Part 17

When a fresh squadron is sent out on reconnaissance, due notice must be given to the squadron to be relieved. The two officers commanding must act in conjunction, so that the officer being relieved can draw in his patrols and the relieving patrols of the new squadron be sent out in good time.

It should also be remembered that, in time of war, close reconnaissance would gradually develop from distant reconnaissance, and would not, as a rule, require any fresh dispositions such as are usually found necessary at manoeuvres.

During all exercises, especially when a long advance is being made and distant patrols are not actually sent out, the commanding officers should be furnished by the directing staff with such information as these patrols would in all probability have obtained. They should also be told which of the distant patrols may be assumed to be in touch with the enemy, and which have either returned or been captured or wiped out. The distant patrols, which are to be in touch with the enemy, might with advantage be despatched by the directing staff, before the manoeuvre commences, in time to procure quarters and receive instructions as to the situation. The troops should, of course, be informed of the despatch of these patrols, and all further reconnaissance will be furnished by the cavalry commander. Every cavalry detachment must also know exactly what area it is to reconnoitre, and what reconnaissances have been, or are assumed to have been, carried out by neighbouring detachments.

It is a mistake to indicate the direction in which a near reconnaissance should be made, without limiting the distance of it. It is the duty of the distant reconnaissance to locate an opponent who is advancing from a distance. As long as the enemy is under the observation of the distant patrols, the close reconnaissance should not be pushed forward to meet him, but should be advanced from one position to the next, within definite limits. When these limits have been reached, the close patrols should be drawn in by the squadrons furnishing them, and fresh patrols be despatched to the next position.

It would also be well if the directing staff were to lessen the work by stopping and sending back to their units such patrols as, by reason of their direction, cannot possibly come in contact with the enemy; or it may even suffice, for the purposes of the manoeuvre, to assume the despatch of patrols in such directions. They might also be given sealed orders, only to be opened at a certain place, containing the data necessary for negative reports and instructions regarding their return to their unit.

I believe that if such methods were adopted, and if the patrol leaders confined themselves to sending such reports as would be sent in real war, which would include a clear and concise statement regarding the configuration of the country, it would be possible to avoid the unwarrantable weakening of the squadrons now in vogue, which does not even produce a correspondingly efficient service of communication. It is, however, true that the art of sending a few, but good reports, and of sending them at the right time requires, in the leader of the patrol, sound tactical judgment, and a training that is nowadays but seldom obtained.

Senior officers also are often to blame for the frequency of reports. Appointed to a command at manoeuvres, they want to know every detail about the enemy, and the exact minute in which an advance or a movement is made. Every little detachment must be reported, and the slightest movement watched. The result is that they encourage patrols, not only to send as many detailed reports as possible, but, if necessary, to obtain the information in a manner incompatible with service conditions. This is a deep-seated evil that is to be seen at all manoeuvres, and one that commanders should consistently endeavour to eradicate.

Such procedure reacts upon the commanding officers themselves by exercising a harmful influence on their individual training. If everything is known about the strength, the line of advance, and the distance of the enemy, generalship descends to the level of the solution of an arithmetical problem, decisions of the commanding officers being based on complete and established data. What a difference is there in actual warfare! But meagre information is available regarding the enemy, and decisions must, as a rule, be based on a certain knowledge of one's own plans and a rough idea of the numbers, intentions, and fighting strength of the enemy. In the former case, decisions of commanding officers are the result of calculation; in the latter--_i.e._ in actual warfare--they are a matter for military skill, or the intuition of genius, which is a very different thing. These are the decisions that officers should be encouraged and trained to make; but, unless the malpractices that have crept into the reconnaissance work are rooted out, this valuable training for actual warfare is likely to be lost.

But all that is only by the way. We are now discussing the cavalry and not the generals, and I should like to point out the great importance of training units themselves to report in a manner suited to service conditions, _i.e._ to report only important matters, and these _at the right time_, so that the commanding officer may receive information regarding the enemy in time to make the necessary dispositions, while at the same time the reconnoitring detachments need not unduly weaken themselves by the too frequent despatch of messages. On the field of battle reports could be carried by individual horsemen instead of by patrols, but of these only a limited number should be drawn from the squadron, as it is not possible to rely on their return. _They must_ also be taught only to take reports to such places as they could actually reach in war. At manoeuvres and other exercises they are often to be seen riding about behind the firing-line in the most exposed places, having apparently no idea of the dangers which they would run in real warfare. This habit, acquired in peace, may in time of war entail the loss of many riders, horses, and reports.

