôle of cavalry. Their teachings, however, have as yet by no means penetrated into the ranks. The new Drill Regulations have endeavoured to give new rules for the tactical employment of cavalry, which have not yet sufficiently established their value, even on the manoeuvre-ground. As yet the troops are only endeavouring to get accustomed to them.

It is also obvious that practical drill instructions, at least for tactics, can only give general principles, and cannot be too definite, lest they should thereby tend to limit the independence of leaders in the thousand varied happenings of war.

It is quite another matter for him who is not called on to make regulations, but whose task is rather to clear the understanding, to stimulate independent thought, and to encourage the troops themselves to form correct judgments. Thus will be moulded the efficiency which will enable the soldier to act in the presence of the enemy according to the Regulations, with full freedom of thought, not after the letter, but the spirit, and even perhaps, in many cases, the intention of them.

From this point of view I have set forth my views and reflections. It seems to me, above all things, important to discuss those points which will be new to cavalry in a future war, and in so doing to touch on many matters of training which long years of experience have convinced me are practical. May I by these hints contribute towards the formation of fresh traditions for the training of the arm that will march with modern conditions, that will break away for good from all half-measures and obsolete views, and thereby clear the way towards a proper conduct of the cavalry in war, and to the winning of fresh and imperishable laurels!

Where I have occasion to touch on views formerly expressed and set forth in my various writings, I find no reason to retract any of them. In certain directions they have naturally developed further, and have become more progressive under the impress of the whole of modern development and the latest experiences of war. On the whole, however, I adhere to my opinions, and only seek to supplement and develop them in order to suit them still better to the practical needs of the arm. I hope they may act as a stimulus and serve as a guide to many a comrade in difficulties.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: This was written five years ago, at a time when, though considerable progress had been made with airship work, the aeroplane was still in the pioneer stage of development, though Blériot had just made his record flight across the Channel. Since then flying corps provided with aeroplanes of improved construction have been introduced into every great army, and the flying men have proved in actual warfare (Tripoli, Morocco, the Balkans, France) the utility of the new means of reconnaissance. But though aerial reconnaissance can do much more than General von Bernhardi anticipated, it is still true that the aviators cannot entirely supersede the cavalry. The two arms have to work together. There are cases where the aviator can accomplish very little. Thus, for instance, we are told that during the French advance into the Vosges and Alsace in the present war, the wooded character of the country led to aerial reconnaissance giving very disappointing results.--Editor.]

[Footnote 2: In England these campaigns have been very carefully studied and our cavalry have learned the lessons they suggest.--Editor.]

[Footnote 3: "Exerzier-Reglement für die Kavallerie," part of which has been translated and published by the General Staff, War Office. These Regulations are frequently referred to throughout this work.--Trans.]

EMPLOYMENT IN WAR THE BASIS FOR TRAINING

There can be no doubt that the value and significance of cavalry in a future war will be chiefly demonstrated in the action of the army cavalry.[4] The army cavalry alone, by virtue of its fighting strength, will be able to carry out the larger services of reconnaissance, to operate against the enemy's communications, to take part in the tactical decision with a force commensurate with modern conditions, or to carry out a pursuit.

Reconnaissance occupies a prominent position amongst these various duties. There will not be a battle every day. Not in every fight will considerations of ground and other circumstances allow of the cavalry taking part in a great decision as a mounted arm. Not always will an effective pursuit by the cavalry mass be possible. It must be remembered that in order not to render itself too weak to carry out its proper rôle cavalry must not expose itself to heavy loss in battle without sufficient reason. Only the possibility of a very great success can justify the risk of staking the whole cavalry force in a decisive charge during the battle. It is true that efforts will have to be made to drive the hostile cavalry from the field to facilitate operations against the flank and rear of the enemy's line of battle. But such operations will generally be limited to fire action, and in a decisive battle the weakness of the cavalry would probably debar it from such undertakings. Engagements, also, that are fought with a view of opening a way for reconnaissance will not be of frequent occurrence, and must only be expected during occasional crises. They will, however, be of decisive value for the whole future conduct of the arm and its operative success. The same may be said of raids against the enemy's communications. Such undertakings may exercise the greatest influence on the course of a campaign, but can only be undertaken under specially favourable conditions.

On the other hand, the everyday task of the cavalry which goes hand in hand with all these various engagements and enterprises is _reconnaissance proper_ carried out by reconnoitring squadrons and patrols. This is the daily bread of the cavalry, a duty that throughout a war should never cease to be performed, even if the main body of the cavalry has been driven from the field by the enemy. It demands, therefore, the highest training, the wisest economy of force and systematic arrangement, if it is not to become ineffective or useless.

In close and continual relation to the above is the further task of safeguarding and screening the army. Reconnaissance itself provides a measure of security, but it is always liable to miscarry, and can never secure the army against hostile observation. Reconnaissance must therefore be supplemented by a special system of security and screening which, however, demands the most careful organisation, and greatly increases the difficulty of husbanding limited forces and of keeping the troops fit by not overworking them.