The best means of counteracting these bad habits is to tell the despatch-riders exactly where to go, and to prevail on the officers concerned to remain in certain fixed places, as in real warfare, instead of moving about on the field of battle, even within the zone of the enemy's fire. It is true that, by moving about and exposing themselves, commanders can get a better idea of the engagement, and can make dispositions more rapidly and better than they could from the rear; but, at the same time, such procedure spoils their own training by removing difficulties that would exist in time of war. Making suitable dispositions from the rear, with hardly anything but reports to go by, is quite a different matter from conducting the fight from the front, where a clear view of the situation can be got.

As regards reconnaissance and screening, the principles evolved in the chapter on these subjects hold good for the conduct of cavalry at manoeuvres.

First of all, we must see whether the cavalry attached to the different divisions should, according to its strength, be only classed as divisional cavalry, or whether its total strength is such as to entitle it to be considered as army cavalry.

Units detailed to act as divisional cavalry should not move about independently in the manoeuvre area, as this would be in opposition to the essence of their duties, nor should they, on the other hand, remain tied to the infantry, as they unfortunately so often do. They must learn to advance from point to point, to reconnoitre by areas, to observe from a distance with glasses, to judge correctly which flank is of most importance for reconnaissance, and, finally, to occupy during the engagement such ground that may be valuable or essential for successful reconnaissance. Regiments and squadrons detailed as army cavalry should, on the other hand, act according to the principles involved.

When army cavalry is taking part in manoeuvres, the leaders should be recommended to include in the exercises reconnaissance and screening problems on a large scale. This can generally be done. Then the merging of the distant into the close and battle reconnaissance should be practised, the gradual withdrawal of reconnoitring squadrons on the approach of the enemy, the evacuation of the areas allotted to them, and the independent action necessitated by the fresh conditions. This stage is instructive, not only for the reconnoitring squadrons and patrols, but also for the cavalry division itself. They will have to decide on which flank of the troops in rear to concentrate, and in this matter must act in conjunction with any divisional cavalry there may be; at the same time, they must take into account the ground and the general strategical situation. The final decision will, as a rule, have to be made after duly weighing many varied and often conflicting considerations.

If a general engagement of all arms should result, it is important, even though the ground should not be suitable for a charge, that the best use should, in any case, be made of the fighting value of the troops. Nothing is more incorrect and more opposed to the principles of warfare than an attitude of inactivity in anticipation of the possibility of an attack. If écheloned forward on the flank of the force, the cavalry should make every endeavour to develop an attack against the flank or rear of the enemy by fire or shock action, and to threaten and harass his artillery. The heavy artillery of the field army will often afford a suitable object of attack, more so, perhaps, in manoeuvres than in actual warfare. It is undoubtedly wrong, whatever the conditions may be, to remain inactive and watch the other arms struggling for the palm of victory. "_Activité! activité! activité!_" cried Napoleon to his generals, and this, too, should be our first demand from our cavalry leaders.

It would also be a useful exercise if pursuits could occasionally be arranged for at manoeuvres, so that the cavalry may learn how to initiate them in good time, and to push them home with energy. The difficulties of pursuits, and the principles to be observed in their conduct, are dealt with elsewhere.

If the cavalry endeavours to carry out the tasks I have sketched above, and at the same time effects the necessary economy of strength, it will reap benefits from manoeuvres that will materially assist its training for war, provided the antiquated ideas that still prevail are discarded.

LARGER RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES

Under this head I should like to draw attention to the importance of frequent practice in screening. In a war of operations, which includes the encounters resulting from strategical concentration, the functions of screening are, in my opinion, most important. The American War of Secession showed in a surprising manner what could be done in this respect. Stuart's screening of the left wheel of the Confederate army, after the battle of Chancellorsville, for instance, was a masterpiece, and the reconnaissance carried out by Mosby's Scouts during the same period was equally brilliant. I would recommend the study of these features of the war, as they are remarkably suited to the present day, in spite of the great change in conditions.

Our cavalry keep, as a rule, but little in touch with such matters. The new "Field Service Manual" introduces the idea of offensive and defensive screens, but the cavalry lack experience in them. Offensive screening is usually accepted, it appears, at all events, at the outset, as being somewhat similar to reconnaissance duties. Real screening is but seldom practised, as operations only last a short time, and usually end with a cavalry encounter, entailing a lapse into the usual set piece.

With regard to these exercises, I would point out that defensive screening, combined with natural obstacles, and possibly with the assistance of the other arms, is much more effective than the offensive method, and therefore deserves more attention, and, further, that there is a considerable difference between a reconnaissance and an offensive screen.

In a reconnaissance an advance is made in the direction which the army commander considers to be most important, and it is left to the enemy's cavalry to oppose this advance. In offensive screening, on the other hand, the enemy must be found before he can be attacked and beaten. An advance would naturally not be risked in a direction that would avoid the enemy's cavalry, and thereby afford it the opportunity of approach against the main army. This should be prevented at all costs. An advance must consequently not be made until information has been obtained from patrols or scouts regarding the position and the line of advance of the enemy's cavalry. Then a determined attack should be made on the cavalry, the force being concentrated as much as possible for this purpose. It is only after this attack has been successfully carried out that the real screening work begins.

The two main points that should be observed when carrying out such exercises are therefore: (1) no advance should be made until the enemy's line of advance has been discovered; and (2) the forces should be distributed, after the defeat of the enemy, on a broad front, in accordance with the requirements of the screening duties, while the enemy's beaten cavalry must be carefully watched, to prevent its further activity.

With regard to defensive screening, it is necessary above all, first, to occupy with sufficient strength all passages over the natural obstacle that has been selected, and to effect a tactical disposition of the forces that will enable them to do a maximum of work with the expenditure of a minimum of strength, making the greatest possible use of field entrenchments; secondly, to so dispose the reserves that they will be quickly available to strengthen any threatened point; and lastly, to arrange a system of communication along the whole screening-line, employing any suitable technical appliances in such a manner that the system will continue to operate even though the enemy's patrol should break through the line. It must be possible also to communicate quickly and safely to the troops in rear, so that any detachments of the enemy that might break through the line may be intercepted. The cavalry telegraph, in fact any kind of telegraph, is the least sure method of communication, particularly in the enemy's country, owing to the ease with which it can be cut. There must, at any rate, be other means of rapid communication besides the telegraph, such as flag signals or the light-signal.

In screening work, balloons are often very useful for discovering the direction in which the enemy is advancing; they are more suited to stationary work, especially behind a protected area, than to active operations. The reconnaissance and the action of the cavalry could then be based on the information received from the balloons. It will, unfortunately, seldom happen during such manoeuvres that a balloon is available, but all the necessary technical appliances for communication should certainly be at hand.

The value of all these exercises, especially in the case of reconnaissance, is largely dependent on the manner in which the enemy is represented. The best plan is, of course, to place real troops at their full strength opposite to one another, but this is scarcely practicable, on account of the expense entailed. Even the Imperial Manoeuvres do not faithfully represent modern armies and distances, but only reproduce portions of great operations on a reduced scale. The fact of the matter is that it is impossible, in time of peace, to set on foot anything approaching the number of men, or to cover anything like the extent of country, necessary to at all correspond with the conditions of modern warfare. The only feasible plan is to indicate columns of the army, and even large bodies of cavalry, by flagged troops; but it is well to place real troops at the head of these columns, so that they may form the vanguard and may send out the full number of patrols and outposts, at all events to the front. The reconnoitring organs would thus, at any rate to the front, be confronted by an enemy disposed as in real warfare. I need hardly say that _both_ sides should send out these reconnoitring detachments, as far as possible at full strength; no advantage can possibly be derived from the exercises if this is not done.

It is also very important to put the divisional cavalry into the field, where possible at full strength, as the difficulties that beset the reconnoitring patrols will only then become apparent. This divisional cavalry need only send out a limited number of these patrols, as they are, as a rule, not absolutely necessary in such exercises, but the work of _screening_ should receive careful attention. The division should therefore be surrounded by a screen of _security patrols_, and all points from which the enemy's patrols might observe the columns should be occupied. If these columns are on the march, the security patrols should advance in "bonds successifs," together with the divisional cavalry, from one line of observation to the next, and thus prevent any possible reconnaissance on the part of the enemy. If the ground on the line of advance is suited to defensive screening, this method should be adopted, and all the enemy's patrols and despatch-riders seen should be hunted down. When the hostile reconnoitring patrols have been driven back behind their own screens or outposts, measures should be taken to prevent their re-issue. If the enemy's patrols endeavour to remain for the night in the vicinity of the troops they wish to keep under observation, they should, if possible, be attacked and captured. When operations are being carried on in friendly country, it will be well to ensure the co-operation of the inhabitants in obtaining information regarding the movements of the enemy's troops. There are always old soldiers to be found among the civil population, who would interest themselves in the matter if called upon by the local magistrates to assist, and who would certainly do their utmost to help their own countrymen and to hamper the enemy. Care should, of course, be taken not to go too far in this direction, as unfortunate consequences might possibly result.