Intimately connected to the services of security and reconnaissance is that of communication, which, owing to the great distances to be traversed in modern war and the necessity of early transmission of intelligence, has become, at the same time, of the highest importance and of the greatest difficulty. Here also is a daily duty for the cavalry in which a thorough training is necessary.

All these considerations must be kept in view in arranging the training, and a clear conception should be formed as to what is to be aimed at in great as well as small matters. Only thus will results be obtained which will stand the test of war.

It is only natural that in our army the greatest stress is at present laid on the duties of the army cavalry. These are so obviously new and important for the arm that it is easy to understand how more time is devoted to them in peace training, and how the task of the divisional cavalry has come to appear of less importance. It might indeed be contended that the training which the latter has hitherto received in garrison and at manoeuvres would suffice for its needs.

It is my opinion, on the other hand, that such a conception is faulty. The importance of the divisional cavalry has in no way diminished, and one is not justified in assuming that any lesser demands will be made upon its efficiency than on that of the larger independent formations. The exact contrary is the case, and I consider it opportune now, when all interest is centred in the army cavalry, to lay particular stress on the extraordinary importance of the divisional cavalry.

As in the newest phases of military development, the general value of cavalry, according to my opinion, particularly in the organism of an army, has increased, so also has that of the divisional cavalry. Higher demands are made of it, and it must therefore be capable of greater performances.

The circumstances of modern war demand that great masses of mounted men shall be used as army cavalry and concentrated in the decisive direction, thus weakening a great part of the front of the army in cavalry, in order to ensure superiority at the decisive point. It is in accordance with the universal law of military success that a concentration of force at the decisive point can, under most circumstances, only be ensured by a corresponding weakening of force in other places. The front of the army, therefore, can never be covered throughout its whole length by the army cavalry, but at the same time it will never be possible to entirely denude of cavalry that front or flank in front of which no army cavalry may lie. This would be simply impossible, for every body of troops, however disposed upon the strategic front, requires cavalry for the service of close reconnaissance, of security, and of screening against surprise or against hostile observation.

Furthermore, even those bodies of troops in immediate advance of which the great cavalry masses are on the move require their own cavalry, not only for the purpose of ensuring and maintaining communication with the army cavalry, but also that they may not be entirely denuded of cavalry when, as the hostile armies approach each other, the cavalry masses clear the front and concentrate towards a flank.

Finally, it will not always be possible to detail portions of the army cavalry to detached forces, because it has other duties to fulfil and other claims made upon it. Thus, for example, the army of Manteuffel in the campaign against Bourbaki had at its disposal none other but the divisional cavalry.[5]

The weak divisional cavalry, therefore, must be prepared to carry out all the cavalry duties which may arise from these conditions. Amongst them particular mention must be made of the outpost service, which, although shared with the infantry, imposes a heavy burden on the divisional cavalry. Any one who has once been through manoeuvres knows how great the demands of this service are, even in peace, in the exertions involved and the time expended. In war these exertions become at times considerable, if less frequent, for the critical days do not follow each other so closely as in manoeuvres.

If we consider, moreover, how every cavalry undertaking has increased in difficulty owing to the greater size of modern battlefields and the improvement in firearms, it will become clear that the sphere of usefulness of the divisional cavalry, even from the purely tactical point of view, which up to now we have alone considered, is a very extensive and important one.

This tactical activity is closely dependent upon the whole interior economy of the division. These few squadrons must furnish orderlies and despatch-riders, which, in the case of the conduct of so large a force as an infantry division, must mean a considerable drain on their strength. They will often be deputed to collect supplies in villages away from the roads, when the supply columns fail and the places occupied do not afford sufficient for the troops. Although it is possible that other troops, such as infantry in carts and bicyclists, may be used for this service, it will never be possible to relieve the divisional cavalry entirely of it. The relay service also makes a greater demand on the strength than is generally supposed. In the campaign of 1870-71 this cause contributed largely to the weakening of the squadrons at the front. Nowadays every effort is made by means of technical apparatus to relieve the cavalry, at least partially, from this service. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the relay service of cavalry can be everywhere replaced by telegraph, telephone, signalling, bicycles, or motor. Circumstances will occur in war in which all these methods of transmission, which are already in themselves partially unreliable, must fail us, especially where they are exposed to destruction from the hand of the enemy. The proper performance of these interior services must never, however, miscarry throughout the whole campaign, and imposes therefore still higher and more continuous demands on the efficiency of the troops.

As the result of these reflections we may conclude that a series of very important duties will fall to the lot of the divisional cavalry in war, which cannot be carried out by any other troops or in any other manner than by the divisional cavalry. Further, that these duties have, on the whole, increased in importance, and that their fulfilment has become considerably more difficult by reason of the conditions of modern war.

According to these conditions the importance of the divisional cavalry must be judged. If the decisive rôle in war falls essentially to the lot of the army cavalry, yet must the duties of the divisional cavalry be regarded as just as necessary for the good of the army. Methods of training must be adopted with these points in view, and it must be quite clearly understood that in this direction modern conditions have to be reckoned with which demand thorough innovations.