It will also be well to send numerous umpires with the army columns and their vanguards, and with the divisional cavalry, and also along the main roads, whose task it will be to conduct the manoeuvres as nearly as possible on the lines of real warfare. Umpires should also be attached to reconnoitring patrols and squadrons, at any rate to those of one side, so that there may be an impartial witness of any encounter. The appointment of these umpires would have the further advantage of providing work at the important points for a larger number of officers, who would thus learn more than they would do when simply marching with their units.

When the various portions of the army are to be represented by flags, each flag should be made to represent a company, a battery, or a squadron, but the flags should be so disposed as to oblige patrols to estimate the strength of the columns by their length, as in war there would not often be time or opportunity to count the separate tactical groups of the enemy. Too few flags should not, however, be used, but rather as many as possible, so as to produce the effect of a continuous column on the move, infantry and artillery being clearly indicated. The detachments of cavalry that would in actual warfare be stationed at different points along the column might with advantage be represented by real cavalry, who would be able to pursue the enemy's horsemen. Artillery patrols might also relieve the cavalry of this duty, and, in difficult country, march on the flanks of the column, thereby making matters more difficult for the hostile scouts. All measures of this description would greatly assist in giving to manoeuvres the character of real warfare, and in increasing the difficulties in the way of the far-too-easy peace-time reconnaissance.

Umpires need not confine themselves to deciding the results of engagements. They might very well draw the attention of patrols that act in a manner incompatible with service conditions to the hostile spirit of the population, or, if necessary, bring about real or assumed attacks that would inflict such losses or damage on the patrols as they would probably have suffered in war. They can, in short, do much to give the manoeuvres a semblance of reality.

The rôle of umpire is also a useful training for regimental officers. Regimental and squadron commanders cannot form a correct idea of the possibilities and functions of their reconnoitring detachments unless they have accompanied patrols as umpires.

It is, in my opinion, impossible to go too far in the direction of making conditions resemble as much as possible those of actual warfare, as one of the greatest difficulties to be faced consists in sustaining the interest of the troops and the semblance of reality.

Goethe, in his "Wilhelm Meister," remarks how rare it is to find among men "any kind of creative imagination." Nothing, indeed, is more difficult than to take a keen interest in hypothetical conditions. This truth applies particularly to soldiers, and the difficulty is one from which most peace exercises suffer.

Some very powerful incentive is required to induce troops to really enter into the conditions presupposed by the general idea of the manoeuvres. They must continually imagine the existence of real warfare, with all its exactions and influences, and they must act consistently according to the spirit of purely imaginative conditions. It is during the reconnoitring exercises of the cavalry that the men's powers of imagination are most heavily taxed, and that most mistakes and unnatural situations result in consequence. Even the officers display a lack of imagination in their inability to conform to service conditions, to appreciate the difficulties and dangers of any situation, and to take them into account when making their dispositions, and in their general conduct.

During the last decade, reconnaissance at our smaller field-training exercises and manoeuvres has suffered greatly from red-tape methods and the consciousness of peace conditions. I refer mainly to the transmission service. Times without number, single horsemen arrive with messages from points behind the enemy or his outposts, so that the messenger must ride right through the enemy, thus entailing the certain loss of the report. It should be unnecessary to point out that the best messages are quite useless if they do not reach their destination.

It is a vital mistake in our army, and one to which I have frequently drawn attention, that these single orderlies are sent with messages, and that even for long distances. Granting that the improbable might happen, and they were successful in finding their way without maps, often at night and in foggy weather, through a strange country, single horsemen would, in the enemy's country, be often captured or fall a prey to the hostile population. In spite of all this, every one is opposed to sending a patrol with a message, and, when it is done, the patrol's strength is cut down most unwarrantably. I am afraid that only bitter experience will teach us the folly of this procedure.

It also frequently happens that technical appliances for transmission are use in a most illegitimate manner. Telegraph-lines belonging to both sides have before now actually been laid peacefully side by side, and had their respective termini within the cantonment area of the opposing armies. Until quite lately, telegraphic messages were often sent through the enemy's lines.